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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2381 OF 2007

STATE OF U.P                 ………APPELLANT

Vs.

CHARAN SINGH                     ………RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. This  appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  

impugned  judgment  and  final  order  dated  

18.07.2006, passed by the High Court of Judicature  

at  Allahabad,  in  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition  No.  

2588 of 1998, whereby the High Court has upheld  

and modified the Award passed by the Industrial  

Tribunal  dated  24.02.1997  in  Adjudication  Case  

No.139 of 1992.  

2.The  factual  matrix  and  the  rival  legal  

contentions urged on behalf of the parties are  

briefly stated hereunder with a view to find out  

whether the impugned judgment and order of the

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High Court warrants interference by this Court  

in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

3.The  respondent  was  appointed  as  a  temporary  

Tube-well  Operator  w.e.f.  06.03.1974  by  the  

Assistant  Director  of  Fisheries  Department,  

Meerut (U.P). His services were terminated vide  

letter dated 22.08.1975 stating thereby that he  

was a temporary employee and that his services  

were no longer required by the Department. He  

was  given  one  month’s  wages  in  lieu  of  the  

notice. On 01.05.1976, the respondent filed a  

petition  before  the  Conciliation  Officer,  

Meerut,  stating  therein  that  the  respondent’s  

employment has been wrongfully terminated by the  

appellant as he is a permanent employee of the  

Fisheries  Department  and  the  provisions  under  

Section  6-N  of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  Industrial  

Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as  

“the Act”), which are mandatory in nature, have  

not  been  complied  with  and  as  such,  the  

termination of the services of the respondent by  

the  appellant  is  illegal.  The  matter  was  

transferred from the Conciliation Officer to the

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Labour  Commissioner,  Kanpur  for  adjudication.  

The  respondent  made  several  representations  

before various high offices and courts including  

this Court wherein, the same was forwarded to  

the Secretary, U.P. State Legal Aid and Advisory  

Board on 09.09.1986 to take necessary action in  

this  regard,  which  instead  directed  the  

respondent  to  contact  the  Sabhapati,  District  

Judge, District Law Assistance and Consultant,  

Civil Court premises, Meerut for consultation.  

4.Thereafter, the respondent moved an application  

before the State Government for the reference of  

the industrial dispute under the provisions of  

Section 4-K of the Act and the State Government  

vide notification no.14499-502 MRIR OP 395/91,  

dated  24.10.1992  referred  the  dispute  to  the  

Industrial Tribunal, Meerut, thereby framing the  

following questions for its determination:

i. Whether the services of the workman  has been illegally terminated, and  

ii. Whether there is any violation of  Section 6-N of the Act?  

5.The  Industrial  Tribunal  after  considering  the  

evidence  on  record  and  the  rival  legal

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contentions of both the parties has answered the  

questions  referred  to  it,  in  favour  of  the  

respondent, stating thereby that the termination  

of the services of the workman was illegal and  

was  liable  to  be  set  aside.  The  Industrial  

Tribunal directed the appellant to reinstate the  

respondent on any post equivalent to the post of  

Tube-well  Operator.  The  Industrial  Tribunal  

passed an Award for the reinstatement of the  

workman w.e.f. 24.02.1997.  However, the workman  

was not granted any back wages.  

6.In  Pursuance  of  the  Award  passed  by  the  

Industrial  Tribunal,  the  appellant  offered  a  

letter of appointment to the respondent workman  

vide its order dated 03.05.1999 to the post of  

fisherman in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-65-

3400/-. However, the respondent workman did not  

join  his  duties  to  the  said  post  even  after  

repeated  reminders  from  the  appellant.  The  

appellant  thereafter,  filed  a  Misc.  Writ  

Petition before the High Court contending that  

the respondent workman has been reinstated on  

the post of “Machhuwa”, which they claimed was

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equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator.  

Since the respondent workman did not respond to  

several  letters  of  the  appellant  which  was  

calling him back for work, he is not entitled to  

any  wages  for  the  period  24.02.1997  to  

31.01.2005 on the principle “no work no pay”.  

The High Court however, rejected the contention  

of  the  appellant  and  held  that  the  State  

Government had kept the workman out of job for  

many years and therefore, the State Government  

is liable to pay the entire amount due to the  

workman for the above mentioned period.  

7.Aggrieved  by  the  said  impugned  judgment  and  

order,  the  present  appeal  is  filed  by  the  

appellant with a prayer to set aside the same  

and requested this Court to pass such order as  

this Court may deem fit and proper in the facts  

and circumstances of the case by urging various  

facts and legal contentions.

8.It has been contended by Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, the  

learned  Additional  Advocate  General  (AAG)  on  

behalf of the appellant that the High Court has  

erroneously  disposed  of  the  writ  petition  in

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view of the fact that as per the order dated  

03.05.1999 passed by the office of the Deputy  

Director  of  Fisheries,  Meerut,  the  respondent  

was given appointment to the post of fisherman  

(Machhua) in the pay-scale of 2610-60-3150-65-

3400/-, which is equivalent to the post of Tube-

well Operator. He has further contended that the  

post  held  by  the  respondent  as  a  Tube-well  

Operator was temporary and was not a sanctioned  

post as he was assigned the same as per the  

availability  of  work  in  the  Department.  Even  

after his appointment for the post of fisherman,  

as per the above said order, the respondent did  

not take charge of the aforesaid post stating  

that it is not equivalent to the post of a Tube-

well Operator, in spite of several letters and  

reminders  sent  by  the  appellant  to  him  in  

pursuance of the Award passed by the Industrial  

Tribunal.   

9. It has been further contended by the learned AAG  

for  the  appellant  that  the  Department  of  

Fisheries does not come under the definition of  

“Industry” as defined under Section 2(k) of the

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Act, as has been decided by this Court in the  

cases of  State of U.P. and Ors. v. Arun kumar  

Singh1 and  Bombay  Telephone  Canteen  Employees  

Association, Prabhadevi Tel. Exchange v.  U.O.I  

& Anr.2.  10. It has been further contended by the learned  

AAG that the respondent has not contributed in  

his  services  to  the  post  of  fisherman  and  

therefore,  as  per  the  “no  work  no  pay”  

principle, as held by this Court in a catena of  

cases, the respondent is not entitled to any  

monetary benefits under Section 6-H of the Act  

for  the  period  24.02.1997  to  31.01.2005  as  

awarded by the High Court. Thus, the findings of  

both the courts below are erroneous and suffer  

from error in law and therefore, the same cannot  

be allowed to be sustained by this Court.  

11. On the other hand, it has been contended by  

Mr. G.V.Rao, the learned counsel on behalf of  

the  respondent  that  the  termination  of  the  

services of the respondent is bad in law as his  

1  (1995) Supp (4) SCC 241

2   (1997)  6   SCC  723

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services have been illegally terminated on the  

ground that he is a temporary employee. He has  

further contended that the services provided by  

the appellant is fully covered within the ambit  

of the Act and the termination of the services  

of  the  respondent-workman  from  his  services  

amounts to retrenchment and since he has worked  

for more than 240 days in one calendar year, he  

is entitled to the benefits as provided under  

the provision of Section 6-N of the Act. Since,  

the  appellant  has  not  complied  with  the  

provisions of the Act, as such, the termination  

order  of  the  respondent  dated  22.8.1975  is  

liable  to  be  quashed  and  he  is  entitled  for  

reinstatement with back wages, as the post of a  

fisherman is not equivalent to the post of Tube-

well Operator.

12. We have heard both the parties. On the basis  

of the aforesaid rival legal contentions urged  

on behalf of the parties and the evidence on  

record, we have come to the conclusion that the  

High Court has rightly held that the State is  

liable  to  pay  the  entire  amount  due  to  the

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workman for the period 24.2.1997 to 31.1.2005,  

as the State has kept the workman out of job for  

many years arbitrarily and unreasonably despite  

the Award of reinstatement of the respondent on  

an  equivalent  post  which  was  passed  by  the  

Industrial Tribunal. Thus, not reporting for the  

duty  of  fisherman  offered  to  him  by  the  

appellant cannot be said to be unjustified on  

the part of the respondent. In support of the  

above  said  conclusions  arrived  at  by  us,  we  

record our reasons hereunder:-

   It  has  already  been  rightly  held  by  the  

Industrial  Tribunal  that  the  Department  of  

Fisheries  is  covered  under  the  definition  of  

“Industry” as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act  

and also in accordance with the statement of R.W.1  

and  E.W.1,  Shri.  R.B.Mathur,  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant  before  the  Industrial  Tribunal,  because  

the object of the establishment of the appellant-

department is fulfilled by engaging employees and  

that the department is run on a regular basis. Thus,  

the matter of termination of the services of the  

workman  of  the  said  department  can  be  legally

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adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal as the matter  

is covered under the provisions of the Act read with  

the Second Schedule in Entry No.10. Thus, it has  

been  rightly  held  by  the  courts  below  that  the  

dispute raised by the workman in relation to the  

termination of his services by the appellant is an  

industrial dispute.

13. Further, it is a well established fact that  

the respondent-workman has continuously worked  

for  240  days  in  a  calendar  year  and  the  

Industrial  Tribunal  has  rightly  recorded  the  

finding of fact on the basis of pleadings and  

evidence on record holding that the work which  

was being done by the respondent-workman still  

continues to exist in the establishment of the  

appellant, which fact has been admitted by the  

respondent  as  well  as  the  witnesses  of  the  

employer  before  the  Industrial  Tribunal.  

Further,  Shri.  R.B.Mathur  has  clearly  deposed  

before the Industrial Tribunal that the work of  

Tube-well Operator has now been taken over by  

other workmen, such as “Machhuwa” and that some  

Tube-well  Operators  were  appointed  on  other

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posts as well. Thus, in view of the statements  

made above by him, it is amply clear that the  

required  conditions  under  the  provisions  of  

Sections  6-N  and  6-W  of  the  Act  were  not  

complied  with  by  the  appellant  and  the  only  

contention of the appellant-department is that  

one  month’s  salary  was  paid  to  the  workman  

concerned  treating  him  to  be  a  temporary  

employee. This contention of the learned AAG on  

behalf  of  the  appellant,  however,  is  not  

sustainable in law and the same has rendered the  

order  of  termination  of  the  services  of  the  

respondent-workman illegal and therefore, both  

the courts below have rightly set aside the same  

and passed an Award of reinstatement and back  

wages, respectively. However, not awarding back  

wages  to  the  respondent  by  the  Industrial  

Tribunal and awarding of the same by the High  

Court  for  the  period  between  24.2.1997  to  

31.1.2005 only, has been done without assigning  

any cogent reason even though he is gainfully  

employed and lawfully entitled for the same from  

the date of termination from his services, i.e.

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22.08.1975, which cannot be said to be valid in  

law. Therefore, the judgment and Award passed by  

the  courts  below  with  regard  to  his  

reinstatement on a post equivalent to the post  

of Tube-well Operator and denial of payment of  

back wages from the date of his termination,  

i.e. 22.08.1975 is wholly untenable in law as  

the same is contrary to the well established  

principles of law and the same is required to be  

modified by awarding back wages.

14. The learned AAG has further contended that the  

termination of the services of the workman was  

made  in  view  of  the  Government  order  dated  

30.07.1975, by which the post of the Tube-well  

Operator  was  abolished  and  the  termination  

letter was served on the respondent-workman as  

he  was  a  temporary  employee.  However,  these  

reasons  were  not  stated  in  his  termination  

letter  dated  22.08.1975  by  the  appellant  and  

instead, it was mentioned that his services were  

no  longer  required  which  tantamount  to  

retrenchment of the respondent as defined under  

Section 2(s) of the Act. Thus, the contention of

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the appellant cannot be accepted by us in this  

regard, in view of the untenable reason stated  

in the letter of termination of the services of  

the respondent-workman. Further, the Government  

order dated 30.07.1975, clearly stated that in  

place of Tube-well Operator, the post of Nalkoop  

Mechanic, class IV employee, was being created  

that would carry out the work of the Tube-well  

Operator.  Hence,  the  post  of  the  Tube-well  

Operator was not abolished but only the name of  

the post was changed, as rightly held by the  

Industrial Tribunal.

15. Therefore, in view of the above stated facts  

and also on a perusal of the reasons given by  

the  Industrial  Tribunal  in  its  Award  on  the  

contentious  point,  the  contention  urged  on  

behalf of the appellant that the termination of  

the  services  of  the  workman  was  done  in  

accordance with above mentioned Government order  

cannot  be  accepted  by  us  as  the  same  is  

erroneous  in  law.  The  fact  that  the  persons  

junior to him as well as his contemporaries are  

still  working  for  the  appellant-department,

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shows that the termination of the services of  

the respondent has been done in an unreasonable  

and unfair manner.

16. Now, coming to the question of the entitlement  

of back wages to the respondent workman, the  

same is answered in the positive, in view of the  

fact that the workman had refused to accept the  

new job as fisherman which was offered to him  

pursuant to the Award passed by the Industrial  

Tribunal on the ground that the said post is not  

equivalent  to  the  post  of  the  Tube-well  

Operator. Even though the appellant had agreed  

to  comply  with  the  terms  of  the  Award  dated  

24.02.1997 passed by the Industrial Tribunal and  

had offered reinstatement to him, it is well  

within the right of the workman to refuse the  

new job offered to him and the same cannot be  

said to be unjustified or erroneous on the part  

of the respondent-workman.  

17. In the present case, there has been an absence  

of  cogent  evidence  adduced  on  record  by  the  

appellant  to  justify  the  termination  of  the  

services of the respondent-workman, who has been

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aggrieved by the non-awarding of back wages from  

the date of termination till the date of passing  

the Award by the Industrial Tribunal. There is  

no justification for the Industrial Tribunal to  

deny the back wages for the said period without  

assigning  any  cogent  and  valid  reasons.  

Therefore,  the  denial  of  back  wages  to  the  

respondent even though the Industrial Tribunal  

has  recorded  its  finding  on  the  contentious  

question no.1 in the affirmative in his favour  

and  in  the  absence  of  evidence  of  gainful  

employment of the respondent during the relevant  

period, amounts to arbitrary exercise of power  

by the Industrial Tribunal for no fault of the  

respondent and the same is contrary to law as  

laid down by this Court in a catena of cases.  

Hence,  it  is  a  fit  case  for  this  Court  to  

exercise its power under Order XLI Rule 33 of  

the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to award back  

wages  to  the  respondent,  even  though  the  

respondent  has  not  filed  a  separate  writ  

petition questioning that portion of the Award  

wherein no back wages were awarded to him by the

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Courts  below  for  the  relevant  period.  The  

respondent has got a right to place reliance  

upon the said provision of the Civil Procedure  

Code,  1908  and  show  to  this  Court  that  the  

findings recorded by both the Courts below in  

denying back wages for the relevant period of  

time in the impugned judgment and Award is bad  

in law as the same is not only erroneous but  

also error in law. Therefore, in accordance with  

the power exercised by this Court under Order  

XLI Rule 33 of this Civil Procedure Code, 1908  

and in the light of the judgment of this Court  

in Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v. Basanti  

Devi  and  Anr3.,  we  hold  that  the  State  

Government  is  liable  to  pay  50%  of  the  back  

wages to the respondent from the date of his  

termination order dated 22.08.1975 till the date  

of the Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal,  

i.e. 24.02.1997. The relevant paragraphs of the  

above referred judgment reads thus:

“17. In  our  approach  we  can  also  draw  strength from the provisions of Rule 33 of  Order  41  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  

3  (1999) 8 SCC 229

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which is as under: “33.  Power  of  Court  of  Appeal.-The  appellate  court  shall  have  power  to  pass  any decree and make any order which ought  to have been passed or made and to pass or  make such further or other decree or order  as the case may require, and this power may  be exercised by the court notwithstanding  that  the  appeal  is  a  part  only  of  the  decree and may be exercised in favour of  all or any of the respondents or parties,  although  such  respondents  or  parties  may  not have filed any appeal or objection and  may,  where  there  have  been  decrees  in  cross-suits  or  where  two  or  more  decrees  are  passed  in  one  suit,  be  exercised  in  respect  of  all  or  any  of  the  decrees,  although an appeal may not have been filed  against such decrees: Provided that the appellate court shall not  make  any  order  under  Section  35-A,  in  pursuance  of  any  objection  on  which  the  court  from  whose  decree  the  appeal  is  preferred  has  omitted  or  refused  to  make  such order.” 18. This  provision  was  explained  by  this  Court in  Mahant Dhangir v.  Madan Mohan in  the following words:  “The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is  wide enough to determine any question not  only between the appellant and respondent,  but  also  between  respondent  and  co- respondents. The appellate court could pass  any  decree  or  order  which  ought  to  have  been  passed  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case. The appellate court could also pass  such other decree or order as the case may  require.  The  words  ‘as  the  case  may  require’ used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have  been  put  in  wide  terms  to  enable  the  appellate court to pass any order or decree  to  meet  the  ends  of  justice.  What  then  should be the constraint? We do not find  many.  We  are  not  giving  any  liberal  interpretation. The rule itself is liberal

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enough. The only constraint that we could  see, may be these: That the parties before  the lower court should be there before the  appellate court. The question raised must  properly arise out of the judgment of the  lower court. If these two requirements are  there, the appellate court could consider  any  objection  against  any  part  of  the  judgment or decree of the lower court. It  may be urged by any party to the appeal. It  is  true  that  the  power  of  the  appellate  court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But  it  is  a  proper  exercise  of  judicial  discretion to determine all questions urged  in order to render complete justice between  the parties. The court should not refuse to  exercise  that  discretion  on  mere  technicalities.”    

18. Further,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondent, in support of his legal submissions  

with regard to back wages has rightly placed  

reliance  on  the  decision  of  Deepali  Gundu  

Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya4,   

wherein this Court has held thus:

“22. The very idea of restoring an employee  to  the  position  which  he  held  before  dismissal  or  removal  or  termination  of  service implies that the employee will be  put in the same position in which he would  have been but for the illegal action taken  by the employer. The injury suffered by a  person, who is dismissed or removed or is  otherwise  terminated  from  service  cannot  easily be measured in terms of money. With  the  passing  of  an  order  which  has  the  effect  of  severing  the  employer-employee  

4  (2013) 10 SCC 324

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relationship, the latter’s source of income  gets  dried  up.  Not  only  the  employee  concerned,  but  his  entire  family  suffers  grave adversities. They are deprived of the  source  of  sustenance.  The  children  are  deprived  of  nutritious  food  and  all  opportunities of education and advancement  in life. At times, the family has to borrow  from the relatives and other acquaintance  to  avoid  starvation.  These  sufferings  continue  till  the  competent  adjudicatory  forum decides on the legality of the action  taken by the employer. The reinstatement of  such an employee, which is preceded by a  finding  of  the  competent  judicial/quasi- judicial  body  or  court  that  the  action  taken by the employer is ultra vires the  relevant  statutory  provisions  or  the  principles of natural justice, entitles the  employee to claim full back wages.  If the  employer wants to deny back wages to the  employee or contest his entitlement to get  consequential  benefits,  then  it  is  for  him/her  to  specifically  plead  and  prove  that  during  the  intervening  period  the  employee  was  gainfully  employed  and  was  getting the same emoluments. The denial of  back wages to an employee, who has suffered  due to an illegal act of the employer would  amount to indirectly punishing the employee  concerned  and  rewarding  the  employer  by  relieving him of the obligation to pay back  wages including the emoluments.”

(emphasis laid down by this Court)

19. He has further placed reliance on the decision  

of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries  

Ltd.5, wherein this Court has held thus:

5  (2014) 11 SCC 85

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“36. On  the  issue  of  back  wages  to  be  awarded in favour of the appellant, it has  been  held  by  this  Court  in  Shiv  Nandan  Mahto v.  State of Bihar that if  a workman  is kept out of service due to the fault or  mistake of the establishment/company he was  working in, then the workman is entitled to  full  back  wages  for  the  period  he  was  illegally kept out of service. The relevant  paragraph of the judgment reads as under:  

“8.  …  In  fact,  a  perusal  of  the  aforesaid short order passed by the  Division  Bench  would  clearly  show  that  the  High  Court  had  not  even  acquainted itself with the fact that  the  appellant  was  kept  out  of  service due to a mistake. He was not  kept  out  of  service  on  account  of  suspension,  as  wrongly  recorded  by  the High Court. The conclusion is,  therefore,  obvious  that  the  appellant could not have been denied  the  benefit  of  back  wages  on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  worked  for  the  period  when  he  was  illegally  kept out of service. In our opinion,  the  appellant  was  entitled  to  be  paid full back wages for the period  he was kept out of service.”

37. Further, in Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan  Singh, the three-Judge Bench of this Court  considered the question whether back wages  should be awarded to the workman in each  and every case of illegal retrenchment. The  relevant paragraph reads as under:  

“8. There is no rule of thumb that  in every case where the Industrial  Tribunal  gives  a  finding  that  the  termination  of  service  was  in  violation  of  Section  25-F  of  the  Act,  entire  back  wages  should  be  awarded. A host of factors like the  manner and method of selection and  appointment  i.e.  whether  after  proper advertisement of the vacancy

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or  inviting  applications  from  the  employment  exchange,  nature  of  appointment, namely, whether ad hoc,  short term, daily wage, temporary or  permanent in character, any special  qualification  required  for  the  job  and the like should be weighed and  balanced  in  taking  a  decision  regarding award of back wages. One  of the important factors, which has  to be taken into consideration, is  the  length  of  service,  which  the  workman  had  rendered  with  the  employer.  If  the  workman  has  rendered  a  considerable  period  of  service  and  his  services  are  wrongfully  terminated,  he  may  be  awarded full or partial back wages  keeping in view the fact that at his  age and the qualification possessed  by him he may not be in a position  to get another employment. However,  where  the  total  length  of  service  rendered by a workman is very small,  the  award  of  back  wages  for  the  complete period i.e. from the date  of termination till the date of the  award, which our experience shows is  often quite large, would be wholly  inappropriate.  Another  important  factor, which requires to be taken  into consideration is the nature of  employment.  A  regular  service  of  permanent  character  cannot  be  compared  to  short  or  intermittent  daily-wage employment though it may  be  for  240  days  in  a  calendar  year.””

20. Thus, in view of the cases referred to supra,  

there  was  absolutely  no  justification  on  the  

part of the Industrial Tribunal to deny back

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wages to the respondent even when it is found  

that the order of termination is void ab initio  

in  law  for  non-compliance  of  the  mandatory  

provisions under Section 6-N of the Act. Keeping  

in view the fact that the period of termination  

was in the year 1975 and the matter has been  

unnecessarily  litigated  by  the  employer  by  

contesting  the  matter  before  the  Industrial  

Tribunal  as  well  as  the  High  Court  and  this  

Court for more than 40 years, and further, even  

after  the  Award/order  of  reinstatement  was  

passed by the Industrial Tribunal directing the  

employer to give him the post equivalent to the  

post of Tube-well Operator, the same has been  

denied to him by offering the said post which is  

not equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator  

and  thereby,   attributing  the  fault  on  the  

respondent for non reporting to the post offered  

to him, which is once again unjustified on the  

part of the employer.

21. Thus,  the  principle  “no  work  no  pay”  as  

observed by this Court in the catena of cases  

does  not  have  any  significance  to  the  fact

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situation of the present case as the termination  

of the services of the workman from the post of  

Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the  

first place, as held by us in view of the above  

stated reasons.  

22. The  respondent  and  his  family  members  have  

been suffering for more than four decades as the  

source of their livelihood has been arbitrarily  

deprived by the appellant. Thereby, the Right to  

Liberty and Livelihood guaranteed under Articles  

19 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been  

denied to the respondent by the appellant as  

held in the case of   Olga Tellis and Ors. v.  

Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors6.,  wherein  

this Court has held thus:

“32. As we have stated while summing up the  petitioners’ case, the main plank of their  argument is that the right to life which is  guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right  to  livelihood  and  since,  they  will  be  deprived  of  their  livelihood  if  they  are  evicted  from  their  slum  and  pavement  dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to  deprivation  of  their  life  and  is  hence  unconstitutional. For purposes of argument,  we will assume the factual correctness of  the  premise  that  if  the  petitioners  are  evicted from their dwellings, they will be  

6 (1985)3 SCC 545

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deprived  of  their  livelihood.  Upon  that  assumption, the question which  we have to  consider  is  whether  the  right  to  life  includes  the  right  to  livelihood.  We  see  only one answer to that question, namely,  that  it  does.  The  sweep  of  the  right  to  life conferred by Article 21 is wide and  far-reaching. It does not mean merely that  life cannot be extinguished or taken away  as,  for  example,  by  the  imposition  and  execution  of  the  death  sentence,  except  according to procedure established by law.  That  is  but  one  aspect  of  the  right  to  life.  An  equally  important  facet  of  that  right is the right to livelihood because,  no  person  can  live  without  the  means  of  living, that is, the means of livelihood.  If the right to livelihood is not treated  as a part of the constitutional right to  life, the easiest way of depriving a person  of his right to life would be to deprive  him of his means of livelihood to the point  of abrogation. Such deprivation would not  only  denude  the  life  of  its  effective  content  and  meaningfulness  but  it  would  make life impossible to live. And yet, such  deprivation  would  not  have  to  be  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  established  by law, if the right to livelihood is not  regarded as a part of the right to life.  That,  which  alone  makes  it  possible  to  live, leave aside what makes life livable,  must be deemed to be an integral component  of the right to life. Deprive a person of  his right to livelihood and you shall have  deprived  him  of  his  life. Indeed,  that  explains the massive migration of the rural  population  to  big  cities.  They  migrate  because they have no means of livelihood in  the  villages.  The  motive  force  which  propels  their  desertion  of  their  hearths  and homes in the village is the struggle  for  survival,  that  is,  the  struggle  for  life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of  the  nexus  between  life  and  the  means  of

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livelihood. They have to eat to live: only  a handful can afford the luxury of living  to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only  if they have the means of livelihood. That  is  the  context  in  which  it  was  said  by  Douglas,  J.  in    Baksey   that  the  right  to    work is the most precious liberty that man  possesses. It is the most precious liberty  because, it sustains and enables a man to  live and the right to life is a precious  freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J.  in    Munn   v.    Illinois   means  something  more    than  mere  animal  existence  and  the  inhibition against the deprivation of life  extends to all those limits and faculties  by which life is enjoyed. This observation  was quoted with approval by this Court in  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.”

(emphasis laid down by this Court)

23. Therefore,  with  respect  to  the  judicial  

decisions of this Court referred to  supra, we  

hold that the appellant is liable to pay 50%  

back wages in favour of the respondent from the  

date of the termination order dated 22.08.1975  

till  the  date  of  the  Award  passed  by  the  

Industrial Tribunal, i.e. 24.02.1997.  

24. In so far as the awarding of full back wages  

to  the  respondent  by  the  High  Court  in  its  

judgment  and  order  dated  18.07.2006 for  the  

period 24.02.1997 to 31.01.2005 is concerned, we  

retain  the  same.  The  appellant  is  further

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directed  to  pay  full  back  wages  to  the  

respondent after computing the same on the basis  

of the revised pay-scale and pay him all other  

monetary  benefits  as  well.  The  aforesaid  

direction  shall  be  complied  with  by  the  

appellant within four weeks from the date of  

receipt of the copy of this order.  

25. Accordingly,  the  appeal  is  dismissed  with  

modification regarding back wages as mentioned  

in  the  preceding  paragraphs.  The  order  dated  

11.12.2006 granting stay shall stand vacated. No  

costs.   

 ……………………………………………………………J.                                     [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

    ……………………………………………………………J.  

                                  [R.BANUMATHI] New Delhi, March 26, 2015

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ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment      COURT NO.9               SECTION XV                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  2381/2007 STATE OF U.P                                       Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS CHARAN SINGH                                       Respondent(s) Date : 26/03/2015 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s)  Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, AAG

Mr. Gaurav Srivastava, Adv.  Mr. Utkarsh Jaiswal, Adv.

                    Ms. Pragati Neekhra,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)                      Mr. Devendra Singh,Adv.

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the  judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble  Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

The  appeal  is  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed  Reportable Judgment.  

  (VINOD KR.JHA)         (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)  COURT MASTER          COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)