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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1791 OF 2008

SURINDER SINGH …APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA      …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. In  this  appeal  judgment  and order  dated 01/11/2007  

passed  by  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  is  under  

challenge.

2. The appellant is original accused no. 1.  He was tried  

along  with  Hazura  Singh–original  accused  no.  2,  Narata  

Singh–original  accused  no.  3  and  Kaushalya  –  original  

accused no. 4 for offences punishable under Sections 498A

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and  304B  of  the  IPC  by  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge  

Yamuna Nagar in Sessions Case No. 60 of 1994.  Appellant is  

the  husband  of  deceased  Anita  (“the  deceased”  or  

“Anita”).  Accused no. 2 is his father, accused no. 3 is his  

uncle and accused no. 4 is his mother.

3. The deceased was daughter of Ram Lal.   Admittedly,  

she was married to the appellant on 24/04/1994.  According  

to the prosecution, the accused were not satisfied with the  

quality  and  quantity  of  the  dowry  given  at  the  time  of  

marriage.  They used to taunt and beat the deceased.  At  

times, they used to keep her hungry.  She had informed her  

brothers and father about this ill-treatment and harassment.  

Her  brother  Ashok  Kumar  and  his  brother-in-law  Pawan  

Kumar went to the house of the accused and protested.  At  

that time the accused told Ashok Kumar that if he had so  

much affection for his sister he should give Rs.60,000/- for  

the business of the appellant.  Ashok Kumar expressed his  

helplessness to meet the demand.  Ashok Kumar sent his  

younger brother Satish Kumar to bring the deceased home,  

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but, the accused told him that he should take the deceased  

home after  some days.   On  22/07/1994  the  uncle  of  the  

appellant i.e. accused no. 3 - Narata Singh went to the house  

of the parents of the deceased and told them that Anita-the  

deceased had committed suicide by burning herself.  Ashok  

Kumar accompanied by his father, brother Satish Kumar and  

brother-in-law  Pawan  Kumar  went  to  the  house  of  the  

accused.  The burnt dead body of Anita was found kept on a  

cot  in  the  verandah.   Ashok  Kumar,  then,  went  to  P.S.  

Yamunanagar and lodged FIR Exhibit-PK.  On completion of  

investigation the accused came to be charged as aforesaid.  

4. The  prosecution  examined,  inter  alia,  PW-6  Satish  

Kumar  and  PW-7  Ashok  Kumar,  who  unfolded  the  

prosecution story about the ill-treatment meted out to the  

deceased.  PW-9 Dr. V.K. Nagpal conducted the post-mortem  

and gave report Exhibit-PH.  PW-11 Maharaj Singh, DSP, who  

conducted the investigation, gave details of investigation.

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5. The accused denied the allegations of demand of dowry  

and  harassment  to  the  deceased.   The  appellant  in  his  

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. stated  

that the deceased was well looked after.  Lot of affection was  

shown  to  her.   When  she  was  carrying,  proper  medical  

treatment was given to her.  She developed complications  

and pregnancy had to be terminated.  The doctors told her  

that  whenever  she  conceives  she  will  have  problem  of  

bleeding.  The deceased was last examined on 19/07/1994.  

After  her  abortion  the  deceased  was  in  depression  and,  

therefore,  she committed suicide.   The accused examined  

three doctors.  They are DW-1 Dr. Mrs. Iqbal Kaur, DW-2 Dr.  

Fitu Mago and DW-3 Dr. C. Vijayendra.  DW-4 Anil Kumar, the  

brother-in-law  produced  letter  Exhibit-DF  received  by  him  

from the deceased.  

6. The  trial  court  by  its  judgment  and  order  dated  

01/08/1998 convicted the appellant and other accused for  

offence  punishable  under  Section  304-B  of  the  IPC  and  

sentenced them to undergo RI for seven years each.  The  

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accused were also convicted for  offence punishable under  

Section 498A of the IPC and sentenced to suffer RI for two  

years each.  They were ordered to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-  

each,  in  default,  they were directed to undergo RI  for  six  

months.   The  substantive  sentences  were  ordered  to  run  

concurrently.

7. The  accused  carried  an  appeal  to  the  Punjab  and  

Haryana High Court.  The High Court acquitted accused nos.  

2 to 4 on the ground that allegations made against them  

were vague and that they were living separately from the  

appellant.   The  High  Court,  however,  confirmed  the  

conviction and sentence of the appellant, hence, this appeal  

to this Court.  

8. Learned senior  counsel  for  the appellant  Mr.  Nidhesh  

Gupta submitted that since on the same set of evidence all  

the other accused have been acquitted the appellant should  

also have been acquitted because no part of the evidence  

involves the appellant alone. Counsel submitted that there is  

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nothing  on  record  to  establish  that  the  deceased  was  

subjected  to  cruelty  or  harassment  by  the  appellant.  

Counsel  submitted  that,  in  any  case,  the  prosecution  has  

failed to establish that the alleged cruelty and harassment  

was  in  connection  with  dowry.   The  allegations  are  too  

general and vague.  No specific allegations are made against  

the  appellant  therefore  Section  304B  of  the  IPC  is  not  

attracted.  Presumptions under Section 304B of the IPC and  

Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 also do not  

arise  in  this  case.   The  witnesses  have  made  only  bald  

statements. No independent witnesses like neighbours have  

been examined to prove that the deceased was treated with  

cruelty.  Thus, the conviction of the appellant under Section  

304B  of  the  IPC  is  not  sustainable.   In  this  connection  

counsel relied on Surinder Kaur and anr.   v.   State of   

Haryana  1  ,   Durga Prasad and anr.  v.  State of Madhya   

Pradesh  2    and Geeta Mehrotra and anr.   v.   State of  

Uttar Pradesh and anr.  3    Counsel further submitted that  

so far  as demand of  Rs.60,000/-  is  concerned,  no date of  1 (2004) 4 SCC 109 2 (2010) 9 SCC 73 3 (2012) 10 SCC 741

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demand is mentioned, therefore, it is not possible to say that  

this  alleged  demand  was  made  soon  before  the  death.  

Moreover,  the  demand  was  made  for  business  of  the  

appellant, therefore, it cannot be called a dowry demand.  In  

this connection counsel relied on  Vipin Jaiswal (A-I)   v.   

State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  represented  by  Public  

Prosecutor  4  .  .   Drawing  our  attention  to  letter  Exhibit-DF  

dated  16/07/1994  counsel  submitted  that  this  letter  was  

written  by  the  deceased  just  15  days  before  the  date  of  

incident to  DW-4 Anil  Kumar,  who is  brother-in-law of  the  

appellant. In that letter she has made no grievance about  

the alleged harassment or cruelty.  In fact, she has made  

fond  reference  to  the  members  of  the  appellant’s  family.  

This shows that allegations of harassment and cruelty are  

false.   Counsel also drew our attention to the evidence of  

the  doctors  examined  by  the  appellant  in  support  of  his  

defence.  He submitted that it is clear from their evidence  

that while the deceased was pregnant she was bleeding and,  

therefore,  her  pregnancy  had  to  be  terminated.   The  

4 (2013) 3 SCC 684

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deceased  was  told  that  she  may  not  conceive  a  child.  

Thereafter, the deceased went into depression.  She appears  

to  have  committed  suicide  while  in  depression.   In  the  

circumstances,  the  appellant  cannot  be  convicted  under  

Section  304B  and  498A  of  the  IPC.   His  conviction  and  

sentence deserves to be set aside.

9. Learned counsel  for  the  State  of  Haryana Mr.  Kamal  

Mohan Gupta submitted that PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7  

Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have unfolded the  

prosecution  case.  They  are  reliable  and  trustworthy  

witnesses.  They have described the ill-treatment meted out  

to  the  deceased  and  the  demand of  dowry  made by  the  

appellant.   Counsel  submitted  that  the  demand  of  

Rs.60,000/-  related  to  the  appellant’s  business.   The  

evidence  of  PW-6  Satish  Kumar  and  PW-7  Ashok  Kumar  

makes reference to the specific date of demand and specific  

amount,  which was demanded by the appellant.   Counsel  

submitted  that  deceased  Anita  died  within  94  days  of  

marriage.  There can be no doubt that her death caused by  

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burns was otherwise than under normal circumstances.  The  

conviction  of  the  appellant  is  legal  and  perfectly  justified  

and, therefore, the appeal be dismissed.  

10. The evidence of  PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7 Ashok  

Kumar, brothers of the deceased, gives us the prosecution  

story.   PW-7 Ashok Kumar  is  the  complainant,  hence,  we  

shall  first  advert  to  his  evidence.   He  stated  that  the  

deceased was married to the appellant on 20/04/1994.  The  

accused were not satisfied with the quality and the quantity  

of the dowry given by them at the time of marriage.  They  

used to taunt the deceased and the deceased had told him  

about  this  many  times.  The  accused  used  to  demand  

Rs.60,000/- for the business of the appellant or for getting  

him some job.  PW-7 Ashok Kumar further stated that once  

he and his brother-in-law Pawan Kumar visited the house of  

the appellant to request the accused to treat the deceased  

properly.  According to him, the accused told him that if he  

had  so  much  affection  for  his  sister  he  should  pay  

Rs.60,000/- to them.  He expressed inability to do so.  On  

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05/07/1994 the deceased came to their house and even at  

that time she told them about the demand of Rs.60,000/-.  

PW-7 Ashok Kumar further stated that on 21/07/1994 they  

received a message that Anita should be taken home.  He  

sent his brother PW-6 Satish Kumar to bring his sister home  

but the accused did not send her.  On 22/07/1994 Narata  

Singh, uncle of the appellant, came to their house and told  

them that Anita had committed suicide.  PW-7 Ashok Kumar  

went to the house of the accused along with his brother PW-

6 Satish Kumar, his father and brother-in-law Pawan Kumar.  

He saw the dead body of his sister kept in a verandah.  He,  

then, lodged FIR Exhibit-PK.  It is pertinent to note that in the  

FIR  also  PW-7  Ashok  Kumar  has  stated  that  the  accused  

demanded Rs.60,000/-, for the business of the appellant or  

for getting him some job.  PW-6 Satish Kumar corroborates  

PW-7  Ashok  Kumar.   PW-6  Satish  Kumar  also  stated  that  

accused were not satisfied with the dowry and they used to  

taunt his sister for bringing less and inferior quality of dowry.  

He stated that the accused used to beat the deceased and  

keep her hungry and the deceased used to tell them about  

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the misbehaviour of the accused whenever she came home.  

He further stated that on 05/07/1994 the deceased told him  

that the accused are demanding Rs.60,000/- for investing in  

the  business  of  the  appellant.   They  expressed  their  

helplessness to pay the amount.  The accused continued to  

beat the deceased.  He further stated that on 21/07/1994  

PW-7 Ashok Kumar received a message from his sister that  

she should be brought to their house.  He, then, went to the  

appellant’s house to bring the deceased home.  The accused  

asked him to fulfill their demand before taking his sister with  

him to his house.  He returned home alone.  PW-6 Satish  

Kumar further stated that on 22/07/1994 Narata Singh, uncle  

of the appellant came to their house and informed them that  

Anita had committed suicide.  He went to the house of the  

appellant along with his father and brother and found that  

the dead body of Anita was kept in the verandah.  Thus, the  

evidence  of  these  two  witnesses  establishes  that  the  

deceased was treated with cruelty.   She was subjected to  

harassment  in  the  appellant’s  house  because  the  dowry  

given  in  the  marriage  was  inadequate  and  not  of  good  

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quality.   It  is  also  established  that  the  accused  wanted  

Rs.60,000/- for investing in the appellant’s business or for  

getting him some job.   

11. The fact that the marriage took place on 20/04/1994 is  

not  disputed.   Anita  died  on  account  of  burns  in  the  

appellant’s  house.    Her  death was  otherwise than under  

normal circumstances.  She died just within 94 days of the  

marriage.  It is true that the relatives of the appellant have  

been  acquitted  on  the  ground  that  there  are  no  specific  

allegations against them.  It is argued that, therefore, the  

appellant should also be acquitted because the allegations  

are general as against him also.  We are unable to agree  

with this submission.  There is a great difference between  

the allegations levelled against the relatives of the appellant  

and  the  appellant.   The  entire  prosecution  story  revolves  

around the appellant.  The demand of Rs.60,000/- relates to  

the appellant.  The witnesses are specific on this point.  PW-

7 Ashok Kumar has stated so in the FIR also.  Therefore, the  

appellant’s case stands on a different footing.  

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12. It is further argued that neither PW-7 Ashok Kumar nor  

PW-6 Satish Kumar have stated the exact date on which they  

went  to  the  house  of  the  accused  when  the  demand  for  

Rs.60,000/-  was made and,  therefore,  it  is  not possible to  

locate the date on which demand for Rs.60,000/- was made.  

Resultantly,  it  is  not  possible to  say whether  the demand  

was  made  soon  before  the  death  of  Anita.   We  have  no  

hesitation in rejecting this submission.   

13. Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 states  

that when the question is whether a person has committed  

the  dowry  death  of  a  woman,  and  it  is  shown that  soon  

before her death such woman has been subjected by such  

person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with,  

any demand for dowry, the court shall  presume that such  

person had caused the dowry death. Section 304B of the IPC  

states that where the death of a woman is caused by any  

burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal  

circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is  

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shown  that  soon  before  her  death  she  was  subjected  to  

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her  

husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,  

such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband  

or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.  Thus,  

the words ‘soon before’ appear in Section 113B of the Indian  

Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304B of the IPC.  For  

the  presumptions  contemplated  under  these  Sections  to  

spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or  

harassment  was  caused  soon  before  the  death.   The  

interpretation  of  the  words  ‘soon  before’  is,  therefore,  

important.  The question is how ‘soon before’?  This would  

obviously depend on facts and circumstances of each case.  

The  cruelty  or  harassment  differs  from  case  to  case.   It  

relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to  

person.  Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical.  Mental  

cruelty  is  also  of  different  shades.   It  can  be  verbal  or  

emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman.  

It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear  

ones.   It  can  be  depriving  her  of  economic  resources  or  

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essential amenities of life.  It can be putting restraints on her  

movements.  It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside  

world.  The list is illustrative and not exhaustive.  Physical  

cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to  

the person of a woman.  Every such instance of cruelty and  

related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a  

woman.   Some instances  may  be  so  grave  as  to  have  a  

lasting impact on a woman.  Some instances which degrade  

her  dignity  may remain etched in  her  memory for  a  long  

time.  Therefore, ‘soon before’ is a relative term.  In matters  

of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae.  The time-lag  

may differ from case to case.  This must be kept in mind  

while examining each case of dowry death.   

14. In  this  connection  we  may  refer  to  judgment  of  this  

Court in  Kans Raj  v. State of Punjab  5   where this Court  

considered  the  term  ‘soon  before’.   The  relevant  

observations are as under:

5 (2000) 5 SCC 207

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“… … … “Soon before” is a relative term which  is  required  to  be  considered  under  specific  circumstances  of  each  case  and  no  straitjacket  formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.  This  expression  is  pregnant  with  the  idea  of  proximity  test.  The  term  “soon  before”  is  not  synonymous with the term “immediately before”  and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as  used and understood in  Section  114,  Illustration  (a) of the Evidence Act. These words would imply  that the interval should not be too long between  the time of making the statement and the death. It  contemplates  the  reasonable  time  which,  as  earlier  noticed,  has  to  be  understood  and  determined  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  each  case.  In  relation  to  dowry  deaths,  the  circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or  harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a  particular instance but normally refer to a course  of conduct.  Such conduct may be spread over a  period  of  time.  If  the  cruelty  or  harassment  or  demand for dowry is shown to have persisted, it  shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any  other intervening circumstance showing the non- existence  of  such  treatment  is  not  brought  on  record,  before  such  alleged  treatment  and  the  date  of  death.  It  does  not,  however,  mean  that  such  time  can  be  stretched  to  any  period.  Proximate  and  live  link  between  the  effect  of  cruelty  based  on  dowry  demand  and  the  consequential  death is  required to be proved by  the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or  harassment  based  upon  such  demand  and  the  date of  death should not be too remote in  time  which,  under  the  circumstances,  be  treated  as  having become stale enough.”

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Thus, there must be a nexus between the demand of  

dowry, cruelty or harassment, based upon such demand and  

the date of  death.   The test  of  proximity  will  have to  be  

applied.  But, it is not a rigid test.  It depends on facts and  

circumstances of each case and calls for a pragmatic and  

sensitive approach of the court within the confines of law.  

15. The  evidence  of  brothers  of  Anita  show  that  after  

marriage  Anita  was  unhappy  in  the  matrimonial  house  

because of the ill-treatment meted out to her.  Anita died  

otherwise than under normal circumstances in her husband’s  

house within three months and four days of marriage.  It is,  

indeed, a very short period.  The cruelty was spread over the  

short period covering the date of her          marriage till her  

death displaying a course of conduct.   In her case, in our  

opinion, cruelty caused to her on any day from the date of  

her marriage i.e. 20/04/1994 till  the date of her death i.e.  

22/07/1994 could be cruelty caused ‘soon before’ her death.  

Therefore, even if date of their visit to the appellant’s house,  

when  the  demand  was  made,  is  not  stated  by  Anita’s  

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brothers in the court, that hardly makes any difference.  In  

any case, the brothers have stated that on 05/07/1994 Anita  

came to their house and told them about the demand.  Anita  

died shortly thereafter.  

16.  That takes us to the next submission that Rs.60,000/-  

were demanded after the marriage for the business of the  

appellant, and, therefore, it is not a dowry demand.  In this  

connection,  reliance is  placed on  Vipin Jaiswal.   In that  

case the appellant therein was married to the deceased on  

22/02/1996.  The case of the prosecution was that ever since  

the marriage, the deceased was subjected to physical and  

mental torture by the appellant and others for not getting  

sufficient dowry.  The trial court convicted all  the accused  

under Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC.  The High Court  

acquitted  the  relatives  of  the  appellant-husband,  but,  

confirmed his conviction.  It is pertinent to note that while  

acquitting the appellant this Court took note of the fact that  

the deceased had left a suicide note in which she had stated  

that nobody from her husband’s family was responsible for  

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her death.  The High Court while noting that the allegations  

against the appellant were general in nature stated that the  

demand  of  Rs.50,000/-  was  made  six  months  after  the  

marriage and that was for enabling the appellant therein to  

purchase a computer and for setting-up his own business.  

This  Court  held  that  demand  made  for  purchasing  a  

computer, six months after the marriage, was not a demand  

in connection with marriage and was not a dowry demand  

within the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,  

1961.  Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case.  

Explanation to Section 304B of the IPC states that for the  

purpose  of  this  sub-section,  dowry  shall  have  the  same  

meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.  

Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, so far as it is  

material to this case, states that dowry means any property  

or  valuable  security  given  or  agreed  to  be  given  either  

directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the other  

party to the marriage at or before or at any time after the  

marriage in connection with the marriage of the said party.  

Thus, the emphasis is on property or valuable security given  

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‘at  or  before’  or  ‘at  any  time  after’  the  marriage  in  

connection with marriage.  The amount or things demanded  

must,  therefore,  have a nexus with the marriage.   In this  

case  both  the  brothers  i.e.  PW-6  Satish  Kumar  and  PW-7  

Ashok Kumar, brothers of the deceased, have clearly stated  

that the accused were unhappy by the quality and quantity  

of  the  dowry  and  the  deceased  was  being  taunted  and  

beaten-up  for  that.   The  words  ‘insufficient  and  inferior  

quality  of  dowry’  are  important.   They  indicate  that  the  

transaction  of  giving  dowry  was  not  complete.   Sufficient  

quantity of dowry was not given and that transaction was  

sought to be completed by asking for Rs.60,000/- after the  

marriage for the business of the appellant.  This demand has  

a connection with the marriage.  Therefore, in our opinion  

Vipin Jaiswal is not applicable to the present case.

17. We are mindful of the fact that in  Vipin Jaiswal this  

Court  relied  upon  Appasaheb  and  anr.  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra  6  .   In  that  case  the  accused  was  convicted  

under  Section  304B  read  with  Section  34  of  IPC.   The  6 (2007) 9 SCC 721

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incident had taken place on 15/09/1991.  The deceased was  

married to the accused about 2 ½ years prior to the date of  

the incident.   The deceased consumed poison and died in  

the house of the accused.  The allegations were that there  

was a  demand for  money and consequent  beating of  the  

deceased.   The  evidence  disclosed  that  the  demand  was  

made for defraying expenses of manure etc.  This Court held  

that  a  demand  for  money  on  account  of  some  financial  

stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or  

for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for  

dowry as the said word is normally understood.  This Court  

held  that  being a  penal  provision Section 2 of  the Dowry  

Prohibition Act, 1961 will have to be construed strictly.    

18. It  is  true that  penal  provisions  have to  be construed  

strictly.   However,  we  may  mention  that  in  Murlidhar  

Meghraj Loya   v.    State of Maharashtra  7   this Court was  

dealing with the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.  

Speaking for this Court, Krishna Iyer, J. held that any narrow  

7 (1976) 3 SCC 684

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and pedantic, literal and lexical construction of food laws is  

likely to leave loopholes for the offender to sneak out of the  

meshes  of  law  and  should  be  discouraged  and  criminal  

jurisprudence  must  depart  from  old  canons  defeating  

criminal statutes calculated to protect the public health and  

the  nation’s  wealth.  Similar  view  was  taken  in  Kisan  

Trimbak Kothula   v.   State of Maharashtra  8  . In State of  

Maharashtra   v.    Natwarlal  Damodardas  Soni  9  ,  while  

dealing with Section 135 of the Customs Act and Rule 126-

H(2)(d) of the Defence of India Rules, a narrow construction  

given by the High Court was rejected on the ground that that  

will emasculate these provisions and render them ineffective  

as a weapon for combating gold smuggling. It was further  

held that the provisions have to be specially construed in a  

manner which will  suppress the mischief and advance the  

object which the legislature had in view.  

19. While  we  reiterate  what  this  Court  has  said  in  

Appasaheb that a penal statute has to be construed strictly,  

8 (1977) 1 SCC 300 9 (1980) 4 SCC 669

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in  light  of  Kisan Trimbak and  Natwarlal  Damodardas,  

we are of the opinion that penal statute, even if it has to be  

strictly construed, must be so construed as not to defeat its  

purport.   Harassment  of  a  married  woman  in  an  Indian  

household is  a peculiar  phenomenon.   In  most  cases it  is  

seen that  the  husband or  the  members  of  his  family  are  

never  satisfied  with  what  they  get  as  dowry.   The  wife’s  

family is expected to keep fulfilling this insatiable demand in  

some  form  or  the  other  for  some  period  of  time  after  

marriage.  Such demands are also fulfilled by parents of the  

wife for fear of their daughter being ill-treated.  The courts of  

law cannot lose sight of these realities.   The presumption  

under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the  

presumption under Section 304B of the IPC have a purpose.  

These are beneficent provisions aimed at giving relief to a  

woman subjected to cruelty routinely in an Indian household.  

The meaning to be applied to each word of these provisions  

has to be in accord with the legislative intent.  Even while  

construing these provisions strictly care will have to be taken  

to see that their object is not frustrated.   

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20. As stated by this Court in  Appasaheb a demand for  

meeting financial stringency may not fall within the ambit of  

the term ‘dowry’ as defined under the Dowry Prohibition Act.  

Similarly,  a  demand  of  money  made  six  months  after  

marriage for setting-up computer business of the husband  

may not be covered by the term dowry as stated in  Vipin  

Jaiswal.  But, in this case, the demand is made to complete  

and fulfill the demand of dowry made prior to the marriage.  

The  appellant’s  grievance  was  about  the  inferior  and  

insufficient dowry given by the deceased’s family and after  

marriage  that  was  sought  to  be  fulfilled  by  asking  for  

Rs.60,000/- for setting-up appellant’s business or for getting  

him some job.  Insufficient dowry given to the appellant was  

sought to be supplemented by the demand of Rs.60,000/-.  

The present case, therefore, stands on a different footing.  

Section 304B of the IPC is clearly attracted to this case.  

21. It  was  argued  that  the  evidence  of  the  doctors  

examined  by  the  appellant  show  that  the  deceased’s  

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pregnancy was terminated, that she was told that she may  

not conceive a child again and, that, thereafter, she was in  

depression.    It  is  argued  that,  therefore,  she  committed  

suicide.  It is not possible to accept this submission.  Even if  

the pregnancy of the deceased was terminated, that would  

not  necessarily  lead  to  depression.   In  fact,  DW-3  Dr.  C.  

Vijayendra, who terminated the pregnancy of the deceased  

stated that it is not necessary that a patient may suffer from  

depression after termination of pregnancy.  Neither DW-1 Dr.  

Mrs. Iqbal Kaur or DW-2 Dr. Mrs. Ritu Mago stated that the  

deceased was in depression.  They stated that there was no  

imminent danger to the life of the deceased.  No medical  

record  was  produced  to  show  that  the  deceased  was  in  

depression  and  she  was  taking  medicine  for  the  same.  

There is nothing on record to show that the deceased was  

told that she will never conceive a child.  It is not, therefore,  

possible  to  say  that  the  deceased  committed  suicide  

because she was in depression.  Reliance was placed on a  

letter,  allegedly written by the deceased to her husband’s  

brother-in-law.   It  was submitted that  this  letter  does not  

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indicate that the deceased was tortured or harassed.  In fact,  

in  this  letter  the  deceased  has  fondly  referred  to  the  

members of the appellant’s family. PW-6 Satish Kumar and  

PW-7 Ashok Kumar have not admitted that this letter was  

written  by  their  sister.   It  is  also  improbable  that  the  

deceased would write a letter  to the brother-in-law of her  

husband.  Assuming that she wrote such a letter, she would  

never complain about the ill-treatment meted out to her in  

her matrimonial house to the brother-in-law of her husband.  

In any case, even if this letter is held to be genuine, that  

does not dilute the evidence of PW-6 Satish Kumar and PW-7  

Ashok Kumar.  This submission, therefore, does not impress  

us and is rejected.

22. None of the judgments relied upon by the appellant’s  

counsel help the appellant.  They turn on their own facts.  In  

Surinder Kaur  the demand was made 2 ½ years prior to  

the death of the deceased and, therefore, it was held that  

allegations were not proximate to the death of the deceased  

hence, Section 304B of the IPC was not attracted.  In that  

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case the appellants before this Court were the relatives of  

Surinder Kumar, the husband of the deceased.  There were  

no  direct  allegations  against  them.   Considering  all  these  

circumstances they were acquitted.  This case will have no  

application to the present case.   

23. In Durga Prasad  the appellants were convicted under  

Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC.   This Court acquitted  

them by giving benefit of doubt on the ground that except  

for certain bald statements made by the witnesses alleging  

cruelty  and  harassment  to  the  deceased-wife  no  other  

evidence was produced to prove that she committed suicide  

because of cruelty and harassment.   This case is also not  

applicable to the instant case because here the demand of  

Rs.60,000/-  specifically relates to the appellant, therefore, it  

cannot be said that qua the appellant there are no specific  

allegations.  Here the harassment and cruelty is inextricably  

linked to the appellant.  

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24. In  Geeta  Mehrotra the  High  Court  had  refused  to  

quash the complaint filed against the appellant(1), who was  

sister-in-law of the complainant and appellant(2), who was  

brother-in-law of the complainant, under Sections 498A, 323,  

504 and 506 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry  

Prohibition Act,  1961,  on  the ground that  the  question  of  

alleged lack of territorial jurisdiction cannot be decided by it  

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.  The High Court left it open  

to the appellants to move the trial court.  While quashing the  

proceedings  this  Court  took  note  of  the  fact  that  the  

marriage  between the  complainant  wife  and her  husband  

was dissolved by an ex-parte decree of divorce.  This Court  

was  of  the  view  that  in  the  circumstances  proceedings  

initiated  prior  to  the  divorce  decree  ought  not  to  be  

prosecuted further.  This Court also took into consideration  

the fact that there were no specific allegations against the  

appellants, who were relatives of the husband.  It appears  

that in the complaint there was only a casual reference to  

the appellants.  The instant case stands on different footing  

because  here  evidence  is  adduced  and  the  appellant  is  

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convicted.   The brothers  of  the  deceased have stated  on  

oath  that  Rs.60,000/-  were  demanded  for  the  appellant’s  

business and for  that amount the deceased was harassed  

and treated with cruelty.  That cruelty led to her death in  

unnatural circumstances.  

25. Before closing, the most commonplace argument must  

be dealt with.  In all cases of bride burning it is submitted  

that independent witnesses have not been examined.  When  

harassment and cruelty is meted out to a woman within the  

four  walls  of  the  matrimonial  home,  it  is  difficult  to  get  

independent witnesses to depose about it.  Only the inmates  

of the house and the relatives of the husband, who cause the  

cruelty,  witness  it.   Their  servants,  being  under  their  

obligation, would never depose against them.  Proverbially,  

neighbours  are  slippery  witnesses.   Moreover,  witnesses  

have a tendency to stay away from courts.  This is more so  

with  neighbours.   In  bride  burning  cases  who  else  will,  

therefore,  depose about the misery of the deceased bride  

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except her parents or her relatives?  It is time we accept this  

reality.  We, therefore, reject this submission.  

26. We are, therefore, of the view that the prosecution has  

successfully proved its case against the appellant.  The trial  

court  and  the  High  Court  have  concurrently  held  the  

appellant guilty of offences punishable under Sections 304B  

and 498A of the IPC.  We have no hesitation in endorsing the  

view taken by the trial court which is confirmed by the High  

Court.  The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.  The appellant is  

on bail.  His bail bonds stand cancelled. He shall surrender to  

the concerned court.

.…………………………..J. (Ranjana Prakash  

Desai)

.…………………………..J. (Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi; November 13, 2013.

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