25 September 2014
Supreme Court
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SURINDER SINGH Vs PUNJAB STATE ELECT.BOARD,PATIALA .

Bench: JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR,ARUN MISHRA
Case number: C.A. No.-006957-006957 / 2009
Diary number: 11145 / 2009
Advocates: ANIS AHMED KHAN Vs UGRA SHANKAR PRASAD


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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6957 OF 2009

Surinder Singh ..Appellant versus

Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala and Ors. ..Respondents

J U D G M E N T

J.S. KHEHAR, J.

1. On  16.07.2002,  the  Punjab  State  Electricity  Board  (hereinafter referred to as the 'Board') took a decision to fill  up 21 posts of Accounts Officer.  The above posts were to be  filled up by way of direct recruitment.  The appellant earned  164 marks in the process of selection.  He made the grade, by  way of merit, from amongst “backward class” candidates.  It is  therefore, that he came to be appointed as Accounts Officer, by  direct recruitment. 2. Respondent  No.4-Anil  Kumar  Uppal,  had  also  applied  for  appointment by way of direct recruitment, in response to the  same advertisement (in furtherance whereof, the appellant was  selected  and  appointed).   His  candidature  was,  however,  not  accepted.  It is therefore, that respondent no.4 approached the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  at  Chandigarh  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  'High  Court')  seeking  an  appropriate  direction to the Board, requiring it to allow him (respondent

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no.4) to participate in the process of selection.  By an interim  order passed by the High Court, respondent no.4 was allowed to  participate in the process of selection.   3. On  considering  the  candidature  of  respondent  no.4,  the  Selection  Committee  awarded  him  146  marks.   It  is  therefore  apparent,  that  in  terms  of  merit,  respondent  no.4  could  not  march over the superior claim of the appellant. This was so  because, whilst the appellant had been awarded 164 marks in the  process of selection, respondent no.4 had been awarded only 146  marks. 4. Respondent no.4, in order to claim appointment, chose to  assail  the  claim  of  the  appellant  by  asserting,  that  the  appellant did not factually belong to the “backward class”, and  as such, his merit could not be determined with reference to the  posts reserved for “backward class” candidates.   If he could  succeed in establishing the aforesaid position, he would fall in  the zone of selection, being possessed of the next highest marks  (after  the  appellant)  from  the  category  of  backward  class  candidates.  Insofar  as  the  instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is  concerned, the pointed contention of respondent no.4 was, that  the appellant belonged to the “creamy layer”, and as such, he  was  dis-entitled  for  being  considered  from  amongst  “backward  class” candidates.  5. The High Court, while disposing of Writ Petition No. 7660 of  2004, vide the impugned order dated 2.3.2009, arrived at the  conclusion, that the appellant actually belonged to the “creamy

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layer”, and as such, was dis-entitled to be considered as a  “backward  class”  candidate.   In  arriving  at  the  aforesaid  conclusion, the High Court took into consideration the income of  the  appellant  himself,  to  declare  that  he  belonged  to  the  “creamy  layer”.   The  aforesaid  determination  was  rendered  by  reading  down  the  policy  instructions  issued  by  the  State  Government,  on  the  basis  whereof,  the  backwardness  of  a  candidate had to be adjudged.  The aforesaid policy instructions  were read down, to include the income of the person concerned,  along with the income of the parents of the person, contemplated  by the policy instructions. 6. In the present appeal, the appellant seeks to assail the  aforesaid determination rendered by the High Court.  It was the  vehement contention of the learned counsel for the appellant,  that the judgment referred to by the High Court, for arriving at  the  conclusion,  that  the  personal  income  of  the  concerned  individual had to be taken into consideration, was a misreading  of the judgment rendered by this Court. It was in the aforesaid  background,  that  we  shall  endeavour  to  examine  the  policy  instructions  regulating  the  determination  of  backwardness  of  candidates, and the judgments relied upon by the High Court. 7. First and foremost, reference needs to be made to the office  memorandum  dated  8.9.1993  issued  by  the  Government  of  India,  Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pension (Department  of  Personnel  &  Training).   It  is  not  a  matter  of   dispute  between  the  rival  parties,  that  the  aforesaid  office

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memorandum is applicable to the present controversy.  Under the  office memorandum dated 8.9.1993, the claim of the appellant for  grant  of  a  backward  class  certificate  was  determinable  under  category IV thereof, since it is not a matter of dispute that  the appellant is a qualified Chartered Accountant.  However, in  column  3  to  the  schedule  relating  to  category  IV,  it  is  mentioned that the criteria specified against category VI would  be applicable to those who fall under category IV.  In the above  view of the matter, our interpretation on the eligibility of the  appellant for being declared as belonging to the backward class,  would be determinable on the basis of the description relatable  to category VI. Category VI and the depiction to whom the same  would be applicable, are being extracted hereunder:

Sl.No. Description of category To  whom  rule  of  exclusion  will apply

1 2 3 VI Income/Wealth Test Son(s) and daughter(s) of

(a)  persons  having  gross  annual income of Rs.1 lakh or  above  or  possessing  wealth  above the exemption limit as  prescribed in the Wealth Tax  Act  for  a  period  of  three  consecutive years; (b)  persons in Categories I,  II, III and V-A who are not  disentitled to the benefit of  reservation  but  have  income  from other sources of wealth  which will bring them within  the  income/wealth  criteria  mentioned in (a) above. Explanation:

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(i) income from salaries or  agricultural  land  shall  not  be clubbed; (ii)the  income  criteria  in  terms  of  rupee  will  be  modified taking into account  the change in its value every  three  years.  If  the  situation,  however,  so  demands, the interregnum may  be less. Explanation:  wherever  the  expression  'permanent  incapacitation'  occurs  in  this Schedule, it shall mean  incapacitation which results  in putting an officer out of  service.

 (emphasis is ours)

Having minutely examined category VI, as also the description  contained in the schedule, to whom the same would apply, there  is really no room for any doubt, that in clauses (a) and (b)  thereof,  it  is  the  income/wealth  of  the  parents  of  the  individual concerned, which is of relevance.  The description is  clearly silent about the individual's own income.  It is not  possible  for  us  to  accept,  that  the  individual's  own  income  could  have  been  taken  into  consideration.   The  above  determination of ours, is with reference to categories IV and  VI.  Therefore,  even  with  reference  to  category  IV,  which  includes professional's, the income of the professional, has not  been included.  Thus viewed, we are satisfied, that on the plain  reading of category VI of the office memorandum dated 8.9.1993,  that it was not the income of the individual concerned, but that

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of  his  parents,  that  would  determine  whether  he  would  fall  within the creamy layer or not. 8. The question which still arises is, whether it was open to  the  High  Court,  to  include  the  individual's  income  in  determining  his  eligibility  for  being  declared  as  backward  class, by reading down the policy instructions on the subject.  Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, there  can be no doubt, that the issue is determinable with reference  to the decision rendered by this Court in Indra Sawhney vs.  Union  of  India  1992  Supp.  (3)  SCC  217.   But  for  the  determination of the present controversy, we need not travel to  the  decision  in  Indra  Sawhney's  case  (supra).   It  will  be  sufficient to make a reference to the decision rendered by this  Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur vs. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 403,  wherein this Court, having examined the Office Memorandum dated  8.9.1993, approved the same by observing as under:

“10. We have carefully examined the criteria for  identifying the “creamy layer” laid down by the  Government of India in the Schedule, quoted above,  and  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  same  is  in  conformity with the law laid down by this Court in  Mandal case (Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992  Suppl.  (3)  SCC  217).  We  have  no  hesitation  in  approving  the  rule  of  exclusion  framed  by  the  Government  of  India  in  para  2(c)  read  with  the  Schedule  of  the  office  memorandum  quoted  above.  Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners  have  also  vehemently  commended  that  the  State  Governments  should follow the Government of India and lay down  similar  criteria  for  identifying  the  “creamy  layer”.  

(emphasis is ours)

It is apparent from the observations recorded by this Court, as

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have  been  extracted  hereinabove,  that  the  Office  Memorandum  dated 8.9.1993 had been examined by this Court,specifically with  reference  to  the  decision  rendered  in  Indra  Sawhney's  case  (supra).   Having  done  so,  this  Court  expressly  approved  and  confirmed the Schedule to the Office Memorandum dated 8.9.1993. 9. Based on the aforesaid declaration of law, we are of the  view that it was not open to the High Court to evaluate the  office memorandum dated 8.9.1993 from any other parameters.  It  also  needs  to  be  noticed,  that  the  issue  which  came  up  for  determination in Ashok Kumar Thakur's case (supra) came to be  re-examined before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ashok  Kumar Thakur vs. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1, wherein on the  subject  of  identification  of  the  “creamy  layer”,  the  Constitution Bench observed as under:

“1-B. IDENTIFICATION OF CREAMY LAYER 415. Income  as  the  criterion  for  creamy  layer  exclusion is insufficient and runs afoul of Sawhney  (I). (See p.724 at para 792).  Identification of  the creamy layer has been and should be left to the  Government, subject to judicial direction.  For a  valid  method  of  creamy  layer  exclusion,  the  Government may use its post-Sawhney (  I  ) criteria as    a template.  (See OM of 8.9.1993, Para 2(c)/Column  3), approved by this Court in Ashoka Kumar Thakur  vs. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 403, para 10.  This  schedule is a comprehensive attempt to exclude the  creamy  layer  in  which  income,  government  posts,  occupation  and  landholdings  are  taken  into  account.”    

(emphasis is ours)

Here again, this Court expressly approved the office memorandum  dated 8.9.1993. In view of the decisions  rendered by this Court  in both Ashok Kumar Thakur's cases (supra), we are of the view

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that the High Court clearly erred in reading down the office  memorandum dated 8.9.1993 and to include therein the income of  the individual concern while determining whether or not he fall  within the “creamy layer”. 10. Despite the declaration of law in the judgments, referred  to hereinabove, it is also necessary to take into consideration  the clarification issued by the Government of India, Ministry of  Personnel,  P.G.  and  Pensions  (Department  of  Personnal  and  Training)  dated  21.11.2002.   The  aforesaid  clarification  was  with  reference  to  the  office  memorandum  dated  8.9.1993.  Relevant extract of the clarificatory letter dated 21.11.2002 is  being reproduced below:

“I am directed to refer to your letter No.2/25/2001  RC-1/670  dated  17-10-2002  on  the  above  noted  subject and say that determination of creamy layer  for an OBC candidate is done with reference to the  income of parents as per instructions contained in  DOPT's O.M. No.36012/22/93-Estt(res) dated 8.9.93.”

(emphasis is ours)

Based on the aforesaid conclusion, there is really no room for  any doubt, that the exposition  with reference to category VI in  the office memorandum dated 8.9.1993 related only to the income  of  the  parents  of  the  individual  concerned.   And  that,  the  income of the  individual concerned was not to be taken into  consideration.    11. The  above  issue  came  to  be  examined  yet  again  by  the  Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances &  Pensions  (Department  of  Personnel  and  Training)  through  its

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memorandum dated 14.10.;2004.  In the above memorandum, a large  number of queries were clarified.  Queries at serial nos.(vi)  and  (vii)  of  paragraph  4  are  relevant  to  the  present  controversy, and are accordingly reproduced hereunder:

“4. Following questions have been raised from time  to  time  about  the  application  of  the  above  provisions to determine creamy layer.  (vi) Will a candidate who himself is a directly  recruited Class I/Group A Officer or a directly  recruited Class II/Group B officer who got into  Class I/Group A at the age of 40 or earlier be  treated to be falling in creamy layer on the basis  of his service status? (vii) will a candidate who has gross annual income  of Rs.2.5 lakh or above or possesses wealth above  the Exemption limit as prescribed in the Wealth Tax  Act  for  a  period  of  three  consecutive  years  be  treated to fall in creamy layer?”

The aforesaid queries came to be answered in paragraph 8 by  observing as under:

“8. In regard to clauses (vi), (vii) and (viii)  of para 4,  it is clarified that the creamy layer  status of a candidate is determined on the basis of  the status of his parents and not on the basis of  his own status or income or on the basis of status  or  income  of  his/her  spouse.   Therefore,  while  determining the creamy layer status of a person the  status or the income of the candidate himself or of  his/her spouse shall not be taken into account.”

(emphasis is ours)

In  view  of  the  above,  there  is  no  room  for  any  further  consideration, whether or not the individual's income is to be  taken  into  consideration,  while  computing  the  total  income  relevant  to  determine  whether  an  individual  belongs  to  the  “creamy layer”.  The above clarification reveals, that it is

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only  the  parents  income,  which  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 12. While  referring  to  the  Clarification/Circular  dated  14.10.2007  and  14.10.2004  respectively,  we  have  extracted  hereinabove the clear view of the Government of India.  It would  also be necessary for us to notice, that the above determination  of the Government of India, was adopted by the State of Punjab,  as  is  apparent  from  the  letter  issued  by  the  Government  of  Punjab, Welfare Department (Reservation Cell) dated 14.10.2007,  whereby the letter dated 17.08.2005 and the memorandum dated  14.10.2004 were circulated by the State Government to all its  Deputy Commissioners.  It is also not a matter of dispute, that  the aforesaid circulars were expressly adopted by the Punjab  State Electricity Board.  Thus viewed, we are satisfied that the  individual's  income  was  not  required  to  be  clubbed  with  the  income of his parents, while determining whether or not he was  eligible  to  be  granted  a  backward  class  certificate.    The  determination to the contrary by the High Court is liable to be  set aside.  The same is accordingly hereby set aside. 13. The instant appeal is accordingly allowed. While allowing  the instant appeal, we restore the appointment of the appellant  Surinder Singh to the post of Accounts Officer. Special Leave Petition(C) No.17161 of 2009

The controversy in the instant special leave petition  is identical to the one adjudicated upon by this Court in the  case  of  Surinder  Singh  vs.  Punjab  State  Electricity  Board,

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Patiala and others (Civil Appeal No. 6957 of 2009, decided on  25.09.2014).

In the above view of the matter, the instant special  leave petition is also disposed of in terms of the order passed  by this Court in Surinder Singh's case(supra).

….....................J. [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]

NEW DELHI; ….....................J. SEPTEMBER 25, 2014. [ARUN MISHRA]

     

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ITEM NO.102               COURT NO.7               SECTION IV                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  6957/2009 SURINDER SINGH                                     Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS PUNJAB STATE ELECT.BOARD,PATIALA & ORS.            Respondent(s) (with office report) WITH SLP(C) No. 17161/2009 (With appln.(s) for Interim Relief and Office Report)   Date : 25/09/2014 This appeal/petition were called on for  

            hearing today. CORAM :               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR              HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA For Appellant(s) Mr. R.K. Kapoor, Adv. In CA 6957/2009 Ms. Shiwani Mahipal, Adv. & respondent in Ms. Rekha Giri, Adv. SLP 17161/2009     for Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan,AOR(NP)                       For Petitioner(s)  Mrs. Jayshree Anand, Adv. In SLP 17161/2009  for Mr. Anurag Pandey,AOR(NP) & for respondent(s) in CA 6957/2009                       For Respondent(s) Mr. Neeraj Kr. Jain, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Pratham Kant, Adv. Mr. Sanjay Singh, Adv.

                   For Mr. Ugra Shankar Prasad,AOR(NP)                                 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  Reportable  Judgment, which is placed on the file.

The special leave petition is disposed of in terms of  the order passed by this Court in Surinder Singh's case, i.e.,  Civil Appeal No. 6957 of 2009. (Parveen Kr. Chawla) (Phoolan Wati Arora)     Court Master  Assistant Registrar