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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.241 OF 2017

STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD.    ...APPELLANT VERSUS

DESIGNATED AUTHORITY, DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF ANTI-DUMPING & ALLIED DUTIES & Ors.            ...RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Order on the admission of this appeal has been kept pending to enable the Court to ascertain the true sweep and purport of the appellate power of this Court under Section 130E(b)of the Customs Act, 1962  (as  amended).   The  language  of  the  above provision of the Act having indicated a very broad and expansive appellate jurisdiction, the precise contours  thereof  were  felt  necessary  to  be determined  and  the  admissibility  of  the  present appeal tested on the aforesaid basis.  

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2. It  may  be  worthwhile  at  the  very  outset  to delve into the history of the taxation regime under the Act to notice the changes that had occurred from time to time.   3. Against the assessment of customs duty made by different  assessing  authorities  under  the  Act, viz.,  Deputy  Collector  of  Customs/Collector  of Customs,  initially, an executive appellate remedy before  the  Collector  of  Customs  and  before  the Central  Board  of  Customs  Excise  and  Customs, depending  on  the  authority  which  has  passed  the initial order of assessment, was provided.  There was a power of suo motu revision with the Board as well as a revisional jurisdiction to be exercised on  an  application  by  an  aggrieved  person.  The Central  Government  under  Section  131  (originally enacted) and under Section 129DD (Substituted by Act 21 of 1984) was also vested with a revisional jurisdiction. 4. By  the  Finance  Act  No.2  of  1980,  a  quasi- judicial authority, namely, Customs Excise and Gold

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(Control)  Appellate  Tribunal  (CEGAT)  was constituted to hear appeals against orders of the Collector as well as the orders of the Board. The said Tribunal came to be known as Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), with the introduction of levy of service tax.  The CEGAT and  its  successor  CESTAT  were  constituted  as specialized  quasi-judicial  appellate  bodies  to decide all issues relating to duty assessment under the Customs Act. There was no provision of appeal to the jurisdictional High Court against the order of the appellate tribunal.  However, under Section 130 of the Act a Reference jurisdiction was vested in the High Court on a question of law not relating to  the  determination  of  any  question  having  a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment.

Under Section 130A, introduced by the Finance Act,  1980,  a  Reference  jurisdiction  was  also conferred  in  the  Supreme  Court  in  case  the Appellate  Tribunal  was  of  the  opinion  that  on

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account of a conflict in the decisions of the High Courts on the same question of law, a reference to the  Supreme  Court  is  necessary.   Under  Section 130E(a) an appeal was provided to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the High Court delivered on a Reference, where the High Court certified the case to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Under Section 130E(b) against any order passed by the  Appellate  Tribunal  relating,  among  other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value  of  goods  for  purposes  of  assessment,  an appeal  was  also  provided  to  the  Supreme  Court. Section 130F of the Customs Act, 1962 provided that the  provisions  of  Civil  Procedure  Code,  1908 relating to appeals to the Supreme Court shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under Section 130 as they apply in the case of appeals from decrees of a High Court.   5. An  amendment  though  not  of  any  significant consequence,  made  in  the  year  1999  may  also  be

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noticed.  The reference jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 130 which was to be exercised at  the  instance  of  the  Appellate  Tribunal  was continued  in  respect  of  orders  passed,  under Section  129B,  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal  on  or before  1.7.1999.  However,  under  Section  130A substituted by the Finance Act (No.27) of 1999 the Reference jurisdiction in respect of orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal on or after 1.7.1999 was to be exercised by the High Court on an application made to it seeking a reference.  6. The aforesaid position was again altered in the year 2003. Against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal  on  or  after  1.7.2003  (not  being  order relating to determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value  of  goods  for  purposes  of  assessment)  an appeal was provided to the High Court if the High Court is to be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.  Simultaneously, under Section  130A,  the  Reference  Jurisdiction  of  the

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High  Court  was  continued  in  respect  of  orders passed by the Tribunal on or before 1.7.2003. Such reference  jurisdiction  remained  circumscribed  as before, as already noticed.  7. Under the 2003 Amendment, as against an order passed  by  the  High  Court  in  appeal  or  on  a reference, an appeal to the Supreme Court continued to be provided [Section 130(E)a]. Section 130E(b) remained and continued to provide that against an order  passed  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal  relating among other things determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment, appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.  Section 130F was retained on similar terms as before. 8. By  the  National  Tax  Tribunal  Act,  2005,  a National Tax Tribunal was constituted under Section 5 thereof to hear appeals from “every order passed in appeal by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the  Central  Excise  and  Service  Tax  Appellate Tribunal if the National Tax Tribunal is satisfied

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that the case involves substantial question of law” (Section 15).  Under Section 23 of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 on and from the notified date all  proceedings  including  appeals  and  references under  direct  taxes,  and  indirect  taxes  pending before all High Courts stood stand transferred to the National Tax Tribunal.  Section 24 provided for an appeal to the Supreme Court against any decision or order of the National Tax Tribunal. With the enactment of the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 provisions contained in Section 130A, B, C, D of the  Customs  Act,  1962  were  repealed  and  the corresponding changes were also brought in Section 130E of the said Act. Section 130F continued to remain in the same form.  9. However, the aforesaid repeal effected by the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 would not be very relevant for the present inasmuch as the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005 has been invalidated by this Court in the case of  Madras Bar Association  Vs.

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Union of India and Another1. Therefore, it is, the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 as prevailing prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  National  Tax Tribunal,  2005  which  is  presently  holding  the field.

10. What is required to be noticed at this stage is that  under  the  Customs  Act,  1962,  (as  amended), against an order of the appellate tribunal on a question not relating to duty or to classification of goods, an appeal lies to the High Court on a substantial question of law. A reference, again, on a question of law, may also be made to the High Court in respect of similar orders of the appellate tribunal (not relating to determination of duty or classification  of  goods)  passed  on  or  before 1.7.2003. At the same time, a direct appeal to the Supreme  Court  against  an  order  of  the  appellate tribunal on a question relating to the rate of duty or classification of goods has also been provided

1

 (2014) 10 SCC 1

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for. No conditions, restrictions or limitations on the availability of the appellate remedy before the Supreme  Court  is  envisaged  in  the  main  Section [130E(b)] though under Section 130F conditions to the exercise of the appellate power seem to have been imposed, the precise application of which is the determination i.e. required to be made by us.

11. Sections 130, 130E and 130F of the Customs Act, 1962 as on date being the relevant provisions in the context enumerated above may now be noticed.

“Section 130.     Appeal to High Court. –

(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of  July,  2003  (not  being  an  order relating,  among  other  things,  to  the determination  of  any  question  having  a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to  the  value  of  goods  for  purposes  of assessment),  if  the  High  Court  is satisfied  that  the  case  involves  a substantial question of law. (2)  Commissioner of Customs or the other party aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall be -

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(a) filed within one hundred and eighty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Customs or the other party;

(b) accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees where such appeal is filed by the other party;

(c) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely  stating  therein  the substantial question of law involved

(2A)  The High Court may admit an appeal after  the  expiry  of  the  period  of  one hundred  and  eighty  days  referred  to  in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for  not  filing  the  same  within  that period.

(3)  Where  the  High  Court  is  satisfied that  a  substantial  question  of  law  is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(4)   The appeal shall be heard only on the  question  so  formulated,  and  the respondents shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

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Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the  power  of  the  Court  to  hear,  for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other  substantial  question  of  law  not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the  case  involves  such  question. (5)  The  High  Court  shall  decide  the question of law so formulated and deliver such  judgment  thereon  containing  the grounds on which such decision is founded and may award such cost as it deems fit.

(6)  The  High  Court  may  determine  any issue which -   (a) has  not  been  determined  by  the

Appellate Tribunal; or

(b) has  been  wrongly  determined  by  the Appellate  Tribunal,  by  reason  of  a decision on such question of law as is referred to in sub-section (1).

(7)  When an appeal has been filed before the  High  Court,  it  shall  be  heard  by  a bench of not less than two Judges of the High  Court,  and  shall  be  decided  in accordance with the opinion of such Judges or  of  the  majority,  if  any,  of  such Judges.

(8)  Where there is no such majority, the Judges shall state the point of law upon

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which  they  differ  and  the  case  shall, then, be heard upon that point only by one or more of the other Judges of the High Court  and  such  point  shall  be  decided according to the opinion of the majority of  the  Judges  who  have  heard  the  case including those who first heard it.

(9)  Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908  (5  of  1908)  relating  to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section.”

“Section 130E  .        Appeal to Supreme Court. - An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from -

(a) any  judgment  of  the  High  Court delivered –

(i) in an appeal made under section 130; or

(ii)on a reference made under section 130  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal before the 1st day of July, 2003;

(iii)on a reference made under section 130A,

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in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application made by or on  behalf  of  the  party  aggrieved, immediately  after  passing  of  the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; or (b) any  order  passed  before  the

establishment of the National Tax Tribunal by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment.”

“Section  130F.           Hearing  before  Supreme Court  . –  

(1) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the Supreme Court shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of appeals  under  section  130E  as  they apply  in  the  case  of  appeals  from decrees of a High Court:

     Provided that  nothing  in  this sub-section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 130D or section 131.

(2) The costs of the appeal shall be in the discretion of the Supreme Court.

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(3) Where the judgment of the High Court is varied or reversed in the appeal, effect shall be given to the order of the  Supreme  Court  in  the  manner provided in section 130D in the case of a judgment of the High Court.”

12. The history of the customs duty regime traced out above would go to show that after constitution of the Appellate Tribunal, the proceedings of which were/are  deemed  under  the  Act  to  be  judicial proceedings,  the  duty  of  determining  the correctness of questions relating to rate of duty or classification of goods has been primarily cast by  the  Act  on  the  Tribunal.  The  Reference jurisdiction of the High Court up to the time of the  amendment  made  in  the  year  2003  and  the Appellate jurisdiction of the High Court thereafter is in respect of questions not relatable to the rate of duty or classification of goods. An appeal also lies to the Supreme Court against the order or the judgment of the High Court either in exercise

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of the appellate or reference jurisdiction [Section 130E(a)].  At the same time, a direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court against an order passed by the appellate tribunal relating to the question of duty or  classification  of  goods  [Section  130E(b)]. Section 130F has weathered all amendments and make the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure relating  to  an  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court applicable to appeals under Section 130 of the Act. The  question,  therefore,  would  be  whether  the provisions of Section 130F would be applicable to both  sets  of  appeals  that  may  be  filed  before Supreme Court, namely, against orders of the High Court as well as those of the appellate tribunal. 13. The language used by the legislature in Section 130F of the Act prescribing the contours of the jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  while  hearing appeals  either  against  the  decision  of  the  High Court in its appellate or reference jurisdiction or while hearing an appeal against the order of the appellate tribunal has been same and has remained

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unchanged  throughout  the  legislative  history  of Chapter  XV  of  the  Act  (dealing  with  appeals) commencing with the amendment brought about by the Finance Act of 1980. The provisions of the Civil Procedure  Code  1908  relating  to  appeals  to  the Supreme Court from a decree of a High Court, as far as may be, has been made applicable to all appeals to the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Act. Section 130F of the Act, all along, has dealt with both sets of appeals that would lie to the Supreme Court, namely, against an order of the High Court in  exercise  of  its  appellate  or  reference jurisdiction, as the case may be, or against the order of the appellate tribunal. If that be so, there is no reason why the appellate power of the Supreme  Court  under  Section  130E(b)  against  the order of the appellate tribunal should be construed in  a  manner  different  from  the  contours  of  the appellate power under Section 130E(a) against the order of the High Court.

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14. The  provisions  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code relating  to  the  appeals  to  the  Supreme  Court against decrees of the High Court are contained in Section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code which is in the following terms:

“109.  When  appeals  lie  to  the  Supreme Court.-  Subject to the provisions in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution and such rules as may, from time to time, be made by the Supreme Court regarding appeals from the Courts  of  India,  and  to  the  provisions hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to  the  Supreme  Court  from  any  judgment, decree  or  final  order  in  a  civil proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court certifies— (i) that the case involves a substantial

question of law of general importance; and

(ii) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.”  

15. Chapter  IV  of  Part  V  of  the  Constitution contains the provisions in Articles 132, 133, 134 and 134A which contemplate appeals to the Supreme Court from any judgment or decree or final order of

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the High Court in exercise of its civil, criminal or any other jurisdiction provided the High Court certifies that the case involves (i) a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, (ii) a substantial question of law of general importance which in the opinion of the High Court needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. 16. Chapter  IV  of  Part  V  of  the  Constitution expressly limits the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to what has been noticed above. The power of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal under Article 136 is an exception, the scope of which is not in issue and hence need not detain the Court. Article 138 of the Constitution confers  power  on  the  Union  Parliament  to  confer further  jurisdiction  in  the  Supreme  Court  with regard to any of the matters in the Union List or any  matter  as  the  Government  of  India  and  the Government  of  a  State  may  by  special  agreement confer,  subject  to  enactment  of  a  law  to  such effect by the Union Parliament. It is under the

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provisions of Article 138 that the statutory power of  appeal  under  different  statutory  regimes  has been  conferred  on  the  Supreme  Court  of  India. Article 138 of the Constitution could not and does not deal with the scope of the appellate power that a statutory enactment made by the Union Parliament may confer on the Supreme Court.  Rather, it deals with  the  range  of  the  subjects  to  which  the jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court  may  be extended/enlarged by Parliament.  Therefore, while construing the extent of the appellate jurisdiction to  be  exercised  by  the  Supreme  Court  under  a statutory enactment, the role of the Supreme Court as envisaged by the Constitution cannot altogether be  lost  sight  of  particularly  when  different statutes like the Electricity Act, 2003; Companies Act  2013,  National  Green  Tribunal  Act,  2010, Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997, by way of illustration, expressly limit the appellate power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  determination  of substantial questions of law (Section 100 CPC).  To

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our minds the position should be no different in construing the provisions of Section 130E(b) of the Act  though  it  omits  to  specifically  mention  any such limitation. 17. Section  130E(b)  of  the  Act  provides  for  a direct appeal to the Supreme Court against an Order of the appellate tribunal, broadly speaking, on a question involving government revenue. This seems to be in view of the fact that the order that would be  under  appeal  i.e.  (order  of  the  appellate tribunal)  may  go  beyond  the  inter  se dispute between the parties and effect upon a large number of assessees. The issue, in such an event, surely will  be  one  of  general/public  importance. Alternatively, the question raised or arising may require  interpretation  of  the  provisions  of  the Constitution.  Such  interpretation  may  involve  a fresh or a relook or even an attempt to understand the true and correct purport of a laid down meaning of the Constitutional provisions that may come into focus in a given case. It is only such questions of

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importance, alone, that are required to be decided by the Supreme Court and by the very nature of the questions raised or arising, the same necessarily have  to  involve  issues  of  law  going  beyond  the inter partes rights and extending to a class or category  of  assessees  as  a  whole.  This  is  the limitation that has to be understood to be inbuilt in  Section  130E(b)  of  the  Act  which,  in  our considered view, would also be consistent with the role and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India as envisaged under the Constitution. Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 130E(b) of the Act or the  pari materia provisions of any other Statute would be in harmony with those contained in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution. 18. Two decisions of this Court would require a specific notice at this stage. The first is in the case of Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co. Ltd. vs.  Collector of Customs2, where this Court has

2

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taken the view that the expression “determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or, value of goods for purposes of assessment”  must be read as meaning a direct and proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for purposes of assessment.  

The  other  is  the  decision  of  this  Court  in Collector of Customs, Bombay  vs.  Swastic Woollen (P)  Ltd.  and  Ors.3,  where  this  Court  had  an occasion to deal with the ambit of the appellate power under Section 130E of the Customs Act. The following  extract  from  the  judgment  in  Swastic Woollen (supra) amply summarize the view of this Court  on  the  above  question  and  therefore  would require to be extracted.

“9.  …Whether  a  particular  item  and  the particular goods in this case are wool wastes, should be so considered or not is  primarily  and  essentially  a question of fact. The decision of such a question of fact must be arrived at without  ignoring  the  material  and relevant facts and bearing in mind the

(1993) 4 SCC 320 3

AIR 1988 SC 2176

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correct  legal  principles.  Judged  by these  yardsticks  the  finding  of  the Tribunal in this case is unassailable. We are, however, of the view that if a fact  finding  authority  comes  to  a conclusion within the above parameters honestly and bona fide, the fact that another  authority  be  it  the  Supreme Court  or  the  High  Court  may  have  a different  perspective  of  that question, in our opinion, is no ground to interfere with that finding in an appeal from such a finding. In the new scheme of things, the Tribunals have been entrusted with the authority and the  jurisdiction  to  decide  the questions  involving  determination  of the rate of duty of excise or to the value  of  goods  for  purposes  of assessment.  An  appeal  has  been provided to this Court to oversee that the  subordinate  Tribunals  act  within the law. Merely because another view might be possible by a competent Court of law is no ground for interference under Section 130-E of the Act though in  relation  to  the  rate  of  duty  of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment, the amplitude of  appeal  is  unlimited.  But  because the  jurisdiction  is  unlimited,  there is inherent limitation imposed in such appeals. The Tribunal has not deviated from the path of correct principle and has  considered  all  the  relevant factors.  If  the  Tribunal  has  acted bona fide with the natural justice by a speaking order, in our opinion, even if superior Court feels that another view is possible, that is no ground for  substitution  of  that  view  in

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exercise of power under clause (b) of Section 130-E of the Act.”

19. On  the  basis  of  the  discussion  that  have preceded,  it  must  therefore  be  held  that  before admitting an appeal under Section 130E(b) of the Customs  Act,  the  following  conditions  must  be satisfied: (i) The  question  raised  or  arising  must  have  a

direct and/or proximate nexus to the question of determination of the applicable rate of duty or to the determination of the value of the goods for the purposes of assessment of duty. This is a sine qua non for the admission of the appeal before this Court under Section 130E(b) of the Act.

(ii)The question raised must involve a substantial question of law which has not been answered or, on  which,  there  is  a  conflict  of  decisions necessitating a resolution.

(iii)If  the  tribunal,  on  consideration  of  the material and relevant facts, had arrived at a conclusion which is a possible conclusion, the same must be allowed to rest even if this Court is inclined to take another view of the matter.

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(iv)The tribunal had acted in gross violation of the procedure or principles of natural justice occasioning a failure of justice.

20. The above parameters, which by no means should be considered to be exhaustive, may now be applied to the case of the parties before us to decide the primary  question  indicated  at  the  outset  of  the present order, namely, whether this appeal deserves to be admitted. 21. The  appellant  which  is  a  public  sector undertaking is engaged in the manufacture of steel in  the  regular  course  of  its  business.  The appellant uses graphite electrodes which it gets imported  from  China.  Against  such  imports  from China, on the basis of the final report of the Designated Authority acting under the Anti Dumping Rules, namely, the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995, the Union of India by a Notification dated 13.02.2015 has imposed anti-dumping duty upon

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the import of graphite electrodes of all diameters from  specific  importers  operating  within  the Republic of China for a period of five years. This Notification was challenged by the appellant before the appellate tribunal (CESTAT). On behalf of the appellant it was urged before the learned Tribunal that the Designated Authority had determined the normal value of graphite electrodes within China in an  impermissible  manner  and  that  there  has  been application  of  excessive  confidentiality  in  the report of the Designated Authority.  No challenge to  the  validity  of  any  provision  of  the  Anti Dumping  Rules  which  sets  out  the  procedure  for determination  of  the  margin  of  dumping  was  laid before the Appellate Tribunal.  22. The  learned  Tribunal,  on  due  consideration, came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  report  of  the Designated  Authority  neither  suffers  from  any excessive  imposition  of  confidentiality  nor  from the alleged non-consideration of any of the grounds urged  on  behalf  of  the  appellant.  The  tribunal

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further  held  that  the  Designated  Authority  had followed an acceptable method of determining the normal  value  of  electrodes  within  China  by comparing individual work undertaken by an exporter vis-à-vis the export price imposed and that there was  no  infirmity  in  the  matter  of  such determination. 23. Specifically,  the  final  findings  of  the Designated Authority disclose that to determine the margin of dumping the said authority undertook an exercise to find out the normal value of graphite electrodes  in  the  Republic  of  China  and  then proceeded to compare the same with the export price of  the  product.   The  Designated  Authority  on conclusion of an arduous determination process came to the conclusion that the margin of dumping varies from one exporter to the other and the percentage thereof  varies  from  20  to  95  per  cent.   The Designated Authority also found that the demand for graphite  electrodes  from  the  domestic  industries had  increased  by  37%  during  the  period  of

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investigation (2009-2012) whereas the demand from particular exporters in China had increased by 177 per cent during the same period.  The Designated Authority further found that during the period of investigation the production of graphite electrodes by the domestic industry had decreased whereas the import  of  the  same  from  China  had  increased substantially  and,  therefore,  the  domestic industries  are  suffering  material  injury  due  to dumping  of  graphite  electrodes  from  exporters within China.  It is on the basis of the aforesaid findings  that  the  Designated  Authority  had recommended that anti-dumping duty be imposed which found  manifestation  in  the  Gazette  Notification dated 13.2.2015.    24. The above narration clearly disclose that the findings recorded by the learned appellate tribunal on the basis of which the appeal of the present appellant has been dismissed are findings of fact arrived  at  on  due  consideration  of  all  relevant materials on record. If that is so, on the ratio of

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the decision of this Court in the case of Swastic Woollen (supra) we will have no occasion to have a re-look  into  the  matter  in  the  exercise  of  our appellate jurisdiction under Section 130E(b) of the Act. 25. The  appeal,  consequently,  is  dismissed  by refusing admission.

................,J.               (RANJAN GOGOI)

................,J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI APRIL 17, 2017.