16 July 2012
Supreme Court
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SUSHILA TIWARY Vs ALLAHABAD BANK .

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: C.A. No.-005224-005224 / 2012
Diary number: 4105 / 2011
Advocates: Mohit Kumar Shah Vs MITTER & MITTER CO.


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL      APPEAL      NO.5224      OF     2012    (arising out of SLP(C)No.11293 of 2011)

SUSHILA TIWARY AND OTHERS …. APPELLANTS

VERSUS

ALLAHABAD BANK AND OTHERS          ….RESPONDENTS

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

SUDHANSU      JYOTI      MUKHOPADHAYA,      J.   

Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  by  the  Legal  

Heirs  of  the  original  writ  petitioner,  Shri  

Ravindra  Nath  Tiwary  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  

“Shri Tiwary”) against  the judgment  dated  3rd May,  

2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Patna High  

Court  in  L.P.A.  No.762  of  2010,  whereby  the  

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Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal  and  affirmed  

the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  

wherein  the  order  of  termination  passed  against  

Shri Tiwary was affirmed.  

3. Appellant No.1, Sushila Tiwary is the wife and  

appellant Nos.2 to 5, Rajesh, Priyanjali, Sudhansu  

and  Himanshu  are  the  sons  and  daughter  of  Shri  

Tiwary.

4. Shri  Tiwary  was  working  as  Special  Assistant  

in  the  Allahabad  Bank,  Arah  Branch(hereinafter  

referred to as “the Bank”). He was suspended on 11th  

June,  1990  for  certain  acts  of  omission  and  

commission  and  proceeded  departmentally  under  

Clause 19.5(d) and 19.5.(j) of the first Bi­partite  

Settlement 1966. Two charge­sheets dated 30th June,  

1990 and 13th October, 1990 were served on him. The  

Bank also decided simultaneously to prosecute Shri  

Tiwary in a criminal case for the criminal act and  

lodged an FIR with the Arah Police Station. After  

trial  Shri  Tiwary  was  convicted  in  the  criminal  

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case  on  19th  April,  1999  by  the  Sub­Divisional  

Judicial Magistrate(SDJM), Bhojpur. He was ordered  

to  undergo  RI  for  one  year  for  the  offence  

punishable  under  Section  468  IPC  and  RI  for  one  

year  for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  

477(A) IPC.

5. In  view  of  the  conviction  in  the  criminal  

case,  the  Assistant  General  Manager,  Regional  

Office, Patna, who was the disciplinary authority,  

by invoking provisions of Clause 19.6(a) of the Bi­

partite Settlement, 1966 dismissed Shri Tiwary from  

the services of the Bank by order No.8/99 dated 21st  

July,  1999  after  giving  opportunity  of  personal  

hearing to Shri Tiwary.  

Against  the  order  of  conviction  Shri  Tiwary  

preferred an appeal in the Court of the Additional  

District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Bhojpur,  who  by  

judgment  dated  6th  February,  2000,  after  giving  

benefit  of  doubt,  had  acquitted  Shri  Tiwary  from  

the  charges.  After  the  acquittal  Shri  Tiwary  

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approached the Bank and informed that he has been  

acquitted in criminal case by the Appellate Court.  

The  Bank  on  receipt  of  such  intimation,  invoked  

Clause 19.3(c) of the Bi­partite Settlement and by  

order  No.1/126  dated  2nd  July,  2001  ordered  that  

Shri  Tiwary  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  placed  

under suspension from the date of original order of  

dismissal, i.e., 21st July, 1999 and shall continue  

to remain under suspension until further order.  It  

was  further  ordered  that  during  the  period  of  

suspension  he  will  be  entitled  to  subsistence  

allowance  on  the  same  scale  as  was  getting  just  

prior to his dismissal dated 21st July, 1999.   The  

Assistant  General  Manager,  Regional  Office,  Patna  

who  was  the  disciplinary  authority  brought  the  

aforesaid  facts  to  the  notice  of  Shri  Tiwary  and  

informed  that  his  Headquarters  has  been  fixed  at  

Arah.

6. In  the  departmental  enquiry,  Shri  Tiwary  did  

not choose to participate. Once, he appeared before  

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the Enquiry Officer but later on he again absented  

and  refused  to  appear.   Shri  Tiwary  moved  before  

the  Patna  High  Court  against  the  order  of  

suspension and revival of departmental proceedings  

by  filing  a  writ  petition,  C.W.J.C.  No.11479  of  

2001.  In  the  said  writ  petition,  in  view  of  the  

statement  made  on  behalf  of  the  Bank  that  the  

departmental enquiry has already been concluded and  

the  Enquiry  Officer  has  already  submitted  the  

report,  Shri  Tiwary  withdrew  the  writ  petition  on  

5th March, 2003 with liberty to raise all the pleas,  

in  case,  the  order  of  disciplinary  authority  goes  

adverse to him.  

7. The  disciplinary  authority  noticed  that  Shri  

Tiwary refused to appear before the Enquiry Officer  

and remained absent. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer  

had  to  submit  ex  parte  reports  on  3rd  September,  

2002 and 9th September, 2002 separately for the two  

different  chargesheets.   In  both  the  departmental  

proceedings  all  the  charges  against  Shri  Tiwary  

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were  found  true.   In  this  background,  a  second  

show­cause notice was issued to Shri Tiwary by the  

disciplinary  authority  by  order  dated  31st  March,  

2003 and it was proposed as to why his services be  

not  terminated  by  paying  three  months’  pay  and  

allowances  in  terms  of  Clause  3(d)  of  the  

Memorandum  of  Settlement  dated  10th  April,  2002.  

Shri Tiwary was advised to appear in person with or  

without  his  Defence  Representative  before  the  

disciplinary  authority,  the  Assistant  General  

Manager,  Regional  Office,  Patna  for  personal  

hearing on 16th May, 2003. Pursuant to such notice,  

Shri  Tiwary  appeared  before  the  disciplinary  

authority  on  16th  May,  2003  with  his  Defence  

Representative.  The  objections  as  raised  by  him  

were  recorded  by  the  disciplinary  authority  and  

after  going  through  the  chargesheets,  Enquiry  

Repots and the objections raised by Shri Tiwary the  

disciplinary  authority  terminated  the  services  of  

Shri Tiwary by order dated 16th June, 2003.

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8. Against  the  order  of  termination,  Shri  Tiwary  

filed the writ petition before the Patna High Court  

in  C.W.J.C.  No.12429  of  2005.  During  the  pendency  

of the said writ petition before the learned Single  

Judge, Shri Tiwary died and was substituted by his  

Legal  Heirs.  After  hearing  the  parties,  learned  

Single Judge by judgment  dated  3rd September, 2008  

taking  into  consideration  the  gravity  of  charges  

and the fact that the amount which was alleged to  

be embezzled was deposited by Shri Tiwary with the  

Bank, pursuant to the order of this Court dated 8th  

July,  2008  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  1019  of  2008,  

refused  to  entertain  the  writ  petition  and  

dismissed the same. The Division Bench of the Patna  

High Court affirmed the said decision and dismissed  

the L.P.A. by the impugned judgment.

9. Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellants  herein  submitted  that  without  

reinstating  the  original  writ  petitioner,  no  

departmental  enquiry  could  be  initiated.  Further,  

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in  view  of  Clause  19.3(c),  the  original  writ  

petitioner was entitled to full pay and allowances  

minus  the  subsistence  allowance  and  all  other  

privileges  for  the  period  of  suspension  which  was  

denied to him.  

It  was  further  contended  by  the  learned  

counsel  for  the  appellants  that  the  High  Court  

ought  to  have  considered  that  the  departmental  

enquiry had been conducted and concluded ex parte,  

hence in all probability, it would have been fair  

enough  to  grant  at  least  one  more  opportunity  to  

the legal heirs of the delinquent to participate in  

the departmental enquiry and prove the innocence of  

the  delinquent.   It  was  also  contended  that  the  

High  Court  ought  to  have  considered  that  the  

impugned  order  of  dismissal  is  void,  having  been  

passed  without  their  being  any  master  and  servant  

relationship existing at the time of passing of the  

order against the delinquent in absence of order of  

reinstatement.  

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10. Per  contra,  according  to  the  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  respondents,  in  view  of  order  

dated 2nd July, 2001 Shri Tiwary was deemed to have  

been reinstated and in terms of Clause 19.3(d) Shri  

Tiwary  was  deemed  to  be  on  duty  of  the  Bank  from  

the date order of suspension was issued.  

11. We  have  considered  the  respective  submissions  

and  also  perused  the  relevant  provisions  of  Bi­

partite Settlement.

12. ‘The disciplinary action and procedure’ of the  

Bank  are  guided  by  Chapter  19  of  Bi­partite  

Settlement,  1966.  As  per  Clause  19.3(b),  if  an  

employee  of  the  Bank  is  convicted  in  a  criminal  

case,  such  employee  may  be  dismissed  from  service  

from the date of his conviction or may be inflicted  

with lesser form of punishment depending on gravity  

of  charges.  Clauses  19.3(c)  and  19.3(d)  relate  to  

action  which  is  to  be  taken  by  the  disciplinary  

authority, in case an employee is acquitted during  

the  trial  or  pursuant  to  an  order  passed  in  an  

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appeal  or  revision.   Relevant  Clause  19.3(c)  and  

Clause 19.3(d)   read as follows:

“19.3(c) If he be acquitted, it shall be open  to  the  management  to  proceed  against  him  under the provisions set out below in Clauses  19.11 and 19.12 infra relating to discharges.  However,  in  the  event  of  the  management  deciding after enquiry not to continue him in  service,  he  shall  be  liable  only  for  termination of service with three months’ pay  and  allowances  in  lieu  of  notice.   And  he  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  on  duty  during  the  period  of  suspension,  if  any,  and  shall  be  entitled  to  the  full  pay  and  allowances  minus  such  subsistence  allowances  as  he  has  drawn  and  to  all  other  privileges  for  the  period  of  suspension  provided  that  he  be  acquitted by being given the benefit of doubt  he  may  be  paid  such  portion  of  such  pay  and  allowances as the management may deem proper,  and  the  period  of  his  absence  shall  not  be  treated as a period spent on duty unless the  management so direct.  

19.3(d)  If  he  prefers  an  appeal  or  revision  application  against  his  conviction  and  is  acquitted, in case he had already been dealt  with  as  above  and  he  applies  to  the  management  for  reconsideration  of  his  case,  the management shall review his case and may  either  reinstate  him  or  proceed  against  him  under  the  provisions  set  below  in  Clauses  19.11  and  19.12  infra  relating  to  discharge,  and  the  provision  set  out  above  as  to  pay,  allowances  and  the  period  of  suspension  will  apply,  the  period  upto  date  for  which  full  pay and allowances have not been drawn being  treated as one of suspension. In the event of  the management deciding, after enquiry not to  continue  him  in  service,  the  employee  shall  

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be  liable  only  for  termination  with  three  months’ pay and allowance in lieu of notice,  as directed above.”

13. The  above  reproduced  provisions  represent  the  

intention of the Bank and the Union to determine as  

to  what  steps  the  disciplinary  authority  requires  

to  take  in  case  an  employee  who  is  accused  in  a  

criminal case is acquitted during the trial or such  

employee after conviction is subsequently acquitted  

in an appeal or revision. Clause 19.3(c) applies to  

the  cases  where  the  employee  is  acquitted  during  

the  trial.  On  the  other  hand,  Clause  19.3(d)  

applies  to  the  cases  where  the  convicted  employee  

prefers  an  appeal  or  revision  application  against  

his  conviction  and  is  acquitted.  Under  Clause  

19.3(d)  if  an  employee  applies  to  the  management  

for  reconsideration  of  his  case  on  acquittal,  the  

management is required to review his case and may  

either  reinstate  him  or  proceed  against  him  under  

the  provisions  set  in  Clauses  19.11  and  19.12  

relating  to  discharge,  the  period  up­to­date  for  

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which  full  pay  and  allowances  have  not  been  paid  

being treated as one of suspension. In the event of  

management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue  

in service, the employee shall be liable only for  

termination  with  three  months’  pay  and  allowances  

in lieu of notice.   

14. Reverting  to  the  facts  of  this  case,  we  find  

that Shri Tiwary was acquitted during the trial for  

the offence under Section 468 IPC and Section 477  

(A) IPC and was ordered to undergo RI for one year  

each  for  both  the  Sections.   He  was  acquitted  by  

giving benefit of doubt in the criminal appeal. In  

such case, Shri Tiwary was liable to be proceeded  

under  Clause  19.3(d)  and,  thereby,  the  appellants  

cannot derive of the benefit of Clause 19.3(c) of  

the Bi­partite Settlement.  

The disciplinary authority by its notice dated  

2nd July, 2001 passed the following order:  

“As such, it is ordered that Shri Tiwary  will be deemed to have been placed under  suspension  from  the  date  of  original  order  of  dismissal  i.e.  21.07.1999  and  

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shall continue to remain under suspension  until further order. During the period of  suspension,  he  will  be  entitled  to  subsistence  allowance  on  the  same  scale  as  he  was  getting  just  before  his  dismissal on 21.07.1999.”

15. If  Clause  19.3(d)  is  read  along  with  the  

notice dated 2nd July, 2001, it is clear that Shri  

Tiwary  stood  reinstated  w.e.f.  21st  July,  1999,  

i.e., the date on which he was originally dismissed  

from  service  and  deemed  to  be  continuing  under  

suspension  since  then.  For  the  said  reasons,  the  

stand taken by the appellants that Shri Tiwary was  

not reinstated before the departmental proceedings  

is  fit  to  be  rejected  and  we  hold  that  he  was  

entitled for subsistence allowance and not the full  

pay and allowances as called for.  

16. We  find  no  illegality  in  the  order  of  

termination or orders passed by the learned Single  

Judge  and  the  Division  Bench  of  the  Patna  High  

Court.  They  do  not  call  for  any  interference.  In  

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absence of any merit, the appeal is dismissed but  

there shall be no order as to costs.  

………..……………………………………………..J.       ( G.S. SINGHVI )

……………………………………………………….J.        ( SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA )

NEW DELHI, JULY 16, 2012.

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