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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4891   OF  2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.14965 of 2013)

Surendra Mohan Arora                                 … Appellant

:Versus:

HDFC Bank Ltd. and Others                                    ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

1.     Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated January 7,  

2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No. 64  

of  2013  dismissing  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  appellant,  

questioning  the  vires  of  Regulation  15  of  the  Consumer  

Protection Regulations,  2005 (hereinafter  referred to as “the

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Regulations”)   framed  under  the  Consumer  Protection  Act,  

1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”).  

3.   The facts of the case briefly are as follows :

(3.1)   The  appellant  filed  a  complaint  before  the  District  

Forum under the said Act.  The foundation of the filing of such  

complaint  was an  allegation  made against  respondent  No.  1  –  

HDFC Bank  Ltd.   for  indulging  in  unfair  trade  practice  on  the  

ground of failure to provide professional services to the appellant  

resulting in pre-payment of loan to respondent No.1 seeking to  

levy a penalty for pre-payment.

(3.2)   By an order dated August 2, 2007, the District Forum held  

in favour of the appellant. Respondent No.1 preferred an appeal  

against the said order before the State Commission resulting in  

dismissal  by  an  order  dated  November  19,  2007.  A  revision  

petition  was  filed  before  the  National  Consumer  Disputes  

Redressal  Commission (hereinafter  referred to as “the National  

Commission”) which set aside the orders of the District Forum and  

the State Commission vide an order dated August 14, 2012 on the  

basis  of  the  agreements  inter  se between  the  parties.  Being  

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aggrieved,  the   appellant  filed a  review application before the  

National  Commission  resulting  in  dismissal  by  an  order  dated  

September 24, 2012.

(3.3) Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order,  the  

appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution  

of India before the High Court, inter alia, praying that Regulation  

15  of the Regulations be struck down on the ground that the said  

Regulation being ultra vires of the said Act, and further the review  

application  filed  by  the  appellant  should  be  re-heard  by  the  

National Commission granting an opportunity to present the case  

by making oral arguments.  

4. Mr. Nikhil Majithia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  

appellant, drew our attention to the Statement of Objects and  

Reasons of the said Act which is to provide for better protection  

of interest of consumers and it is towards that objective that  

Section 22 of the said Act was amended by Act No.62 of 2002  

with  effect  from  March  15,  2003,  conferring  the  power  of  

review on the National Commission, which was not available in  

the original Act. According to him, Regulation 15 is  ultra vires  

Section 22 of  the  said  Act.  It  is  also  his  contention  that  by  

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introducing  Regulation  15,  the  National  Commission  has  

exceeded  its  jurisdiction  and  the  power  vested  in  it  under  

Section 30A of the said Act.

5.  Section 22 of the said Act reads as follows :

“Section 22.  Power of and procedure applicable  to the National Commission. — (1) The provisions of  sections  12,  13  and  14  and  the  rules  made thereunder for the disposal of complaints by the  District Forum shall, with such modifications as may be  considered necessary by the Commission, be applicable  to the disposal of disputes by the National Commission. (2)   Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions  contained  in  sub-section (1), the National Commission shall have the  power to review any order made by it, when there is an  error apparent on the face of record.”

It is necessary to quote Regulation 15 for our purpose which  

is as under:

“Regulation 15.  Review.-(1) It  shall  set  out  clearly  the grounds for review.

(2)  Unless  otherwise  ordered by the National  Commission, an application for review shall be disposed  of  by  circulation  without  oral  arguments,  as  far  as  practicable  between  the  same  members  who  had  delivered the order sought to be reviewed.”

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6. It is needless to mention here that the said Regulations were  

duly published in the Official Gazette dated May 31, 2005 and  

were  so  made  in  pursuance  of  the  power  conferred  under  

Section 30A of the said Act conferring power on the National  

Commission to make such regulations with the prior approval  

of  the  Central  Government.  According  to  Mr.  Majithia,  the  

Consumer  Protection  Act  has  been  enacted  to  protect  and  

advance the cause of consumers.  He further contended that  

the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act in Clause 2  

states that the Act seeks to promote and protect the rights of  

consumers  including the right  to  hear  and further  to  assure  

that  the  interest  of  the  consumers  will  receive  due  

consideration at appropriate fora. He further submitted that all  

these fora are quasi-judicial authorities, therefore, are bound to  

observe the principles of natural justice.       

7. He further pointed out that the amendment of Section 22 is  

only  to  empower  the  National  Commission  to  function  more  

explicitly  and  further  to  streamline  the  functioning  of  the  

consumer fora. The main grievance of the appellant is that the  

National  Commission  has  provided  for  disposal  of  review  

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application by circulation without oral arguments. Mr. Majithia  

submitted that  the said  Act  has  provided for  promotion and  

protection of the rights of the consumers which includes the  

right  to  be  heard.  The  said  Act  has  also  provided  that  the  

principles of natural justice shall  be adhered to by all  quasi-

judicial  fora  which  include  the  National  Commission.  He  

submitted that the salient features of the Act are sought to be  

rendered redundant by way of Regulation 15, by taking away  

the right of being heard and there is no adherence to principles  

of natural justice, thereby making it ultra vires to Section 22 of  

the  said  Act.  In  these  circumstances,  he  submitted  that  

Regulation 15 should be struck down.

8. To  fortify  his  submission,  he  relied  on  the  decisions  of  this  

Court in  State of Orissa vs.  Dr.  (Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors1  

followed in  Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India2 & Anr., Sahara  

India  (Firm),  Lucknow  vs.  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax,   

Central-I  &  Anr.3 and  Automotive  Tyre  Manufacturers   

Association vs. Designated Authority and Ors.4, and it has been  

1  (1967) 2 SCR 625 2  (1978) 1 SCC 248 3  (2008) 14 SCC 151 4  (2011) 2 SCC 258

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contended by Mr. Majithia that the courts have emphasized on  

the right of being heard time and again even when an order is  

passed  by  an  administrative  authority  and  that  written  

arguments cannot be a substitute for oral hearing. It is also the  

case  of  the  appellant  that  the  national  Commission  has  

exercised its power beyond the scope of Section 30A of the Act  

while enacting Regulation 15, which in its present form defeats  

the objective of the amended Section 22 of the Act as the right  

of making oral arguments is taken away from the consumer,  

making the Regulation inconsistent with the objective of the  

Act. It has also been submitted that the impression given by  

Regulation  15(2)  that  oral  arguments  can  be  made  when  

allowed by the National Commission, is fallacious as it does not  

consider the fact that the Act has given the prerogative to the  

consumer and not to the National Commission.  Moreover, this  

would also lead to inequality as some consumers are given the  

right of being heard in open court and some are deprived of the  

same at  the  discretion  of  the  National  Commission.  Another  

submission of the learned counsel  is  that in the light of the  

principle that justice must not only be done but also be seen to  

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have been done; Section 22 is rendered redundant on account  

of Regulation 15 as the same is contrary to the principle of audi  

alteram partem which is undisputedly followed by judicial and  

quasi-judicial bodies alike.

9.   We have perused Section 22 of the said Act. Under Section  

22(2), the National Commission has been empowered to review  

an order made by it when there is an error apparent on the  

face of the record. We have also noticed sub-section (1) of the  

said  Act.  It  is  a  fact  that  this  provision  streamlines  the  

functioning of the consumer Redressal forums and also reduces  

the number of appeals to the Supreme Court from the orders of  

the National  Commission.  The power of  review did not  exist  

earlier.  It  is  trite  law  that  unless  the  power  of  review  is  

specifically  conferred  by  the  statute,  there  cannot  be  any  

inherent power of review.  

10. In the instant case, the power conferred by Section 22 of the  

said Act on the National Commission is not an inherent power  

and further the Commission has the power to review its order  

when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. We  

do not find any dispute that the Regulations have been framed  

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in accordance with the power conferred under Section 30A on  

the  Commission,  thereby  effecting  its  right  to  frame  

Regulations. Therefore, the Regulations have been framed in  

accordance  with  law.  We  have  minutely  gone  through  

Regulation  15(2)  and  found  that  power  to  deal  with  review  

applications lies with the Commission. The procedure is to be  

adopted  by  the  National  Commission,  whether  the  review  

petition would be decided after hearing the parties orally or can  

be disposed of by way of circulation. Therefore, we do not find  

that  any  mischief  has  been  done  by  framing  the  said  

Regulations. In our opinion, the said Regulations under Section  

22 of the said Act, cannot be said to be ultra vires the said Act.  

Accordingly,  we do not find any substance in the arguments  

put up before us by Mr. Majithia. There is no reason to believe  

that  the  National  Commission  by  enacting  Regulation  15  

exceeded its jurisdiction or the power vested in it under Section  

30A of the said Act, as has been tried to be contended by Mr.  

Majithia.  

11. The  other  grievance  of  Mr.  Majithia  is  that  the  National  

Commission in its Cause List specifically issued a notice that no  

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proxy counsel shall be allowed to make submissions. According  

to  him,  such  a  direction  is  bad  in  law  and  is  without  any  

jurisdiction. According to him, such direction is also arbitrary  

and illegal as it prevents a qualified lawyer enrolled on the rolls  

of  a  State  Bar  Council  from presenting  his  case  before  the  

National  Commission.  He further  submitted that  it  is  also  in  

violation  of  Article  19(1)(g)  of  the  Constitution,  being  the  

fundamental  right  to  practice.  He  further  stated  that  under  

Section  30  of  the  Advocates  Act,  1961,  an  Advocate,  after  

having been enrolled, has a right to appear before the courts or  

any other authority and, therefore, it is curtailment of the right  

of an Advocate. We find that under the Advocates Act, there is  

no terminology which defines “proxy counsel”. We have found  

in  a  very  recent  decision  of  this  Court  in  S.L.P.  (Criminal)  

No.9967 of 2011 (Sanjay Kumar v. The State of Bihar & Anr.), a  

three-Judge Bench of this Court in its order dated January 28,  

2014 has held as follows :

“In  such  a  chaotic  situation,  any  “Arzi”,  “Farzi”,  half-baked  lawyer  under  the  label  of  “proxy  counsel”,  a  phrase  not  traceable  under  the  Advocates Act, 1961 or under the Supreme Court Rules,  1966 etc., cannot be allowed to abuse and misuse the  

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process of the court under a false impression that he  has a right to waste public time without any authority  to appear in the court, either from the litigant or from  the AOR, as in the instant case. ….”

       Therefore, we do not find any substance in the submission of  

Mr. Majithia with regard to “proxy counsel”. We also do not find  

that the decisions cited by Mr. Majithia before us can extend any  

help in the facts and circumstances of this case.  

12. The foundation, as it appears to us for filing this appeal by  

the  appellant,  is  only  to  curtail  the  rights  of  the  National  

Commission  to  adopt  the  procedure  whether  the  review  

petitions will be decided after granting an opportunity of being  

heard to the petitioner. From the order of the High Court, we  

find that no such request was made in the application before  

the  National  Commission  for  such  hearing.  In  these  

circumstances,  the  High  Court  correctly  held  that  the  writ  

petition  is  misconceived  and  devoid  of  merit  without  even  

laying the basic foundation for having sought an oral hearing of  

the review application. We do not find any reason to interfere  

with  the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court.  Accordingly,  we  

uphold and affirm the said order and dismiss this appeal.

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…....……………………..J. (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi;                                                             ......... …………………….J.

April 25, 2014.                                           (Pinaki Chandra   Ghose)

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