SUBHANKAR BISWAS Vs SANDIP META
Bench: HARJIT SINGH BEDI,CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001129-001129 / 2006
Diary number: 10049 / 2005
Advocates: PARIJAT SINHA Vs
AVIJIT BHATTACHARJEE
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1129 OF 2006
SUBHANKAR BISWAS .. APPELLANT(S)
vs.
SANDEEP META .. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1086-
1089 OF 2008
O R D E R
This order will dispose of all the appeals referred
to above.
The facts have been taken from criminal appeal No.
1129/2006. The matter arises out of a complaint under
Section 19 of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act,
1976. In the complaint it has been urged that Rules 2,4,6,
8, 9 and 23 of the Standards of Weights and Measures
(Packaged Commodities) Rules 1977 had been violated. In
the meantime the appellant also filed an application for
the compounding of the offence and the appropriate
authority directed that the offence be compounded. This
however could not go through for the reason that as per the
allegation several similar offences had been committed by
the Company within three years. An application under
Section 482 was thereafter filed by the Chairman of the
Company Mr. H.B.Lal and the appellant Subhankar Biswas the
then Deputy General Manager raising several pleas, one of
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being based on Section 74 of the Act and the averments made
in the complaint which did not identify as to who was the
person responsible and incharge of the affairs of the
Company. It was pointed out that in the complaint the bare
language of Section 74 had been reproduced without naming any
body as being responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the
Company. The averment made in the complaint which is
relevant to the matter is reproduced below:
“That the persons committed this offence
are companies. So every person at the time of
offence was in charge of and was responsible to the
companies for the business of the companies as well
as the companies shall be liable to be proceeded
against the punished accordingly as per section 74
of the Standards of Weights and Measures Act,
1976.”
It was accordingly argued in the High Court that the
complaint itself was not maintainable as it did not
indicate as to who was responsible for the day-to-day
affairs of the Company. After hearing both sides the High
Court by its order of 24th March 2005 quashed the
proceedings qua the Chairman Mr. H.B.Lal with the
following observations:
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“Therefore in the absence of any specific
averment regarding the role played by petitioner
No.1 M.B.Lal, who is the Chairman of the
Corporation and there is nothing to indicate that
he was in charge of and responsible to the
Corporation relating to its day-to-day affairs of
the Corporation at the time of commission of the
alleged offence, the present application deserves
to be allowed in part and the proceeding against
the said petitioner No.1 M.B.Lal is to be
quashed.”
Today, before us, Mr. Pradeep Ghosh, the learned
senior counsel for the appellant, has argued that the
allegations against the Chairman of the Company and the
appellant before us were identical and there was no
distinction whatsoever between the two and the High Court
having quashed the proceedings against the Chairman, a
similar order ought to have followed for the appellant as
well.
Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for
the respondent-State, has however pointed out that the
question as to the identity of the person(s) in charge of
the day-to-day affairs of the Company was a matter of
evidence and it was therefore imperative that the trial go
on.
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We have considered the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel for the parties. We find absolutely no
distinction between the case of the Chairman and the
appellant and the High Court has not brought out any
distinction between the two. It has to be borne in mind
that in prosecutions in such like cases no roving enquiry
is permissible and an obligation rests on the prosecution
to give details so that the persons responsible so that the
trial can proceed against them. We are therefore of the
opinion that the appeal qua the present appellant ought to
succeed.
We accordingly allow these appeals; set aside the
order of the High Court insofar it goes against the
appellant and direct that the proceedings against the
appellant shall also stand quashed in all cases.
.................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)
....................J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
New Delhi, April 7, 2011.