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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850  OF 2003

Tara Chand & Ors.                    …Appellants

Versus

Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors.                              …Respondents

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1.   These appeals have been preferred against the judgments and  

orders  dated  18.9.2002,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  

Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition Nos.13985 to 13990 of  

2001, by way of which, the High Court has dismissed the said writ  

petitions,  concurring with the  judgment  and order  of  the  Financial  

Commissioner  dated  29.11.2000,  by  which  while  allowing  the  

Revision Petition filed by the respondent-Gram Panchayat, claims of

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the  appellants  for  occupancy  rights  in  the  land  in  dispute  were  

rejected.   

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as  

follows:

A. The  appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  had  been  in  

cultivatory possession of the land in dispute, measuring 78 kanal 5  

marlas situated in the village of Jhupa Khurd, Tehsil  Loharu Distt.  

Bhiwani, prior to 1935-36.  Until  the year 1954, the said land was  

recorded as Shamilat deh in the revenue records.  In the cultivation  

column,  the appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  were  shown as  

co-sharers.  The appellants/their predecessors-in-interest, filed a suit  

on  4.7.1989  in  the  Court  of  the  Assistant  Collector,  First  Grade  

Loharu, District Bhiwani, Haryana for declaration of their occupancy  

rights,  under  Sections  5  and  8  of  the  Punjab  Tenancy  Act,  1887  

(hereinafter referred to as, ‘the Tenancy Act’) in relation to the land in  

dispute.  The suit was contested by the State, as well as by the Gram  

Panchayat  and after  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  the  same stood as  

dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 28.8.1992.

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B. Aggrieved,  the  appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  

preferred an appeal before the District Collector, which was allowed  

vide order dated 28.6.1993, by way of which the appellate authority  

set  aside  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  Assistant  Collector,  and  

remanded back the case so that the same could be decided afresh.   

C. The Court of First  Instance, i.e. the Assistant  Collector, after  

remand, allowed the case vide judgment and order dated 18.11.1993,  

observing :

“Plaintiff has paid the rent to the Gram Panchayat from  time to time and when the Panchayat refused to take the  rent  the  same  was  deposited  in  the  court,  on  courts’  order. Receipts of which are on the file. The plaintiff has  been  paying  the  nominal  rent  since  before  12  years  before  the  commencement  of  Punjab  village  common  lands Act,1961and therefore there is relationship between  the parties as land lord and tenant.”  

It was further held that, as the appellants/plaintiffs fulfilled all  

the conditions of Sections 5 and 8 of the Tenancy Act, owing to the  

fact that they had been in uninterrupted possession of the land for a  

very  long  time  and  had  also  been  cultivating  the  said  land  

continuously,  paying  nominal  rent  to  the  Gram  Panchayat,  much  

before  the  commencement  of  the  Punjab  Village  Common  Lands  

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(Regulation)  Act,  1961,  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  Act  1961),  and  

hence, the provisions of Section 7 of the Act 1961 were not attracted  

and that  they were,  therefore,  in  fact  entitled to  the declaration as  

sought by them.

D. Aggrieved,  the  Gram  Panchayat-defendant,  filed  an  appeal  

before  the  District  Collector,  Bhiwani,  which  was  allowed  vide  

judgment and order dated 26.2.1996, taking into consideration the fact  

that the Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, were  in possession  

of the land for a period of more than 60 years upon the payment of  

nominal  rent  of  34  paise,  however,  the  disputed  land  was  always  

shown as ‘shamilat deh’, and all revenue records showed the status of  

the appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  as  co-sharers, owing to  

which, they could not be termed as tenants.  To create a relationship  

of tenancy, there must be an agreement between the parties,  which  

was  not  in  existence  in  the  instant  case.   The  possession  of  the  

appellants as regards the land in dispute, remained unauthorised and  

illegal and thus, they could not claim occupancy rights.  In the event  

that  the  land was  in  illegal  possession  of  any person,  prior  to  the  

commencement of the Act, 1961, the same would be deemed to be  

illegal, and no occupancy rights over it would be allowed.

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E. The  appellants/their  predecessors-in-interest  filed  an  appeal  

against  the  said  order,  before  the  Divisional  Commissioner,  Hisar.  

The  Divisional  Commissioner,  while  deciding  further  appeals  vide  

judgment  and order dated 22.8.1996, held that  the predecessors-in-

interest of the appellants,  had been in cultivatory possession of the  

land  before  1935-1936  as  share  holders/joint  owners,  upon  the  

payment of nominal rent.  As the appellants had been in cultivatory  

possession for more than 12 years, from the date of commencement of  

the Act 1961, without the payment of rent, or by payment of charges  

not exceeding the land revenue and cesses payable thereon, thus in  

view of the provisions of Section 4(3)(ii) of the Act, 1961, it cannot  

now,  make  any  distinction  between  a  tenant  or  co-owner  of  the  

‘shamilat  deh’  and  therefore,  the  right  of  occupancy  would  be  

available to the tenants, as well as to the co-sharers for the reason that  

co-sharers must have a superior claim as compared to that of a tenant.  

F. The  said  judgment  dated  22.8.1996  was  challenged  by  the  

respondent-Gram Panchayat by filing a revision application before the  

Financial  Commissioner  of  the  State  of  Haryana.  The  Financial  

Commissioner vide its judgment and order dated 29.11.2000, held that  

the provisions of 4(3)(ii) of the Act, l961 which provide that the rights  

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of  persons  who have  been  in  continuous  cultivatory  possession  of  

‘shamilat deh’, for a period of  more than 12 years from the date of  

commencement of the said Act,   without payment of rent, or upon  

payment of nominal rent, were not applicable as the appellants were  

recorded in the revenue record, as joint owners, to whom the land was  

never leased out by the Gram Panchayat, and thus, the provisions of  

the Act 1961 were not attracted, and as it is a settled legal proposition  

that occupancy rights cannot be acquired in shamilat deh by a joint-

owner, the revision was accepted.

G. Aggrieved,  the  appellants  challenged  the  said  judgment  and  

order  dated  29.11.2000,  by  filing  writ  petitions  which  have  been  

dismissed by the impugned judgments and orders.  The High Court  

held that the expression, ‘any person’ contained in Section 8 of the  

Tenancy  Act,  referred  only  to  the  person  mentioned  in  Section  5,  

which was a tenant.  This section only provides that any person can  

establish  a  right  of  occupancy on any ground other than the one’s  

specified  in  Section  5,  and  that  as  the  appellants  had  never  been  

tenants,  the  question  of  granting  them  occupancy  rights  could,  

therefore, not arise.  The relationship of a landlord and tenant could  

not exist between the parties. The appellants had been joint-owners  

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prior to the year 1953.   Till date, the revenue record depicts them as  

joint-owners. Section 10 of the Tenancy Act puts an embargo on joint-

owners to claim occupancy rights.  

 Hence, these present appeals.

3. Shri Amrendra Sharan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the  

appellants, has submitted that the suit was filed under Sections 5 and 8  

of the Tenancy Act and that, as the appellants were tenants, they were  

entitled to declaration of their occupancy rights as regards the land in  

dispute.  Even otherwise, Section 8 of the Tenancy Act enables the  

appellants  to  attain  the  said  declaration.   The  statutory  authorities  

committed  a  grave  error  in  holding that  the  appellants  were  joint-

owners in the shamilat deh, and not tenants.  Therefore, the present  

appeals deserve to be allowed.

4. Per contra, Shri Manjit Singh, learned AAG appearing for the  

respondents, has vehemently opposed the appeals contending that the  

appellants/their predecessors-in-interest were in cultivatory possession  

of  the land as  joint-owners/‘hisedars’  (village proprietors),  prior  to  

1935-36, and continued to be so, as per the revenue records even after  

the  year  1954.   Moreover,  the  appellants  have  claimed  occupancy  

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rights  as  provided  under  Section  2(f)  of  the  Punjab  Occupancy  

Tenants  (Vesting  of  Proprietary  Rights)  Act,  1952,  (hereinafter  

referred to as the Act, 1952) and therefore, they cannot be allowed to  

claim any benefit  under  the provisions  of  Sections 5 and 8 of  the  

Tenancy Act.  They can claim relief only under Section 11 of the Act  

1961. The suit under the Tenancy Act itself, is not maintainable and  

the present appeals are therefore, liable to be dismissed.

5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Relevant statutory provisions applicable in the case.

(a) The Tenancy Act :

“5. Tenants having right of occupancy. – (1) A tenant –

(a)    who at the commencement of this Act has for more  than two generations in the male line of descent through  a grandfather or grand-uncle and for a period of not less  than twenty years, been occupying land paying no rent  therefore beyond the amount of the land-revenue thereof  and the rates  and cesses for  the time being chargeable  thereon; or

(2) If  a  tenant  proves  that  he  has  continuously  occupied land for thirty years and paid no rent therefore  beyond the amount of the land-revenue thereof and the  rates and cesses for the time being chargeable thereon, it  

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may be presumed that he had fulfilled the conditions of  clause (a) of sub-section (1).  

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8.      Establishment of right of occupancy on grounds  other than those expressly stated in Act  - Nothing in  the foregoing sections of this Chapter shall preclude any  person  from establishing  a  right  of  occupancy  on  any  ground  other  than  the  grounds  specified  in  those  sections.”

10. Rights of occupancy not to be acquired by joint  owner in land held in joint ownership – In the absence  of  a  custom  to  the  contrary,  no  one  of  several  joint  owners of land shall acquire a right of occupancy under  the Chapter in land jointly owned by them.  

(b) The Act 1952 :

Section  2(f)  of  the  Act,  1952  defines  “Occupancy  

Tenancy” as under:-

“occupancy  tenant”  means  a  tenant  who,  immediately  before the commencement of this Act, is recorded as an  occupancy tenant in the revenue records and includes a  tenant who, after such commencement, obtains a right of  occupancy in respect of the land held by him whether by  agreement  with  the  landlord  or  through  a  court  of  competent jurisdiction or otherwise, and includes also the  predecessors and successors in interest of an occupancy  tenant.”

Section 3-  Vesting of proprietary rights in occupancy  tenants and extinguishment of corresponding rights of  landlords:-

(a) all  rights,  title  and  interest  (including  the  contingent interest, if any, recognised by any law, custom  or usage for  the time being in force and including the  share in the Shamilat with respect to the land concerned)  of  the  landlord  in  the  land  held  under  him  by  an  

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occupancy tenant, shall be extinguished, and such rights,  title and interest shall be deemed to vest in the occupancy  tenant free from all encumbrances, if any, created by the  landlord.

(c) Act 1961 :

“Section 4 -Vesting of rights in Panchayats and Non- Proprietors:

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(3)(ii)  rights of  persons  in  cultivating  possession  of  Shamilat deh, for more than twelve years [immediately  preceding the commencement of this Act]  [Inserted by  the  Punjab  Act  No.19  of  1976,  Section  3]  without  payment of rent or by payment of charges not exceeding  the land revenue and cesses payable thereon.

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7.  Power to put panchayat in possession of  Shamilat  deh- (1) The collector shall, on an application  made to him  by a panchayat, or by an officer, duly authorised in this  behalf by the state government by a general or special  order, after making such enquiry, as he may think fit and  in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed  put  the  panchayat  in  possession  of  the  land  or  other  immovable  property in the  Shamilat deh of that village  which vests or is deemed to have been vested in it under  this Act and for so doing the collector  may exercise the  powers of a revenue court in relation to execution of a  decree for possession  of land under the Punjab Tenancy  Act,1887.

Section  11 –  Decision  of  claims  of  right,  title  or  interest  in  Shamilat  Deh -  (1)  [Any  person  or  a  Panchayat] [Substituted by Act No. 25 of 1993] claiming  right,  title  or  interest  in  any land vested  or  deemed to  have  been  vested  in  a  Panchayat  under  this  Act,  or  

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claiming that any land has not so vested in a Panchayat,  may submit to the Collector, within such time as may be  prescribed, statement of his claim in writing and signed  and verified in the prescribed manner and the Collector  shall  have  jurisdiction  to  decide  such  claim  in  such  manner as may be prescribed.  

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6. It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellants that Section 8  

of the Tenancy Act contains the expression, ‘any person’ and not, the  

‘tenant’. Therefore, the expression ‘any person’ cannot be restricted to  

mean a ‘tenant’, for the reason that had this been the intention of the  

legislature, the expression ‘tenant’ itself could have been used under  

Section 8. Therefore, all together, a different meaning is to be given to  

the said expression.  

7. This Court in  Kailash Nath Agarwal & Ors. v. Pradeshiya  

Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. & Anr.,  AIR  

2003 SC 1886, held that :  

“As a general  rule when two different  words   are used by a statute, prima facie one has to   construe  different  words as carrying different   meanings.  But  sometimes  two different  words   are used in one and the same statute to convey   the same meaning, but that is exception rather   than the rule"  

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(See  also:  Tej  Mohammed  Hussainkhan  Pathan  v.  V.J.  

Raghuvanshi  &  Anr. AIR  1993  SC  365;  Bipin  Chandra  

Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC 642; D.L.F  

Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of  

Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622; and  K.S.L Industries Ltd. v. Arihant  

Threads Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 763).  

8. In  Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company  

Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 196, it was held by this Court:  

“Further, it is a well established principle of   statutory  interpretation  that  the  legislature  is   specially  precise  and  careful  in  its  choice  of   language.  Thus,  if  a  statutory  provision  is   enacted by the legislature in a certain manner,   the  only  reasonable  interpretation  which  can   be resorted to by the courts is that such was the   intention  of  the  legislature  and  that  the   provision  was  consciously  enacted  in  that   manner.”

9. In Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay  

AIR 2002 SC 1706, this court observed :   

“That  different  expressions  like  'similar'  and   'other'  have not been used without any basis.   No  words  or  expressions  used  in  any  statute   can  be  said  to  be  redundant  or  superfluous.   Every provision and every word must be looked   at  generally  and in the context  in which it  is   

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used. It is said that every statute is an edict of   the  legislature.  The  elementary  principle  of   interpreting  any  word  while  considering  a   statute is to gather the mens or sentential legis   of  the legislature.  Where the words arc clear   and  there  is  no  obscurity,  and  there  is  no   ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is   clearly  conveyed,  there  is  no  scope  for  the   Court to take upon itself the task of amending   or  alternating  the  statutory  provisions.   Wherever the language is clear the intention of   the  legislature  is  to  be  gathered  from  the   language used. While doing so what has been   said in the statute as also what has not been   said has to be noted.  The construction which   requires for its support addition or substitution   of words or which results in rejection of words   has to be avoided”.  

10. The word, ‘any person’ has to be understood in the context that  

was  intended  by  the  legislature  with  respect  to  the  tenancy  Act,  

keeping in mind the purpose for which, the statute was enacted. The  

provisions  of  the  Act,  thus,  have  to  be  construed  to  achieve  the  

purpose  of  its  enactment.   The  Court  has  to  adopt  a  constructive  

approach not contrary to attempted objective of the enactment.  The  

Court must examine and give meaning to the said words, in view of  

the statute of which it is a part, considering the context and the subject  

of  the  said  statute.  (Vide:  Shri  Balaganesan  Metal  v.  M.N.  

Shanmugham Chetty  & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1668; and  Sahakari  

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Sakhar  Karkhana  Ltd.  v.  Collector  of  Central  Excise,  Pune,  

(2003) 3 SCC 506).  

11.       In Union of India & Ors v. Brigadier P.S Gill, (2012) 4 SCC  

497, this Court following its earlier decisions held:

“Every clause of  a statute is to be construed   with  reference  to  the  context  and  other   provisions of the Act to make a consistent and   harmonious meaning of the statute relating to   the  subject-matter.  The  interpretation  of  the   words  will  be  by  looking  at  the  context,  the   collocation of the words and the object of the   words  relating  to  the  mattes……..It  is  an   elementary  rule  of  construction  that  no   provision  of  a  statute  should be construed in   isolation  but  it  should  be  construed  with   reference to the context and in the light of other   provisions  of  the  Statute  so  as,  as  far  as   possible, to make a consistent enactment of the   whole statute...”

(See also:  Sri Ram Saha v. State of West Bengal  (2004) 11 SCC  

497;  Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala (2009) 4 SCC 94;  

Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority  

& Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 139;  Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar (2011) 5  

SCC 729;  Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale v. Jayanthi  

Raghu & Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 793 )

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12. Generally, the phrase, ‘any person’ should be given the widest  

possible import, and the words may cover persons other than those  

mentioned  in  various  other  provisions  of  the  statute.  But,  if  the  

statutory provisions suggest, that the legislature itself has intended to  

give a restricted meaning to the phrase, ‘any person’, then it is not  

open to the court to give a wide or un-restricted meaning to the words,  

‘any person’. (Vide:  Sita Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR  

1962 SC 1146; Sri Vedagiri Lakshmi Narasimha Swami Temple v.  

Induru  Pattabhirami  Reddi,  AIR  1967  SC  781;  New  India  

Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 607; and  

National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC  

1).    

13. In Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bhubaneshwar & Anr. v.  

Parmeshwari  Devi  Sultania  &  Ors.,  AIR  1998  SC  1276,  while  

interpreting the provisions of Section 132(11) of the Income Tax Act,  

1961,  this  Court  interpreted  the  expression,  ‘any  person’,  as  not  

confined to a person searched, or against whom an order is passed, but  

such expression would include, even a third party giving reasons for  

its objections to an order and, hence, seeking appropriate relief in the  

matter.  

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14. A similar view was re-iterated in Balkrishna Chhaganlal Soni  

v.  State  of  West  Bengal,  AIR  1974  SC  120,  by  this  Court,  

interpreting the provisions of Sections 107 and 135 (b) of the Customs  

Act,  1962,  observing  that  the  words,  ‘any person’  as  contained in  

Section 107 cannot be given a restricted meaning so as to exclude  

from their ambit, persons who may subsequently be put up for trial.  

(See also:  The Trustees  of  the Port  of  Bombay v.  The Premier  

Automobiles Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1982).    

15. The  instant  case  is  required  to  be  examined  in  light  of  the  

aforesaid statutory provisions and settled legal propositions.  

This Court in Puran & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Faridabad,  

(2006) 2 SCC 433, dealt with an identical case and examined most of  

the statutory provisions involved in this  case.   The court  held that  

Section  4(3)(ii)  of  the  Act,  1961  would  be  attracted  only  if  the  

following three conditions are satisfied:

(i) The person must be cultivating land which is part  

of the shamilat deh of a village;  

(ii) He should be cultivating such land for a period of  

12  years  immediately  preceding  the  

commencement of the Act; and  

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(iii) He  should  be  cultivating  such  land  without  

payment of rent or payment of charges in excess of  

the land revenue and cess.

While dealing with the provisions of Section 8 of the Tenancy  

Act, the court held that nothing contained in Sections 5 to 7, shall  

preclude any person from establishing a right of occupancy on any  

ground  other  than  the  grounds  that  have  been  specified  in  these  

sections.

The  contention  of  the  appellants  therein,  that  their  right  of  

occupancy was based on a ground other than the ones mentioned in  

Section 5 of the Tenancy Act, was based on Section 3(a) of the Act,  

1952. However, while dealing with the same, the Court held as under:  

“Section  3  of  the  Act  relates  to  vesting  of   proprietary  rights  in  occupancy  tenants  and   extinguishment  of  corresponding  rights  of   landlords. It is evident therefrom that the right,   title and interest shall be deemed to vest only in   an  “occupancy  tenant”.  Occupancy  tenant  is   defined under Section 2(f) as meaning a tenant   who, immediately before the commencement of   the Proprietary Rights Act,  is recorded as an   occupancy  tenant  in  the revenue records  and  includes  a  tenant  who,  after  such   commencement, obtains a right of occupancy in   respect  of  the  land  held  by  him  whether  by   agreement with the landlord or through a court   of  competent  jurisdiction  or  otherwise,  and   

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includes also the predecessors and successors- in-interest of an occupancy tenant. Admittedly,   neither  the  appellants  nor  their  predecessors   were  recorded  as  occupancy  tenants  in  the   revenue  records  immediately  before  the   commencement  of the Proprietary Rights Act,   nor  did  they  obtain  a  right  of  occupancy  in   respect  of  the  said  land  either  by  agreement   with  the  landlord  or  through  a  court  of   competent  jurisdiction  or  otherwise  after  the   commencement  of  the  Act.  The  appellants,   therefore,  do  not  answer  the  definition  of   “occupancy  tenant”  under  the  Proprietary   Rights  Act.  Consequently,  they  cannot  derive   any benefit under Section 3 of the said Act.

    If Section 3 of the Proprietary Rights Act is   inapplicable,  the  question  that  remains  for   consideration is whether they are entitled to the   relief  sought  merely  because  the  names  of   Sarjeet and Jivan Lal (father of Appellants 1 to   3 and father of Appellants 4 and 5 respectively)   were shown as cultivating the lands for some   years from 1966-67. To get excluded from the   vesting  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Common   Lands Act,  by relying on Section 4(3)(ii),  the   appellants  should  prove  that  they  and  their   ancestors  were  cultivating  such  land  for  a   period  of  at  least  12  years  prior  to  the   commencement of the Common Lands Act….”.  

16. If the aforesaid test laid down by this Court, is applied to the  

case at hand, then undoubtedly, all  the conditions specified therein  

have  been  satisfied  by  the  appellants,  and  their  case  is  also  fully  

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supported  by  the  Gram  Panchayat.  The  contents  of  its  counter  

affidavit filed before this Court, read:  

“It is, however, not denied that the petitioners   have been in cultivating possession of the lands   as per entries in the revenue records from the   time  of  their  forefathers  for  the  past  over   seventy years or so and paying  nominal rent to   the  Gram  Panchayat  from  time  to  time  and   when  the  Panchayat  refused  to  take  rent  the   same  was  deposited  in  the  court.  Their   possession  has  remained  uninterrupted.   Though the possession has been unauthorised,   the Panchayat never admitted the petitioners as   its tenants.”

17. In view of the above, the appellants may have a valid case. But  

in the said case, the provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act, not  

attracted and thus, the facts herein become distinguishable. However,  

the High Court found them non-suited on the anvil of Section 10 of  

the  Tenancy  Act,  observing  that  the  expression  ‘any  person’,  

contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has  

been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors  

were  hisedars/joint  owners/co-sharers  in  the  shamilat  deh  from  a  

period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact,  

begin with such admission by them.  

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18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete  

embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is  

no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any  

tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would  

amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be  

against  all  norms  of  interpretation  which  requires  that  statutory  

provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any  

of  its  provision  otiose  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons  for  the  

court to resort to that extreme contingent.   

19. Thus,  in  view thereof,  we  do  not  see  any  cogent  reason  to  

interfere  with  the  well-reasoned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  

impugned  before  us.   The  appeals  lack  merit  and  are  dismissed  

accordingly.   However, in the facts and circumstances of the case,  

there shall be no order as to costs.   

      ………………………………..……………………..J.

(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

……………………………….……………………...J.

(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

New Delhi,   November 6, 2012

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