SUBHASH CHANDRA Vs GULAB BAI
Bench: T.S. THAKUR,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: C.A. No.-001696-001696 / 2016
Diary number: 21712 / 2013
Advocates: SESHATALPA SAI BANDARU Vs
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1696 OF 2016 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.23066 of 2013]
SUBHASH CHANDRA ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
GULAB BAI & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1697 OF 2016 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.32048 of 2013]
SUBHASH CHANDRA ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
GULAB BAI & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
T.S. THAKUR, CJI.
1. Leave granted.
2. The short question that falls for determination in these
appeals is whether a retired Municipal Corporation employee
can also maintain an application for eviction under Chapter
1
Page 2
III-A of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act,
1961 and, in particular, whether any such ‘retired employee’
is an employee of a ‘company owned or controlled by the
State Government’ within the meaning of Section 23-J(ii) of
the Act aforementioned. A Full Bench of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Indore has by a 2:1 decision answered
the said question in the negative and declared that ‘retired
employees’ of Municipal Corporation will not be covered
under Section 23-J (ii) of the Act to maintain an application
for eviction under Chapter III-A thereof.
3. We have heard Mr. Subhash Samvatsar, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. S.K. Dube, learned senior
counsel appearing as Amicus on behalf of the respondents.
We also had the advantage of going through the judgment
and order under challenge and several other decisions
rendered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh including
those rendered in Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra
Verma (1995 MPLJ 21) and Ghanshyam v. Subhash
[ILR (2011) MP 2586].
2
Page 3
4. In Ranjit Narayan’s case (supra) a Division Bench of
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was examining whether
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation was a
‘company owned or controlled by the State Government’ so
as to entitle any employee who retired from its service to
maintain an eviction petition under Chapter III-A of the
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
Answering the question in the affirmative, the High Court
held that keeping in view the objects and reasons and the
scheme of the Act, especially the scheme underlying
Chapter-IIIA thereof, the expression ‘company owned or
controlled by the State Government or Central Government’
must be understood to include even statutory corporations
like the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation
established under the State Road Corporation Act. The High
Court while saying so, approved the ratio in Vipin v.
Ranajitnarayan and Ors. (1986 MPRCJ Note 11) while
overruling the decision in Sobhagyamal v. Prakash
Pharmaceuticals, Indore (AIR 1990 MP 345).
3
Page 4
5. In a Special Leave Petition filed against the said
judgment and order, this Court by a short order affirmed the
reasoning and the view taken by the High Court. This Court
observed:
“We agree with the view taken by the Division Bench that the word ‘company’ in Section 23(J)(ii) would include ‘Corporation’ created under the special Statute which is owned or controlled by the Central or the State Government. Hence, the S.L.P. is dismissed.” (Surendra Verma v. Ranjeet Narayan Haksar: 1995 JLJ 460)
6. Ghanshyam (supra) is a Single Bench decision of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh where the question which fell
for consideration was whether a retired Municipal
Corporation employee could maintain an application for
eviction under Section 23-A(b) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The High Court answered
the said question in the affirmative and dismissed the
revision petition filed before it. Reliance in support was
placed by the High Court upon a Division Bench decision in
Ranjit Narayan Haksar (supra). The Court held that
Municipal Corporation was a statutory corporation on
account of its constitution under Section 7 of the Madhya
4
Page 5
Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and that Chapter
XXXIV of the Act contains several provisions which empower
the State Government to exercise control over it. Such
being the case, the retired employee of the Municipal
Corporation was a landlord within the meaning of Section
23-J(ii) of the Act declared the Court. The contrary decision
delivered by the Single Bench of that Court in Mohan Das
v. Deven Das [1994 (1) MPJR 259] was held to have
been impliedly overruled by the pronouncement in Ranjit
Narayan Haksar’s case (supra). A Special Leave Petition
filed against the decision was dismissed by this Court by a
non-speaking order.
7. In the case at hand the question whether a ‘retired
employee’ of the Municipal Corporation can maintain an
eviction petition under Chapter III-A appears to have arisen
once again before the High Court which was referred to a
Full Bench of the High Court for an authoritative
pronouncement. The Full Bench has, by majority, taken the
view that such an employee is not covered under Section
23-J(ii) of the Act so as to entitle him to maintain an eviction
5
Page 6
petition under Chapter-IIIA thereof. The majority judgment
draws a distinction between the fact situation in Ranjit
Narayan Haksar’s case (supra) and observes that the
Court was not in that case concerned with the status of a
retired employee of the Municipal Corporation or his right to
maintain an eviction petition. The decision in Ranjit
Narayan Haksar’s case (supra) was, therefore, of no
assistance, declared the majority view. The minority view,
however, relied upon Ranjit Narayan Haksar’s case
(supra) and held that Municipal Corporation is an
instrumentality of the State over which the State
Government exercises its control not only touching its
constitution but the conduct of its business also.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some
length we are of the view that the matter deserves to be
referred to a larger Bench of three Judges for an
authoritative pronouncement on the subject. We say so
because Ranjit Narayan Haksar (supra) dealt with the
case of an employee of a trading corporation like the Madhya
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation. A Municipal
6
Page 7
Corporation is, however, not a trading corporation. Such
corporations have in the Indian context, a constitutional
status inasmuch as Chapter IX-A of the Constitution of India
provides for establishment of Municipalities as institutions of
local self-Government. Article 243-Q envisages a Municipal
Corporation for a larger area. The provision mandates the
State to establish Municipalities/ Corporations depending
upon the size of the area comprising such units of local
self-Government. Having regard to the nature of the
functions which the Corporations discharge in terms of the
constitutional scheme and the scheme of the Municipal
Corporation Act, there can be no manner of doubt that such
Corporations are distinctly different from trading
corporations or companies. The question that would,
therefore, arise is whether Section 23-J(ii) was intended to
benefit employees of trading companies or corporations
alone or was such benefit also meant to be available to
Municipal Corporations which are in terms of their activities
materially different from trading companies or corporations.
If the answer be in the negative the incidental question that
7
Page 8
may require to be examined would be whether the term
‘company owned or controlled by the State Government or
Central Government’ appearing in the statute deserves an
expansive and liberal interpretation to save the same from
being declared unconstitutional. That is because even when
employees of Municipalities or Municipal Corporations may
not be government employees or employees of a company
owned or controlled by the State within the meaning of the
statute and even when the classification between the State
Government employees and employees of Companies and
Corporations owned or controlled by the State Government
on the one hand and those of Municipal Corporation on the
other may be an intelligible classification, yet, there may be
no nexus between such classification and the object sought
to be achieved by the statute. The object underlying
Chapter-IIIA, there is no gainsaying, is to make it easier for
retired government employees and employees of
Corporations owned or controlled by the government to get
their properties vacated from the tenants or occupants of
the same. If that be the so, there is no reason why
8
Page 9
employees of Corporations that are discharging
governmental functions or functions akin thereto should be
deprived of that benefit. It may be difficult to justify the
refusal of benefit or discover a nexus between the
classification as suggested by the majority judgment and the
object sought to be achieved by the legislation. All told, the
issues are not only interesting but substantial having regard
to the conflict in pronouncements and the inferences that
can be drawn from the orders passed by this Court in
Ranjit Narayan Haksar’s and in Ghanshyam’s cases
(supra). We accordingly refer these appeals to a larger
Bench. Papers be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of
India for constitution of an appropriate Bench.
................................CJI (T.S. THAKUR)
…………………….…..…J. (KURIAN JOSEPH)
NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 24, 2016.
9