SUKHLAL SARKAR Vs UNION OF INDIA .
Bench: K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001117-001117 / 2006
Diary number: 17479 / 2006
Advocates: ANJANI AIYAGARI Vs
SUSHMA SURI
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Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1117 OF 2006
SUKHLAL SARKAR Appellant (s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. We are in this case concerned only with the question
whether Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No.
172 of 2001 was correct in holding that no case has been made
out attracting the first exception to Section 300 IPC so as to
convert the conviction under Section 302 to 304-I IPC
2. The Appellant Sukhlal Sarkar was working as a constable
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in Border Security Force (BSF). He was convicted under
Sections 302 and 307 IPC for offences committed in the
intervening night of 13/14th July, 1996. The General Security
Force Court (GSFC) after conducting the full dress trial convicted
him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life. The order was confirmed by
Confirming Officer, Inspector General, (IG) BSF.
3. Dissatisfied with the order, the appellant filed the writ
petition (W.P.(C) No. 562/1999) which was partly allowed by an
order dated 13.09.2001 by the learned Single Judge by
converting the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304-I,
IPC reducing the sentence from life term to 10 years rigorous
imprisonment.
4. Aggrieved by the said judgment, Writ Appeal No. 172 of
2001 was filed by the respondent herein, which was allowed by
the High Court vide order dated 9.2.2005 setting aside the
judgment of the learned Single Judge and confirming the
judgment of GSFC. Aggrieved by the said judgment, this appeal
has been preferred.
5. Counsel appearing for the appellant confined her
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submission only to the question whether the conviction under
Section 302 IPC be converted to Section 304-I IPC, for which
according to the counsel, sufficient grounds exist.
6. Counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted
that learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in
holding that there was no motive on the part of the appellant to
do away with the life of his colleague Sanjay Kumar Dubey but it
was due to grave and sudden provocation he opened fire from
his rifle resulting in the death of Sanjay Kumar Dubey. Learned
counsel for the appellant referred to the evidence of M. Robin,
P.W 1, who was the sole eye witness to the occurrence. The
relevant portion of the evidence of PW 1 was read over to us.
7. Learned counsel submitted that the evidence of P.W 1
would clearly indicate that the deceased Sanjay Kumar Dubey
had slapped and pushed the appellant down and provoked him
to open fire from his rifle. Further it was submitted that the
evidence of P.W 1 would clearly indicate that the deceased shook
the appellant's leg with his hand in order to wake him up and all
those deeds committed by the deceased caused grave and
sudden provocation to commit the offence. Counsel submitted
that the learned Single Judge was justified in converting the
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conviction of the appellant from Section 302 IPC to that of
Section 304-I IPC.
8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents
submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court had
correctly appreciated the evidence of PW 1 and came to the right
conclusion that ingredients of offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC were clearly made out. Learned counsel
also referred to the evidence of PW 1 and submitted that there
was no grave and sudden provocation for the appellant to claim
the first exception of Section 300 IPC warranting conviction
under Section 304-I IPC.
9. We have critically gone through the evidence on record
especially the evidence of PW 1. Considerable thrust was made
by the counsel appearing for the appellant on the following
evidence of PW 1 which reads as follows: “Infuriated, Sanjay
Kumar Dubey slapped and pushed the accused and the accused
fell down”. Learned Single Judge, it may be noted, had opined
that the provocation was mild, but was sudden and hence the
exception to Section 300 would apply.
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10. The meaning of the expressions “grave” and “sudden”
provocation has come up for consideration before this Court in
several cases and it is unnecessary to refer to the judgments in
those cases. The expression “grave” indicate that provocation be
of such a nature so as to give cause for alarm to the appellant.
“Sudden” means an action which must be quick and unexpected
so far as to provoke the appellant. The question whether
provocation was grave and sudden is a question of fact and not
one of law. Each case is to be considered according to its own
facts.
11. Under Exception 1 of Section 300, provocation must be
grave and sudden and must have by gravity and suddenness
deprived the appellant of the power of self-control, and not
merely to set up provocation as a defence. It is not enough to
show that the appellant was provoked into loosing his control,
must be shown that the provocation was such as would in the
circumstances have caused the reasonable man to loose his self-
control. A person could claim the benefit of provocation has to
show that the provocation was grave and sudden that he was
deprived of power of self-control and that he caused the death of
a person while he was still in that state of mind.
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12. We have critically gone through the evidence of PW 1, the
eye witness, and we are of the considered view that the deceased
had not provoked the appellant in inviting him to fire from his
rifle so as to kill him. The deceased, it may be noted was
unarmed. PW 1 was only trying to wake up the appellant so as
to do patrolling duty. Assuming that the deceased had slapped
and pushed the appellant, such an action of the deceased could
not be characterized as grave and sudden, so as to provoke the
appellant to fire at the deceased killing him at the spot.
13. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the reasoning of the
Division Bench of the High Court in declining to convert the
conviction to Section 304-I IPC. We, therefore, dismiss the
appeal.
....................................J (K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
....................................J (DIPAK MISRA)
NEW DELHI April 24, 2012
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