TARABAI Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
Bench: FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000552-000552 / 2012
Diary number: 6016 / 2011
Advocates: SUDHANSHU S. CHOUDHARI Vs
ASHA GOPALAN NAIR
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Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.552 OF 2012
Tarabai Appellant(s)
VERSUS
The State of Maharashtra Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed by accused No.1 against the
final judgment and order dated 30.11.2010 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai in Criminal
Appeal No. 145 of 1991 which arose from the
judgment and order dated 26.02.1991 passed by the
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5th Additional Sessions Judge at Kolhapur in Sessions
Case No. 106 of 1990 convicting accused Nos. 1 & 2
for the offences punishable under Section 498A and
Section 304-B read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)
and sentenced them to suffer simple imprisonment
for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- under
Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC with default
clause and to undergo simple imprisonment for 7
years under Section 304-B/34 IPC. By impugned
judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal in
respect of the present appellant–accused No.1 and
allowed the appeal in respect of accused No.2 by
acquitting her of the charges.
2. Facts of the case need mention in brief to
appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.
3. Krishnabai (deceased) was the daughter of Malu
(PW-1) and Bhagwan Dhavele. She was married to
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one Hanmant Taralkar on 12.05.1989. After
marriage, Krishnabai was living with her husband and
parents-in-law at Ichalkaranji, a nearby village. The
present appellant (accused no. 1) is the mother-in-
law of Krishnabai (deceased) whereas (accused no.
2)-Balabai aged around 18 years is her sister-in-law.
4. It is the case of prosecution that the appellant
(accused no. 1) and Balabai (accused no. 2) used to
constantly treat Krishnabai with cruelty by beating
or/and ill-treating her because she had not brought
any gold, cash, new clothes etc. with her in marriage
and also pressurized her to bring gold, cash, new
clothes etc. from her parents. On coming to know of
this, Malu (PW-1)-mother of Krishnabai had gone to
meet Krishnabai thrice and requested the appellant-
accused no.1 to permit Krishnabai to go along with
her for few days but she did not allow her to go.
5. However, on 26.2.1990, Gangadhar, father-in-
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law, took Krishnabai (deceased) to her parents
house. On reaching there, Krishnabai started
weeping and told her mother (PW-1) about the ill-
treatment meted out to her by the appellant-accused
No.1 and her sister- in-law (accused No.2) because
she did not bring any cash, gold and new clothes in
marriage. She also complained that her husband
never paid any attention to such behavior of his
mother-the appellant and sister towards her. On
03.03.1990, Malu (PW-1) and the neighbour-Amirbi
(PW-2) took Krishnabai to her husband's place. On
reaching there, the appellant herein started
quarreling with them and began to beat Krishnabai
with ‘chappal’. On seeing this, Gangadhar-the
appellant's husband intervened and asked her not to
beat krishnabai. The appellant did not like the
interference made by her husband and pushed him
aside. Amirbi also tried to persuade the appellant
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not to do such things but the appellant did not listen
to her. Malu and Amirbai, PWs 1 & 2 respectively,
then returned to their village leaving Krishnabai
there.
6. On 23.03.1990 after 9.00 p.m., one unknown
person came to Malu's house and informed her that
Krishnabai is serious. On hearing this news, Malu and
some other people immediately left to see
Krishnabai. On their reaching there, they found that
many people had gathered in front of Krishnabai's
house. The door of the room was closed from
outside. Sharda-the daughter of accused No.1,
opened the door and PW-1– the mother of the
deceased went inside the room and saw that
Krishnabai was lying dead with burn injuries on her
body.
7. Report of the said incident was lodged by
Mhalaba, uncle of Krishnabai (deceased) and son-in-
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law of accused No.1, who too had accompanied Malu
that Krishnabai had committed suicide by immolating
herself. Thereafter the dead body of the deceased
was taken to nearby Hospital where post-mortem
examination was conducted. The autopsy surgeon
reported that Krishnabai died due to shock because
of 100% burn injuries. Malu (PW-1), the mother of
the deceased, then lodged another report at the
police station on 25.03.1990 about the incident. The
police accordingly registered Crime No. 40/1990 for
the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). The police
investigated the case and prepared spot Panchnama
(Ex-P-11). The statements of witnesses were
recorded. The appellant and her daughter Balabai
were prima facie found responsible for the death of
Krishnabai and hence both were apprehended. The
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charge-sheet was then filed against both of them for
their prosecution. The case was committed to the
Court of Session.
8. Both the accused abjured the guilt and claimed
trial. The prosecution examined five witnesses and
filed documents, which were admitted by the
accused during trial.
9. The Session Judge, by judgment and order
dated 26.02.1991, in Sessions Case No. 106 of 1990
held both the accused guilty of offence punishable
under Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34
of IPC. So far as the offence under Section 498-A/34
IPC was concerned, both the accused were
sentenced to suffer one year's simple imprisonment
and to pay a fine amount of Rs.1000/- and in default
of payment of the fine amount, to suffer 3 months
further simple imprisonment whereas the offence
under Section 304-B/34 IPC was concerned, the
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appellants were sentenced to undergo 7 years simple
imprisonment. Both the sentences were directed to
run concurrently. Felt aggrieved by the order of
conviction and sentence, both the accused filed
appeal before the High Court.
10. The High Court, by impugned judgment, allowed
the appeal in so far as accused no. 2, namely,
Belabai, is concerned and acquitted her of both the
charges. So far as the present appellant (accused
no.1) is concerned, the High Court dismissed her
appeal and upheld her conviction. Challenging the
said judgment, accused No.1 has filed this appeal by
way of special leave.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant while
challenging the conviction has raised five
contentions.
(i) Since there was inordinate delay in lodging the
FIR, conviction based upon such delayed FIR is not
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legally sustainable.
(ii) Police authorities, after tearing of the original
statement recorded under Section 161, prepared any
other statement and hence, this action of the police
authorities vitiates the trial because no reliance can
be placed on such statement prepared by the police
to falsely implicate the appellant.
(iii) No reliance should be placed on the testimony
of PW-1 because she was not having cordial relations
with her daughter – Krishnabai, who used to live
separately with her uncle before marriage.
(iv) There was no evidence to hold that the present
appellant-an aged lady in late seventies, at the
relevant time, could make demand of dowry or ill-
treat the Krishnabai or beat her.
(v) If the other accused was acquitted by giving
benefit of doubt then on the same set of evidence,
the present appellant is also entitled for acquittal.
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12. In contra, learned counsel for the respondent-
State contended that no case is made out for any
interference in the concurrent conviction recorded by
the two Courts below. Learned Counsel urged that
none of the aforementioned submissions of the
appellant have any substance inasmuch as all the
five submissions pressed in service are against the
record and settled principle of law laid down by this
Court. It was also his submission that the appellant
did not adduce any evidence in her defence except
to deny the case of prosecution. It was pointed out
that the appellant’s husband was the best witness to
rebut the prosecution story of alleged demand of
dowry, ill-treatment and beating meted out to
Krishnabai which persuaded her to end her life.
Learned Counsel urged that non-examination of this
best witness despite he being available should go
against the appellant.
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13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no
merit in any of the submissions of the appellant.
14. Coming first to the submission relating to the
delay in filing the FIR, we find no merit in the same
for more than one reason. In the first place, there is
no delay in filing FIR. It has come in evidence that in
midnight of 23.03.1990 PW-1-Malu along with others
reached the house of Krishnabai to find out as to
what happened to her. Having seen her condition,
naturally they first took Krishnabai to the hospital on
24th, where doctors declared her dead. Since it was a
case of 100% burn injuries, doctors performed post-
mortem on the same day and declared the cause of
death. PW-1, the mother of the deceased accordingly
lodged the FIR of the incident the next day,i.e.,25th.
15. In our considered opinion, there was no delay in
filing the FIR of the incident and in fact, it was lodged
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immediately after the incident with specific details
mentioning the ill- treatment, beating and demand of
dowry made by the appellant and her daughter from
the deceased.
16. Coming now to the second submission that the
police authorities had torn the original statement of
PW-1 recorded under Section 161 and prepared the
second one with a view to file a false case against
the appellant has also no merit for the reason that
firstly, the appellant did not raise this plea before the
Courts below and secondly, on perusal of the
evidence of PW-1, it is clear that what was torn off
was one unsigned paper in which only few lines were
recorded. This could be due to various reasons and
no such suggestion was put to witnesses on this
issue and lastly, P.W-1 stated that her signed
statement was used in trial.
17. We have also perused the recorded statement
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and the evidence of PW-1 and find no inconsistency
or/and any conflicting version in both to reject the
testimony of PW-1 or the statement recorded under
Section 161.
18. Coming to the third submission that no reliance
should be placed on the evidence on PW-1 because
her relations with daughter were strained due to
which both used to live separately before marriage
has no merit for the reason that there is no evidence
to prove this fact. That apart, even assuming for the
sake of argument that Krishnabai used to live
separately from her mother (PW-1) before her
marriage could not be made a ground to reject the
testimony of PW-1. Indeed the fact of living
separately could be due to various reasons and one
could be that PW-1's husband was a drunkard and
used to create problems in the house due to which
Krishnabai at times used to live in her uncle's house
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which was near to their house.
19. We have perused the entire evidence of PW-1
and find that it is consistent in all respects and
commands acceptance for proving complicity of the
appellant in commission of the offence. We cannot,
therefore, accept the submission of the appellant to
disbelieve the sworn testimony of PW-1.
20. Coming to the last submission of the appellant
that since benefit of doubt was given to other
accused, i.e., Belabai by the High Court, on parity the
same benefit should be extended to the appellant by
acquitting her has no substance for the reason that
there was enough evidence to prove the complicity
of the appellant in commission of offence whereas
the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to
prove the complicity of Belabai-accused No.2.
21. This is a case where the death of Krishnabai
occurred within seven years of her marriage. It was
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within one year because the marriage was performed
on 12.05.1989 whereas she died on 26.02.1990. In
view of this admitted position emerging from the
case, the basic ingredients of Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act, 1872 read with Sections 304-B and
498-A of IPC stood against the accused persons for
their prosecution for the offences punishable under
Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC.
22. It has come in evidence that soon after the
marriage, the appellant started making demand of
gold, cash and clothes etc. from the deceased
coupled with beating and ill-treating her for not
satisfying the demands made by her.
23. A young girl in early twenties ending her life
with 100 % burns within 8 months of her marriage
due to ill treatment, beating and demands made by
mother-in-law can not be over-looked to show
sympathy towards the appellant. Indeed, it was the
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appellant who was responsible for her death.
24. As rightly urged by the learned counsel for the
respondent, the best person to prove the case of the
appellant was the appellant's husband because he
was living in the same house. He was in a position to
tell as to what used to happen in the house and
whether relations between the appellant and the
deceased were cordial or strained. On the other
hand, it has come in evidence that sometimes
husband used to intervene and warned the appellant
of her behavior towards the deceased.
25. So far as sentencing part is concerned, the
Courts below have awarded seven years’ simple
imprisonment to the appellant. The appellant should
feel fortune to suffer only 7 years because having
regard to the nature of commission of the offence
and her complicity in the offence, it could have been
even more than what has been awarded. We,
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however, do not wish to say any thing more on this
issue except to uphold the conviction and sentence.
26. In the light of foregoing discussion, we have not
been able to notice any infirmity in the impugned
judgment of the High Court and hence find no merit
in this appeal.
27. The appeal thus fails and is hereby dismissed.
…………….…. ……...................................J.
[FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]
………..………………..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi; January 20, 2015.
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