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                                 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3989 OF 2006

State of U.P. & Ors.         … Appellants

    Versus

Pawan Kumar Divedi & Ors.           … Respondents

WITH

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3990 OF 2006 CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3991 OF 2006 CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3992 OF 2006 CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3993 OF 2006 CIVIL  APPEAL NO.3994 OF 2006 CIVIL  APPEAL NO.6111 OF 2008

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, CJI.  

The  common  question  for  consideration  in  this  group  of  

seven appeals is whether teachers of privately managed primary schools  

and primary sections of privately managed high schools are eligible to  

receive their salaries from the State Government?  

2. These appeals were first listed before the two-Judge Bench.  

While  noticing  the  provisions  of  Uttar  Pradesh  High  Schools  and  

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Intermediate  Colleges  (Payment  of  Salaries  of  Teachers  and  Other  

Employees)  Act,  1971  (for  short  ‘the  1971  Act’),  Uttar  Pradesh  Basic  

Education Act, 1972 (for short ‘the 1972 Act’), Uttar Pradesh Recognised  

Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Teachers and  

Other Conditions) Rules, 1975 (for short ‘the 1975 Rules’), Uttar Pradesh  

Junior  High  Schools  (Payment  of  Salaries  of  Teachers  and  Other  

Employees)  Act,  1978  (for  short  ‘the  1978  Act’),  Uttar  Pradesh  

Recognised  Basic  Schools  (Junior  High  Schools)  (Recruitment  and  

Conditions  of  Service  of  Teachers)  Rules,  1978  (for  short  ‘the  1978  

Rules’), the two-Judge Bench felt that a three-Judge Bench decision of  

this Court in Vinod Sharma1 required reconsideration.   

3. The relevant portion of the reference order dated 08.09.2006ð  

reads as follows:

“In the present appeals, submissions which were similar to  those raised in the writ petitions filed by Vinod Sharma1 and  others before the High Court and in the special leave petition  in this Court have been repeated and reiterated. What has  been highlighted is the fact that having regard to the various  government orders, it would be quite evident that the State  Government  had  never  intended  to  bring  the  primary  sections  of  the  different  junior  basic  schools,  junior  high  schools and intermediate colleges within  the scope of  the  Payment  of  Salary  Act,  1978  and  that  a  deliberate  and  conscientious decision was, therefore, made in treating the  “junior basic schools” differently from “junior high schools”. It  is the latter category of schools that were brought within the  scope of the Payment of Salary Act, 1978.

1 Vinod Sharma and others v. Director of Education (Basic) U.P. and others; [(1998) 3 SCC 404]   ð reported in (2006) 7 SCC 745

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While noticing the fact that “junior basic schools” and “junior  high schools” were treated differently, the High Court and,  thereafter,  this Court  appear to have been swayed by the  fact that certain schools provided education from Classes I  to X as one single unit, although, the same were divided into  different  sections,  such as,  the primary section,  the junior  high school section, which were combined together to form  the junior basic section from Classes I to VIII, and the high  school section comprising Classes IX and X. In fact, in one  of these appeals where a recognised Sanskrit institution is  involved, the said institution is imparting education both for  the primary section, the high school section, the intermediate  section  and  the  BA  section.  The  Mahavidyalaya  is  thus  imparting education from Class I up to graduate level in a  recognised  institution  affiliated  to  the  Sampurnanand  Sanskrit University, Varanasi. It has been contended by Dr.  Padia on behalf of the institution that the said institution is  one unit  having different  sections and the teachers of the  institution are teachers not of the different sections but of the  institution itself  and as a result  no discrimination could be  made  amongst  them.  This  was  precisely  one  of  the  arguments advanced in Vinod Sharma1 which was accepted  by this Court.

However, it appears to us that both the High Court and this  Court appear to have lost sight of the fact that education at  the primary level has been separated from the junior high  school  level  and  separately  entrusted  under  the  different  enactments to a Board known as the Uttar Pradesh Board of  Basic  Education  constituted  under  Section  3  of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  Basic  Education  Act,  1972  and  the  same Board  was  entrusted  with  the  authority  to  exercise  control  over  “junior  basic  schools”  referred  to  in  the  1975  Rules  as  institutions imparting education up to the Vth class.   In  our  view,  the  legislature  appears  to  have  made  a  conscientious distinction between “junior basic schools” and  “junior  high  schools”  and  treated  them  as  two  separate  components comprising “junior basic education” in the State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  Accordingly,  in  keeping  with  the  earlier  government orders, the Payment of Salary Act, 1978 did not  include  primary  sections  and/or  separate  primary  schools  within the ambit of the 1978 Act.

Of  course,  it  has been conceded on behalf  of  the  State  Government that an exemption was made in respect of 393  

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schools which had been continuing to function from prior to  1973  and  the  teachers  had  been  paid  their  salaries  continuously by the State Government.  In the case of the  said  schools,  the  State  Government  took  a  decision  to  continue to pay the salaries of the teachers of the primary  section of such schools.

Apart  from the above,  it  has also been submitted by Mr  Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  State of Uttar Pradesh that payment of salaries of teachers  of  recognised  primary  institutions  must  be  commensurate  with  the  State’s  financial  condition  and  capacity  to  make  such payment.

Having regard to the contentions of the respective parties,  the  issue decided in  Vinod Sharma1 that  teachers  of  the  primary sections of recognised junior basic schools,  junior  high schools and high schools were entitled to payment of  their salaries under the Payment of Salary Act, 1978, merits  reconsideration.”

4. On 10.10.2007,  these appeals were listed before the three-

Judge Bench.  The Bench noted that Vinod Sharma1 case was decided by  

a  three-Judge  Bench  and,  therefore,  these  appeals  are  required  to  be  

considered by a larger Bench.  The order of 10.10.2007 is as under :

           “These appeals have been placed before us on  reference  order  dated  8/9/2006  passed  by  Hon'ble  two  Judges Bench.

Having  noticed  the  judgment  rendered  by  three  Judges  Bench  in  Vinod  Sharma  &  Ors.  Vs.  Director  of  Education(Basic)  U.P.  &  Ors.  (1998)  3  SCC  404,  the  learned  Judges  were  of  the  view  that  the  judgment  rendered in Vinod Sharma (supra) needs reconsideration  by a larger Bench and directed to place the matter before  Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.

       We have seen the orders of Hon'ble CJI passed on the  basis of a note dated 14/9/2006 of A.R. (Listing). In the said  

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note it is stated that the matters are placed before Hon'ble  CJI  for  listing  it  before  an  appropriate  Bench  of  three  Hon'ble Judges.

       Since Vinod Sharma case (supra) has been decided  by  three  Judge  Bench,  these  appeals  require  to  be  reconsidered by a larger Bench.  Place the matter before  Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders for  placing  these  appeals  before  a  larger  Bench  for  re- consideration of the issue involved.”

5. This  is  how these appeals  have come up for  consideration  

before this Bench.

6. The appeal  in  Vinod Sharma1  reached this  Court  from the  

judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court whereby the High Court  

issued  direction  to  the  Director  of  Education  (Basic)  U.P.  and  other  

functionaries of the state to pay salary to the appellants under the 1978  

Act.  The essential facts in Vinod Sharma1 case as noted by this Court in  

the  judgment  are:  58  Gorkha  Training  Centre,  Junior  High  School,  

Dehradun Cantt. was established in the year 1952 for providing education  

to the children of ex-servicemen, serving military personnel and officers as  

well as civilians. The institution got recognition from the U.P. Government  

with effect from 09.04.1959.  The appellants, Vinod Sharma and others,  

were  appointed  as  Assistant  Teachers  being  duly  qualified.  On  

09.04.1970, the District Inspector of Schools (Dehradun) gave permission  

to the management to run Classes I to VIII. The Director of Education did  

not  bring these teachers under the 1978 Act.  The Assistant  Teachers,  

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Vinod  Sharma  and  others,  filed  a  writ  petition  before  the  High  Court  

seeking direction for payment of salary to them under the 1978 Act.  The  

state functionaries, on the other hand, relied on Rule 10 of the 1975 Rules,  

which provides that a recognised school shall undertake to pay, with effect  

from 01.07.1975, to every teacher and employee the same scale of pay,  

dearness allowance and additional dearness allowance as are paid to the  

teachers  and employees  of  the Board  possessing  similar  qualifications.  

The High Court allowed the writ petition on 29.08.1991 and directed the  

state functionaries to bring the writ petitioners under the provisions of the  

1978 Act and pay their salaries accordingly under it.   The State of U.P.  

filed  special  leave petition  against  the  judgment  and order  of  the  High  

Court, which was dismissed by this Court on 10.05.1993. Review petition  

was also dismissed by this Court  on 17.09.1993.   Here ended the first  

round of litigation.  As there was no prayer for payment of arrears of salary,  

no specific order was passed by the High Court or this Court and the State  

of U.P. also did not pay arrears of salary with effect from 01.07.1975.  The  

aggrieved Assistant Teachers, after making several representations, filed  

another writ petition for specific direction for payment of arrears of salary  

since 01.07.1975.  That matter was disposed of by the High Court with a  

direction to pay salaries of the writ petitioners with effect from 29.08.1991.  

It was this order which came to be challenged in this Court.  The three-

Judge Bench considered the provisions of the 1975 Rules, particularly the  

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definitions  of  “Junior  Basic  School”  and  “Recognised  School”.   Having  

regard to the arguments advanced on behalf of the state that the 1978 Act  

was not applicable to the primary sections, i.e., Junior Basic Schools and  

applied only to the Junior High Schools, the Bench referred to the earlier  

decision of the High Court dated 29.08.1991 which took note of the fact  

that although the writ petitioners were teaching in the primary classes, they  

were working in an institution which was a Junior High School and they  

were all teachers of the Junior High School which ran classes from I to VIII,  

which were being taught in the school, that constituted one unit and were  

not separate units.  The relevant portion of the judgment in Vinod Sharma1  

case reads as follows:

“However,  the  aforesaid  Junior  High  School  Payment  of  Salaries Act, 1978 came into force with effect from 1-5-1979  by virtue of the notification issued under Section 1(3). This  Act was brought in to remove frequent complaints that salary  of  teachers  and  non-teaching  employees  of  aided  non- government Junior High Schools are not disbursed in time,  resulting  in  hardships  to  its  employees.  The  aforesaid  judgment  dated  29-8-1991  refers  to  this  Act.  For  the  respondent State of U.P. the contention is that  this is not  applicable to the primary sections, namely, from Class I to  Class V but only to Classes VI to VII. The High Court finally  directed the respondents to bring the appellants under the  said Act, meaning thereby under the 1978 Act, and pay the  salary  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  said  Act.  The  operative portion of the said order is also quoted hereunder:

“The respondents are directed by a mandamus to bring the  petitioners  under  the provisions of  Payment  of  Salary  Act  and pay their salary according to the provisions of the said  Act.”

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It is not that the appellants are not entitled to the payment of  any salary. They are, but prior to bringing them under the  said  Act  this  obligation  is  only  on  the  recognised  school  under the aforesaid Rule 10 of the 1975 Rules. But by the  said High Court  judgment the respondents were bound to  bring them under the Payment of Salary Act and pay their  salaries accordingly. This cannot be denied by the State. But  in spite of this, nothing was done in this regard.

Coming to the State’s objection, the submission is that they  are only entitled for payment of salary under the said Act  since  11-2-1993,  as  on  that  date  the  Government  issued  such  orders.  This  objection  has  no  force  and  cannot  be  permitted  to  be  raised  in  the  present  case.  As  aforesaid,  inter  se,  between  the  appellants  and  the  respondents  including  the  State  the  matter  has  become  final  by  the  aforesaid High Court judgment dated 29-8-1991. Against the  aforesaid  judgment,  admittedly,  SLP  of  the  State  was  rejected; even review petition was rejected. This apart, even  otherwise  the  State  has  not  come  in  appeal  against  the  impugned  judgment  dated  7-10-1996,  hence  it  cannot  challenge the same in this appeal.

Returning to the impugned order, we find, in spite of several  representations,  that  the  respondents  did  not  respond  in  spite of  the earlier  direction,  hence it  was ordered to  pay  them under  the Payment  of  Salary Act  at  least  since the  earlier High Court judgment and order dated 29-8-1991.

The appellants were not satisfied by the impugned order, as  they claimed their salaries since 1975 when the aforesaid  1975 Rule came into effect. The contention is the spirit of the  earlier High Court order was to pay from that date. This was  as  Junior  High  School  teachers  were  getting  since  then,  hence primary section teachers cannot be denied this right  being in the same school. In other words, to pay from the  same date as was paid to the Junior High School teachers.  We  find  force  in  this  submission.  When grievance  of  the  appellants  was  accepted  in  the  first  writ  petition  to  bring  them  in  parity  with  the  Junior  High  School  teachers,  the  payment from 1991 cannot be construed to be correct on the  facts  of  this  case.  But  considering  the  claim  of  the  appellants, they could in no case be entitled to be paid prior  to the Payment of Salary Act, 1978. Hence the appellants’  claim since 1975 cannot be accepted.

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Considering the direction issued by the High Court, in its first  judgment,  where clear direction is to pay these appellants  under the Payment of Salary Act as in the same institution  another set of teachers (Junior High School) are being paid  under it and the institution being one unit, the same cannot  be denied to the teachers in the primary sections. In other  words, to pay them also under the same Act from the date  Junior High School teachers were paid in this institution. As  we have held above even if the argument for the State may  have  any  merit  in  law,  it  cannot  be  sustained,  as  it  has  become final inter se between the parties. It is also brought  to our notice that one of such teachers Km Harsh Uniyal,  similar to the appellants, though did not join in the first writ  petition but on the basis of decision of that case (1991), filed  a Writ Petition No. 11644 of 1993 which was allowed by the  High Court on 8-12-1993 with a direction to pay the salary  since the Payment of Salary Act was made applicable to that  institution. We were informed accordingly that payment was  made to her by the respondents.”

7. The correctness  of  the  above view in  Vinod Sharma1 case  

requires examination by us.  This necessarily involves consideration of the  

aspect whether the separation of education at the primary level from the  

Junior High School level and constitution of Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic  

Education under the 1972 Act and the entrustment of the Board with the  

authority to exercise control over Junior Basic Schools, referred to in the  

1975 Rules as institution imparting education upto V class, render the view  

taken by this Court in Vinod Sharma1 bad in law.   

8. Mr.  P.P.  Rao,  learned senior  counsel  for  the State  of  U.P.  

submits that the 1978 Act does not apply to private unaided schools and  

teachers of primary section of the Junior Basic School are not entitled to  

the benefit  of the said Act. The management is liable to pay salaries of  

teachers both according to the 1975 Rules and the 1978 Act.  There is no  

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provision for payment of salaries to the teachers in Junior Basic Schools  

by the State Government.  With regard to respondent No.10, Riyaz Junior  

High School (Classes VI to VIII), learned senior counsel submits that the  

unaided  primary  section  (Classes  I  to  V)  after  obtaining  separate  

recognition  on  28.02.1980,   though  referred  to  as  “primary  section”,  in  

terms of definition in Rule 2(b) of the 1975 Rules, is a Junior Basic School.  

Rule 4 requires the management to provide adequate financial resources  

for it and Rule 10 requires the management to give an undertaking to pay  

the  salaries  and  allowances  at  the  same  scale  prescribed  for  both  

teachers.  In terms of the 1975 Rules, the fact that the Junior Basic School  

is run by the management of the Junior High School in the same premises  

makes no difference. Learned senior counsel submits that in the first round  

in  Vinod Sharma1, the High Court in its order dated 29.08.1991, without  

adverting to any statutory provision, held that all the classes taught in the  

institution are one unit and the teachers work under one management and  

one Head Master and, therefore, teachers of the primary classes cannot  

be deprived of the benefit of the 1978 Act. He submits that such a finding  

could not have been given in the absence of a challenge to the 1975 Rules  

or the 1978 Act on the ground of  discrimination.  The order of the High  

Court  became final  inter  partes after  the special  leave petition  and the  

review petition filed by the state were dismissed.  It was for this reason that  

in the second round of Vinod Sharma1 case, the three-Judge Bench of this  

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Court declined to go into the merits of the earlier order of the High Court  

and considered only from which date the teachers would be entitled to  

salaries under the 1978 Act.

9. Mr.  P.  P.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  submits  that  in  the  

reference order,  the two-Judge Bench has rightly  differed with the view  

taken by the High Court  in  the first  round in  Vinod Sharma1 case  and  

observed that the High Court did not appreciate that education at primary  

level has been separated from the Junior High School level and separately  

entrusted  under  the  different  enactments  to  a  Board  constituted  under  

Section  3 of  the 1972 Act  and the  same Board  exercised  control  over  

Junior  Basic  Schools  and  it  was  a  conscious  distinction  made  by  the  

Legislature  between  the  two  sets  of  schools  and  treat  them  as  two  

separate components. He submits that the state which has enacted the  

laws has always been of the same view. He argues that assuming that two  

interpretations are possible to the statutory provisions, one taken by the  

High Court in the first round of Vinod Sharma1 case and the other taken by  

a Bench of this Court in the order of reference, which is the same as that of  

the  Rule  maker,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  allow  the  Rule  maker  to  

continue to implement the Acts and the Rules as per their understanding  

from the inception.

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10. Mr.  P. P. Rao referred to  TMA Pai Foundation2,  particularly  

paragraph 61 (Page 546 thereof),  wherein  this  Court  observed that  the  

solution to the problem of the inability of the states to establish institutions  

at the same level of excellence as private schools would lie in the states  

not  using their  scanty resources to prop up institutions that are able to  

otherwise maintain themselves out of the fees charged, but in improving  

the facilities and infrastructure of state-run schools and in subsidizing the  

fees payable by the students there. Rules 4 and 10 of the 1975 Rules are  

consistent with this view. With reference to  Unnikrishnan3, learned senior  

counsel  would  submit  that  the  resources  of  the  state  are  meant  to  be  

utilized  for  the  benefit  of  the  children  who  are  deprived  of  access  to  

education or cannot afford it.  Distinguishing HP State Recognised Higher   

Schools Managing Committee4, learned senior counsel submitted that the  

judgment  in  this  case  was  not  applicable  as  it  considered  a  different  

question whether teachers of aided recognised private schools are entitled  

to government pay scales. Learned senior counsel submits that Article 21A  

of  the  Constitution  and  the  Right  of  Children  to  Free  and  Compulsory  

Education  Act,  2009,  which  came into  force  w.e.f.  01.04.2010,  are  not  

relevant for the present case which relates to an earlier period.

2 TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka; [(2002) 8 SCC 481] 3 J.P. Unnikrishnan v. State of AP; [(1993) l SCC 645] 4  State of HP v. HP State Recognised High Schools Managing Committee; [(1995) 4 SCC 507]

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11. Mr.  Sunil  Gupta,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants submits that meaning of the expression “Junior High School”  

occurring in the 1978 Act has to be determined with reference to the 1978  

Rules that were framed under the 1972 Act since neither the 1978 Act nor  

the  1972  Act  defines  “Junior  High  School”.   He  heavily  relies  on  the  

principle of interpretation of statutes that Rules made under a statute must  

be treated for all purposes of construction and obligation exactly as if they  

were in the Act, and are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act,  

and  are  to  be  judicially  noticed  for  all  purposes  of  construction  and  

obligation (Maxwell  ‘On Interpretation of  Statutes’,  10th Edn.).   Learned  

senior counsel submits that this principle of interpretation is accepted by  

this Court in Babu Ram5 and Vibha6.  He submits that taking Section 4(2)

(b) of the 1972 Act and the 1978 Rules as guiding factors, the expression  

“Junior High School” would carry, as per Section 2 (j) of the 1978 Act, the  

meaning “Classes VI to VIII” and exclude Classes I to V.  

12.  Alternatively,  Mr.  Sunil  Gupta argues that  one of  the legal  

principles well-recognized is that when an expression in a later statute is  

ambiguous, its meaning can be ascertained from its use and / or meaning  

in  a prior  statute  or  statutory  instrument  dealing with the same subject  

matter.  In this regard, he relies upon two English decisions,  Barras7 and  

5 State of UP v. Babu Ram Upadhya; [AIR 1961 SC 751]  6 Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur v. Vibha Shukla (Smt.) and Others; [ (2007) 15 SCC 161] 7 Barras v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Company; [1933 All ER 52]

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Gallagher8 and three decisions of this Court in  Diamond Sugar9,  Sirsilk10  

and  Pure11.   He would,  thus,  submit  that  the  use  and  meaning  of  the  

expression “Junior High School” must be traced with reference to Section  

4(2)(b) of the 1972 Act and Rule 2(e) of the 1978 Rules.  

13. Learned  senior  counsel  submits  that  despite  the  wider  

expression “Basic School” embracing Classes I to VIII being available, at  

least from 1972, the Legislature chose not to use the said expression in  

the  1978  Act.  Rather,  in  contrast  therewith,  the  Legislature  chose  the  

expression  “Junior  High  School”  in  the  1978  Act.  The  intention  of  the  

Legislature, learned senior counsel submits, is to apply the 1978 Act to the  

narrower category, namely, Classes VI to VIII only and not to Classes I to  

V of the basic schools.

14. Learned  senior  counsel  also  submits  that  totally  different  

arrangements have been made for the two sets of teachers, (1) teachers of  

Classes  VI  to  VIII  and  (2)  teachers  of  Classes  I  to  V  in  the  statutory  

provisions, namely, the 1975 Rules, on the one hand, and the 1978 Rules/  

1978 Act, on the other hand.

15. Dr. M.P. Raju, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 9, in  

response to the arguments of the learned senior ounsel for the appellants,  

argues that the term “Junior Basic School" means and includes Classes I  

8 Gallagher v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints; [(2008) 4 All ER 640] 9 Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. v. the State of Uttar Pradesh; [AIR 1961 SC 652]  10 Sirsilk v. Textile Committee and Others; [1989 Supp 1 SCC 168] 11 Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. and Others; [(2007) 8  SCC 705]

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to VIII wherever Classes I to V are part of the said school.  He submits that  

there is an obligation on the state to provide aid to Classes I to VIII and  

exclusion of junior basic school section of the same Junior High School  

from aid is discriminatory and impermissible classification.

16. Learned counsel  referred to  Vinod Sharma1,  wherein it  was  

held: "the petitioners may be teaching the primary classes but they were   

working in the institution which is junior high school and they are teachers   

of the junior high school which runs classes from I to VIII.  All the classes   

which are being taught in the school constitute one unit and they are not   

separate units." Relying upon Articles 21, 41, 45, 46 and, after 01.04.2010,  

Articles 21A and 51A(k) of the Constitution, learned counsel submits that  

the state has an obligation to provide grant-in-aid to basic education or  

basic schools (Classes I to VIII), corresponding to the students of 6 to 14  

years.

17. Learned counsel in support of his submission that state has an  

obligation  to  provide  grant-in-aid  to  basic  education  or  basic  schools  

(Classes I to VIII) cited quite a few decisions of this Court.  Some of them  

being  Unnikrishnan3,  TMA Pai Foundation2,  HP State Recognised Higher   

Schools Managing Committee4 and Mata Tapeshwari12.

18. Dr.  M.P.  Raju,  learned  counsel  also  submits  that  a  

classification  excluding  Classes  I  to  V  from Junior  High School  for  the  

12 State of U.P. v. Committee of Management, Mata Tapeshwari; [(2010) 1 SCC 639]  

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purpose of aid is discriminatory and without any reasonable objective or  

any rational nexus.

19. Learned counsel argues that the 1978 Act contemplates the  

Junior High School as including the Junior Basic School, i.e., Classes I to  

V also wherever the components of Junior Basic Schools and Senior Basic  

Schools  are  together  leading  to  Junior  High  School  examination.   The  

schools having the Junior  Basic Schools and the Senior  Basic Schools  

either separately or together are under the same Board, i.e., the Board of  

Basic Education as per the provisions of the 1972 Act.  The aid granted to  

the schools having Classes VIII and below was brought under the statutory  

scheme of payment of salary through the 1978 Act.  Excluding Classes I to  

V which are part of basic schools in the same school or institution from the  

operation  of  the  1978  Act  would  be  irrational.   Learned  counsel,  thus,  

submits that the view taken in Vinod Sharma1 is the correct view.     

20. Having noted the arguments of the learned senior counsel and  

counsel appearing for the parties, we think that for proper consideration of  

the  arguments  advanced  before  us,  it  is  appropriate  to  consider  the  

relevant provisions of a few statutory enactments and the rules framed by  

the Government from time to time.    

21. In 1921, the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (for short  

“1921  Act”)  was  enacted  to  establish  the  Board  of  High  School  and  

Intermediate  Education  (for  short,  “the  Board”)  which  took the place  of  

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Allahabad University in regulating and supervising the system of the High  

School and Intermediate Education in Uttar Pradesh and prescribe courses  

therefor.  Section  2(a)  of  the  1921  Act,  as  amended  in  1975,  defines  

"Board"  and Section 2(b)  defines  “Institution”.   In  Section  2(a),  “Board”  

means  the  Board  of  High  School  and  Intermediate  Education.  The  

expression “Institution” in Section 2(b) means a recognized Intermediate  

College, Higher Secondary School or High School,  and includes, where  

the context so requires, a part of an institution.  Section 7 deals with the  

powers of the Board. Under sub-section (3) of Section 7, one of the powers  

conferred on the Board is to conduct examinations at the end of the High  

School and Intermediate courses.  

22. Educational  Code  of  Uttar  Pradesh  (Revised  1958  Edition)  

which has been placed on record is significant.  Clauses (x) and (xxvi) of  

para 1 define “Institution” and “School”, respectively, as follows:

“1(x)  Institution  means  an  educational  institution.  Such  institutions are divided into the following two classes ;

(a) Recognised  institution  means  an  institution  which  imparts  the  course  of  instruction  prescribed  or  recognized by the Department or the Intermediate Board or  a University, and satisfies one or more of these authorities,  as the case may be,  in  the matter  of  efficiency.  Such an  institution is open to periodical inspections by an officer or  officers of  the Department and its students are eligible for  admission  to  public  examinations  conducted  by  the  Department, or the Intermediate Board, or a University;

(b) Unrecognised  institution  means  an  institution  that does not come under the above definition of recognised  institutions;

 (xxvi)     School  means  a  recognized  institution  which  follows the curriculum prescribed by the Department or the  

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Intermediate Board. There are several types of schools as  follows :

(a) Nursery School means a school where children  of pre-basic stage, i.e. from about three to six years of age  are taught,

(b)  Junior Basic School means a school teaching  children generally between 6 and 11 years of age in Classes  I to V (i.e. primary section),

(c) Senior  Basic  School  or  Junior  High  School  means either a school preparing students for the Junior High  School Examination of the Department or a school teaching  Classes I to VIII or VI to VIII (middle section), Note -  Basic  Schools include both Senior  or  Junior  Basic  Schools as well as single schools with classes I to VIII.

(d) Higher  Secondary  School  means  a  school  which  with  or  without  lower  classes maintains  Classes IX  and X and/or XI and XII and prepares students for the High  School and/or Intermediate Examinations of the Intermediate  Board or a University;”

23. The 1971 Act was enacted to regulate the payment of salaries  

to  teachers  and  other  employees  of  High  Schools  and  Intermediate  

Colleges receiving aid out of the state funds and to provide for matters  

connected  therewith.  Section  2(b)  of  the  1971  Act  defines  "Institution",  

which  means  recognized  institution  for  the  time  being  receiving  

maintenance grant  from the State  Government  and includes  a Sanskrit  

Mahavidyalaya or a Sanskrit Vidyalaya receiving maintenance grant from  

the  State  Government.  Section  2  also  defines  expressions  such  as  

“Management”,  “Teacher”,  “Employee”  and  “Salary”.  The  residuary  

definition clause, viz., Section 2(h) of the 1971 Act, says that other words  

and expressions in the 1921 Act shall have the meaning assigned to them  

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if  not  defined  under  the  Act.   Section  5  of  the  1971  Act  provides  for  

procedure for payment of salary in the case of certain institutions.

24. The 1972 Act provides for  the establishment  of  a Board of  

Basic Education and for matters connected therewith.  In the Statement of  

Objects  and  Reasons,  it  is  stated  that  the  responsibility  for  primary  

education has so far rested with Zila Parishads in rural  areas and with  

Municipal  Boards and Mahapalikas in urban areas.  The administration of  

education at this level by the local bodies was not satisfactory, and it was  

deteriorating day by day. There was public demand for the Government to  

take immediate steps for improving the education at this level.  Hence, for  

reorganizing,  reforming and expanding elementary education,  it  became  

necessary for the State Government to take over its control into its own  

hands.  It further records that in order to strengthen the primary and junior  

high schools and to increase their usefulness, the Government was going  

to assume full responsibility for its control and management.   With a view  

to  take  effective  steps  for  securing  the  object  of  Article  45  of  the  

Constitution, the Government has decided to transfer the control of primary  

education  from  the  local  bodies  to  the  Uttar  Pradesh  Board  of  Basic  

Education with effect from the Educational Session 1972-73.  Section 2 of  

the  1972  Act  defines  various  expressions.   The  expression  “basic  

education”, as defined in Section 2(b), means education up to the eighth  

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class imparted in schools other than high schools or intermediate colleges,  

and the expression “basic schools” shall be construed accordingly.      

25. Section 4 of  the 1972 Act  provides for  the functions of  the  

Board.   One  of  the  important  functions  of  the  Board,  subject  to  the  

provisions of the Act, is to organize, coordinate and control the imparting of  

basic  education.   On  coming  into  force  of  the  Act,  the  powers  of  

management,  supervision  and  control  over  the  basic  schools  under  

clauses  (cc)  or  (d)  of  sub-section  (2),  which  before  the  appointed  day  

belonged to local body, stood transferred in respect of such schools to the  

Board.

26. In exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of  

the 1972 Act, the 1975 Rules were framed.  In the 1975 Rules, under Rule  

2(b),  the  expression  “Junior  Basic  School”  is  defined,  which  means  an  

institution  other  than  High  Schools  or  Intermediate  Colleges  imparting  

education up to Class V.  The expression “Recognised School” in Rule 2(c)  

means any Junior Basic School, not being an institution belonging to or  

wholly maintained by the Board or any local body, recognized by the Board  

before the commencement  of  these Rules for  imparting education from  

Class I to V.  Rule 4 provides that in every recognized school adequate  

financial resources shall be made available by the management of such  

school for its efficient working and adequate facilities shall be provided in  

accordance  with  such  standard  as  may  be  specified  by  the  Board  for  

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teaching the subjects in respect of which such school is recognized.  Rule  

7  provides  that  subject  to  the  provisions  of  paras  106  to  114  of  the  

Education  Code,  so far  as they are applicable,  free education shall  be  

provided in any recognized school to 25 per cent of the number of students  

on the rolls of such school.     

27. The 1978 Rules were framed by the Governor of the state in  

exercise of the powers under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the 1972 Act.  

These Rules came into force w.e.f. 13.02.1978.  Clauses (c) and (e) of  

Rule 2 define “Board” and “Junior High School”.

“Board” means the Uttar Pradesh Board of Basic Education  

constituted under Section 3 of the 1972 Act.

“Junior  High  School”  means  an  institution  other  than  high  

school or intermediate college imparting education to boys or girls or both  

from classes VI to VIII (inclusive).

28. The  1978  Act  came  to  be  enacted  by  the  Uttar  Pradesh  

Legislature  to  regulate  the  payment  of  salaries  to  teachers  and  other  

employees of Junior High Schools receiving aid out of the state funds and  

to provide for matters connected therewith.  The Act came into force w.e.f.  

01.05.1979.   Clause  (b),  Clause  (e),  Clause  (h)  and  Clause  (i)  define  

“Education officer”, “Institution”, “Teacher” and “Salary”, respectively.   

“Education officer” means the District Basic Education Officer  

appointed under the 1972 Act and in relation to girls’ institution, the District  

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Basic Education  Officer  (women),  and in each case includes any other  

officer authorized by the State Government to perform all  or any of the  

functions of the Education Officer under this Act.

“Institution”  means a recognized Junior  High School  for  the  

time being receiving maintenance grant from the State Government.

“Teacher”  of  an  institution  means  a  headmaster  or  other  

teacher in respect of whose employment maintenance grant is paid by the  

State Government to the institution.

“Salary” of a teacher or employee means the aggregate of the  

emoluments, including dearness or any other allowance, for the time being  

payable  to  him  at  the  rate  approved  for  the  purpose  of  payment  of  

maintenance grant.

Clause (j) of Section 2 in the definition clause says that other  

words and expressions defined in the 1972 Act, not defined in the 1978  

Act, shall have the meanings assigned to them in that Act.

29. Section  10  of  the  1978  Act  provides  that  the  State  

Government  shall  be  liable  for  payment  of  salaries  of  teachers  and  

employees  of  every  institution  due  in  respect  of  any  period  after  the  

appointed day.

30. Section 13-A makes transitory provisions in respect of certain  

upgraded institutions.  It reads:

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“13-A. Transitory provisions in respect of certain upgraded  institutions.— (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  this  Act,  the  provisions of  this  Act  shall,  mutatis  mutandis apply,  to an  institution which is upgraded to High School or Intermediate  standard and, to such teachers and other employees thereof  in respect of whose employment maintenance grant is paid  by the State Government to such institution.

(2)  For  the  purposes  of  this  section  the  reference  to  the  students  wherever  they  occur  in  section  5,  shall  be  construed  as  reference  to  the  students  of  classes  up  to  junior High School level only.”

31. Section  15  empowers  the  State  Government  to  remove  

difficulties in giving effect to the provisions of the Act.  The provision reads:

“15.  Power to remove difficulties.—(1) If any difficulty arises  in giving effect to the provisions of this Act or by reason of  anything contained in this Act, the State Government may as  occasion  requires,  by  notification  make  such  incidental  or  consequential provisions including provisions for adapting or  modifying any provision of this Act or of the Uttar Pradesh  Basic Education Act,  1972, or the rules made thereunder,  but not affecting the substance, as it may think necessary or  expedient for the purposes of this Act.

(2) No order under sub-section (1) shall be made after the  expiration of a period of the three years from the appointed  day.

(3) Every order made under sub-section (1) shall be laid, as  soon as  may  be,  before  both  the  Houses  of  the  State  Legislature.”

32. Section 17 empowers the State Government to make rules for  

carrying out the purposes of this Act.

33. As would be seen, the 1978 Act makes the State Government  

liable  for  payment  of  salaries  of  teachers  and  employees  of  every  

recognised  Junior  High  School  receiving  maintenance  grant  after  the  

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appointed day.  Curiously, Junior High School is not defined in the 1978  

Act.  We have to determine the meaning of the expression “Junior High  

School” for the purposes of the 1978 Act.  But before we do that, a brief  

comment  in  respect  of  state’s  obligation  to  grant  aid  to  recognised  

educational  institutions  imparting  basic  education  corresponding  to  

students of 6 to 14 years may be made.  Before insertion of Article 21-A in  

the Constitution by 86th Amendment Act, 2002 which received the assent  

on 12.12.2002, this Court in Unnikrishnan3 observed that the children up to  

the age of 14 years have a fundamental right to free education.

34. Article  45  which  was  under  consideration  in  Unnikrishnan3  

reads that  “the State shall  endeavour  to provide,  within a period of  10   

years  from  the  commencement  of  this  Constitution,  for  free  and   

compulsory education for  all  children until  they complete the age of  14   

years.”

35. In  paragraph  172  of  the  Report,  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Unnikrishnan3 said:

“172. Right  to  free  education  for  all  children  until  they  complete the age of fourteen years (Art. 45). It is noteworthy  that  among the several  articles in Part  IV,  only  Article 45  speaks  of  a  time-limit;  no  other  article  does.  Has  it  no  significance? Is it a mere pious wish, even after 44 years of  the Constitution? Can the State flout the said direction even  after  44 years  on the  ground that  the  article  merely  calls  upon  it  to  “endeavour  to  provide”  the  same  and  on  the  further  ground  that  the  said  article  is  not  enforceable  by  virtue of the declaration in Article 37. Does not the passage  of 44 years — more than four times the period stipulated in  

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Article 45 — convert the obligation created by the article into  an enforceable right? In this context, we feel constrained to  say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of  education  in  India  discloses  an  inversion  of  priorities  indicated by the Constitution. The Constitution contemplated  a  crash  programme  being  undertaken  by  the  State  to  achieve the goal set out in Article 45. It is relevant to notice  that Article 45 does not speak of the “limits of its economic  capacity and development”  as does Article 41, which inter  alia  speaks  of  right  to  education.  What  has  actually  happened is — more money is spent and more attention is  directed to higher education than to — and at the cost of —  primary  education.  (By  primary  education,  we  mean  the  education,  which  a  normal  child  receives  by  the  time  he  completes 14 years of age.) Neglected more so are the rural  sectors, and the weaker sections of the society referred to in  Article 46. We clarify, we are not seeking to lay down the  priorities for the Government — we are only emphasising the  constitutional policy as disclosed by Articles 45, 46 and 41.  Surely  the  wisdom  of  these  constitutional  provisions  is  beyond  question.  This  inversion  of  priorities  has  been  commented upon adversely by both the educationists  and  economists.”

Then, in paragraph 175, the Court stated:  

“175. Be that as it may, we must say that at least now the  State should honour the command of Article 45. It must be  made  a  reality  —  at  least  now.  Indeed,  the  National   Education Policy 1986 says that the promise of Article 45 will  be redeemed before the end of this century.  Be that as it  may, we hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental right to  free education up to the age of 14 years.”

In paragraph 176 in Unnikrishnan3, the Court said as follows:

“176. This does not however mean that this obligation can  be performed only through the State Schools. It can also be  done by  permitting,  recognising  and aiding  voluntary non- governmental organisations, who are prepared to impart free  education to children. This does not also mean that unaided  private schools cannot continue. They can, indeed, they too  have a role to play. They meet the demand of that segment  of  population  who  may  not  wish  to  have  their  children  educated  in  State-run  schools.  They  have  necessarily  to  charge fees from the students.  In this judgment,  however,  

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we do not wish to say anything about such schools or for  that  matter  other  private  educational  institutions  except  ‘professional colleges’. This discussion is really necessitated  on account  of  the  principles  enunciated  in  Mohini  Jain  v.  State  of  Karnataka  (1992)  3  SCC 666 and the  challenge  mounted against those principles in these writ petitions.”

36. In TMA Pai Foundation2, the eleven-Judge Constitution Bench  

approved the view of  Unnikrishnan3 to the extent it was held in that case  

that primary education is a fundamental right.  Question 9 and its answer  

(Pg. 590 of the Report) read as under:

“Q. 9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan,  J.P. v.  State  of  A.P. (except  where  it  holds  that  primary  education is  a fundamental  right)  and the scheme framed  thereunder  require  reconsideration/modification  and  if  yes,  what?

A. The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan case  and the direction to impose the same, except  where it  holds  that  primary  education  is  a  fundamental  right,  is  unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should  not  be  capitation  fee  or  profiteering  is  correct.  Reasonable  surplus  to  meet  cost  of  expansion  and  augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to  profiteering.”

37. The statement by the five–Judge Constitution Bench in  

Unnikrishnan3 that primary education is fundamental right is echoed in  

HP State Recognised Higher Schools Managing Committee4 as well.  

The three–Judge Bench in paragraphs 16 and 17 (pgs. 514-515 of the  

Report) reiterated the constitutional mandate to the state to provide free  

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education to the children up to the age of 14.  The three–Judge Bench  

said:

“16. The constitutional mandate to the State, as upheld by  this Court in Unni Krishnan case — to provide free education  to  the  children  up  to  the  age  of  fourteen  —  cannot  be  permitted  to  be  circumvented  on  the  ground  of  lack  of  economic capacity or financial incapacity.

17. It is high time that the State must accept its responsibility  to  extend free  education  to  the children up to  the age of  fourteen.  Right  to  education  is  equally  guaranteed  to  the  children who are above the age of fourteen, but they cannot  enforce  the  same  unless  the  economic  capacity  and  development  of  the  State  permits  the  enforcement  of  the  same. The State must endeavour to review and increase the  budget allocation under the head ‘Education’. The Union of  India  must  also  consider  to  increase  the  percentage  of  allocation of funds for “Education” out of the Gross National  Product.”

38. With the above constitutional philosophy, let us determine the  

meaning of the expression “Junior High School” for the purposes of the  

1978 Act.  

39. There is not much debate that the students of secondary and  

primary schools are classified in Section 3 of Educational Code (Revised  

1958 Edition) as follows:

(a) Pre-basic Stage ….Nursery Education  

(b) Junior Basic (Primary) Stage ….Classes I to V

(c) Senior Basic (Junior High Schools) …Classes VI to VIII Stage

(d) Higher Secondary Stage:

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I. High School Stage …..Classes IX and X

II. Intermediate Stage …..Classes XI and XII

40. On behalf of the appellants, heavy reliance is placed on the  

definition of “Junior High School” in the 1978 Rules.  Does the definition of  

“Junior  High  School”  in  the  1978  Rules  control  the  same  expression  

occurring in the 1978 Act?  We do not think so. The definition of “Junior  

High School” in Rule 2(e) of the 1978 Rules is not incorporated in the 1978  

Act either  expressly or impliedly.   The principle of interpretation that an  

expression used in a rule or bye-law framed in exercise of power conferred  

by a statute must have the same meaning as is assigned to it under the  

statute has no application in a situation such as the present one where the  

meaning of an expression occurring in a statute is itself to be determined.  

Obviously  that  cannot  be  done  with  the  help  of  a  rule  made  under  a  

different statute.  

41. Section  2(j)  of  the  1978  Act  says  that  the  words  and  

expressions defined in the 1972 Act and not defined in this Act shall have  

the meanings assigned to them in the 1972 Act.  But, the 1972 Act also  

does not define the expression “Junior High School”, it merely refers to it  

as examination. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellants  

sought to invoke the principle of interpretation of statutes that Rules made  

under  a  statute  must  be  treated  for  all  purposes  of  construction  and  

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obligation exactly as if they were in the Act, and are to be of the same  

effect  as if  contained in the Act,  and are to be judicially  noticed for  all  

purposes of construction and obligation.  The invocation of this principle is  

misplaced.  Firstly, because we are not concerned with the construction of  

an expression in the 1972 Act under which the 1978 Rules have been  

made.   Secondly  and more  importantly,  there  is  no principle  that  rules  

made  under  a  different  and  distinct  statute  must  be  treated  for  the  

purposes of construction as if they were part of the Act.  In our view, the  

definition of “Junior High School”  in the 1978 Rules cannot be judicially  

noticed for the purposes of construction and obligation of the 1978 Act.  

42. We are also not persuaded by the submission of  Mr.  Sunil  

Gupta that since the expression “Junior High School” is not defined in the  

1978 Act, its meaning can be ascertained from the 1978 Rules by applying  

the principle that when an expression in a later statute is ambiguous, its  

meaning can be ascertained from its use and/or meaning in a prior statute  

or statutory instrument dealing with the same subject matter for the present  

purpose.   On  the  above  principle  of  interpretation,  there  is  not  much  

challenge.   The question is of  its applicability  to the present  case.  The  

1978 Rules are made by the Governor under the 1972 Act, which do not  

deal  with  the  aspect  of  payment  of  salaries  to  the  teachers  and  the  

employees of a recognized school at all.  The State Legislature has made  

a separate enactment, viz., the 1978 Act, for payment of salaries.  The  

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definition of “Junior High School” in the 1978 Rules does not exhaust the  

scope  of  the  expression  “Junior  High  School”.   Moreover,  a  prior  rule  

cannot be taken in aid to construe a subsequent enactment.  

43. It  is  important  to  notice  here  that  recognised  Junior  High  

Schools can be of three kinds: (one) having Classes I to VIII, i.e., Classes I  

to V (Junior Basic School) and so also Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic  

School),  (two)  a  school  as  above  and  upgraded  to  High  School  or  

intermediate standard and (three) Classes VI to VIII (Senior Basic School)  

initially with no Junior Basic School (Classes I to V) being part of the said  

school.     

44. As regards the first two categories of Junior High Schools, the  

applicability of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not create any difficulty.  

The debate which has centered round in this group of appeals is in respect  

of  third  category  of  the  schools  where  Classes  I  to  V  are  added  after  

obtaining recognition to the schools which are recognized and aided for  

imparting education in Classes VI to VIII.   Whether teachers of  primary  

section Classes I to V in such schools are entitled to the benefit of Section  

10 of the 1978 Act is the moot question.  As noticed, the constitutional  

obligation  of  the state  to  provide  for  free  and compulsory  education  of  

children till they complete the age of 14 years is beyond doubt now.  The  

note appended to clause (xxvi), para 1 of the Educational Code (revised  

edition,  1958),  inter  alia,  provides  that  Basic  Schools  include  single  

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schools  with  Classes  I  to  VIII.  In  our  view,  if  a  Junior  Basic  School  

(Classes  I  to  V)  is  added  after  obtaining  necessary  recognition  to  a  

recognized and aided Senior Basic School (Classes VI to VIII), then surely  

such Junior Basic School becomes integral part of one school, i.e., Basic  

School having Classes I to VIII.   The expression “Junior High School” in  

the 1978 Act is intended to refer to the schools imparting basic education,  

i.e., education up to VIII class. We do not think it is appropriate to give  

narrow meaning to the expression “Junior High School” as contended by  

the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  state.   That  Legislature  used  the  

expression  Junior  High  School  and not  the  Basic  School  as  used and  

defined in the 1972 Act, in our view, is insignificant.  The view, which we  

have taken, is fortified by the fact that in Section 2(j) of the 1978 Act, the  

expressions defined in the 1972 Act are incorporated.

45. The submission of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for  

the  State  of  U.P.  with  reference  to  the  subject  School,  namely,  Riyaz  

Junior High School (Classes VI to VIII), that the said school was initially a  

private recognized and aided school and the primary section (Classes I to  

V)  was  opened  by  the  management  later  on  after  obtaining  separate  

recognition, which was un-aided, the teachers of such primary section, in  

terms of  definition  in  Rule 2(b)  and Rule  4  of  the 1975  Rules are  not  

entitled to the benefits of Section 10 of the 1978 Act does not appeal to us  

for what we have already said above.  The view taken by the High Court in  

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the  first  round  in  Vinod  Sharma1 that  Classes  I  to  VIII  taught  in  the  

institution are one unit, the teachers work under one management and one  

Head Master  and, therefore,  teachers of  the primary classes cannot  be  

deprived of the benefit of the 1978 Act, cannot be said to be a wrong view.  

Rather,  it  is  in  accord  and  conformity  with  the  Constitutional  scheme  

relating to free education to the children up to 14 years.  

46. Though  in  the  Reference  Order,  the  two-Judge  Bench has  

observed that the High Court in the first round in  Vinod Sharma1 did not  

appreciate that the education at the primary level has been separated from  

the Junior High School level and separately entrusted under the different  

enactments to the Board constituted under Section 3 of the 1972 Act and  

the same Board exercises control over Junior Basic Schools and it was a  

conscious distinction made by the Legislature between two sets of schools  

and treat them two separate components and, therefore,  Vinod Sharma1  

does not take the correct view but we think that the features noted in the  

reference order do not render the view taken in Vinod Sharma1 bad.  We  

find merit  in the argument of Dr. M.P. Raju that the schools having the  

Junior Basic Schools and the Senior Basic Schools either separately or  

together are under the same Board, i.e., the Board of Basic Education, as  

per the 1972 Act.  Moreover, any other view may render the provisions of  

the  1978  Act  unconstitutional  on  the  ground  of  discrimination.   In  our  

considered view, any interpretation which may lead to unconstitutionality of  

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the provision must be avoided. We hold, as it must be, that Junior High  

School necessarily includes Classes I to V when  they are opened in a  

Senior  Basic  School  (Classes  VI  to  VIII)  after  obtaining  separate  

recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid  

by the Government.

47. We  accordingly  affirm  the  view  taken  by  the  three-Judge  

Bench in Vinod Sharma1. Our answer to the question is in the affirmative.

48. As the fate of these appeals is dependant on the answer that  

we have given, we do not think it is necessary to send these appeals to the  

Regular Bench. The appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.

                ….………..……………………CJI.  (R.M. Lodha)

      …….………..……………………J.  (Jagdish Singh Khehar)

      …….………..……………………J.        (J. Chelameswar)

      …….………..……………………J.  (A.K. Sikri)

NEW DELHI;        …….………..……………………J. SEPTEMBER 2, 2014. (Rohinton Fali Nariman)

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