REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.117 OF 2006  State of Punjab .....Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Dalbir Singh ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1.This appeal at the instance of the State has been  

preferred from the judgment of the Division Bench of  

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh,  

dated July 27, 2005 in Criminal Appeal No. 250/1996  

whereby High Court gave the appellant the benefit of  

doubt  and  acquitted  him  of  the  charges  framed  

against him.  

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2. Briefly,  the  facts  of  the  case  are  that  the  

respondent  Dalbir  Singh,  a  constable  in  36th  

Battalion  Central  Reserve  Police  Force,  at  the  

relevant  time  was  posted  at  Fatehabad,  District  

Amritsar,  Punjab.  On  April  11th,  1993,  Harish  

Chander, the Battalion Havaldar Major (hereinafter  

‘B.H.M.’) in ‘Company D’ of the Battalion, reported  

to Hari Singh, the Deputy Commandant Quarter Master  

(hereinafter ‘Deputy Commandant’), that the accused  

had refused to carry out the fatigue duty assigned  

to  him.  On  such  report  being  made,  the  Deputy  

Commandant  directed  the  B.H.M.  and  Sub  Inspector  

Kewal Singh to produce the accused before him. As  

per  these  directions,  the  accused  was  produced  

before  the  Deputy  Commandant  at  11:15  a.m.  Upon  

being warned verbally about his non compliance of  

the orders for fatigue duty, the accused requested  

the warning to be issued in writing. Upon such a  

response, the Deputy Commandant ordered the B.H.M.  

and the Sub Inspector to have the accused present  

before him the next morning.

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3.However, immediately after these talks, the Deputy  

Commandant’s office saw firing from a Self Loading  

Rifle (SLR), even as the Deputy Commandant himself  

and  the  B.H.M.  were  inside  it.  As  the  Deputy  

Commandant positioned himself underneath a table, he  

allegedly  noted  that  it  was  the  accused  who  was  

firing from a rifle from a tent pitched outside.  He  

was allegedly hit in his back. The B.H.M. sustained  

multiple bullet injuries in his shoulders.

4.This  entire  incident  was  allegedly  witnessed  by  

Constable Dalip Kumar Mishra and Sub Inspector Kewal  

Singh. Eventually, when the firing had stopped and  

the accused was trying to reload his gun, he was  

overpowered  and  disarmed  by  Constable  Mishra.  The  

Deputy Commandant directed the Sub Inspector Kewal  

Singh to hand over the accused to the police, while  

he himself and B.H.M. Harish Chander were rushed to  

Sri  Guru  Nanak  Hospital.  Unfortunately,  B.H.M.  

Harish  Chander  died  en  route  and  his  body  was  

identified  in  the  hospital.  The  Deputy  Commandant  

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recorded his statement (Ex. PH) and an F.I.R. (Ex.  

PH/2)  was  registered  at  the  hospital  by  Sub  

Inspector Jaswant Singh.

5.During investigation, the Investigating Officer, in  

the presence of SI Kewal Singh and Constable Mishra,  

found 20 empty bullet-cartridges (Ex.P4-P23) at the  

Battalion  Headquarters  at  Khawaspur.  These  were  

taken into possession after putting them in a sealed  

parcel  through  recovery  memo  (Ex.PK).  The  empty  

cartridges  were  sent  to  the  Forensic  Science  

Laboratory on 15.4.1993 and the SLR was forwarded on  

23.4.1993.  

6.After investigation a challan was put in the Court  

of the Ilaqua Magistrate who found that the case was  

exclusively  triable  by  the  Court  of  Session,  

committed the same to Court of Session. The accused  

was charged under Section 302 and 307 of IPC and  

under  Section  27  of  the  Arms  Act.  The  accused  

pleaded not guilty and the Prosecution was called  4

upon to examine its witnesses including DCQM Hari  

Singh  (PW.6),  SI  Kewal  Singh  (PW.7),  Constable  

Mishra (PW.9) and Sub Inspector Jaswant Singh. The  

accused, upon examination, denied all circumstances  

and  asserted  that  he  was  innocent  and  had  been  

falsely  implicated.  The  Trial  Court  consequently  

convicted  the  accused  under  Section  302  of  IPC,  

sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life and  

fine  of  Rs.2,000/-,  under  Section  307  of  IPC,  

sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for 5 years  

and fine of Rs.2,000/-, and under Section 27 of Arms  

Act, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for 3  

years  and  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-.  The  substantive  

sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

7.In  the  impugned  judgment  the  High  Court  while  

reversing the order of conviction found that there  

is  some  irreconcilable  inconsistency  in  the  

prosecution case.  The High Court found that PW.9  

the alleged eye witness deposed that the respondent  

was  apprehended  at  the  spot  by  him  and  he  was  

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disarmed by him and the SLR which was being used by  

the  accused  was  taken  in  his  possession  and  the  

accused was handed over to the Court.  But according  

to the Investigating Officer (IO) PW.12, he went to  

the place of occurrence on the date of occurrence  

i.e. on 11.4.93, but neither the accused nor the SLR  

allegedly used by the accused were handed over to  

him.  The further evidence of the IO is that on  

14.4.93, the accused was handed over to him outside  

the  CRPF  headquarters.   Then  on  his  disclosure  

statement the SLR was recovered.  In view of such  

irreconcilable  discrepancy  in  the  evidence  of  the  

prosecution, the High Court came to the finding that  

the prosecution was trying to suppress a vital part  

of the case and the incident did not take place in  

the manner presented by the prosecution.  The High  

Court further found that even though the prosecution  

allegation is that 20 cartridges were fired, only 7  

empties were recovered and none of the bullets were  

recovered.  The High Court found that the same is  

very surprising when the prosecution version is that  

20 bullets were actually fired in a room towards the  

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side where there are no windows. It is, therefore,  

impossible  that  none  of  the  bullets  had  been  

recovered.  In view of the aforesaid finding of the  

High  Court  the  accused  was  given  the  benefit  of  

doubt.   

8.We are of the opinion that there is no reason to  

interfere with the order of acquittal given by the  

High Court sitting in our jurisdiction under Article  

136 of the Constitution.  We do not think that the  

order of the High Court is either perverse or not  

based on proper appreciation of evidence. Therefore,  

on the merits of the order of acquittal granted by  

the High Court we find no reason to interfere.  But  

since  in  this  case  the  accused  was  charged  under  

Section  27(3)  of  the  Arms  Act  (hereinafter,  ‘the  

Act’) and since the vires of Section 27(3) of the  

said Act has been questioned, we proceed to examine  

the said issue in detail.   

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9.In this matter leave was granted on 16.1.2006.  On  

31.8.2010,  a  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  issued  

notice to the Attorney General as vires of Section  

27(3)  of  the  Act  was  challenged  in  the  said  

proceeding.   

10. Pursuant  to  such  notice  Mr.  Gourab  Banerjee,  the  

learned ASG initially submitted before this Court on  

15th March, 2011 and again on 21st July, 2011 that a  

proposal to amend Section 27(3) of the Act is under  

consideration of the Government of India and as such  

matter  was  adjourned.   Thereafter  the  matter  was  

heard on 1st December, 2011 and on subsequent dates  

both on merits of the High Court order and also on  

the question of vires of Section 27(3) of the Act.

11. Since the Court is to examine the constitutional  

validity of Section 27, sub-section (3) of the Act,  

for a proper appreciation of the questions involved,  

Section 27 of the Act is set out below:-

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“27.Punishment for using arms, etc.-

(1) Whoever uses any arms or ammunition in  contravention  of  section  5  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which shall not be less than three years  but which may extend to seven years and  shall also be liable to fine.

(2)  Whoever uses  any prohibited  arms or  prohibited ammunition in contravention of  section  7  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment for a term which shall not be  less than seven years but which may extend  to imprisonment for life and shall also be  liable to fine.

(3)  Whoever uses  any prohibited  arms or  prohibited ammunition or does any act in  contravention of section 7 and such use or  act  results  in  the  death  of  any  other  person, shall be punishable with death.”

12. The present form of Section 27 including Section  

27(3)  has  come  by  way  of  amendment,  namely,  by  

Amending Act 42 of 1988, the previous Section 27 was  

substituted.  The Arms Act was enacted in 1959.  At  

the time when it was enacted, Section 27 was in the  

following form:-

“27.  Punishment  for  possessing  arms,  etc.,  with intent to use them for unlawful purpose –

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Whoever has in his possession any arms  or ammunition with intent to use the same  for any unlawful purpose or to enable any  other  person  to  use  the  same  for  any  unlawful  purpose  shall,  whether  such  unlawful  purpose  has  been  carried  into  effect  or  not,  be  punishable  with  imprisonment for a term which may extend  to  seven  years,  or  with  fine  or  with  both.”

13. The Statements of Objects and Reasons of Act 42 of  

1988 (the Amending Act) are as follows:-

“Act 42 of 1988. - The Arms Act, 1959 had  been  amended  to  provide  for  enhanced  punishments  in  respect  of  offences  under  that  Act  in  the  context  of  escalating  terrorist  and  anti-national  activities.  However, it was reported that terrorist and  anti-national  elements,  particularly  in  Punjab  had  in  the  recent  past  acquired  automatic firearms, machine guns of various  types,  rockets  and  rocket  launchers.  Although the definitions of the expressions  "arms",  "ammunitions",  "prohibited  arms"  and “prohibited ammunition” included in the  Act  are  adequate  to  cover  the  aforesaid  lethal weapons in the matter of punishments  for offences relating to arms, the Act did  not make any distinction between offences  involving ordinary arms and the more lethal  prohibited arms and prohibited ammunition.  Further  while  the  Act  provided  for  punishment of persons in possession of arms  and ammunition with intent to use them for  any  unlawful  purpose,  it  did  not  provide  for  any  penalties  for  the  actual  use  of  illegal  arms.  To  overcome  these  deficiencies, it was proposed to amend the  Act by providing for deterrent punishment  for  offences  relating  to  prohibited  arms  and ammunition and for the illegal use of  firearms  and  ammunition  so  as  to  effectively  meet  the  challenges  from  the  terrorist  and  anti-national  elements.  

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Accordingly,  the  Arms  (Amendment)  Ordinance,  1988  was  promulgated  by  the  President  on  the  27th May,  1988.  The  Ordinance  amended  the  Act  to  provide  for  the followings among other things namely:-  

(i)  The  definitions  of  "ammunition"  and  "prohibited  ammunition"  have  been  amended  to include missiles so as to put the matter  beyond any doubt;  

(ii)  Deterrent  punishments  have  been  provided for offences involving prohibited  arms and prohibited ammunition;  

(iii) Punishments have also been provided  for the use of illegal arms and ammunition  and death penalty has been provided if such  use causes death."  

14. A perusal of Section 27, sub-section (3), the vires  

of which has been challenged, shows that if by mere  

use of any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunitions  

or if any act is done by any person in contravention  

of Section 7, he shall be punishable with death.  

15. Section 7 of the said Act prohibits acquisition or  

possession,  or  manufacture  or  sale  of  prohibited  

arms or prohibited ammunitions. The said Section 7  

is set out below:-

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“7. Prohibition  of  acquisition  or  possession, or of manufacture or sale, of  prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition.-

No person shall--

(a)  acquire,  have  in  his  possession  or  carry; or

(b) use,  manufacture,  sell,  transfer,  convert, repair, test or prove; or

(c) expose or offer for sale or transfer or  have in his possession for sale, transfer,  conversion, repair, test or proof;

any  prohibited  arms  or  prohibited  ammunition  unless  he  has  been  specially  authorised  by  the  Central  Government  in  this behalf.”

16. In  the  definition  clause  prohibited  ammunitions  

and prohibited arms have been defined respectively  

under  Section  2,  sub-Sections  (h)  and  (i)  

respectively of the said Act.  Those definitions are  

set out below:-

“(h)  “Prohibited  ammunition”  means  any  ammunition,  containing,  or  designed  or  adapted  to  contain,  any  noxious  liquid,  gas  or  other  such  thing,  and  includes  rockets, bombs, grenades, shells, missiles  articles designed for torpedo service and  submarine mining and such other articles  as  the  Central  Government  may,  by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  specify to be prohibited ammunition;”

“(i) "prohibited arms" means-- 1

(i)  firearms  so  designed  or  adapted  that, if pressure is applied to the  trigger,  missiles  continue  to  be  discharged until pressure is removed  from  the  trigger  or  the  magazine  containing the missiles is empty, or

(ii)  weapons  of  any  description  designed or adapted for the discharge  of  any  noxious  liquid,  gas  or  other  such thing,

and  includes  artillery,  anti-aircraft  and anti-tank firearms and such other  arms as the Central Government may, by  notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  specify to be prohibited arms;”

17. The  word  ‘acquire’,  ‘possession’  or  ‘carry’  has  

not been defined under the said Act nor the word  

‘used’, ‘manufacture’, ‘sale’, ‘convert’, ‘repair’,  

‘test’ or ‘prove’ have been defined in the Act.  The  

word  ‘transfer’  has  only  been  defined  in  Section  

2(k) to mean as follows:-

“(k)  “transfer”  with  its  grammatical  variations  and  cognate  expressions,  includes letting on hire, lending, giving  and parting with possession.”

18. Section 7 imposes a prohibition on certain acts in  

respect  of  prohibited  arms  and  ammunitions  but  

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Section  7  does  not  spell  out  the  penalty.   The  

penalty for contravention of Section 7 is provided  

under Section 27(3) of the Act as mentioned above.  

19. If we look at Section 27, which has been set out  

above, it is divided into three sub-sections. Sub-

section 1 prescribes that if any person who uses any  

arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5 he  

shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  

which shall not be not less than three years but  

which may extend to seven years and he shall also be  

liable  to  fine.  Section  5  prohibits  manufacture,  

sale  of  arms  and  ammunition.  Sub-section  (2)  of  

Section  27  provides  for  higher  punishment,  inter  

alia, on the ground that whoever uses any prohibited  

arms  or  prohibited  ammunition  in  contravention  of  

Section 7, he shall be punishable with imprisonment  

for a term which shall not be less than seven years  

but which may extend to imprisonment for life and he  

shall also be liable to fine.

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20. Section 7 prohibits acquisition or possession, or  

of  manufacture  or  sale,  of  prohibited  arms  or  

prohibited ammunition. Therefore, between Section 5  

and Section 7 of the Act a distinction has been made  

since manufacture and sale of arms and ammunition is  

dealt with in Section 5 but Section 7 deals with  

prohibition  of  acquisition  or  possession,  or  of  

manufacture  or  sale,  of  prohibited  arms  and  

ammunition.  Therefore,  there  is  a  reasonable  

classification between Section 5 and Section 7 of  

the Act. Consequently, there is valid classification  

between Sections 27(1) and 27(2) on the severity of  

the punishment.  

21. But  so  far  as  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  27  is  

concerned, the same stands apart in as much as it  

imposes  a  mandatory  death  penalty.  The  difference  

between  sub-section  (2)  and  sub-section  (3)  of  

Section 27 is that under sub-section (2) of Section  

27  if  a  person  uses  any  prohibited  arms  or  

ammunition in contravention of Section 7, he shall  

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be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  of  less  

than seven years which may extend to imprisonment  

for life and also with fine. But if the said use or  

act prohibited under Section 7 results in the death  

of  any  other  person  he  shall  be  punishable  with  

death penalty. Therefore, Section 27(3) is very wide  

in  the  sense  anything  done  in  contravention  of  

Section  7  of  the  Act  and  with  the  use of  a  

prohibited  arms  and  ammunition  resulting in  death  

will attract mandatory death penalty.  Even if any  

act  done  in  contravention  of  Section  7,  namely,  

acquisition or possession, or manufacture or sale,  

of prohibited arms results in death of any person,  

the person in contravention of Section 7 shall be  

punished  with  death.  This  is  thus  a  very  drastic  

provision for many reasons. Apart from the fact that  

this imposes a mandatory death penalty the Section  

is  so  widely  worded  to  the  extent  that  if  as  a  

result of any accidental or unintentional use or any  

accident arising out of any act in contravention of  

Section 7, death results, the only punishment, which  

has  to  be  mandatorily  imposed  on  the  person  in  

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contravention  is,  death.  It  may  be  also  noted  in  

this  connection  that  language  used  is  ‘results’  

which  is  wider  than  the  expression  ‘causes’.  The  

word ‘results’ means the outcome and is wider than  

the expression ‘causes’.

22. Therefore, very wide expression has been used in  

Section 27(3) of the Act and without any guideline  

leading to mandatory punishment of death penalty.

23. In this connection we may compare Section 302 of  

the IPC with Section 27(3) of the Act. Section 302  

is as follows:

“302. Punishment  for  murder.-  Whoever  commits  murder  shall  be  punished  with  death, or imprisonment for life, and shall  also be liable to fine.”

24. In  Section  302  of  IPC  death  penalty  is  not  

mandatory but it is optional. Apart from that the  

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word ‘murder’ has been very elaborately defined in  

Section  300  of  IPC  with  various  exceptions  and  

explanations. Section 300 of IPC is set out below:

“300.  Murder.-Except  in  the  cases  hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is  murder, if the act by which the death is  caused  is  done  with  the  intention  of  causing death, or-

Secondly.-If it is done with the intention  of  causing  such  bodily  injury  as  the  offender knows to be likely to cause the  death of the person to whom the harm is  caused, or

Thirdly.-If it is done with the intention  of causing bodily injury to any person and  the bodily injury intended to be inflicted  is  sufficient in  the ordinary  course of  nature to cause death, or-

Fourthly.-If the person committing the act  knows that it is so imminently dangerous  that  it must,  in all  probability, cause  death or such bodily injury as is likely  to  cause  death,  and  commits  such  act  without any excuse for incurring the risk  of  causing  death  or  such  injury  as  aforesaid.

Exception 1.-When culpable homicide is not  murder.-Culpable homicide is not murder if  the offender, whilst deprived of the power  of  self-control  by  grave  and  sudden  provocation,  causes  the  death  of  the  person who gave the provocation or causes  

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the death of any other person by mistake  or accident.  

The  above  exception  is  subject  to  the  following provisos:-  

First.-That the provocation is not sought  or voluntarily provoked by the offender as  an excuse for killing or doing harm to any  person.  

Secondly.-That  the  provocation  is  not  given by anything done in obedience to the  law, or by a public servant in the lawful  exercise  of  the  powers  of  such  public  servant.  

Thirdly.-That the provocation is not given  by anything done in the lawful exercise of  the right of private defence.

Explanation.-Whether  the  provocation  was  grave  and  sudden  enough  to  prevent  the  offence  from  amounting  to  murder  is  a  question of fact.”

25. But in the case of Section 27(3) law is totally  

devoid of any guidelines and no exceptions have been  

carved  out.  It  is  common  ground  that  the  said  

amendment of Section 27 was brought about in 1988  

which was much after the Constitution of India has  

come into operation.  

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26. The Parliament while making law has to function  

under  the  specific  mandates  of  the  Constitution.  

Apart from the restrictions imposed on distribution  

of  legislative  powers  under  Part  XI  of  the  

Constitution  by  Article  245  onwards,  the  direct  

mandate of the Constitution under Article 13 is that  

the State shall not make any law which takes away or  

abridges  the  right  conferred  by  Part  III  of  the  

Constitution and any law made in contravention of  

the same is, to the extent of contravention, void.  

Article 13 is set out hereinbelow:

“13.Laws  inconsistent  with  or  in  derogation of the fundamental rights: (1)  All  laws  in  force  in  the  territory  of  India immediately before the commencement  of this Constitution, in so far as they  are  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this Part, shall, to the extent of such  inconsistency, be void.

(2) The State shall not make any law which  takes  away  or  abridges  the  rights  conferred by this Part and any law made in  contravention of this clause shall, to the  extent of the contravention, be void.

(3) In  this  article,  unless  the  context  otherwise requires,-

(a)  “law”  includes  any  Ordinance,  order,  bye-law,  rule,  regulation,  

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notification,  custom  or  usage  having  in  the territory of India the force of law;

(b) “laws  in  force”  includes  laws  passed or made by a Legislature or other  competent  authority  in  the  territory  of  India  before  the  commencement  of  this  Constitution and not previously repealed,  notwithstanding that any such law or any  part thereof may not be then in operation  either at all or in particular areas.

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to  any  amendment  of  this  Constitution  made  under Article 368.

27. It  is  obvious  from  the  aforesaid  that  Article  

13(2) clearly prohibits the making of any law by the  

State which takes away or abridges rights, conferred  

by Part III of the Constitution. In the event of  

such a law being made the same shall be void to the  

extent of contravention.

28. It is obvious that only the judiciary can give the  

declaration that a law being in contravention of the  

mandate  of  Part-III  of  the  Constitution  is  void.  

Therefore, power of judicial review is inherent in  

2

our Constitution. Article 13 of the Constitution is,  

therefore, a unique feature in our Constitution.  

29. Mr. Banerjee, the learned A.S.G appearing on behalf  

of Union of India submitted that after notice was  

issued in this matter to the Attorney General, the  

matter was examined by the Government of India and a  

tentative decision to amend Section 27(3) of the Act  

retrospectively with effect from 27th May, 1988 was  

under the contemplation of the Government. Pursuant  

to  such  exercise,  the  Union  Home  Minister  gave  

notice to the Secretary General of the Lok Sabha on  

17th November,  2011  of  its  intention  to  move  for  

leave to introduce the said Bill in the Lok Sabha  

and the Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha in the  

following form. The form in which it is sought to be  

introduced in the Lok Sabha is as follows:

“Be it enacted by Parliament in the  Sixty-second year of the Republic of India  as follows:-

2

1.  (1)  This  Act  may  be  called  the  Arms  (Amendment) Act, 2011

Short  title  and  commencement

(2) It shall be deemed  to  have  come  into  force on the 27th day  of May, 1988

54 of  

1959

2.  In  the  Arms  Act,  1959 in Section 27, in  sub-section  (3),  for  the  words  “shall  be  punishable with death”  The  words  “shall  be  punishable with death  or  imprisonment  for  life and shall also be  liable to fine”, shall  be substituted.

30. Leaned Addl. Solicitor General submitted that in the  

light of the aforesaid pronouncement by this Court  

in Mithu vs. State of Punjab – (1983) 2 SCC 277, the  government  is  examining  the  question  of  making  

suitable  amendments  as  indicated  above  to  Section  

27(3) of the Act.

31. This Court, however, is not inclined to defer its  

decision.  The  Court,  however,  cannot  refuse  to  

2

examine the provision in view of a very fair stand  

taken by learned ASG.

32. The  Judges  of  this  Court  have  taken  an  oath  to  

uphold and preserve the Constitution and it is well  

known  that  this  Court  has  to  protect  the  

Constitution as a sentinel on the qui vive against  

any abridgement of its principles and percepts.  

33. It may be noted that Section 27(3) as it stands as  

on  date  was  considered  by  this  Court  in  several  

judgments. Those judgments are noted hereinbelow.

34. It was considered in the case of  Subhash Ramkumar  Bind  Alias  Vakil  and  another vs.  State  of  Maharashtra reported in (2003) 1 SCC 506. In that  case the appellant Bind was charged under Section  

302/34 and also under Section 27(3) of the Act and  

death sentence was awarded to Bind by the Sessions  

Court and the same was affirmed by the High Court.  2

This Court while reducing the death sentence awarded  

by the High Court to one of life did not pronounce  

on the constitutional validity of Section 27(3) even  

though  this  Court  referred  to  the  statement  of  

Objects  and  Reasons  of  the  Amending  Act  which  

introduced Section 27(3). This Court found that the  

arms  in  question  could  not  be  brought  within  the  

definition  of  ‘prohibited  arms’  as  defined  under  

Section 2(i) of the Act. This Court held that in  

order  to  bring  the  arms  in  question  within  the  

prohibited arms, the requirement of the statute was  

to  issue  a  formal  notification  in  the  Official  

Gazette  but  as  the  State  was  relying  on  an  

administrative  notification,  this  Court  held  that  

the same cannot be treated as a gazette notification  

and the conviction of Bind under Section 27(3) of  

the Act was set aside. This Court did not pronounce  

either way on the constitutional validity of Section  

27(3). Therefore, the decision in  Bind  (supra) is  not an authority on the constitutional validity of  

Section 27(3) of the Act.

2

35. Section 23 was again considered by this Court in the  

case of  Surendra Singh Rautela vs.  State of Bihar  (now State of Jharkhand) - (2002) 1 SCC 266. The  

appellant  Surendra  Singh  Rautela  was  initially  

convicted under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and  

was  given  death  penalty.  Thereafter,  the  same  

sentence was set aside by the High Court on merits.

36. In Surendra Singh (supra), before this Court learned  senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State very  

fairly  stated  that  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  

challenge the order of acquittal of the appellant  

under  Section  27(3)  on  merits.  Therefore,  the  

question of constitutional validity of Section 27(3)  

was  neither  canvassed  nor  examined  before  this  

Court.

37. The question of constitutional validity of Section  

27(3) of the Arms Act was referred to Full Bench of  

Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of  State  

2

of Punjab vs. Swaran Singh - Murder Reference No. 5  of 2000 decided on 26.5.2009.

38. The  matter  went  before  the  Full  Bench   as  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  High   Court  of  Punjab  and  

Haryana expressed doubt about the correctness of the  

decision rendered by the Division Bench in  Santokh  Singh vs.  State of Punjab, 2000(3) Recent Criminal  Reports 637.

39. The following questions were raised:

(i) Whether the judgment of Division Bench is  correct in law?

(ii)Whether section 27(3) of the Arms Act is  unconstitutional being violative of  Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of  India?

40. The  Court  found  that  a  303  rifle  has  not  been  

notified  as  a  prohibited  arm  by  the  Central  

Government. The Court dealt with the provisions of  

Rule 3 and Schedule I to the said Rules categorising  2

arms and ammunition for the purpose of Rule 3 under  

the said Act.

41. On such consideration, the Full Bench, on a careful  

reading of Rules 3 and 4 and two Schedules, came to  

a conclusion that in the absence of a notification  

by  the  Government  declaring  303  rifle  as  a  

prohibited arm, the said weapon cannot be treated as  

the  one  prohibited  under  the  Act  and  accordingly  

affirmed the view taken in the case of Santokh Singh  (supra). However, the Full Bench did not answer the  

question No.2 in the light of the law declared in  

Mithu (supra). Therefore the constitutional validity  of Section 27(3) has not been decided by the Full  

Bench.

42. The question of constitutional validity of mandatory  

death sentence was examined by this court in  Mithu  (supra). In that case the constitutional validity of  

2

Section  303  of  IPC  came  up  for  consideration.  

Provision of Section 303 of IPC is set out below:  

“303. Punishment  for  murder  by  life- convict.- Whoever, being under sentence of  imprisonment  for  life,  commits  murder  shall be punished with death.”

43. Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud giving the majority  

opinion held that the sentence of death, prescribed  

by  Section  303  of  IPC  for  the  offence  of  murder  

committed by a person who is under a sentence of  

life  imprisonment  is  a  savage  sentence  and  this  

Court held that the same is arbitrary and oppressive  

being  violative  of  Articles  21  and  14  of  the  

Constitution. Relevant para 23 at page 296 of the  

report is set out below:

“23. On  a  consideration  of  the  various  circumstances which we have mentioned in  this judgment, we are of the opinion that  Section 303 of the Penal Code violates the  guarantee of equality contained in Article  14 as also the right conferred by Article  21  of  the  Constitution  that  no  person  shall be deprived of his life or personal  liberty  except  according  to  procedure  established  by  law.  The  section  was  

2

originally  conceived  to  discourage  assaults  by life  convicts on  the prison  staff, but the legislature chose language  which  far  exceeded  its  intention.  The  Section  also  assumes  that  life  convicts  are  a  dangerous  breed  of  humanity  as  a  class. That assumption is not supported by  any  scientific data.  As observed  by the  Royal Commission in its Report on “Capital  Punishment”:

“There  is  a  popular  belief  that  prisoners serving a life sentence  after conviction of murder form a  specially  troublesome  and  dangerous class. That is not so.  Most  find  themselves  in  prison  because  they  have  yielded  to  temptation under the pressure of a  combination  of  circumstances  unlikely to recur.”

In  Dilip Kumar Sharma v.  State of M.P.,  this  Court  was  not  concerned  with  the  question of the vires of Section 303, but  Sarkaria, J., in his concurring judgment,  described the vast sweep of that Section  by saying that “the section is Draconian  in severity, relentless and inexorable in  operation” [SCC para 22, p. 567: SCC (Cri)  p. 92]. We strike down Section 303 of the  Penal Code as unconstitutional and declare  it void. It is needless to add that all  cases  of  murder  will  now  fall  under  Section 302 of the Penal Code and there  shall  be no  mandatory sentence  of death  for the offence of murder.”

3

44. In  the  said  judgment,  Chief  Justice  Y.V.  

Chandrachud,  who  was  delivering  the  majority  

judgment observed that the court has to exercise its  

discretion in the matter of life and death. In the  

opinion of the learned Chief Justice any sentencing  

process by which the legislature deprives the courts  

of their legitimate jurisdiction to exercise their  

discretion  not  to  impose  the  death  sentence  in  

appropriate cases, and compels them to shut their  

eyes to mitigating circumstances is unconscionable.  

The relevant observations made in paragraphs 12 and  

16 are set out below

“12. The other class of cases in which, the  offence of murder is committed by a life  convict while he is on parole or on bail  may now be taken up for consideration. A  life convict who is released on parole or  on  bail  may  discover  that  taking  undue  advantage of his absence, a neighbour has  established illicit intimacy with his wife.  If he finds them in an amorous position and  shoots  the  seducer  on  the  spot,  he  may  stand a fair chance of escaping from the  charge of murder, since the provocation is  both grave and sudden. But if, on seeing  his wife in the act of adultery, he leaves  the  house,  goes  to  a  shop,  procures  a  weapon and returns to kill her paramour,  there would be evidence of what is called  mens rea, the intention to kill. And since,  

3

he was not acting on the spur of the moment  and went away to fetch a weapon with murder  in his mind, he would be guilty of murder.  It is a travesty of justice not only to  sentence such a person to death but to tell  him  that  he  shall  not  be  heard  why  he  should not be sentenced to death. And, in  these circumstances, now does the fact that  the accused was under a sentence of life  imprisonment when he committed the murder,  justify the law that he  must be sentenced  to death? In ordinary life, we will not say  it about law, it is not reasonable to add  insult to injury. But, apart from that, a  provision of law which deprives the Court  of  the  use  of  its  wise  and  beneficent  discretion in a matter of life and death,  without  regard  to  the  circumstances  in  which  the  offence  was  committed  and,  therefore, without regard to the gravity of  the  offence,  cannot  but  be  regarded  as  harsh,  unjust  and  unfair.  It  has  to  be  remembered that the measure of punishment  for an offence is not afforded by the label  which that offence bears, as for example  ‘theft’, ‘breach of trust’ or ‘murder’. The  gravity  of  the  offence  furnishes  the  guideline  for  punishment  and  one  cannot  determine how grave the offence is without  having regard to the circumstances in which  it was committed, its motivation and its  repercussions. The legislature cannot make  relevant circumstances irrelevant, deprive  the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction  to exercise their discretion not to impose  the  death  sentence  in  appropriate  cases,  compel  them  to  shut  their  eyes  to  mitigating circumstances and inflict upon  them the dubious and unconscionable duty of  imposing a preordained sentence of death.  Equity  and  good  conscience  are  the  hallmarks  of  justice.  The  mandatory  sentence  of  death  prescribed  by  Section  303, with no discretion left to the court  

3

to have regard to the circumstances which  led to the commission of the crime, is a  relic of ancient history. In the times in  which we live, that is the lawless law of  military regimes. We, the people of India,  are pledged to a different set of values.  For  us,  law  ceases  to  have  respect  and  relevance when it compels the dispensers of  justice  to  deliver  blind  verdicts  by  decreeing  that  no  matter  what  the  circumstances  of  the  crime,  the  criminal  shall be hanged by the neck until he is  dead.

16. Thus, there  is no  justification for  prescribing a mandatory sentence of death  for the offence of murder committed inside  or outside the prison by a person who is  under the sentence of life imprisonment. A  standardized mandatory sentence, and that  too in the form of a sentence of death,  fails to take into account the facts and  circumstances of each particular case. It  is  those  facts  and  circumstances  which  constitute  a  safe  guideline  for  determining  the  question  of  sentence  in  each  individual  case.  “The  infinite  variety of cases and facets to each would  make general standards either meaningless  ‘boiler  plate’  or  a  statement  of  the  obvious…….”  As  observed  by  Palekar,  J.,  who  spoke  for  a  Constitution  Bench  in  Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.: [SCC para  26, p. 35: SCC (Cri) p. 184]

“The  impossibility  of  laying  down  standards is at the very core of the  criminal law as administered in India  which invests the judges with a very  wide  discretion  in  the  matter  of  fixing  the  degree  of  punishment....  The exercise of judicial discretion on  well-recognised principles is, in the  

3

final  analysis,  the  safest  possible  safeguard for the accused.”

45. In  his  concurring  judgment  Justice  O.  Chinnappa  

Reddy held as follows:

“25. Judged  in  the  light  shed  by  Maneka  Gandhi and  Bachan Singh, it is impossible  to uphold Section 303 as valid. Section 303  excludes judicial discretion. The scales of  justice are removed from the hands of the  Judge so soon as he pronounces the accused  guilty  of  the  offence.  So  final,  so  irrevocable  and  so  irrestitutable  [sic  irresuscitable]  is  the  sentence  of  death  that no law which provides for it without  involvement  of  the  judicial  mind  can  be  said to be fair, just and reasonable. Such  a law must necessarily be stigmatised as  arbitrary  and  oppressive.  Section  303  is  such a law and it must go the way of all  bad  laws.  I  agree  with  my  Lord  Chief  Justice  that  Section  303,  Indian  Penal  Code,  must  be  struck  down  as  unconstitutional.”

46. It is now well settled that in view of decision in  

Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India – (1978) 1 SCC 248,  Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab – (1980) 2 SCC 684  and  Mithu (supra) ‘due process of law’ is part of  our Constitutional jurisprudence.

3

47. The  Constitution  Bench  in  Sunil  Batra vs.  Delhi  Administration and Others – (1978) 4 SCC 494,  has  also held that the guarantee against cruel and harsh  

punishment given in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.  

Constitution  is  also  part  of  our  constitutional  

guarantee. Once the concept of ‘due process of law’  

and the guarantee against harsh and cruel punishment  

(Eighth  Amendment  of  the  U.S.  Constitution)  are  

woven  in  our  Constitutional  guarantee,  it  is  the  

duty of this Court to uphold the same whenever any  

statute even prima-facie seeks to invade the same.  

This also seems to be the mandate of Article 13(2)  

of the Constitution of India.

48. Mr.  Banerjee,  learned  ASG  has  rendered  

considerable  assistance  to  this  Court  by  placing  

before  the  Court  judgments  from  different  

jurisdiction  on  the  question  of  mandatory  capital  

punishment and also decisions where Court examined  

cases of cruel and unusually harsh punishment.   

3

49. In this connection we may refer to the judgment of  

the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of  James Tyrone  Woodson and Luby Waxton vs. State of North Carolina,  428 US 280 = 49 L Ed 2d 944.  In that case the  

petitioners were convicted of first degree murder in  

view of their participation in an armed robbery of a  

food store.  In the course of committing the crime a  

cashier  was  killed  and  a  customer  was  severely  

wounded.  The petitioners were found guilty of the  

charges and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of  

North  Carolina  affirmed  the  same.   But  then  

certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court to  

examine  the  question  whether  imposition  of  death  

penalty in that case constituted a violation of the  

Eighth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  of  the  U.S.  

Constitution.  The factual background of that case  

is  that  in  1974  North  Carolina  General  Assembly  

codified  a  statute  making  death  the  mandatory  

sentence for all persons convicted of first degree  

murder.  Stewart, J., speaking for the Court held  

that  the  said  mandatory  death  sentence  was  3

unconstitutional and violated the Eighth Amendment.  

The learned Judge held:-

“…A process that accords no significance to  relevant facets of the character and record  of  the  individual  offender  or  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  offense  excludes from consideration in fixing the  ultimate  punishment  of  death  the  possibility of compassionate or mitigating  frailties  of  humankind.  It  treats  all  persons convicted of a designated offense  not  as  uniquely  individual  human  beings,  but  as  members  of  a  faceless,  undifferentiated  mass  to  be  subjected  to  the  blind  infliction  of  the  penalty  of  death.  

.... This Court has previously recognized  that “for the determination of sentences,  justice generally requires consideration of  more than the particular acts by which the  crime was committed and that there be taken  into  account  the  circumstances  of  the  offense  together  with  the  character  and  propensities  of  the  offender."  ....  Consideration of both the offender and the  offense in order to arrive at a just and  appropriate sentence has been viewed as a  progressive  and  humanizing  development.    ...While  the  prevailing  practice  of  individualizing  sentencing  determinations  generally  reflects  simply  enlightened  policy  rather  than  a  constitutional imperative, we believe that  in  capital  cases  the  fundamental  respect  for  humanity  underlying  the  Eighth  Amendment, see Trop v Dulles, 356 US, at  100, 2 L Ed 2d 630, 78 S Ct 590 (plurality  opinion),  requires  consideration  of  the  character  and  record  of  the  individual  offender  and  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  offense  as  a  constitutionally  indispensable  part  of  the  process  of  inflicting the penalty of death. ... This  conclusion rests squarely on the predicate  that the penalty of death is qualitatively  different from a sentence of imprisonment,  however  long.  Death,  in  its  finality,  differs more from life imprisonment than a  100-year  prison  term  differs  from  one  of  only  a  year  or  two.   Because  of  that  

3

qualitative  difference,  there  is  a  corresponding  difference  in  the  need  for  reliability in the determination that death  is the appropriate punishment in a specific  case.”

50. However, strong dissent was expressed by Justice  

White, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.  

According  to  these  learned  Judges,  North  Carolina  

statute providing for mandatory death penalty upon  

proof of guilt in a case of first degree murder was  

constitutionally valid.   

51. A similar conclusion was pronounced on the same day  

i.e. 2nd July, 1976 in  Stanislaus Roberts vs.  State  of Louisiana, 428 US 325 = 49 L Ed 2d 974 in a case  of death penalty for a crime of first degree murder  

under the laws of Louisiana.   Justice John Paul  

Stevens  giving  the  majority  opinion  observed  at  

pages 981-982 of the report as follows:-

“…The  history  of  mandatory  death  penalty  statutes  indicates  a  firm  societal  view  that limiting the scope of capital murder  is an inadequate response to the harshness  and  inflexibility  of  a  mandatory  death  

3

sentence  statute.  ...  A  large  group  of  jurisdictions  first  responded  to  the  unacceptable  severity  of  the  common-law  rule of automatic death sentences for all  murder  convictions  by  narrowing  the  definition  of  capital  homicide.  Each  of  these  jurisdictions  found  that  approach  insufficient  and  subsequently  substituted  discretionary  sentencing  for  mandatory  death  sentences.  See  Woodson  v  North  Carolina, ante, at 290-292, 49 L Ed 2d 944,  96 S Ct 2978.”

“The  futility  of  attempting  to  solve  the  problems  of  mandatory  death  penalty  statutes  by  narrowing  the  scope  of  the  capital  offense  stems  from  our  society's  rejection of the belief that "every offense  in  a  like  legal  category  calls  for  an  identical punishment without regard to the  past  life  and  habits  of  a  particular  offender”. Williams v New York, 337 US 241,  247, 93 L Ed 1337, 69 S Ct 1079 (1949). See  also Pennsylvania v Ashe, 302 US 51, 55, 82  L Ed 43, 58 S Ct 59 (1937).”

“The constitutional vice of mandatory death  sentence statutes - lack of focus on the  circumstances of the particular offense and  the  character  and  propensities  of  the  offender - is not resolved by Louisiana's  limitation  of  first-degree  murder  to  various  categories  of  killings.  The  diversity  of  circumstances  presented  in  cases falling within the single category of  killings  during  the  commission  of  a  specified felony, as well as the variety of  possible offenders involved in such crimes,  underscores  the  rigidity  of  Louisiana's  enactment and its similarity to the North  Carolina  statute.  Even  the  other  more  narrowly  drawn  categories  of  first-degree  murder  in  the  Louisiana  law  afford  no  meaningful opportunity for consideration of  mitigating  factors  presented  by  the  circumstances  the  particular  crime  or  by  the attributes of the individual offender.”

52. Here  also  Chief  Justice  Burger,  White  J.,  

Balckmum,  J.,  and  Rehnquist,  J.,  dissented  and  3

upheld  the  constitutionality  of  the  Louisiana  

statute.

53. In Harry Roberts vs. State of Louisiana, 431 US 633  = 52 L Ed 2d 637, the case arose out of a Louisiana  

statute  imposing  mandatory  death  penalty  for  the  

first degree murder of a police officer.  The Court  

opined:-

“To  be  sure,  the  fact  that  the  murder  victim was a peace officer performing his  regular  duties  may  be  regarded  as  an  aggravating  circumstance.  There  is  a  special interest in affording protection to  these  public  servants  who  regularly  must  risk  their  lives  in  order  to  guard  the  safety of other persons and property. But  it  is  incorrect  to  suppose  that  no  mitigating circumstances can exist when the  victim is a police officer. Circumstances  such  as  the  youth  of  the  offender,  the  absence  of  any  prior  conviction,  the  influence  of  drugs,  alcohol,  or  extreme  emotional  disturbance,  and  even  the  existence  of  circumstances  which  the  offender  reasonably  believed  provided  a  moral justification for his conduct are all  examples  of  mitigating  facts  which  might  attend the killing of a peace officer and  which  are  considered  relevant  in  other  jurisdictions.  

As we emphasized repeatedly in Roberts and  its companion cases decided last Term, it  is  essential  that  the  capital  sentencing  decision  allow  for  consideration  of  whatever  mitigating  circumstances  may  be  relevant to either the particular offender  

4

or  the  particular  offense.  Because  the  Louisiana  statute  does  not  allow  for  consideration  of  particularized  mitigating  factors, it is unconstitutional.”  

54. Accordingly, death penalty was set aside by the  

majority  and  the  matter  was  remitted  for  further  

proceeding.  Here also Chief Justice Burger, Justice  

Blackmum, Justice White and Justice Rehnquist gave  

strong  dissents,  opining  that  the  statute  was  

constitutionally valid.   

55. Again  similar  question  came  up  before  the  U.S.  

Supreme Court in  George Summer vs.  Raymond Wallace  Shuman, 483 US 66 = 97 L Ed 2d 56.  This case came  from Nevada which mandated death penalty for murder  

committed by a person while serving a life sentence  

without the possibility of parole.  The statutory  

provision considered in this case is somewhat akin  

to  Section  303  of  Indian  Penal  Code.   Justice  

Blackmum delivering the majority opinion held that  

Nevada statute was unconstitutional being violative  

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of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The learned  

Judge held:-

“……This Court has recognized time and again  that the level of criminal responsibility  of a person convicted of murder may vary  according  to  the  extent  of  that  individual's  participation  in  the  crime.  See, e.g., Tison v Arizona, 481 US 137, 95  L Ed 2d 127,107 S Ct 1676 (1987); Enmund  Florida, 458 US 782, 73 L Ed 2d 1140, 102 S  Ct  3368  (1982).  Just  as  the  level  of  an  offender's involvement in a routine crime  varies, so too can the level of involvement  of an inmate in a violent prison incident.  An inmate's participation may be sufficient  to support a murder conviction, but in some  cases it may not be sufficient to render  death an appropriate sentence, even though  it  is  a  life-term  inmate  or  an  inmate  serving a particular number of years who is  involved.  

……The  circumstances  surrounding  any  past  offense  may  vary  widely  as  well.  Without  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  predicate  life-term  offense  and  the  circumstances surrounding the commission of  that offense, the label "life-term inmate"  reveals little about the inmate's record or  character. Even if the offense was first- degree  murder,  whether  the  defendant  was  the primary force in that incident, or a no  triggerman like Shuman, may be relevant to  both his criminal record and his character.  Yet  under  the  mandatory  statute,  all  predicate life-term offenses are given the  same weight - a weight that is deemed to  outweigh  any  possible  combination  of  mitigating circumstances."

56. The Court insisted on a guided discretion on the  

statute by holding:-

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“…state  interests  can  be  satisfied  fully  through  the  use  of  a  guided-discretion  statute  that  ensures  adherence  to  constitutional  mandate  of  heightened  reliability in death-penalty determinations  through  individualized  sentencing  procedures. Having reached unanimity on the  constitutional  significance  of  individualized sentencing in capital cases,  we decline to depart from that mandate in  this case today.  We agree with the courts  below  that  the  statute  under  which  respondent  Shuman  was  sentenced  to  death  did  not  comport  with  the  Eighth  and  Fourteenth Amendments.”

57. This judgment was also dissented by Justice White,  

Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.   

58. In  this  connection  if  we  look  at  some  of  the  

judgments delivered by the Privy Council we would  

find the same principle has been followed in  Reyes  vs. The Queen, (2002) 2 AC 235 = (2002) UKPC 11.  In  Reyes (supra)  the  appellant  was  convicted  and  sentenced  to  death  under  the  laws  of  Belize  he  

committed the murder by shooting.  The Privy Council  

granted leave to the accused to raise two issues on  

constitutional points – (i) mandatory death penalty  

infringes both the protection against subjection to  

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inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment  

in  violation  of  rights  under  Section  7  of  the  

Constitution of Belize and also in violation of the  

right to life protected under Sections 3 and 4 of  

the said Constitution.  The second issue was on the  

constitutionality  of  hanging.   Section  4(1)  and  

Section  7  of  the  Constitution  of  Belize  are  as  

follows:-

“4(1). A person shall not be deprived of  his life intentionally save in execution of  the  sentence  of  a  court  in  respect  of  a  criminal offence under any law of which he  has been convicted.”

“7. No person shall be subjected to torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  punishment  or  other treatment.”

59. In the case of  Reyes (supra) the decision of this  Court in Mithu (para 36 page 252 of the report) as  also  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Bachan  Singh  (para 43, page 256 of the report) were considered.  

The Board observed:-

“…The Board is however satisfied that the  provision requiring sentence of death to be  

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passed on the defendant on his conviction  of  murder  by  shooting  subjected  him  to  inhuman  or  degrading  punishment  or  other  treatment incompatible with his right under  section 7 of the Constitution in that it  required sentence of death to be passed and  precluded any judicial consideration of the  humanity of condemning him to death.  The  use of firearms by dangerous and aggressive  criminals is an undoubted social evil and,  so long as the death penalty is retained,  there may well be murders by shooting which  justify  the  ultimate  penalty.   But  there  will also be murders of quite a different  character  (for  instance,  murders  arising  from  sudden  quarrels  within  a  family,  or  between neighbours, involving the use of a  firearm legitimately owned for no criminal  or aggressive purpose) in which the death  penalty  would  be  plainly  excessive  and  disproportionate.  In a crime of this kind  there may well be matters relating both to  the  offence  and  the  offender  which  ought  properly to be considered before sentence  is  passed.   To  deny  the  offender  the  opportunity, before sentence is passed, to  seek to persuade the court that in all the  circumstances to condemn him to death would  be disproportionate and inappropriate is to  treat  him  as  no  human  being  should  be  treated  and  thus  to  deny  his  basic  humanity,  the  core  of  the  right  which  section 7 exists to protect…”

60. In  paragraph  44  at  page  257  of  the  report  the  

Board  made  a  very  valid  and  very  interesting  

distinction between mercy and justice, which is set  

out below:-

“……Mercy, in its first meaning given by the  Oxford  English  Dictionary,  means  forbearance  and  compassion  shown  by  one  person to another who is in his power and  who has no claim to receive kindness. Both  in  language  and  literature  mercy  and  justice are contrasted. The administration  

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of  justice  involves  the  determination  of  what  punishment  a  transgressor  deserves,  the fixing of the appropriate sentence for  the crime. The grant of mercy involves the  determination that a transgressor need not  suffer the punishment he deserves, that the  appropriate sentence may for some reason be  remitted.  The  former  is  a  judicial,  the  latter  an  executive,  responsibility…….  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that  not  only  determination  of  guilt  but  also  determination of the appropriate measure of  punishment  are  judicial  not  executive  functions.  ....  The  opportunity  to  seek  mercy  from  a  body  such  as  the  Advisory  Council cannot cure a constitutional defect  in the sentencing process.”  

61. The Privy Council thus overruled the decision of  

the Court of Appeal of Belize.   

62. In Regina v. Hughes, (2002) 2 AC 259 = (2002) UKPC  12,  the  defendant  (accused)  was  convicted  by  the  

High Court of Saint Lucia for murder.  The Criminal  

Code of Saint Lucia provided death sentence to be  

imposed on anybody who is convicted of murder and  

Hughes was sentenced to death.  The Board found that  

under Section 178 of the Criminal Code, imposition  

of death sentence for murder was mandatory and the  

Court had no power to impose a lesser sentence.  The  

Board  held  such  inhuman  and  degrading  sentencing  

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procedure  to  be  void.   In  this  case  also  this  

Court’s decision in  Mithu (supra) and  Bachan Singh  (supra) were considered by the Privy Council.  In  

paragraph 52, the Board held:-

“……It follows that the decision as to the  appropriate penalty to impose in the case  of  murder  should  be  taken  by  the  judge  after  hearing  submissions  and,  where  appropriate,  evidence  on  the  matter.   In  reaching  and  articulating  such  decisions,  the  judges  will  enunciate  the  relevant  factors to be considered and the weight to  be  given  to  them,  having  regard  to  the  situation in Saint Lucia.  The burden thus  laid on the shoulders of the judiciary is  undoubtedly heavy but it is one that has  been  carried  by  judges  in  other  systems.  Their  Lordships  are  confident  that  the  judges of Saint Lucia will discharge this  new  responsibility  with  all  due  care  and  skill.”

63. Therefore, the constitutionality of Section 178 of  

the statute was not affirmed and instead matter was  

left to the discretion of the judges.   

64. The question again came up before the Privy Council  

in the case of Fox vs. The Queen (2002 (2) AC 284).

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65. In that case the defendant was convicted by the High  

Court of Saint Chrisopher and Nevis on two counts of  

murder and he was sentenced to death on each count  

pursuant to Section 2 of the Offences against the  

Person Act, 1873, which prescribed a mandatory death  

sentence for murder.  His appeal against conviction  

and sentence was dismissed by the Eastern Caribbean  

Court of Appeal (Saint Christopher and Nevis). Then  

the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council granted  

him special leave to appeal against both conviction  

and  sentence.  Ultimately  appeal  was  dismissed  

against conviction, but on the question of sentence  

the  Privy  Council  held  that  Section  2  of  the  

offences  against  the  Person  Act,  1873  was  

inconsistent with section 7 of the Constitution and  

accordingly sentence of death was quashed and the  

matter was remitted to the High Court to determine  

the appropriate sentence having regard to all the  

circumstances of the case and in the light of the  

evidence  relevant  to  the  choice  of  sentences.  In  

doing so the Privy Council applied its ratio in the  

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case of  Reyes (supra) and also the ratio in  Regina  (supra).

66. The  Privy  Council  again  had  to  consider  the  same  

question in Bowe & Anr. vs. The Queen -(2006) 1 WLR  1623.  In  that  case  also  both  he  appellants  were  

convicted for murder and sentenced to death in terms  

of the Section 312 of the Penal Code of The Bahamas  

and  their  appeals  against  conviction  did  not  

succeed.

67. Section  312  of  the  Code  was  challenged  to  the  

extent  that  it  provides  that  persons  other  than  

pregnant women charged for murder under Section 312  

of the Code must be punished by death sentence.

68. In  that  case  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  by  a  

majority that any challenge to the constitutionality  

of the Code providing for mandatory sentence must be  

made to the Supreme Court. 4

69. Allowing the appeal, the Privy Council held that  

the Court of appeal erred in construing Article 28  

of  the  Constitution  as  precluding  it  from  

entertaining a challenge to the constitutionality of  

a sentencing provision.

70. In paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Privy Council  

formulated  the  principles  which  are  relevant  for  

consideration in a case of mandatory death sentence.  

The said principles are set out below:

(I) It is a fundamental principle of just  sentencing that the punishment imposed on  a  convicted  defendant  should  be  proportionate to the gravity of the crime  of which he has been convicted.

(II)The  criminal  culpability  of  those  convicted of murder  varies  very  widely.

(III)Not  all  those  convicted  of  murder  deserve to  die.

(IV)Principles  (I),  (II)  and  (III)  are  recognised in the  law  or  practice  of  all, or almost all, states  which  impose  the capital penalty for murder.

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(V) Under  an  entrenched  and  codified  Constitution on the Westminster model,  consistently with the rule of law, any  discretionary judgment on the  measure  of punishment which a convicted defendant  should  suffer  must  be  made  by  the  judiciary and not by the executive.

71. The  Privy  Council  answered  the  question  in  

paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 34 and 35 of the judgment.

72. In  para  43  the  conclusion  of  the  Board  was  as  

follows:

“The  Board  will  accordingly  advise  Her  Majesty  that  section  312  should  be  construed as imposing a discretionary and  not  a  mandatory  sentence  of  death.  So  construed, it was continued under the 1973  Constitution.  These  appeals  should  be  allowed,  the  death  sentences  quashed  and  the cases remitted to the Supreme Court for  consideration of the appropriate sentences.  Should  the  Supreme  court,  on  remission,  consider sentence of death to be merited in  either  case,  questions  will  arise  on  the  lawfulness of implementing such a sentence,  but they are not questions for the Board on  these appeals.”

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73. In the unreported judgment of the Privy Council in  

Bernard Coard and Others vs.  The Attorney General  

(Criminal Appeal No. 10/2006) the same principle has  

been upheld. In that appeal from the Court of Appeal  

of Grenada, the Judicial Committee of Privy Council  

consisted  of  Lord  Bingham  of  Cornhill,  Lord  

Hoffmann,  Lord  Phillips  of  Worth  Matravers,  Lord  

Carswell and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. The  

facts were that in Grenada, a revolutionary outfit  

was split into two factions, one of which was led by  

the appellant Bernard Coard. In a violent incident  

Maurice Bishop, the then Prime Minister of Grenada  

and others were executed by Coard’s supporters. Over  

that  incident,  the  appellants  were  mandatorily  

sentenced to death for murder. However the Governor  

General  commuted  the  death  sentence  to  life  

imprisonment,  and  a  pardon  was  granted  on  the  

condition  that  the  appellants  be  kept  in  custody  

with hard labour for the remainder of their lives.  

The appellant challenged the sentence.

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74. The Board, while rejecting the other contention by  

the appellant, allowed the appeal on the ground that  

the mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional.  

The Board relied on its previous decision in Regina  

(supra). In paragraph 32 of the judgment, the Board  

inclined  in  favour  of  accepting  the  principle  of  

determination of a sentence by the judiciary rather  

than  accepting  the  statutory  mandate  of  a  death  

sentence. The judgment by Lord Hoffmann laid down  

the following principles:

“32. Fifthly, and perhaps most important,  is the highly unusual circumstance that,  for  obvious  reasons,  the  question  of  appellants’ fate is so politically charged  that it is hardly reasonable to expect any  Government of Grenada, even 23 years after  the tragic events of October 1983, to take  an objective view of the matter. In their  Lordships  opinion that  makes it  all the  more important that the determination of  the  appropriate  sentence  for  the  appellants,  taking  into  account  such  progress  as  they  have  made  in  prison,  should  be  the  subject  of  a  judicial  determination.”

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75. Similar principles were followed in the High Court  

of  Malawi  in  the  case  of  Francis  Kafantayeni  and  Others vs.  Attorney  General (Constitutional  Case  No.12 of 2005 [2007] M.W.H.C.1). Facts therein were  

that  the  accused  was  convicted  of  murder  and  

sentenced to mandatory death penalty. The challenge  

to  the  constitutionality  of  death  penalty  was  on  

four grounds, all based on the Malawi Constitution.  

The first ground related to depravation of right to  

life under Section 16, the second related to inhuman  

and degrading treatment under Section 19, the third  

related to right to a fair trial under Section 42  

(2) (f) and finally the fourth challenge was that it  

violated  principles  of  separation  of  powers  of  

State.

76. The Court, after analyzing the relevant provisions  

of  the  Constitution  and  the  Penal  Code,  and  the  

leading  authority  or  Reyes (supra),  struck  down  

mandatory  death  penalty  holding  that  such  penalty  

was degrading and inhuman, and denied the right to a  

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fair trial. The Court expressed its opinion in the  

following words:

“We agree with counsel that the effect of  the mandatory death sentence under section  210 of the Malawi Penal Code for the crime  of  murder  is  to  deny  the  accused  as  a  convicted person the right to have his or  her  sentence reviewed  by a  higher court  than the court that imposed the sentence;  and we hold that this is a violation of  the right to a fair trial which in our  judgment extends to sentencing.”

77. In  the  concluding  portion  of  the  judgment,  the  

court, by exercising a degree of caution, observed  

as follows:

“Pursuant  to  Section  5  of  the  Constitution,  we  declare  section  210  of  the Penal Code to be invalid to the extent  of the mandatory requirement of the death  sentence  for the  offence of  murder. For  the removal of doubt, we state that our  declaration  does  not  outlaw  the  death  penalty  for  the  offence  of  murder,  but  only  the  mandatory  requirement  of  the  death penalty for that offence. The effect  of  our  decision  is  to  bring  judicial  discretion into sentencing for the offence  of murder, so that the offender shall be  liable to be sentenced to death only as  the maximum punishment.”

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78. The  Supreme  Court  of  Uganda,  at  Mengo,  struck  a  

similar  note  in  the  case  of  Attorney  General vs.  Susan  Kigula  and  417  others (Constitution  Appeal  No.03/2006). Out of the various issues urged before  

the Court, one of them was, that the laws of Uganda,  

which  provide  for  mandatory  death  sentence  were  

unconstitutional  and  that  the  carrying  out  of  a  

death  sentence  after  a  long  delay  is  a  cruel,  

inhuman and degrading treatment. Equally degrading  

is the legal mode of carrying out a death sentence  

by hanging. The majority of the judges by relying  

upon  Mithu (supra) and  Reyes (supra),  James Tyrone  Woodson (supra)  held  that  imposition  of  mandatory  death  sentence  for  certain  offences  was  

unconstitutional. A most pertinent ruling has been  

given in the following words:

“In  our  view  if  there  is  one  situation  where  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  expected  an  inquiry,  it  is  the  one  involving a death penalty. The report of  the Judge is considered so important that  it  forms  a  basis  for  advising  the  President  on  the  exercise  of  the  prerogative  of mercy.  Why should  it not  have  informed  the  Judge  in  passing  sentence in the first place.”

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79. Furthermore,  the  administration  of  justice  was  

considered a function of the Judiciary under Article  

126 of the Constitution. The entire process of trial  

from the arraignment of an accused person to his/her  

sentencing  was  what  constitutes  administration  of  

justice.  By  providing  mandatory  death  penalty  

Parliament removed the power to determine sentence  

from the Court’s power and that, the Court is to be  

inconsistent with Article 126 of the Constitution.

The Court further held:  

“We do not agree with learned counsel for  the  Attorney  General  that  because  Parliament has the powers to pass laws for  the good governance of Uganda, it can pass  such  laws  as  those  providing  for  a  mandatory death sentence. In any case, the  Laws  passed  by  Parliament  must  be  consistent  with  the  Constitution  as  provided  for  in  article  2  (2)  of  the  Constitution.”

It also held:

“Furthermore,  the  Constitution  provides  for the separation of powers between the  Executive,  the  Legislature  and  the  

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Judiciary.  Any  law  passed  by  Parliament  which has the effect of tying the hands of  the judiciary in executing its function to  administer  justice  is  inconsistent  with  the  Constitution.  We  also  agree  with  Professor Sempebwa, for the respondents,  that the power given to the court under  article  22  (1)  does  not  stop  at  confirmation of conviction. The Court has  power  to  confirm  both  conviction  and  sentence.  This  implies  a  power  NOT  to  confirm,  implying  that  court  has  been  given discretion in the matter. Any law  that  fetters  that  discretion  is  inconsistent with this clear provision of  the Constitution.”

80. In  a  still  more  recent  decision  in  the  case  of  

Godfrey Ngotho Mutiso vs.  Republic (Criminal Appeal  No.17/2008), the Kenyan Court of Appeal pronounced  

its judgment in a criminal appeal arising from the  

judgment of the High Court of Kenya. The three-judge  

Bench delivering the verdict, considered the matter  

as  an  issue  of  singular  historical  moment  in  the  

country in dealing with the offence of murder and  

penalty of death.  

81. The Court formulated the following proposition:

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“In  its  judgment,  the  Court  of  Appeal  clarified  the  various  issues,  particularly, the fact that the appellant  did not challenge the conviction for the  offence  of  murder  nor  the  constitutionality  of  the  death  penalty  itself.  The Court  then framed  the issue  for  determination  and  listed  out  the  various  authorities  relied  upon  by  the  counsel.  The  submissions  made  by  the  counsel for the appellants were summarized  by the Court as follows:

“The imposition of the mandatory  death penalty for particular offences  is neither authorized nor prohibited  in  the  Constitution.  As  the  Constitution is silent, it is for the  courts to give a valid constitutional  interpretation on the mandatory nature  of sentence.

Mandatory  death  sentence  is  antithetical  to  fundamental  human  rights and there is no constitutional  justification  for  it.  A  convicted  person ought  to  be  given  an  opportunity  to  show  why  the  death  sentence should not be passed against  him.  

The  imposition  of  a  mandatory  death  sentence  is  arbitrary  because  the offence of murder covers a broad  spectrum.  Making  the  sentence  mandatory  would  therefore  be  an  affront  to  the  human  rights  of  the  accused.

Section 204 of the Penal Code is  unconstitutional  and  ought  to  be  declared a nullity. Alternatively the  word “shall” ought to be construed as  “may”.

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There is a denial to (sic of) a  fair  hearing  when  no  opportunity  is  given to an accused person to offer  mitigating  circumstances  before  sentence,  which  is  the  normal  procedure in all other trials for non- capital offences. Sentencing was part  of  the  trial  and  mitigation  was  an  element of fair trial.   

Sentencing is a matter of law and  part of the administration of justice  which  is  the  preserve  of  the  Judiciary. Parliament should therefore  only  prescribe  the  maximum  sentence  and  leave  the  courts  to  administer  justice  by  sentencing  the  offenders  according  to  the  gravity  and  circumstances of the case.”

82.  By  formulating  the  aforesaid  propositions,  the  

Court held that Section 204 of the Penal Code which  

provided  for  mandatory  death  penalty  was  

unconstitutional.  

83. However, a discordant note was struck by the Privy  

Council in one of its old judgments in the case of  

Ong  Ah  Chuan vs.  Public  Prosecutor  and  Another,  

(1981) A.C. 648. The judgment was rendered by Lord  

Diplock, in a Bench consisting of Lord Diplock, Lord  

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Keith of Kinkel, Lord Scarman and Lord Roskill. The  

Board heard the appeal from the Court of Criminal  

Appeal from Singapore, against a conviction for the  

offence of drug trafficking of heroine in Singapore.  

As the amount of heroine was more than 15 grams in  

each case, a sentence of death was imposed on each  

of the defendants. Even though, before the Court of  

Appeal, the constitutionality of the provisions of  

the Drug Act was not challenged, leave was sought  

before  the  Board  on  those  issues.  Especially  the  

constitutional  issue  was  that  the  provision  in  

Section  29  in  Schedule  II  for  mandatory  death  

penalty  for  trafficking  in  controlled  drugs,  in  

excess  of  the  prescribed  quantities,  was  

unconstitutional.

84. The Board permitted the questions to be raised.  

Ultimately,  the  Board  came  to  the  following  

findings:

“The social object of the Drugs Act is to  prevent  the  growth  of  drug  addition  in  Singapore by stamping out the illicit drug  

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trade  and,  in  particular,  the  trade  in  those  most  dangerously  addictive  drugs,  heroin  and  morphine.  The  social  evil  caused by trafficking which the Drugs Act  seeks to prevent is broadly proportional  to the quantity of addictive drugs brought  on to the illicit market. There is nothing  unreasonable in the legislature’s holding  the  view  that  an  illicit  dealer  on  the  wholesale scale who operates near the apex  of  the  distributive  pyramid  requires  a  stronger deterrent to his transactions and  deserves more condign punishment than do  dealers  on  a  smaller  scale  who  operate  nearer the base of the pyramid. It is for  the legislature to determine in the light  of  information  that  is  available  to  it  about  the structure  of the  illicit drug  trade in Singapore, and the way in which  it  is carried  on, where  the appropriate  quantitative  boundary  lies  between  these  two  classes  of  dealers.  No  plausible  reason  has  been  advanced  for  suggesting  that  fixing  a  boundary  at  transactions  which involve 15 grams of heroin or more  is so low as to be purely arbitrary.  

The Court also held:  

“Wherever  a  criminal  law  provides  for  a  mandatory sentence for an offence there is  a  possibility  that  there  may  be  considerable  variation  in  moral  blameworthiness, despite the similarity in  legal  guilt  of  offenders  upon  whom  the  same mandatory sentence must be passed. In  the case of murder, a crime that is often  committed  in  the  heat  of  passion,  the  likelihood  of  this  is  very  real;  it  is  perhaps more theoretical than real in the  

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case of large scale trafficking in drugs,  a  crime  of  which  the  motive  is  cold  calculated  with  equal  punitive  treatment  for similar legal guilt.” (Page 674 of the  report)  

85. In  their  Lordships’  view  there  is  nothing  

unconstitutional  in  the  provision  for  a  mandatory  

death  penalty  for  trafficking  in  significant  

quantities of heroin and morphine. Their Lordships  

held that the quantity that attracts death penalty  

is so high as to rule out the notion that it is the  

kind  of  crime  that  might  be  committed  by  a  good  

hearted Samaritan out of the kindness of his heart  

as was suggested in the course of argument. But if  

by any chance it were to happen, the prerogative of  

mercy is available to mitigate the rigidity of the  

law which the long established constitutional way of  

doing is the same in Singapore as in England. (674  

of the report)  

86. However the aforesaid opinion of Lord Diplock, was  

subsequently noticed by the Privy Council in  Bowe  

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(supra) at page 1644, wherein the decision in Ong Ah  

Chuan (supra)  was  explained  inter  alia,  on  the  

ground that the Constitution of Singapore does not  

have  a  comparable  provision  like  the  Eighth  

Amendment of the American Constitution relating to  

cruel and unusual punishment.

87. It is clear from the discussion hereinabove that  

mandatory  death  penalty  has  been  found  to  be  

constitutionally  invalid  in  various  jurisdictions  

where  there  is  an  independent  judiciary  and  the  

rights  of  the  citizens  are  protected  in  a  

Constitution.  

88. It has already been noted hereinabove that in our  

Constitution  the  concept  of  ‘due  process’  was  

incorporated in view of the judgment of this Court  

in  Maneka Gandhi (supra). The principles of Eighth  Amendment have also been incorporated in our laws.  

This has been acknowledged by the Constitution Bench  

of this Court in Sunil Batra (supra).  In para 52 at  6

page  518  of  the  report,  Justice  Krishna  Iyer  

speaking for the Bench held as follows:

“52. True, our  Constitution has  no ‘due  process’  clause  or  the  VIII  Amendment;  but, in this branch of law, after  Cooper  and  Maneka Gandhi the consequence is the  same. For what is punitively outrageous,  scandalizingly  unusual  or  cruel  and  rehabilitatively  counter-productive,  is  unarguably unreasonable and arbitrary and  is shot down by Articles 14 and 19 and if  inflicted  with  procedural  unfairness,  falls foul of Article 21.”

89. Almost  on  identical  principles  mandatory  death  

penalty  provided  under  Section  303  of  the  Indian  

Penal  Code  has  been  held  ultra  vires  by  the  

Constitution Bench of this Court in  Mithu (supra).  Apart from that it appears that in Section 27(3) of  

the Act the provision of mandatory death penalty is  

more unreasonable inasmuch it provides whoever  uses  

any prohibited arms or prohibited ammunition or acts  

in contravention of Section 7 and if such use or act  

results in the death of any other person then that  

person guilty of such use or acting in contravention  

of  Section  7  shall  be  punishable  with  death.  The  

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word  ‘use’  has  not  been  defined  in  the  Act.  

Therefore, the word ‘use’ has to be viewed in its  

common meaning. In view of such very wide meaning of  

the  word  ‘use’  even  an  unintentional  or  an  

accidental  use  resulting  in  death  of  any  other  

person shall subject the person so using to a death  

penalty. Both the words ‘use’ and ‘result’ are very  

wide. Such a law is neither just, reasonable nor is  

it fair and falls out of the ‘due process’ test.

90. A  law  which  is  not  consistent  with  notions  of  

fairness  while  it  imposes  an  irreversible  penalty  

like death penalty is repugnant to the concept of  

right and reason.

91. In Dr. Bonham case - (1610) 8 Co Rep 114a : 77ER  

646,  Lord  Coke  explained  this  concept  several  

centuries  ago.  The  classical  formulation  by  Lord  

Coke is:-

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“It  appears  in  our  books,  that  in  many  cases, the common law will control acts of  Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be  utterly void: for when an act of Parliament  is  against  common  right  and  reason,  or  repugnant,  or  impossible  to  be  performed,  the common law will control it and adjudge  such act to be void.”

92. The principle of ‘due process’ is an emanation from  

the  Magna  Carta  doctrine.   This  was  accepted  in  

American jurisprudence [See Munn vs. Illinois, 24 L  Ed. 77 : 94 US 113, 142 (1876)].  

93. Again this was acknowledged in Planned Parenthood of  Southeastern  Pennsylvania vs.  Casey,  120  L  ED  2d  674, wherein the American Supreme Court observed as  

follows:

“The  guarantees  of  due  process,  though  having their roots in Magna Carta’s ‘per  legem terrae’ and considered as procedural  safeguards  ‘against  executive  usurpation  and tyranny,’ have in this country ‘become  bulwarks  also  against  arbitrary  legislation’.”

94. All  these  concepts  of  ‘due  process’  and  the  

concept of a just, fair and reasonable law has been  6

read by this Court into the guarantee under Articles  

14  and  21  of  the  Constitution.  Therefore,  the  

provision of Section 27(3) of the Act is violative  

of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

95. Apart from that the said Section 27 (3) is a post  

Constitutional law and has to obey the injunction of  

Article  13  which  is  clear  and  explicit.  Article  

13(2) is as follows:

“13(2) The State shall not make any law  which  takes away  or abridges  the rights  conferred by this Part and any law made in  contravention of this clause shall, to the  extent of the contravention, be void.”

96. In view of the aforesaid mandate of Article 13 of  

the Constitution which is an Article within Part-III  

of  our  Constitution,  Section  27(3)  having  been  

enacted in clear contravention of Part-III rights,  

Section 27(3) of the Act is repugnant to Articles 14  

and 21 and is void.

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97. Section  27(3)  of  the  Act  also  deprives  the  

judiciary from discharging its Constitutional duties  

of judicial review whereby it has the power of using  

discretion in the sentencing procedure.

98. This power has been acknowledged in Section 302 of  

the Indian Penal Code and in  Bachan Singh (supra)  case it has been held that the sentencing power has  

to  be  exercised  in  accordance  with  the  statutory  

sentencing structure under Section 235(2) and also  

under  Section  354(3)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure.

99. Section 27(3) of the said Act while purporting to  

impose  mandatory  death  penalty  seeks  to  nullify  

those  salutary  provisions  in  the  Code.   This  is  

contrary  to  the  law  laid  down  in  Bachan  Singh  (supra).

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100. In  fact  the  challenge  to  the  constitutional  

validity  of  death  penalty  under  Section  302  of  

Indian Penal Code has been negatived in Bachan Singh  (supra)  in  view  of  the  sentencing  structure  in  

Sections  235(2)  and  354  (3)  of  the  Criminal  

Procedure  Code.   By  imposing  mandatory  death  

penalty, Section 27(3) of the Act runs contrary to  

those statutory safeguards which give judiciary the  

discretion  in  the  matter  imposing  death  penalty.  

Section 27(3) of the Act is thus ultra vires the  

concept of judicial review which is one of the basic  

features of our Constitution.   

101. It has also been discussed hereinabove that the  

ratio in both Bachan Singh (supra) and Mithu (supra)  has  been  universally  acknowledged  in  several  

jurisdictions across the world and has been accepted  

as  correct  articulation  of  Article  21  guarantee.  

Therefore,  the  ratio  in  Mithu (supra)  and  Bachan  Singh (supra) represents the concept of  Jus cogens  meaning thereby the peremptory non derogable norm in  

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international  law  for  protection  of  life  and  

liberty.

102.That  is  why  it  has  been  provided  by  the  44th  

Amendment  Act  of  1978  of  the  Constitution,  that  

Article  21  cannot  be  suspended  even  during  

proclamation  of  emergency  under  Article  359(vide  

Article 359(1)(a) of the Constitution.

103.This Court therefore holds that Section 27(3) of  

the Arms Act is against the fundamental tenets of  

our Constitutional law as developed by this Court.

104.This  Court  declares  that  Section  27(3)  of  Arms  

Act,  1959  is  ultra  vires  the  Constitution  and  is  

declared  void.  The  appeal  is  thus  dismissed  on  

merits and the High Court judgment acquitting the  

respondent is affirmed.   

.......................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

.......................J. New Delhi (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR) February 1, 2012

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