REPORTABLE   

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6314-15 OF 2001

T.V. Venugopal `  ... Appellant

Versus

Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. & Another ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. These  appeals  are  directed  against  the  judgment  

delivered by a Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh  

in Letter Patent Appeal Nos. 12 and 13 of 2001 on 15.06.2001.

2. Brief  facts which have been given by the appellant are  

recapitulated as under.

3. The appellant is the sole proprietor of a firm carrying on  

business inter alia as manufacturers of and dealers in incense

sticks (agarbathis)  in the name and style  of  Ashika Incense  

Incorporated at Bangalore.

4. The appellant started his business in the year 1988 and  

adopted  the  mark  ‘Ashika’s  Eenadu’.   According  to  the  

appellant the word ‘Eenadu’ in Kannada language means ‘this  

land’.  In Malayalam and Tamil language it conveys the same  

meaning.  In Telugu language it means ‘today’.   

5. In  consonance  with  the  above  meaning  the  appellant  

devised an artistic  label  comprising  a rectangular  carton in  

bottle  green  background  with  sky-blue  border  and  in  the  

centre, in an oval  tricolour, the word ‘Eenadu’ is written.

6. According to the appellant, in the year 1993 he honestly  

and bona fidely adopted the trade mark ‘Eenadu’ meaning ‘this  

land’ in Kannada.  In the said label the other expressions used  

are ‘Ashika’s original’ and the firm’s logo printed in red against  

yellow background.  The other panel of the carton contains the  

same description in Telugu besides the name and address of  

the appellant.  The panel on one side of the carton mentions  

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the  name,  address,  contents  and  another  side  contains  

‘Eenadu’ in Devnagari, Tamil and Malayalam.

7. The appellant applied for registration of trade mark on or  

about  10.02.1994  of  the  said  label  bearing  application  No.  

619177.  The appellant made an application to the Registrar of  

the Trade Marks for a certificate under proviso to Section 45(1)  

of the Copyright Act, 1957.  The Registrar issued a certificate  

on  7.3.1996.   Thereafter,  an application  for  registration  for  

copyright was made by the appellant on 14.3.1997.

8. The  appellant’s  product,  incense  sticks  (agarbathies)  

were well received in the market and according to him, when  

he filed the appeal before this Court, his annual business was  

about rupees eleven crores per annum.

9. The  respondent  company,  who  was  engaged  in  the  

business  of  publishing  a  newspaper  in  Telugu  entitled  as  

‘Eenadu’,  served a cease and desist  notice on the appellant  

which  was  replied  by  the  appellant  on  8.3.1995.   The  

respondent  company  in  the  year  1999  filed  a  suit  for  

infringement of copyrights and passing-off trade mark in the  

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Court  of  Second  Additional  Chief  Judge,  City  Civil  Court,  

Hyderabad.  The  respondent  company  therein  claimed  that  

they have been in the  business of  publishing a newspaper,  

broadcasting, financing and developing a film city.   

10. It  was contended by the respondent company that the  

use  of  the  word  ‘Eenadu’  by  the  appellant  amounted  to  

infringement of their copyright and passing-off in trade mark.  

According  to  the  respondent  company,  the  business  of  the  

appellant and the respondent company was different and there  

is  no  commonality  or  casual  connection  between  the  two  

businesses.    

11. The  appellant  states  that  the  word  ‘Eenadu’  is  a  well  

known and well understood word appearing in all the South  

Indian  languages.   It  means  ‘today’  in  Telugu.   In  Tamil,  

Malayalam and Kannada it means ‘this land’.  Therefore, no  

absolute  monopoly  could  either  be  claimed  or  vest  in  any  

single  proprietor  in respect  of  the  entire  spectrum of  goods  

and/or  services  and  there  have  been  other  traders  and  

manufacturers  who  have  been  using  the  word  ‘Eenadu’  to  

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distinguish  their  merchandise  from  similar  merchandise  of  

others.    

12. The appellant also asserted that in Hyderabad one co-

operative  bank  exists  in  the  name  of  ‘Eenadu  Cooperative  

Bank  Ltd.’  and  their  services  are  advertised  as  ‘Eenadu  

Deposits’,  a  shop  also  exists  in  Vijayawada  by  the  name  

‘Eenadu Men’s Wear’ and a film titled ‘Eenadu’ in Malayalam  

and Telugu was produced some time over a decade back.  The  

appellant contended that detergent powder, playing cards, hair  

oil, coffee powder, tea powder, papad etc. are being sold with  

the mark ‘Eenadu’.

13. The  Second  Additional  Chief  Judge,  City  Civil  Court,  

Hyderabad on 24.11.1999 had granted an ex-parte ad interim  

injunction restraining the appellant from using the expression  

‘Eenadu’  and  the  same  was  confirmed  on  27.12.1999.  

Thereafter, the appellant, aggrieved by the said order, moved  

the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.  The High  

Court  suspended  the  interim  injunction.   The  High  Court  

permitted the appellant to dispose off their finished products  

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to the tune of Rs.1 crore and also permitted the appellant to  

produce goods that were in the process of manufacture to the  

tune of Rs. 78 lakhs.   

14. Meanwhile, the trial court on 24.7.2000 partially decreed  

the suit of the respondent company.  The appellant was not  

injuncted from using the words ‘Eenadu’ in the entire country  

other than in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  

15. The appellant,  aggrieved by  the  order  of  the  City  Civil  

Judge  filed  an  appeal  before  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  

Pradesh.   The  respondent  company  also  filed  an  appeal  

against the order of City Civil Judge praying that the order of  

injunction to  be made absolute  and not  be confined to  the  

State of Andhra Pradesh.  The learned Single Judge disposed  

of  both  the  appeals  by  a  common  judgment/order  dated  

29.12.2000.  The appeal filed by the respondent company was  

dismissed and the appeal filed by the appellant was allowed.  

16. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge,  

the  respondent  company filed  Letters  Patent  Appeals  before  

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the Division Bench of the High Court.  The High Court vide  

impugned order allowed its appeals, decreeing the O.S. No.555  

of 1999.

17. The appellant also aggrieved by the impugned judgment  

filed appeals and submitted that the courts  below were not  

justified in granting relief which was not specifically prayed for  

in the plaint.  The appellant further submitted that the High  

Court erred in holding that the copyrights of the respondent  

company  were  infringed  in  the  absence  of  a  prayer  for  

infringement of copyrights.    According to the appellant  the  

Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that they  

were passing-off the copyrights when the Copyright Act, 1957  

does not provide for such a remedy.   

18. The appellant also submitted that the courts below have  

not properly appreciated the distinction between the existence  

of a copyright and its infringement.

19. According  to  the  appellants,  the  respondent  company  

was aware of the appellant’s business since at least 27.2.1995  

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and there  has  been a  gross  delay  in  filing  of  the  suit  and  

because  of  inordinate  delay  in  approaching  the  court,  the  

respondent company is not entitled to any relief.   

20. The appellant further submitted that whether an action  

for  passing-off  could  be  maintained  and  injunction  granted  

when a mark is used consisting of the word ‘Eenadu’, which is  

a common word.  The word ‘Eenadu’  literally means ‘Today’ in  

Telugu  and  ‘this  land/our  land’  in  Kannada,  Tamil  and  

Malayalam.

21. The  appellant  contended  that  the  businesses  of  the  

appellant and the respondent company are entirely different  

and there  is  no  question of  passing-off  of  the  goods of  the  

appellant as that of the respondent company.

22. The respondent company denied all the averments of the  

appellant and submitted the following propositions.

1. The essence of an action of passing-off is an attack  

on or dilution or benefitting from the goodwill and  

reputation of another person.

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2. If such goodwill or reputation arises out of the use  

of a name in respect of a particular product and the  

goodwill  and reputation is  restricted only to such  

product  and unknown outside  such product  then  

the  use  of  such  name  by  another  person  with  

respect  to  a  totally  different  product  would  not  

affect  the  goodwill  and  reputation  so  as  to  

constitute an action of passing-off

3. If,  however,  the  goodwill  and  reputation  is  

sufficiently  wide  and the  name is  associated  with  

the  source  in  a  more  general  way  rather  than  

restricted only to a given product then the use of  

such  name  by  another  trader  for  even  a  totally  

different product could amount to a passing-off.

4. The exception to the three above propositions would  

be if such name is a generic name for the product  

being  manufactured  by  the  rival  trader  in  which  

case it would never constitute an action of passing-

off.

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5. Again, if the said name is descriptive of the product  

of the rival trader, it would then amount to passing-

off  only  if  it  is  established  that  it  has  become  a  

household  name  of  such  a  nature  as  to  have  

acquired a strong secondary meaning and it being  

associated  substantially  with  the  first  trader,  in  

which case alone it would amount to a passing-off.  

The  standard  of  proof  of  such  a  case  would  be  

higher  than  the  standard  of  proof  of  first  three  

propositions.

23. Mr.  Mukul  Rohtagi,  learned  senior  counsel  and  Mrs.  

Prathiba  Singh,  learned  counsel  arguing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant submitted that in the instant case the suit was in  

fact governed by Trade & Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and  

not by the Trade Marks Act, 1999 which came into force w.e.f.  

15.9.2003.  It was submitted that this case is covered under  

section 159(4) of the 1999 Act, which specifically provides that  

any  legal  proceedings  pending  in  any  court  at  the  

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commencement of this Act would be governed by the old Act.  

Section 159(4) of the 1999 Act is reproduced as under:-

“159. (4)  Subject to the provisions of section  100  and  notwithstanding  anything  contained in any other provision of this  Act, any legal proceeding pending in any  Court  at the commencement of  this Act  may be continued in that court as if this  Act had not been passed.”

Thus, none of the concepts of well-known marks, dilution etc.  

as  statutorily  applicable  under  the  1999  Act,  have  any  

application in this case. It is submitted that the present case,  

as decided by all the courts below, is a case of passing off and  

not of dilution.

24. In reply to the submission of the respondent company,  

learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the passing  

off test is the test of likelihood of confusion.  Such confusion  

should be either confusion arising due to get up of products,  

confusion as to sponsorship/affiliation of source or confusion  

arising  out  of  the  use  of  identical/deceptively  similar  

trademarks.

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25. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  also  submitted  that  

dilution is a completely different concept, namely, if there is  

confusion, there is no dilution.  The concept of dilution steps  

in when in fact the consumer is not being confused but the  

plaintiff’s  mark is  being  diluted  in some form or  the  other.  

McCarthy,  a  well-known  author  on  Trademarks  and  Unfair  

Competition clearly states the same in the said publication.  

Reliance is  being placed at  para 24.70 wherein it  has been  

observed that “the dilution doctrine is concerned with granting  

protection to trademarks beyond that provided by the classic  

‘likelihood of confusion’ tests.”

26. According  to  the  appellant,  the  principle  of  dilution  

requires that the consumer in fact should not be confused but  

a  well-known  mark,  in  the  absence  of  confusion,  is  being  

diluted.   In the United States of America, dilution is protected  

by a specific statute called the Federal Anti Dilution Act, 1996.  

The  discussion  on  dilution  in  McCarthy  establishes  the  

following:-

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a) The traditional likelihood of confusion test applies to  

passing off.

b) If a mark is a well-known mark, then the argument of  

dilution  is  to  be  considered  in  the  absence  of  

confusion.

c) Dilution is a doctrine which should be strictly applied.

d) Standard of distinctiveness required to protect a mark  

from dilution is very high.

e) Not  every  trade  mark  can  be  protected  against  

dilution.

f) If  a  mark  enjoys  a  regional  reputation  it  does  not  

deserve protection under the law of dilution.

g) A  reputation  on  a  national  scale,  especially  while  

testing the mark for unrelated goods, is required to be  

protected under dilution.

27. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that under  

the traditional law of passing off or under the law of dilution,  

the  only  marks  which  have  been  protected  across  product  

category are marks which can easily be termed even in the  

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common parlance as well-known marks. Such marks such as  

Bata, Volvo, Benz, Mahindra & Mahindra and Tata etc.

28. It was submitted that the case pleaded by the respondent  

company (plaintiff) is one of confusion and passing off and not  

of  dilution.   The  standard  for  establishing  dilution  are  

completely different.  There is neither a pleading in the present  

case alleging dilution, nor any evidence in support of dilution.  

The  standards  for  recognizing  dilution  have  not  been  

confirmed by any court of law in India and while deciding the  

present case in the courts below the threshold of dilution was  

never applied.    

29. In India, the law on dilution has developed through case  

law going back to the Benz’s case decided by the Delhi High  

Court  in  Daimler  Benz Aktiegesellschaft  and another v.  

Hybo Hindustan   AIR 1994 DELHI 239.  However, ‘Eenadu’  

cannot  claim the  distinctiveness  or  the  reputation  which is  

enjoyed by a mark like Benz or Harrods. ‘Eenadu’ is a very  

ordinary word commonly used in Telugu language and to vest  

a monopoly in favour of the respondent company (plaintiff) for  

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such a common word on the ground of dilution would result in  

conferring an undue monopoly to a generic/descriptive word.  

There  are  several  marks  which  are  used  in  the  ordinary  

language for different types of products, such as :-

1. Time/Times Time  Magazine,  Time  Education,  Times  London,  Times  of  India,  Navbharat Times, Hindustan Times,  Times Now

2. Today India Today, Punjab Today, Today’s  Tea, Today’s Contraceptive

3. Marvel Marvel Comics, Marvel Detergent 4. Sun,  Surya,  

Suraj Oil, Lights & Bulbs, Tobacco

5. Metro Metro  Shoes,  Delhi  Metro,  Metro  Walk Malls

6. Maruti Oil, Cars 7. Taj Hotels (Taj Hotels), Tea (Wah! Taj) 8. Citi Citi Bank, City Mall 9. Mustang Motel, Cars, Trailers

30. The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  

‘Eenadu’ is a common word used in Telugu language. This has  

been fully established by the evidence on record.

31. He referred to the deposition of Jagannadharao, PW1, Law  

Officer of the plaintiff, who has stated that the literal meaning of  

the word ‘Eenadu’ is ‘Today’.

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32. According to the deposition of PW2, N. Swami, Artist, the  

meaning of the word ‘Eenadu’ is ‘Today’.

33. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to deposition  

of  PW5,  R.  Kumaraswamy,  Advocate  who  has  stated  that  

literal meaning of the word ‘Eenadu’ is ‘Today’.

34. The learned counsel  referred to the deposition of PW6,  

T.V. Venugopal, the appellant herein.  He has stated that the  

word ‘Eenadu’ was specifically given for the purpose of ‘daily’  

prayer.

35. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  

word ‘Eenadu’ literally means “Today” or “This Day” and hence  

is not an invented word but is a generic/descriptive word used  

in common parlance.  This is further proved by the fact that  

the word ‘Eenadu’ has been used by several parties for various  

products which include :-

- ‘Eenadu’  Turmeric  powder  –  even  the  script  is  the  same

- ‘Eenadu’ Cooperative Bank

- ‘Eenadu’ Match Sticks – even the script is the same

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- ‘Eenadu’ Playing Cards

- ‘Eenadu’ Ayurvedic Bath Soaps

- ‘Eenadu’ Dresses

- ‘Eenadu’ Chilly Powder – even the script is the same

- ‘Eenadu’ Washing Powder

- ‘Eenadu’ Coffee – even the script is the same

- ‘Eenadu’  Telugu Feature Film

- ‘Eenadu’ Tobacco – same script

- ‘Eenadu’  Hotel

- ‘Eenadu’  Marble Estate

- ‘Eenadu’  Feature  Film  (The  said  film  by  UTV  Production uses the word ‘Eenadu’ in the same script  as used by the respondent – (This particular film has,  in fact, been featured for a  review in the respondent’s  own newspaper dated 15.8.09 & 27.8.09 and copies of  the same are attached.  The music launch of this film  was also featured in the newspaper of the respondents  dt.  14.9.09.  This film has at least 2 songs with the  word ‘Eenadu’.   One of  the  songs in the film called  “Eenadu Eesamaram”  which  means  “This  Day,  This  War”.

- A famous Kannada song – Eenadu Kannada, Eeneeru  Kannada  (This  day  is  Kannada,  This  water  is  Kannada).

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36. The appellant submitted that it is clear that ‘Eenadu’ is a  

term which is used in the ordinary Telugu language and in  

Kannada and the  same is  acknowledged by the  respondent  

company itself as is evident from the wide publicity given to  

the film in the respondent company’s newspaper.

37. The appellant further submitted that the evidence relied  

upon  by  the  respondent  company  in  order  to  allege  that  

‘Eenadu’ is a reputed and distinctive mark, is a compilation of  

documents handed over before this court during the course of  

arguments  on 23.3.10.  In order  to  show that  ‘Eenadu’  is  a  

household  name,  an  extract  from  Wikipedia  printed  on  

13.4.09 was submitted by the respondent company before this  

court.  In fact, all the other internet print-outs annexed by the  

respondent company are based on Wikipedia itself.  It is the  

submission  of  the  appellant  that  it  is  now  an  established  

position, internationally in law that Wikipedia does not have  

any evidentiary value in the court proceedings.  The same has  

been held by the US Court of Federal Claims in Taylor Mary  

Campbell v.  Secretary of Health and Human Services 69  

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Fed.  Cl.  775  (2006)  and  by  the  US  Court  of  Appeals  in  

Lamilem Badasa v. Michael B. Mukasey   540 F.3d 909. As  

against the Wikipedia evidence, the actual evidence on record  

reveals the following:-

a) ‘Eenadu’  has a specific  meaning in Telugu language  

and  also  has  a  meaning  in  Kannada  language  and  

possibly even in Malayalam;

b) ‘Eenadu’ has been used by several parties in the same  

script  without  any  objection  whatsoever  from  the  

respondent company (barring 2 ex-parte injunctions).

c) ‘Eenadu’ means “Today” or “This Day”.

d) The respondent company itself  has acquiesced to 3rd  

party  usage  of  the  mark (including  ‘Eenadu’  feature  

film by UTV).

e) The respondent company’s submission that this court  

ought  to  ignore  the  concrete  documentary  evidence  

and testimony and instead rely upon extracts from the  

Wikipedia to prove that ‘Eenadu’ is a household name,  

is not liable to be entertained.

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38. Thus, ‘Eenadu’ does not enjoy the distinctiveness which  

the  respondent  company  claim  and  in  any  event  such  

distinctiveness does not span across all classes of goods and  

services.

39. The respondent  company has argued before  this  court  

that the descriptive nature of the mark has to be determined  

with  respect  to  the  appellant’s  goods.   This  approach  

according  to  the  appellant  is  completely  erroneous.   While  

determining  the  nature  of  the  mark  –  for  the  purpose  of  

registration or for the purpose of passing-off/infringement, the  

first inquiry which the court ought to carry out is to determine  

whether  the  applicant’s/plaintiff’s  mark  is  invented,  

arbitrary/suggestive, descriptive or generic.  The nature of the  

mark  is  always  determined  with  respect  to  the  

plaintiff’s/applicant’s goods.  For example, if a person applies  

for a trademark called “Extra Strong”, the Registrar of trade  

mark  has  to  examine  whether  the  mark  is  descriptive  or  

laudatory  for  the  goods  for  which  it  is  applied,  i.e.,  the  

applicant’s goods.  The inquiry does not depend on the person  

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opposing  the  use  of  the  said  mark.  Thus,  to  hold  that  the  

nature of the mark has to be determined by the nature of the  

appellant’s goods is stating the proposition in the reverse.

40. In  the  present  case,  the  plaintiff/respondent  company  

was conscious that ‘Eenadu’ is a descriptive mark and it is for  

this  reason  that  in  the  plaint,  the  plaintiff  (respondent)  

company has pleaded a  secondary meaning with respect  to  

their  mark  ‘Eenadu’.   If  the  plaintiff’s  case  is  based  on  

‘Eenadu’  being a distinctive mark, a suggestive mark and a  

well  known  mark,  then  there  is  no  question  of  pleading  

secondary  meaning  to  its  mark.   It  is  only  with  respect  to  

descriptive marks that secondary meaning needs to be pleaded  

and considered by this court.

41. The  argument  of  the  respondent  company  is  that  

‘Eenadu’ is not a generic or descriptive mark but a suggestive  

mark.   The  difference  between  categorization  as  generic,  

descriptive or suggestive is a follows:-

* A generic mark can never be a trademark

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* A  descriptive  mark  can become a  trademark  if  it  acquires secondary meaning

* A suggestive mark is inherently distinctive

42. The  line  between  suggestive  marks  and  descriptive  

marks  is  very  thin.   Various  commentaries  including  

McCarthy have laid down the imagination test to determine  

as to whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive.  When  

this test is applied to the mark ‘Eenadu’ for a newspaper, it  

is clear that the same is descriptive in nature inasmuch as  

it means ‘Today’, i.e. news for today.  It  does not require  

any imagination at all.  Thus in the imagination test, if the  

mark describes a characteristic of the product – in the case  

of ‘Eenadu’ the newspaper, it refers to the characteristic of  

the newspaper, i.e., today’s news.  ‘Eenadu’ would therefore,  

be an expression which immediately describes a newspaper.  

In fact with respect to its Agarbathies, ‘Eenadu’ would be a  

completely  arbitrary  term.   However,  with  respect  to  

newspapers, this is a descriptive term.  

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43. The  appellant  submitted  that  the  entire  object  of  

including the 4th Schedule in the Trademark Rules is that  

marks are to be registered for the goods and services for the  

purpose for which they are used.  Non-use of a mark entails  

rectification under section 46 of the 1958 Act.  Thus, the  

entire  object  of  trademarks  is  to  confer  monopoly  of  a  

particular individual or entity with respect to a mark for a  

particular category of goods or category of services.  It  is  

only in exceptional cases that a mark is protected across all  

product categories.  If that was not the position, then every  

trademark  owner  whose  mark  enjoys  a  reputation  in  

whatever limited field and for specific goods/services, would  

be able to claim monopoly for the mark with respect to all  

42 classes of goods and services.   This could never have  

been  the  intention  of  the  Legislature.   Even  while  

establishing  the  criteria  for  the  marks  which  are  well-

known, the legislature has thought it  fit  to deal  with the  

reputation  of  such  well-known  marks  by  taking  into  

consideration  factors  like  section  of  the  public,  relevant  

geographical  area  etc.   Thus,  every  trade  mark  is  not  

23

entitled  to  protection across  all  categories  as  every  trade  

mark does not automatically become a “well-known mark”.  

If this was not the case, then there would come a time when  

most  words  would  get  monopolized  across  products  and  

services which would not conform to the intention behind  

the Law of Trade Marks.

44. Every mark with a reputation cannot be determined as  

a well-known mark as reputation by itself does not escalate  

the  mark  into  the  position  of  a  well-known  mark.  The  

reputation  of  a  mark  can  be  restricted  to  a  particular  

territory, to a particular category of goods or services, to a  

particular category of population, to a particular linguistic  

section of public etc.

45. The  appellant  submitted  that  in  most  of  the  cases  

where  absolute  protection  has been granted,  extending it  

beyond the goods and services in which the plaintiff deals  

with, the mark or name has been an extremely distinctive  

mark.  They have either invented the mark or marks which  

are  derived  from  surnames  or  marks  are  used  across  

24

categories of products.  The defendant’s products may be  

confused  from  the  other  products  originating  from  the  

plaintiff, but the plaintiff has to be dealing with more than  

one  products  or  services  with  respect  to  the  said  

mark/name.

46. In  the  present  case,  the  evidence  on  record  has  

established that the plaintiff/respondent company has only  

dealt  with  mark  ‘Eenadu’  for  newspapers.  The  television  

channel is known as ETV where the word ‘Eenadu’ is not  

used for the same.  The evidence itself establishes the same.  

Further it is pertinent to note that:

• There  is  not  a  single  document  showing  that  the  

respondent  company  is  referred  to  as  ‘Eenadu’  

Margdarshi’s goods;

• Priya  is  also  a  mark  of  pickles  which  is  

manufactured by the respondent company;

• ‘Eenadu’  pickles  (if  any)  are  not  available  in  the  

local market;

25

• ETV  is  the  shortcut  name  for  the  ‘Eenadu’  

Television;

• The  respondent  company  does  not  manufacture  

incense sticks;

• That ‘Eenadu’ has been used to convey the literal  

meaning as “Today”.

47. The appellant submitted that in the background of this  

evidence  emanating  from  the  plaintiff’s  main  witness,  it  is  

evident that ‘Eenadu’ is not a distinctive mark.  It is in fact a  

descriptive mark.  At best, a secondary meaning may accrue in  

its favour with respect to only newspapers and nothing more.  

Descriptive words which have been used only for one category  

of goods cannot claim across the board protection.  ‘Eenadu’ is  

not like Volvo or Kirloskar or Harrods or Benz.   

48. ‘Eenadu’ would fall in the category of marks like Shell,  

Safeguard,  Flexgrip,  Imperial,  Skyline  and  Financial  Times,  

Heat Piller, One Day Drycleaners, Instea, Kesh Nikhar, Whipp  

Toppings.  All  these words have not been granted protection  

across the board.

26

49. The respondent  company has argued before  this  court  

that the appellant’s adoption is dishonest in view of the similar  

scripts being used by the defendant.  The script being used by  

the  appellant  is  a  standard  block  script  in  the  Telugu  

language. The perusal of all the third party use of the mark  

‘Eenadu’ would reveal that almost every party uses the same  

script.  Thus, there is no dishonesty in adoption of the same  

as the script is commonly used in Telugu language.  Even the  

feature film which has been released in 2009 has used the  

same script.   There is no dishonesty in the adoption of the  

mark  ‘Eenadu’  or  the  script  ‘Eenadu’.   The  appellant  went  

through the  process  of  applying  for  a Search as prescribed  

under  the  Copyright  Act.   The  appellant  obtained  a  No-

Objection in accordance with Section 45 of the Copyright Act  

and Rule 24(3) of the Trade Mark Rules, 1959.

50. The  mark  ‘Eenadu’  meaning  DAILY  or  TODAY,  the  

appellant genuinely adopted the same to signify Daily use of  

Agarbathi, which is in fact used on a daily basis by persons  

27

performing puja.  Thus, the appellant does have a valid and  

acceptable explanation for the adoption.  It is submitted that  

for the appellant’s goods, it is an arbitrary mark.

51. The appellant  submitted  that  in  order  to establish the  

appellant’s  bona fides, the appellant  is ready and willing to  

change the script and to prefix the word “Ashika” in order to  

distinguish itself from the respondent company and to ensure  

that there is no confusion as to source.

52. The appellant submitted that as long as the product is  

distinguishable from the product of the respondent company,  

the appellant prays that the injunction ought to be modified  

and the appellant ought to be permitting to adopt the carton  

which it has proposed to use before this court.  It is incorrect  

that the trade made application for registration of the trade  

mark  was  subsequent  to  the  issuance  of  the  notice.   The  

appellant  submitted  that  the  respondent  company  has  not  

been able to establish bona fide conduct.  This is established  

from the following facts:-

28

a. According to the appellant, the mark ‘Eenadu’ has  

been permitted by the respondent company to be in  

common use because the respondent company did  

not  take  action  against  all  those  who  had  been  

using the mark ‘Eenadu’.  

b. According to the respondent company, the appellant  

stopped  using  the  mark  after  caution  notice  was  

sent to the appellant in 1995 and then commenced  

using it in 1999.  In 1995 the respondent company  

gave a notice restricting the grievance to Copyright.  

The grievance was restricted to a Disclaimer.  After  

1995  when  the  sales  of  the  appellant  began  to  

increase  from sales  of  two  crores  to  the  sales  of  

approximately ten crores, then the suit was filed by  

the  respondent  company  on  a  false  plea  in  the  

plaint and obtained an ex-parte injunction.

53. The appellant submitted that the case law is clear that  

confusion as to source applies only when the source is not  

clearly stated.  The appellant in the impugned carton has used  

29

the word Agarbathi along with the word ‘Eenadu’.  However,  

Ashika’s  Eenadu  completely  distinguishes  itself  from  the  

respondent company.  A carton being proposed to be adopted  

by the appellant which would completely eliminate any remote  

chance of any confusion.

54. Mr. R.A. Sundaram, learned Senior Advocate argued on  

behalf  of  the  respondent  company.   He  submitted  that  

‘Eenadu’ is not a common Telugu word meaning “Today” and  

is  not  a  common  word.   He  submitted  that  ‘Eenadu’  has  

acquired secondary meaning and referred to and relied on the  

trial  court  findings in  that  respect.   He  submitted  that  the  

appellant  failed  to  note  that  ‘Eenadu’  Group is  inter  alia  a  

publisher of a newspaper which is the second largest regional  

daily circulating in India and is the largest in Andhra Pradesh.

55. Mr.  Sundaram  submitted  that  the  appellant  is  a  

Bangalore  based  company  which  started  manufacturing  its  

products  in  Bangalore  under  the  name  “Ashika”  and  had  

started selling its products in Andhra Pradesh in 1995.  The  

appellant started using the name ‘Eenadu’ for its Agarbathies  

30

and used same artistic script, font and method of writing the  

name cannot be a co-incidence.  The appellant is a Karnataka  

company after adoption of the name ‘Eenadu’ accounted for  

90% of the sale of their product Agarbathies.  The appellant  

was restrained from using the word ‘Eenadu’ in the State of  

Andhra  Pradesh,  their  sales  have  dropped  by  10  times  

although they continued to sell the product under the name  

“Ashika”.   The  appellant  glossed  over  the  fact  of  being  

manufacturer of Agarbathies as is inexplicable as to why they  

had  applied  for  registration  of  name  ‘Eenadu’  not  just  for  

Agarbathies but inasmuch as 34 classes of the Trade Marks  

Act for goods which they do not even produce or do not have  

any intention to produce which would itself show the intention  

that they can trade on the respondent company’s household  

name  and  goodwill  and  reputation.   According  to  the  

respondent  company,  all  these  facts  clearly  show  that  

adoption of name ‘Eenadu’ was by no means innocent but was  

intended to capitalize and derive benefit on the goodwill and  

reputation of the respondent company which is impressible.

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56. Mr. Sundaram submitted the basic underlying fallacy is  

that since after all the readers of a newspaper are literate and,  

therefore, would be able to make out that the Agarbathies are  

by the name “Ashika Eenadu” or that it comes from a different  

source,  overlooks completely  that  it  is  the purchaser  of  the  

Agarbathies and not the purchaser of newspaper that we are  

concerned with.  The goodwill sought to be cashed in is the  

name ‘Eenadu”  by  the  appellant  who is  selling  Agarbathies  

and  the  person  so  deceived  is  not  the  purchaser  of  the  

newspaper but the purchaser of the Agarbathies.  To say that  

all the purchasers of Agarbathies are illiterate people is a basic  

fallacy since the purchasers of Agarbathies will transcend all  

classes  of  people  in  the  society.   The  entire  submission,  

therefore, overlooks the basic fact that the purchaser of the  

Agarbathies  would  be  deceived  into  believing  that  the  said  

Agarbathies also come from the House of ‘Eenadu’ and thereby  

they would be deceived as to the source of the product, and  

this  cashing  in  on  the  goodwill  and  reputation  of  the  

respondent company is impressible in law.

32

57. The  respondent  company’s  reply  to  the  appellant’s  

contention that ‘Eenadu’ is not a household name since it only  

deals with newspaper is complete fallacy because the group is  

known as “Eenadu Margadarshi Group” and the meaning of  

‘Eenadu’ in various publications is stated to be the respondent  

company’s  group.   Furthermore,  it  also  overlooked  that  in  

actual  fact  there are  various products which are also being  

produced  and  sold  by  the  respondent  company  under  the  

business name of ‘Eenadu’.  It is also relevant to mention that  

the ‘Eenadu’ TV Channel (also known as ETV) is one of the  

most popular channels and, therefore, the word ‘Eenadu’ has  

come  to  be  completely  associated  with  the  respondent  

company group and in  fact  is  a  household  name.   He has  

referred to the findings of the Trial Court, the High Court and  

that  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  and  submitted  that  such  

findings  are  not  unreasonable  so  as  to  require  interference  

under section 136 of the Constitution.

58. Mr. Sundaram submitted that ‘Eenadu’ is not a generic  

name, but in fact would be a ‘fancy’ name outside the State of  

33

Andhra Pradesh and within the State of Andhra Pradesh it is a  

name which is not in common use, and therefore, would be a  

‘fancy’  name.   In  any event,  ‘Eenadu’  is  not  generic  in  the  

Trade Mark’s sense of the word since it is not the use of the  

product name itself.  What is meant by generic for Trade Mark  

law is that when you call  a cake a cake or a shoe a shoe.  

When a shoe is called a cake or a cake is called a shoe, it is  

neither descriptive nor generic.  On the contrary, it is ‘fancy’.  

The name ‘Eenadu’, therefore, for any of the products of the  

respondent company would not be a generic name at all.  The  

appellant  overlooks  that  his  complaint  as  to  name  being  

generic can only arise qua product using generic or descriptive  

name.   It  is  nobody’s  case  that  ‘Eenadu’  is  descriptive  of  

Agarbathi.

59. All  the  cases,  i.e.,  Newseek,  Ovenchips,  MaltedMilk,  

Shredded Wheat etc. were cases where the appellant wanted  

exclusivity of the name which was descriptive of their product  

and  the  respondent  company  who  was   manufacturing  a  

similar product objected to the exclusivity on the ground that  

34

the name was descriptive of the product in question.  In this  

case, for the application of the judgments the following must  

arise:-

- are the appellant and the respondent company dealing  

in the name product?  This is not so.

-   is  the  word  ‘Eenadu’  descriptive  of  the  respondent  

company’s product (i.e. Agarbathies)?  This is no so.

60. Mr. Sundaram while dealing with the scope of passing off  

action  submitted  that  the  law  of  passing  off  can  be  

summarized in one short general proposition - no man may  

pass off his goods as those of another.  More specifically, it  

may be expressed in terms of the elements which the appellant  

in such an action has to prove in order to succeed.  These are  

there in number.

a) He must establish a goodwill or reputation attached  

to the goods or services which he supplies in the  

mind of the purchasing public by association with  

the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of  

a  brand  name  or  a  trade  description,  or  the  

35

individual features of labeling or packaging) under  

which his particular goods or services are offered to  

the public, such that the get-up is recognized by the  

public  as distinctive  specifically  to the  appellant’s  

goods or services.

b)  He must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the  

respondent company to the public (whether or not  

intentional)  leading or  likely  to lead the  public  to  

belief that the goods or services offered by him are  

the  goods  or  services  of  the  appellant  and  the  

source  of  such goods or  services  is  the  appellant  

even if the appellant does not make such products.

c) He must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quia  

timet action, that he is likely to suffer damage by  

reason of  the  erroneous  belief  engendered  by  the  

respondent  company’s  misrepresentation  that  the  

source  of  the  respondent  company’s  goods  or  

service is the same as the source of those offered by  

the appellant.

36

d) Alternatively,  the  appellant  must  show  that  the  

description or  confusion in  the  public  is  that  the  

source  of  the  respondent  company’s  product  that  

they are buying is the appellant.

61. Learned counsel placed reliance on the following passage  

from a well-known case  Reddaway & Co.  and Another v.  

Banham & Co.  and Another 1895-99  All  ER 133   which  

reads as under:-

“The name “Glenfield” had become associated  

with the starch manufactured by the plaintiff,  

and the defendant,  although he  established  

his manufactory at Glenfield, was restrained  

from using that word in connection with his  

goods in such a way as to deceive. Where the  

name  of  a  place  precedes  the  name  of  an  

article sold, it primâ facie means that this is  

its place of production or manufacture. It is  

descriptive, as it strikes me, in just the same  

sense  as  “camel  hair”  is  descriptive  of  the  

material  of  which  the  plaintiff's  belting  is  

made.  Lord  Westbury  pointed  out  that  the  

term “Glenfield” had acquired in the trade a  

secondary  signification  different  from  its  

37

primary  one,  that  in  connection  with  the  

word  starch  it  had  come  to  mean  starch  

which was the manufacture of the plaintiff. In  

Massam v. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.    just  referred to, James L.J. said:

“The  defendant  was  actually  manufacturing  starch  at  Glenfield,  having  gone  thither  for the purpose of enabling him  to  say  that  he  was  manufacturing  it  at  Glenfield.  The  House  of  Lords  said  the  mere  fact  that  he  was  really  carrying on his manufacture at  Glenfield,  and  was  not  therefore  telling  a  lie,  did  not  exempt  him  from  the  consequence  of  the  fact  that  his proceedings were intended  and  calculated  to  produce  on  the mind of the purchasers the  belief  that  his  article  was  the  article of the plaintiffs.”

62. The House of Lords was justified in observing that fallacy  

lies in overlooking the fact that a word may acquire in a trade  

a secondary signification differing from its primary one, and  

that if it is used to persons in the trade who will understand it,  

and be known and intended to understand it in its secondary  

38

sense, it will none the less be a falsehood that in its primary  

sense it may be true. A man who uses language which will  

convey to persons reading or hearing it a particular idea which  

is false, and who knows and intends this to be the case, is  

surely not to be absolved from a charge of falsehood because  

in  another  sense  which  will  not  be  conveyed  and  is  not  

intended to be conveyed it is true. In the present case the jury  

have found that there was ample evidence to justify it, that the  

words  “camel  hair”  had  in  the  trade  acquired  a  secondary  

signification  in  connection  with  belting,  that  they  did  not  

convey to persons dealing in belting the idea that it was made  

of camel's hair, but that it was belting manufactured by the  

plaintiffs. They have found that the effect of using the words in  

the manner in which they were used by the defendants would  

be to lead purchasers to believe that they were obtaining goods  

manufactured by the plaintiffs, and thus both to deceive them  

and  to  injure  the  plaintiffs.  On  authority  as  well  as  on  

principle, the court granted relief to the plaintiffs.

39

63. Mr. Sundaram also placed reliance on Reckitt & Colman  

Products Ltd. v. Borden Inc. and others – 1990 (1) ALL ER 873  

where the court has dealt with general law applicable to passing  

off of action.  In that case the court observed thus:-

“The basic underlying principle of   such  an  action   was   stated   in  1842   by   Lord  Langdale  M.R.  in  Perry  v.  Truefitt  (1842)  6  Beav. 66 , 73 to be: “A man is not to sell his  own goods under  the  pretence  that  they  are  the goods of another man..….”. Accordingly, a  misrepresentation  achieving  such  a  result  is  actionable because it  constitutes an invasion  of  proprietary  rights  vested  in  the  plaintiff.  However, it is a prerequisite of any successful  passing  off  action  that  the  plaintiff's  goods  have acquired a reputation in the market and  are known by some distinguishing feature. It is  also a prerequisite that the misrepresentation  has deceived or is likely to deceive and that the  plaintiff  is  likely  to  suffer  damage  by  such  deception. Mere confusion which does not lead  to a sale is not sufficient. Thus, if a customer  asks  for  a  tin  of  black  shoe  polish  without  specifying any brand and is offered the product  of A which he mistakenly believes to be that of  B, he may be confused as to what he has got  but he has not been deceived into getting it.  Misrepresentation  has  played  no  part  in  his  purchase”.  

40

64. He also relied on the judgment of this court in Ruston &  

Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara Engineering Co. – 1969 (2)  

SCC 727  wherein the court observed as under:-

“The distinction between an infringement action and  a  passing  off  action  is  important.  Apart  from the  question as to the nature of trade mark the issue in  an infringement  action is  quite  different  from the  issue in a passing off action. In a passing off action  the issue is as follows :

“Is the defendant selling goods so marked  as  to  be  designed  or  calculated  to  lead  purchasers  to  believe  that  they  are  the  plaintiff's goods?”

But  in  an  infringement  action  the  issue  is  as  

follows:

“Is the defendant using a mark which is  the  same  as  or  which  is  a  colourable  imitation of the plaintiff's registered trade  mark ?”

65. He also relied on  Laxmikant V.  Patel v.  Chetanbhai  

Shah and Another  – 2002 (3) SCC 65.  This court observed  

as under:-

“A person may sell his goods or deliver his  services  such  as  in  case  of  a  profession  under  a  trading  name  or  style.  With  the  

41

lapse  of  time  such  business  or  services  associated  with  a  person  acquire  a  reputation  or  goodwill  which  becomes  a  property  which  is  protected  by  courts.  A  competitor  initiating  sale  of  goods  or  services in the same name or by imitating  that name results in injury to the business  of one who has the property in that name.  The law does not permit any one to carry on  his  business  in  such  a  way  as  would  persuade  the  customers  or  clients  in  believing that he goods or services belonging  to  someone  else  are  his  or  are  associated  therewith.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the  latter  person  does  so  fraudulently  or  otherwise.  The  reasons  are  two.  Firstly,  honesty and fair play are, and ought to be,  the basic policies in the world of business.  Secondly, when a person adopts or intends  to  adopt  a  name  in  connection  with  his  business or services which already belongs  to someone else it results in confusion and  has  propensity  of  diverting  the  customers  and clients of someone else to himself and  thereby resulting in injury.”

66. Mr. Sundaram also placed reliance on a judgment of this  

court  in  Satyam  Infoway Ltd.   v.  Sifynet  Solutions (P)  

Limited  –  2004  (6)  SCC  145.   The  relevant  passage  is  

reproduced as under:-

“The next question is would the principles of  trade  mark  law  and  in  particular  those  

42

relating to passing off apply? An action for  passing off, as the phrase "passing off" itself  suggests, is to restrain the defendant from  passing  off  its  goods  or  services  to  the  public  as  that  of  the  plaintiff's.  It  is  an  action not only to preserve the reputation of  the  plaintiff  but  also  to  safeguard  the  public.  The  defendant  must  have  sold  its  goods  or  offered  its  services  in  a  manner  which  has  deceived  or  would  be  likely  to  deceive  the  public  into  thinking  that  the  defendant's  goods  or  services  are  the  plaintiff's.  The action is  normally  available  to the owner of a distinctive trademark and  the person who, if the word or name is an  invented  one,  invents  and  uses  it.  If  two  trade  rivals  claim  to  have  individually  invented  the  same  mark,  then  the  trader  who  is  able  to  establish  prior  user  will  succeed. The question is, as has been aptly  put, who gets these first? It is not essential  for  the  plaintiff  to  prove  long  user  to  establish reputation in a passing off action.  It  would depend upon the volume of sales  and extent of advertisement.”

67. Mr. Sundaram also relied on Ramdev Food Products (P)  

Limited v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and Others – 2006 (8)  

SCC 726 as under:-

“A trade mark is the property of the manufacturer.  The  purpose  of  a  trade  mark  is  to  establish  a  connection  between  the  goods  and  the  source  thereof which would suggest the quality of goods. If  the trade mark is registered, indisputably the user  

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thereof by a person who is not otherwise authorised  to do so would constitute infringement. Section  21  of the 1958 Act provides that where an application  for registration is filed, the same can be opposed.  Ordinarily  under  the  law  and,  as  noticed  hereinbefore,  there  can  only  be  one  mark,  one  source or one proprietor. Ordinarily again right to  user of a trade mark cannot have two origins. The  first  respondent  herein  is  a  rival  trader  of  the  appellant-Company. It did not in law have any right  to  use  the  said  trade  mark,  save  and  except  by  reason  of  the  terms  contained  in  the  MOU  or  continuous  user.  It  is  well-settled  that  when  defences in regard to right of user are set up, the  onus would be on the person who has taken the  said  plea.  It  is  equally  well-settled  that  a  person  cannot  use  a  mark  which  would  be  deceptively  similar  to  that  of  the  registered  trade  mark.  Registration of trade marks is envisaged to remove  any confusion in the minds of  the consumers.  If,  thus, goods are sold which are produced from two  sources,  the  same  may  lead  to  confusion  in  the  minds of the consumers. In a given situation, it may  also amount to fraud on the public. A proprietor of a  registered trade mark indisputably has a statutory  right thereto. In the event of such use by any person  other  than  the  person  in  whose  name  the  trade  mark is registered, he will have a statutory remedy  in terms of Section  21 of the 1958 Act. Ordinarily,  therefore,  two people are not entitled to the same  trade mark, unless there exists an express licence  in that behalf.”  

68. He  also  relied  on  Harrods  Limited v.  R.  Harrod  

Limited – (1924) RPC 74 where the court observed as under:-

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“………it  seems to  me  to  be  quite  clear  that  where  there  is  fraud the Court  can interfere  and there is fraud where you find a particular  name  taken  by  a  defendant,  a  well  known  fancy name,  which could not  be  taken for  a  legitimate  purpose,  and  a  name  which  is  taken, to use Lord Justice Buckley’s words, for  the  purpose  of  posing as being some person  whom you are not.  

In Aerators Limited v. Tollitt (L.R. (1902) 2 Ch.,  p.319), Mr.Justice Farwell, said this, that you  can interfere where the use of the particular  name is calculated to deceive, even though it  does not point to intentional fraud, and it is a  question of fact in each case as to whether or  not the names were so alike as to induce the  belief  that  the  companies  are  identical.   So  that,  where  there  is  fraud,  the  court  can  interfere, and where the names are so alike as  to  be  calculated  to  deceive  it  can  interfere.  Further it may draw the inference that there is  fraud  where  there  is  an  attempt  to  pose  as  being a particular business firm when you are  not, and are not entitled to use their name.”

69. Mr. Sundaram also placed reliance on Harrods Limited  

v.  Harrodian School Limited (1996) RPC 697.  In this case  

the  court  held  that  the  manifold  services  and  activities  for  

which  the  plaintiffs  are  known,  and  the  wide  field  of  

recognition  of  the  name  “Harrods”,  would  lead  to  an  

assumption that, the plaintiffs are in some way are connected,  

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associated  or  mixed-up  with  the  school  which  bears  their  

name  in  its  adjectival  form.   The  court  also  observed  that  

Erosion  of  distinctiveness  of  a  brand  name  had  been  

recognized as a form of damage to the goodwill of a business  

with which the name is connected in a number of cases, but  

unless  care  was  taken  this  could  mark  an  unacceptable  

extension of the law of passing off.

70. Learned counsel for the respondent  company also relied  

on a judgment of this Court in the case of  Midas Hygiene  

Industries (P)  Ltd.   and another v.   Sudhir Bhatia and  

others (2004) 3 SCC 90.  The court observed that the law on  

the subject is well settled.  In cases of infringement either of  

trade  mark  or  of  copyright,  normally  an  injunction  must  

follow.  Mere delay in bringing action is not sufficient to defeat  

grant of injunction in such cases.  The grant of injunction also  

becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption  

of the mark was itself dishonest.

71. Mr.  Sundaram also  relied  on a  judgment  of  the  Delhi  

High  Court  in  the  case  of  Madhubhan  Holiday  Inn  v.  

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Holiday Inn Inc.  100 (2002) DLT 306 (DB) (on which one of  

us, Dalveer Bhandari, J. was the author).  The Division Bench  

of the High Court observed as under:

“…  the  adoption  of  the  words  “Holiday  Inn” by the appellants is  ex facie   fraudulent  and  mala  fide  from the  very  inception.   The  words “Holiday Inn” have been adopted by the  appellant  to  ride  on the  global  reputation of  the respondent.   The appellant was actuated  by bad faith and dishonest motive.  In the facts  and circumstances,  the learned Single  Judge  was  fully  justified  in  granting  the  injunction  and decreeing the suits in order to protect the  commercial  goodwill  and  to  ensure  that  the  global business reputation of the respondent is  not exploited by the appellants in a clandestine  manner.”

72. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company  also  

submitted that where a trade/business name has acquired a  

reputation such as it has become a household name.  In such  

a case anyone who uses the identical name albeit in a different  

field of business altogether would be guilty of passing off by  

cashing in on the reputation and goodwill of the business of  

the plaintiff and would be restrained.  

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73. Mr. Sundaram also placed reliance on the judgment of  

Harrodian School Limited  (supra).   The court observed as  

under:

“The absence of  any common field of  activity:   This is of particular significance in the present  case.  The judge correctly directed himself as  to the law; he cannot be faulted in the way in  which he applied it.  It is not merely that the  plaintiffs have never run a school and have no  established  reputation  for  doing  so;  or  even  that  the  nature  of  the  parties’  respective  businesses  are  as  dissimilar  as  can  well  be  imagined.   It  is  rather  that  the  commercial  reputation  for  excellence  as  a  retailer  which  the plaintiffs enjoy would be regarded by the  public as having no bearing upon their ability  to run a school.   Customers of the plaintiffs  would be surprised to learn that Harrods had  ventured  into  the  commercial  theatre;  they  would, I think, be incredulous if they were told  that  Harrods  had  opened  a  preparatory  school.”

74. The  respondent  company  also  placed  reliance  on  a  

judgment of this Court in the case of Mahendra & Mahendra  

Paper Mills Limited  v.  Mahindra & Mahindra Limited  

(2002) 2 SCC 147 wherein this Court observed as under:

       “Judging the case in hand on touchstone of  the principles laid down in the aforementioned  decided cases, it is clear that the plaintiff has  

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been  using  the  word  "Mahindra"  and  "Mahindra  &  Mahindra"  in  its  companies/business concerns for a long span  of time extending over five decades. The name  has  acquired  a  distinctiveness  and  a  secondary  meaning  in  the  business  or  trade  circles.  People  have  come  to  associate  the  name  'Mahindra'  with  a  certain  standard  of  goods  and  services.  Any  attempt  by  another  person to use the name in business and trade  circles is likely to and in probability will create  an  impression  of  a  connection  with  the  plaintiffs' group of companies. Such user may  also  effect  the  plaintiff  prejudicially  in  its  business and trading activities.  Undoubtedly,  the  question  whether  the  plaintiffs'  claim  of  'passing-off  action' against the defendant will  be accepted or not has to be decided by the  Court after evidence is led in the suit. Even so  far  the  limited  purpose  of  considering  the  prayer  for  interlocutory  injunction  which  is  intended  for  maintenance  of  status  quo,  the  trial  Court  rightly  held that  the  plaintiff  has  established a prima facie case and irreparable  prejudice in its favour which calls for passing  an order of interim injunction restraining the  defendant-company which is yet to commence  its  business  from  utilising  the  name  of  'Mahindra'  or  'Mahindra & Mahindra'  for  the  purpose of its trade and business.  Therefore,  the Division Bench of the High Court cannot  be  faulted  for  confirming  the  order  of  injunction  passed  by  the  learned  single  Judge.”

75. Mr. Sundaram also relied on a judgment of this court in  

the case of Bata India Limited  v.  Pyare Lal & Company,  

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Meerut City & Ors.  AIR 1985 All  242]  the Allahabad High  

Court  observed  that  considering  the  plea  of  passing-off  or  

enabling  others  to  pass-off  mattresses,  sofa  cushions  and  

other articles associating them with the name of “Bata” in any  

manner or form held that:

“The  name  ‘Bata’  was  well  known  in  the  market and the user of such a name is likely to  cause  not  only  deception  in  the  mind  of  an  ordinary customer but may also cause injury  to  the  plaintiff  Company.   The  fact  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  producing  form  was  not  enough to hold that there could be no passing- off action in respect of the user of the name  ‘Bata’  to  the  products  marketed  by  the  defendants.   The  use  of  the  name  or  mark  ‘Bata’ by the defendants is indicative of their  intent.”

76. Learned counsel for the respondent company also relied  

on a judgment of Delhi  High Court in the case of  Diamler  

Benz Aktiegesellschaft  (supra) wherein the Court observed  

as under:

“… … …The boxes in which the defendant sells  its  undergarments  for  men,  and  the  representation  thereon  is  of  a  man with  his  legs  separated  and  hands  joined  together  above his shoulder, all within a circle, indicate,  the strong suggestion of the link between the  three pointed star of "Mercedes Benz" car and  

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the undergarment's sold by the defendant. In  my  view,  this  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a  "honest concurrent user" by the defendant of  the above said symbol.”

The Court also observed in the said case that:

“There  are  marks  which  are  different  from  other  marks.  There  are  names  which  are  different from other names. There are names  and  marks  which  have  become  household  words.  "Benz"  as  name  of  a  Car  would  be  known to  every  family  that  has  ever  used  a  quality car. The name "Benz" as applied to a  car, has a unique place in the world. There is  hardly one who is conscious of existence of the  cars/automobiles,  who  would  not  recognize  the name "Benz" used in connection with cars.  Nobody can plead in  India,  where  "Mercedes  Benz"  cars  are  seen  on  roads,  where  "Mercedes"  have  collaborated  with  Tatas,  where  there  are  Mercedes  Benz  Tata  trucks  have  been  on  roads  in  very  large  number,  (known as Mercedes Benz Trucks, so long as  the  collaboration  was  there),  who  can  plead  that he is unaware of the word "Benz" as used  with reference to car or trucks.

In my view, the Trade Mark law is not intended  to protect a person who deliberately sets out to  take the benefit of somebody else's reputation  with reference to goods, especially so when the  reputation extends world wide. By no stretch  of imagination can it be said that use for any  length of  time of the name "Benz" should be  not objected to.”

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The Court further observed as under:

“However, if despite legal notice, any one big or  small, continues to carry the illegitimate use of  a significant world wide renowned name/ mark  as  is  being  done  in  this  case  despite  notice  dated 09-12-1989, there cannot be any reason  for  not  stopping  the  use  of  a  world  reputed  name. None should be continued to be allowed  to  use  a  world  famed  name  to  goods  which  have  no  connection  with  the  type  of  goods  which  have  generated  the  world  wide  reputation.

In the instant case, "Benz" is a name given to a  very high priced and extremely well engineered  product.  In  my  view,  the  defendant  cannot  dilute,  that by user of the name "Benz" with  respect to a product like under-wears.”

77. Mr.  Sundaram  placed  reliance  on  Harrods  Limited  

(supra) where the Court observed as under:

“Messrs.  Harrods  Limited,  a  long  established and well  known Company  whose  business included a banking department but  who  were  precluded  by  their  Articles  of  Association from carrying on a moneylenders  business brought an action against R. Harrod  Limited,  a  Company  registered  in  August,  1923,  with  the  object  of  carrying  on  the  business  of  a  registered  moneylender.   The  plaintiffs  applied  for  an  interlocutory  injunction  “to  restrain  the  Defendant  Company,  its  servants  and  agents  until  judgment  or  further  order  from  carrying  on  

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business under the name R. Harrod Limited or  under any name comprising the word “Harrod”  likely to mislead the public into the belief that  the  Defendant  Company  was  connected  with  the Plaintiff Company or that the business of  the Defendant Company was the same as or in  any  way connected  with  the  business  of  the  Plaintiff Company.”

78. Learned counsel for the respondent company submitted  

that  the  scope  of  passing-off  action  is  wider  than  in  an  

infringement of trademark or copyright action.  Therefore, in  

an action of  passing-off,  an injunction can be granted even  

against a registered trademark holder.

79. Learned counsel for the respondent company also relied  

on a judgment of this Court in the case of  N.R. Dongre and  

others  v.   Whirlpool  Corporation and another  (1996)  5  

SCC 714.   In  this  case  this  Court  affirmed the  concurrent  

findings  of  the  single  Judge,  as  affirmed  on  appeal  by  the  

division bench of the Delhi High Court and observed that:

“… … …adopting  the  mark  ‘Whirlpool’  when  business  in  washing  machines  was  being  carried  out  earlier  in  other  names,  which at  this stage, is supportive of the plea of unfair  trading  activity  in  an  attempt  to  obtain  economic benefit of the reputation established  

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by Plaintiff 1, whose name is associated with  the mark ‘Whirlpool’. … … …”

80. Mr. Sundaram also submitted that common words with  

strong  primary  meaning  retain  the  said  meaning  and  

protection  would  then be  granted  only  qua the  product  for  

which such common word is used viz. Sun TV, Moon, Earth  

etc.   In  this  connection  learned counsel  for  the  respondent  

company relied on a case of this Court in the case of Godfrey  

Philips India Limited  v.   Girnar Food & Beverages (P)  

Limited (2004) 5 SCC 257 where this court observed as under:

“Without going into the question whether the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  Division  Bench  that the trade mark is descriptive is correct or  not, it appears to us, and as is conceded by  both parties before us, that the enunciation of  principle of law with regard to the protection  available  even  in  respect  of  the  descriptive  trade  mark  was  wrong.  A  descriptive  trade  mark  may  be  entitled  to  protection  if  it  has  assumed a secondary meaning which identifies  it with a particular product or as being from a  particular source. … … …”

81. Learned counsel for the respondent company also relied  

on a judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of  Info Edge  

(India) Private Limited and another  v.  Shailesh Gupta  

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and another   98 (2002) DLT 499 where the Court observed  

that:

“It was sought to be submitted by the counsel  appearing  for  the  defendant  that  the  word  'Naukri'  cannot  assume  a  significance  of  a  trademark, as the same is generic. The word  'Naukri',  would  be  a  descriptive  word  as  it  denotes and describes the nature of work and  business offered by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff  has  chosen  to  use  the  domain  name  'Naukri.Com',  which  is  descriptive  of  the  business,  the  plaintiff  carries  on i.e.  it  gives  information  to  its  subscribers  about  the  availability of jobs and employment in various  establishments, concerns and offices and the  manner  in  which  request  for  employment  could be made and, therefore,  it  is a service  offered  by  the  plaintiff  relating  to  job  opportunity and situation and giving guidance  thereto  and,  therefore,  the  same  is  a  descriptive word. It  is also a settled law that  the distinction between the generic word and  descriptive  word is  very  thin and such word  could also assume a secondary meaning by its  long  user  by  a  person,  who  establishes  his  reputation in the market.

If  a  product  of  a  particular  character  or  composition is marketed in a particular area or  place under a descriptive name and gained a  reputation  there  under,  that  name  which  distinguished  it  from  competing  products  of  different composition, the goodwill in the name  of those entitled to make use of it there was  protected  against  deceptive  use  there  of  the  name of competitors.  In Erven Warnink by  

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and Ors. v. J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd.  and Ors. reported in (1979) 2 All ER, it was  held that whether the name denoted a product  made  from  ingredients  from  a  particular  locality  or  whether  the  goodwill  in the  name  was the result of the product being made from  particular  ingredients  regardless  of  their  provenance,  since  it  was the  reputation  that  the product itself had gained in the market by  reason  of  its  recognisable  and  distinctive  qualities  which  had  generated  the  relevant  goodwill. In the said case, the trademark was  the  name  of  a  spirit-based  product  called  ADVOCAAT.  The  said  product  had  gained  a  reputation and goodwill  for that name in the  English  market  and  the  defendants  were  seeking  to  take  advantage  of  that  name  by  misrepresenting that their wine-based product  was of the same type as ADVOCAAT.”

82. Mr. Sundaram placed reliance on a judgment of House of  

Lords in the case of  Office Cleaning Services  Limited v.  

Westminster Office Cleaning Association  1944 (2) All E R  

269, where the court observed that the word 'office cleaning'  

was held to be a descriptive word, for it is a descriptive of the  

business they  carry  on.  It  was held that  the  plaintiff  could  

assume or  establish monopoly  on the said word only when  

they show that they have acquired a secondary or subsidiary  

meaning. The aforesaid legal principle is well-settled and even  

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the counsel  for  the defendant did not dispute the aforesaid  

position.  

83. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 48 Fourth edition  

at page 190, it is stated that it is possible for a word or phrase,  

which is wholly descriptive of the goods or services concerned,  

to  become  so  associated  with  the  goods  or  services  of  a  

particular trader that its use by another trader is capable of  

amounting to a representation that his goods or services are  

those  of  the  first  trader  and  that  although  the  primary  

meaning  of  the  words  is  descriptive,  they  have  acquired  a  

secondary meaning as indicating the products of a particular  

trader.  

84. In McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition Vol.  

2  3rd Edition in  para  12.5 (2)  it  is  stated  that  in  order  to  

obtain some form of relief on a "passing off" claim, the user of  

a generic term must prove some false or confusing usage by  

the newcomer above and beyond mere use of generic name.

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85. The  contention  of  the  defendant  is  that  adjectives  are  

normally  descriptive  words  and  nouns  are  generic  word.  

However, McCarthy has said that the said "part of speech" test  

does not accurately describes the case law results. therefore,  

such a criteria cannot be accepted as a safe and sound basis  

to  ascertain  as  to  whether  a  particular  name  is  generic  or  

descriptive.  Besides,  even  assuming  that  the  said  word  is  

generic yet if it is found by the court that such a mark has  

attained distinctiveness and is associated with the business of  

the plaintiff for considerable time and thereafter the defendant  

adopts  a  similar  word  as  one  of  his  two  marks  to  induce  

innocent  internet  users  to  come  to  the  website  of  the  

defendant,  which  establishes  dishonest  intention  and  bad  

faith,  would  the  court  still  be  not  granting  injunction  to  

protect the business of the plaintiff? The answer to the said  

question has to be an emphatic 'No". User of similar word by a  

competitor  coupled  with  dishonest  intention  and  bad  faith  

would empower a court to restrain such user/misuser to do  

equitable justice to the aggrieved party.

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86. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company  also  

submitted that the use of the word by another would result in  

diminishing the distinctiveness of the word qua the good and  

reputation of the plaintiff.   

87. Mr. Sundaram also placed reliance on  Taittinger and  

others  v.  Allbev Limitd and others (1994) 4 All E R 75. The  

relevant passages are reproduced as under:

“… … …Further  it  cannot  be  right  that  the  larger  the  scale  of  the  activities  of  a  trader  suing in passing off, the less protection it will  receive  from  the  Court  because  of  a  comparison with the scale of the activities of a  defendant who trades on a smaller scale. The  question is  whether  the  relevant  activities  of  the  defendants  are  on  such  a  small  scale  leading to such a small injury that it can be  ignored.  On  the  evidence  of  the  defendants'  sales,  I  find it  impossible  to  say  that  is  the  case here.  

But  in  my  judgement  the  real  injury  to  the  champagne  houses'  goodwill  comes  under  a  different head and although the judge refers to  Mr. Sparrow putting the point in argument, he  does  not  deal  with  it  specifically  or  give  a  reason for its undoubted rejection by him. Mr.  Sparrow  had  argued  that  if  the  defendants  continued to market their product, there would  take  place  a  blurring  or  erosion  of  the  uniqueness  that  now  attends  the  word  

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adjective  denoting  the  country  of  origin,  the  distinction  between genuine  Champagne  and  'champagne  type'  wines  produced  elsewhere  would  become  blurred;  that  the  word  'Champagne' would come gradually to mean no  more than 'sparkling wine'; and that the part  of  the  plaintiffs'  goodwill  which  consisted  in  the  name  would  be  diluted  and  gradually  destroyed.

That  passage  was  referred to  approvingly  by  Gault  J.  in  Wineworths Group Limited  v.  Comite  Interprofessionel  du  Vin  de  Champagne [1992] 2 NZLR 327 In that case  the sale of Australian sparkling wine under the  name  champagne  was  held  to  constitute  passing off. The New Zealand Court of Appeal  upheld the decision of Jeffries J. who had held  in C.I.V.C. v. Wineworths:  

By using the word champagne on the label the  defendant  is  deceptively  encroaching  on  the  reputation and goodwill of the plaintiffs. [1991]  2 NZLR 432  

Jeffries J. had no doubt that if relief was not  granted  the  plaintiffs  would  most  certainly  suffer damage if the word was used on all or  any sparkling  wine sold in  New Zealand.  He  thought  the  ordinary  purchaser  in  New  Zealand  without  special  knowledge  on  wines  was likely to be misled. Gault J. after agreeing  with Jeffries J. on deception said (at p.343):  

I find the issue of damage or likely damage to  the goodwill with which the name 'Champagne'  is  associated  equally  obvious  in  light  of  the  finding  that  there  is  in  fact  an  established  goodwill in New Zealand. I have no doubt that  

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erosion  of  the  distinctiveness  of  a  name  or  mark is a form of damage to the goodwill of the  business with which the name is  connected.  There is  no clearer example of  this than the  debasing of the name 'Champagne' in Australia  as a result of its use by local wine makers.   

By parity of reasoning it seems to me no less  obvious that erosion of the distinctiveness of  the name champagne in this country is a form  of  damage to the goodwill  of  the business of  the champagne houses. There are undoubtedly  factual points of distinction between the New  Zealand  case  and  the  present  case,  as  Mr.  Isaacs  has  pointed  out,  and  he  placed  particular reliance on the fact that in the New  Zealand case as well  as in Bollinger v. Costa  Brava  Wine  Co.  Ltd.  (No.  2),  the  Court  held  that  there  was  a  deliberate  attempt  to  take  advantage of the name champagne, whereas in  the  present  case  the  judge  found  no  such  specific  intention.  In  general  it  is  no  doubt  easier  to  infer  damage  when  a  fraudulent  intention is established. But that fact does not  appear  to  have  played  any  part  in  the  reasoning  on  this  particular  point  either  of  Jeffries  J.  or  of  Sir  Robin  Cooke  P.,  who  thought the case exemplified the principle that  a tendency to impair distinctiveness might lead  to an inference of damage to goodwill [1992] 2  NZLR 327, or of Gault J.; nor in logic can I see  why it should. It seems to me inevitable that if  the  defendants,  with  their  not  insignificant  trade as a supplier of drinks to Sainsbury and  other retail  outlets,  are  permitted to use the  name Elderflower Champagne, the goodwill in  the distinctive name champagne will be eroded  with  serious  adverse  consequences  for  the  champagne houses.  

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In  my  judgement  therefore  the  fifth  characteristic  identified  in  Advocaat  case  is  established. I can see no exceptional feature to  this  case  which would  justify  on grounds  of  public policy withholding from the champagne  houses the ordinary remedy of an injunction to  restrain passing off. I would therefore grant an  injunction  to  restrain  the  defendants  from  selling,  offering  for  sale,  distributing  and  describing,  whether  in  advertisements  or  on  labels or in any other way, any beverages, not  being wine produced in Champagne, under or  by  reference  to  the  word  champagne.  That  injunction,  I  would,  emphasise,  does  not  prevent  the  sale  of  the  defendants'  product,  provided it is not called champagne.”

88. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company also  

submitted that the protection qua common field of activity has  

now  expanded  and  been  interpreted  to  mean  extending  to  

other product lines than what is manufactured by the plaintiff  

and hence common field of activity is not restricted to same or  

similar products but extend to all other products.  The test of  

common field of activity now accepted is that of “common class  

of consumers”.  The reason for this is the likelihood of such  

consumers  identifying  the  Defendant’s  goods  as  originating  

from the same source as the plaintiff.  The question therefore  

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would be, whether from the factual situation, an inference can  

be drawn that a purchaser of the Defendant’s product could  

assume such product as originating from the plaintiff.   

89. He also relied  on  Kamal  Trading  Co.,  Bombay  and  

Others  v.  Gillette U.K. Limited [1988] IPLR 135  wherein it  

has been observed that:

“… … ..the plaintiffs have not established any  of the conditions required for grant of interim  relief.   It  was  submitted  that  the  goods  manufactured  by  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendants  are  different  in  nature;  the  plaintiffs  manufacture  blades,  while  the  defendants manufacture “tooth brushes”.  The  goods of the plaintiffs and the defendants are  not  available  in  the  same  shop  and  the  customers  of  these  goods are  different.   The  goods sold by the plaintiffs are blades and fall  in class 8, while those of the defendants are  tooth brushes which fall in class 21.  Relying  on these  circumstances,  it  was merit  in  this  submission.  In  the  first  instance,  the  assumption  of  the  learned  counsel  that  the  class  of  customers  for  purchase  of  safety  blades  and  tooth  brushes  are  different  and  these goods are not available in the same shop  is wholly misconceived.  We take judicial notice  of  the  fact  that  these  goods  are  available  in  every shop including a small  shop and each  and every person is required to purchase these  goods. … … …”

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90. Mr. Sundaram also relied on  Honda Motors Company  

Limited   v.  Charanjit Singh & Others  (101 (2002) DLT  

359) wherein it has been observed that:

“The case of the plaintiff is in fact based on  passing off action and not for infringement of  the trade mark. It has never been the case of  the  plaintiff  that  the  two  sets  of  goods  are  identical. The concept of passing off, which is a  form of tort has undergone changes with the  course of time. The plaintiff now does not have  to be in direct competition with the defendant  to suffer injury from the use of its trade name  by the defendants.”

The court further observed that:

“In  the  present  case  the  plaintiff's  mark  HONDA has  acquired  a  global  goodwill  and  reputation.  Its  reputation  is  for  quality  products.  The name of  HONDA is associated  with  the  plaintiff's  especially  in  the  field  of  automobiles  and  power  equipments  on  account  of  their  superior  quality  and  high  standard. The plaintiff's business or products  under  the  trade  mark  HONDA has  acquired  such  goodwill  and  reputation  that  it  has  become  distinctive  of  its  products  and  the  defendants' user of this mark for their product  "Pressure Cooker" tends to mislead the public  to  believe  that  the  defendants  business  and  goods are that of  the plaintiff.  Such user by  the defendants has also diluted and debased  the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiff.

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As observed above, the concept of passing off  is a tort and with the passage of time, with the  developing case law it  has changed and now  the two traders need not necessarily operate in  the same field so as to suffer injury on account  of the goods of one trader being passed off as  those of the other.

With the changed concept of passing off action,  it is now not material for a passing off action  that  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant  should  trade  in  the  same  field.  I  find  that  some  business  are  truly  international  in  character  and  the  reputation  and  goodwill  attached  to  them cannot in fact be held being international  also. The plaintiff's business is of international  character  and  obviously  the  reputation  and  goodwill attached to its trade mark HONDA is  also  of  international  repute.  The  plaintiff's  trade mark HONDA, which is of global repute,  is  used by the defendants for  a product like  pressure cooker,  to acquire the benefit  of  its  goodwill  and  reputation  so  as  to  create  deception for the public who are likely to buy  defendant's  product  believing  the  same  as  coming  from  the  house  of  HONDA or  associated with the plaintiff in some manner.  By doing so, it would dilute the goodwill and  reputation  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  wrong  committed by the defendants would certainly  be  an  actionable  wrong  and  the  plaintiff  is  within its rights to ask for restraint against the  defendants  from  using  its  mark  HONDA for  their products.”

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91. From the above discussions, the following two situations  

arise:

i. Where the name of the plaintiff is such as to give  

him exclusivity  over  the  name,  which  would  ipso  

facto extend to barring any other person from using  

the  same.   viz.  Benz,  Mahindra,  Caterpillar,  

Reliance, Sahara, Diesel etc.

ii. The plaintiff’s adopted name would be protected if it  

has acquired a strong enough association with the  

plaintiff  and  the  defendant  has  adopted  such  a  

name in common field of activity i.e. the purchasers  

test  as  to  whether  in  the  facts  of  the  case,  the  

manner  of  sale,  surrounding  circumstances  etc.  

would  lead  to  an  inference  that  the  source  of  

product is the plaintiff.  

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92. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company also  

submitted that once there is a dishonest intention to adopt the  

mark a mere delay in bringing an action will not be defeated  

because in case of continuing tort fresh period of limitation  

begins  to  run  every  moment  of  the  time  during  which  the  

breach continues.   

93.  Mr.  Sundaram  relied  on  a  case  of  this  court  in  M/s.  

Bengal Waterproof Limited  Vs.  M/s. Bombay Waterproof  

Manufacturing Company and Another   (1997)  1  SCC 99  

wherein it has been observed that:

“… … …It is now well settled that an action for  passing off is a common law remedy being an  action in substance of deceit under the Law of  Torts. Wherever and whenever fresh deceitful  act  is  committed  the  person  deceived  would  naturally have a fresh cause of action in his  favour. Thus every time when a person passes  off his goods as those of another he commits  the act of such deceit. Similarly whenever and  wherever  a  person  commits  breach  of  a  registered trade mark of another he commits a  recurring act of breach or infringement of such  trade mark giving a recurring and fresh cause  of action at each time of such infringement to  the party aggrieved. … … …”  

…  …  …  

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Heinz Italia and another  v.  Dabur India Limited (2007) 6  

SCC 1 wherein this court observed that:

“… …. it has been repeatedly held that before  the  use  of  a  particular  mark  can  be  appropriated it is for the plaintiff to prove that  the product that he is representing had earned  a  reputation  in  the  market  and  that  this  reputation had been sought to be violated by  the  opposite  party.  In  Corn  Products case  (supra)  it  was observed that  the  principle  of  similarity could not to be very rigidly applied  and that if it could be prima facie shown that  there was a dishonest intention on the part of  the  defendant  in  passing  off  goods,  an  injunction  should  ordinarily  follow  and  the  mere delay in bringing the matter to Court was  not a ground to defeat the case of the plaintiff.  It  bears reiteration that the word "Glucon-D"  and  its  packaging  had  been  used  by  Glaxo  since 1940 whereas the word "Glucose-D" had  been used for the first time in the year 1989.”

95. Mr.  Sundaram  further  placed  reliance  on  another  

judgment of this Court in Ramdev Food Products (P) Limited  

(supra),  wherein it has been held that:

“Acquiescence is a facet of delay. The principle  of acquiescence would apply where: (i) sitting  by or allow another to invade the rights and  spending  money  on  it;  (ii)  it  is  a  course  of  conduct  inconsistent  with  the  claim  for  exclusive  rights  for  trade  mark,  trade  name,  etc.

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is  not before this Court for  adjudication and  even if the plea of dilution was to be available  in an infringement action, no case of dilution  in  India  is  made  out.  Recently  the  Division  Bench of this Court in Pankaj Goel v. Dabur  India  Limited  2008  (38)  PTC 49  (Delhi)  held  that  merely  because  others  are  carrying  on  business under similar  or deceptively  similar  trademark or have been permitted to do so by  the plaintiff, cannot offer a licence to the world  at  large  to  infringe  the  trademark  of  the  plaintiff.  It  was  further  held  that  even  otherwise, the use of similar marks by a third  party cannot be a defence to an illegal act of  passing off.  In Castrol  Limited v.  A.K. Mehta  1997  (17)  PTC  408  DB  it  was  held  that  a  concession given in one case does not  mean  that other parties are entitled to use the same.  Also,  in  Prakash  Roadline  v.  Prakash  Parcel  Service 1992 (2) Arbitration Law Reporter 174  it has been held that use of a similar mark by  a third party in violation of plaintiff's right is  no defence.”

97. Learned counsel for the respondent company also placed  

reliance on Prakash Roadline Limited  v.  Prakash Parcel  

Service (P)  Ltd.  48 (1992) Delhi  Law Times 390 the Delhi  

High Court held that:

“… … … Merely  because  no  action  is  taken  against certain other parties, it does not mean  that the plaintiff is not entitled to take action  against the defendant. The other parties may  not be affecting the business of  the plaintiff.  They may be small-time operators who really  

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do not matter to the plaintiff.   Therefore, the  plaintiff  may  not  chose  to  take  any  action  against  them.  On  the  contrary  the  plaintiff  feels danger from defendant in view of the fact  that  the  defendant's  promoters  are  the  ex  Directors/employees  of  the  plaintiff  who  are  fully in the know of the business secrets of the  plaintiff.  Therefore,  the  mere  fact  that  the  plaintiff  has  not  chosen  to  take  any  action  against  such  other  parties  cannot  disentitle  the  plaintiff  from  taking  the  present  action.  This  contention  is,  therefore,  prima-facie  without any merit and is rejected.”

98. Lastly,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  company  

submitted that in any one of the following circumstances the  

plaintiff  would  be  entitled  to  injunctive  relief  even  qua  a  

common word:

a. If  the  factors  for  justifying  absolute  protection  as  

per  ‘absolute  protection  for  common  words’  have  

been made out then it would ipso facto entitle the  

plaintiff to protection against the world at large.

b. The  protection  would  be  given  against  any  

particular  defendant  if  the  plaintiff’s  name  has  

acquired a  secondary  meaning and the defendant  

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uses  the  name  in  a  common field  of  activity,  i.e.  

where there are common purchasers.  However, the  

court may decline to grant the relief if such name is  

descriptive of the defendant’s product and not just a  

name unconnected with the defendant’s product.

c. The protection would be granted qua a defendant  

with  relation to  even an unrelated product  where  

the tests of dishonest adoption are satisfied and the  

defendant  will  be  restrained  from  cashing  in  or  

profiting from the plaintiff’s name.

99. We  have  heard  the  detailed  and  comprehensive  

arguments advanced by the learned counsel  for the parties.  

We place on record our appreciation for the able assistance  

provided by the learned counsel for the parties in this case. We  

have also carefully examined relevant decided Indian, English  

and American cases.  

100. The respondent company’s mark ‘Eenadu’ has acquired  

extra-ordinary reputation and goodwill in the State of Andhra  

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Pradesh.  ‘Eenadu’  newspaper  and  TV  are  extremely  well  

known and almost household words in the State  of  Andhra  

Pradesh.  The word ‘Eenadu’ may be a descriptive word but  

has acquired a secondary or subsidiary meaning and is fully  

identified  with  the  products  and  services  provided  by  the  

respondent company.

101. The appellant is a Karnataka based company which has  

started manufacturing its product in Bangalore in the name of  

‘Ashika’ and started selling its product in the State of Andhra  

Pradesh  in  1995.   The  appellant  started  using  the  name  

‘Eenadu’ for its Agarbathi and used the same artistic script,  

font and method of writing the name which obviously cannot  

be a co-incidence.  The appellant  company after  adoption of  

name ‘Eenadu’   accounted for  90% of  sale  of  their  product  

Agarbathi.

102.  On  consideration  of  the  totality  of  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, we clearly arrive at the following  

findings and conclusions :  

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a) The respondent company’s mark ‘Eenadu’ has  

acquired extraordinary reputation and goodwill  

in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh.   The  

respondent  company’s  products  and  services  

are correlated,  identified and associated with  

the word ‘Eenadu’ in the entire State of Andhra  

Pradesh.   ‘Eenadu’  means  literally  the  

products  or  services  provided  by  the  

respondent  company  in  the  State  of  Andhra  

Pradesh.   In  this  background  the  appellant  

cannot  be  referred  or  termed  as  an  honest  

concurrent user of the mark ‘Eenadu’;

b) The adoption of the words ‘Eenadu’ is ex facie  

fraudulent  and  mala  fide  from  the  very  

inception.  By adopting the mark ‘Eenadu’ in  

the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  the  appellant  

clearly wanted to ride on the reputation and  

goodwill of the respondent company;

c) Permitting  the  appellant  to  carry  on  his  

business  would  in  fact  be  putting  a  seal  of  

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approval of the court on the dishonest, illegal  

and clandestine conduct of the appellant;

d) Permitting  the  appellant  to  sell  his  product  

with the mark ‘Eenadu’ in the State of Andhra  

Pradesh  would  definitely  create  confusion  in  

the  minds  of  the  consumers  because  the  

appellant  is  selling  Agarbathies  marked  

‘Eenadu’  as  to  be  designed  or  calculated  to  

lead  purchasers  to  believe  that  its  product  

Agarbathies  are  in  fact  the  products  of  the  

respondent  company.   In  other  words,  the  

appellant wants to ride on the reputation and  

goodwill of the respondent company.  In such  

a  situation,  it  is  the  bounden  duty  and  

obligation of the court not only to protect the  

goodwill  and  reputation  of  the  respondent  

company but also to protect the interest of the  

consumers;

e) Permitting the appellant to sell its product in  

the State of Andhra Pradesh would amount to  

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encouraging the appellant to practise fraud on  

the consumers;

f) Permitting  the  appellant  to  carry  on  his  

business  in the name of ‘Eenadu’ in the State  

of Andhra Pradesh would lead to eroding extra-

ordinary reputation and goodwill  acquired by  

the  respondent  company  over  a  passage  of  

time;

g) Appellant’s  deliberate  misrepresentation  has  

the  potentiality  of  creating  serious  confusion  

and deception for the public at large and the  

consumers  have  to  be  saved  from  such  

fraudulent  and  deceitful  conduct  of  the  

appellant.   

h) Permitting  the  appellant  to  sell  his  product  

with the mark ‘Eenadu’ would be encroaching  

on  the  reputation  and  goodwill  of  the  

respondent company and this would constitute  

invasion of proprietary rights vested with the  

respondent company.

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i) Honesty and fair play ought to be the basis of  

the policies in the world of trade and business.

103. The law is consistent that no one can be permitted  

to encroach upon the reputation and goodwill of other parties.  

This  approach  is  in  consonance  with  protecting  proprietary  

rights of the respondent company.

104. Consequently, the appeals are disposed of in terms  

of the aforesaid observations and directions.   

105. In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case,  the  

parties are directed to bear their own costs.

………….….…….……………………..J.                                         (Dalveer Bhandari)

…………….…….……………………..J.                                          (K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan)

New Delhi; March 3, 2011  

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