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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1278  OF 2014 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.1696 of 2006)

STATE OF PUNJAB ..... APPELLANT VERSUS

GURMIT SINGH            .... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Chandramauli Kr. Prasad  

State  of  Punjab  aggrieved  by  the  order  

dated 7th of September, 2005, passed by the  

Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  in  Criminal  

Revision No. 320 of 2000 whereby it has set  

aside the order of the trial court dated 24th  

of  January,  2000  summoning  the  respondent  

Gurmit Singh to face trial under Section 319

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of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  has  

preferred this special leave petition.

Leave granted.

Facts lie in a very short compass.  On the  

basis of a report a case under Section 304B of  

the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) was  

registered at Police Station, Kharar.  In the  

first information report, the names of various  

accused  persons  figured  including  Gurmit  

Singh, the respondent herein.  Police after  

usual  investigation,  submitted  the  charge-

sheet in which the respondent did not figure  

as an accused.  However, the respondent along  

with some other accused persons who were not  

charge-sheeted  were  summoned  to  face  the  

trial.  They challenged the said order before  

the High Court in Criminal Misc. No. 1584-M of  

1999 and the High Court by its order dated 25th  

of  February,  1999  set  aside  the  order  

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summoning those accused persons including the  

respondent but while doing so gave liberty to  

take recourse to the provisions of Section 319  

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter  

referred to as the ‘Code’, at an appropriate  

stage  of  the  trial.   During  the  course  of  

trial, evidence of one Shakuntla Rani, PW-1  

was recorded, who averred that the respondent  

herein was also responsible for the death of  

Gurjit  Kaur,  the  wife  of  Paramjit  Singh.  

Thereafter, an application was filed by the  

prosecution  for  summoning  aforesaid  Gurmit  

Singh  and  other  accused  persons  before  the  

trial  court  in  exercise  of  the  power  under  

Section 319 of the Code.  The trial court by  

its order dated 24th of January, 2000, summoned  

the respondent besides other accused persons  

to face trial, for commission of offence under  

Section 304B IPC, inter alia, observing that  

the names of those persons figured in the FIR,  

statement  of  the  witnesses  recorded  under  

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Section 161 of the Code and the evidence of  

Shakuntla Rani, PW-1.

Respondent challenged the aforesaid order  

in  a  revision  application  filed  before  the  

High Court inter alia on the ground that he  

cannot be tried for offence under Section 304B  

of the Code because he is not a relative of  

the husband of the deceased.  It was pointed  

out  that  Paramjit  Singh  happened  to  be  the  

husband of the deceased whereas the respondent  

is  the  brother  of  his  aunt  (chachi)  and,  

therefore, cannot be said to be a relative of  

the deceased’s husband.   Aforesaid submission  

found  favour  with  the  High  Court  and,  

accordingly,  it  quashed  the  order  summoning  

the  respondent  to  face  the  trial.    While  

doing so, the High Court observed as follows:

“Even the dictionary meaning of a  relative is one who is related by  blood or marriage.  Gurmit Singh  is  certainly  not  related  to  Paramjit Singh either by blood or  by marriage.  Gurmit Singh would  not  fall  in  the  category  of  

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relative  of  the  husband.  Therefore, Gurmit Singh must be  excluded  from  the  array  of  the  accused.  It is not necessary to  try him under Section 304B I.P.C.  for the dowry death of Paramjit  Singh’s wife.

Mr.  V.  Madhukar,  learned  Additional  

Advocate General appearing on behalf of the  

State  submits  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  

holding that the respondent is not a relative  

of the husband of the deceased.  He points out  

that  Balbir  Kaur  is  the  wife  of  Paramjit  

Singh’s  father’s  brother  and  Gurmit  Singh  

respondent herein happens to be Balbir Kaur’s  

brother, hence, a relative of Paramjit Singh.  

According  to  him,  the  High  Court  erred  in  

holding  that  he  is  not  a  relative  of  the  

husband  of  the  deceased.   Mr.  C.D.  Singh,  

learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent,  however,  submits  that  the  

respondent cannot be said to be related to the  

husband  of  the  deceased  in  any  manner  and,  

therefore,  cannot  be  prosecuted  for  offence  

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under  Section  304B  of  the  IPC.   The  rival  

submission  necessitates  the  examination  of  

Section  304B  of  the  IPC,  same  reads  as  

follows:

”304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the  death of a woman is caused by any  burns or bodily injury or occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal  circumstances  within  seven  years  of her marriage and it is shown  that soon before her death she was  subjected to cruelty or harassment  by her husband or any relative of  her husband for, or in connection  with, any demand for dowry, such  death  shall  be  called  “dowry  death”,  and  such  husband  or  relative shall be deemed to have  caused her death.  

Explanation.—For  the  purpose  of  this  sub-section,  “dowry”  shall  have  the  same  meaning  as  in  section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition  Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever  commits  dowry  death  shall be punished with imprison- ment for a term which shall not be  less  than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment  for  life.”         

(underlining ours)

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From  a  plain  reading  of  the  aforesaid  

provision it is evident that when a woman dies  

by  any  burns  or  bodily  injury  or  otherwise  

than under normal circumstances within seven  

years  of  the  marriage,  her  husband  or  any  

relative  of  her  husband  shall  be  deemed  to  

have committed the offence of dowry death if  

it is shown that soon before the death the  

woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment  

by  her  husband,  or  by  any  relative  of  her  

husband.  This section therefore, exposes the  

husband of the woman or any relative of her  

husband for the commission of offence of the  

dowry death.  Admittedly, the respondent is  

not the husband of the woman who died and,  

therefore,  the  question  which  falls  for  

determination is as to whether he comes within  

the ambit of “any relative of her husband”.  

The expression “relative” has not been defined  

in the IPC. The provision with which we are  

concerned is a penal provision which deserves  

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strict construction. It is well settled that  

when the words of a statute are not defined,  

it  has  to  be  understood  in  their  natural,  

ordinary or popular sense.  For this purpose,  

it  shall  be  permissible  to  refer  to  

dictionaries to find out the general sense in  

which  the  word  is  understood  in  common  

parlance.   In Ramanatha Aiyar’s, Advance Law  

Lexicon (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the word relative  

means any person related by blood, marriage or  

adoption.  A large number of dictionaries give  

this word relative, in context, same meaning.  

It  is  relevant  here  to  state  that  the  

expression “relative of the husband” has been  

used in Section 498-A of the I.P.C.   While  

interpreting the said expression, this Court  

in  the  case  of  U.  Suvetha  vs.  State  by  Inspector of Police and Anr.(2009) 6 SCC 787  held it to mean a person related by blood,  

marriage or adoption.  Relevant portion of the  

judgment reads as follows:

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“10.  In  the  absence  of  any  statutory  definition,  the  term  “relative”  must  be  assigned  a  meaning as is commonly understood.  Ordinarily  it  would  include  father, mother, husband or wife,  son,  daughter,  brother,  sister,  nephew  or  niece,  grandson  or  granddaughter of an individual or  the  spouse  of  any  person.   The  meaning  of  the  word  “relative”  would  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  statute.   It  principally  includes  a  person  related  by  blood, marriage or adoption.”

The  expression  relative  of  the  husband  

further came up for consideration in the case of  

Vijeta Gajra vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2010)11  SCC 618 and while approving the decision of this  Court in  U. Suvetha (Supra),  it was held that  the word relative would be limited only to the  

blood relations or the relations by marriage.  

It  is  appropriate  to  reproduce  the  following  

passage from the said judgment:

“12.  Relying  on  the  dictionary  meaning of the word “relative” and  further  relying  on  Ramanatha  Aiyar’s,  Advance  Law  Lexicon  (Vol.4, 3rd Edn.), the Court went  on to hold that Section 498-A IPC  being  a  penal  provision  would  

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deserve  strict  construction  and  unless  a  contextual  meaning  is  required  to  be  given  to  the  statute, the said statute has to  be  construed  strictly.   On  that  behalf  the  Court  relied  on  the  judgment in  T. Ashok Pai vs. CIT  (2007) 7 SCC 162.  A reference was  made to the decision in Shivcharan  Lal Verma vs. State of M.P. (2007)  15 SCC 369.  After quoting from  various decisions of this Court,  it was held that reference to the  word “relative” in Section 498-A  IPC would be limited only to the  blood relations or the relations  by marriage.”

It  is  well  known  rule  of  construction  

that when the Legislature uses same words in  

different part of the statute, the presumption  

is that those words have been used in the same  

sense, unless displaced by the context.  We do  

not find anything in context to deviate from  

the general rule of interpretation.  Hence, we  

have  no  manner  of  doubt  that  the  word  

“relative of the husband” in Section 304 B of  

the  IPC  would  mean  such  persons,  who  are  

related by blood, marriage or adoption.  When  

we apply this principle the respondent herein  

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is not related to the husband of the deceased  

either  by  blood  or  marriage  or  adoption.  

Hence, in our opinion, the High Court did not  

err in passing the impugned order.  We hasten  

to add that a person, not a relative of the  

husband,  may  not  be  prosecuted  for  offence  

under Section 304B IPC but this does not mean  

that such a person cannot be prosecuted for  

any other offence viz. Section 306 IPC, in  

case the allegations constitute offence other  

than Section 304B IPC.

In the result, we do not find any merit in  

the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly.  

  ………………………………………………………………J  

  (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

  ………………………………………………………………J

                (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)

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NEW DELHI, July 2, 2014.   

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