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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2051 of 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1235 of 2012]

STATE OF M.P.         .…APPELLANT  

VERSUS

SHIVSHANKAR                        ..... RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  

dated 10th July, 2008 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,  

Jabalpur Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.292 of 2005  

altering the conviction of the respondent from Section 302 of  

the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to 304 Part-I of the IPC reducing  

the sentence from life imprisonment to rigorous imprisonment  

for seven years while upholding the sentence to pay a fine of  

Rs.10,000/-,  in default to undergo two years further rigorous  

imprisonment.

3. The case of the prosecution is that on 2nd March, 1999  

after celebration of Holi festival,  sugar cakes (Batase) were  

being distributed in front of the house of the complainant by

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Ramlachhin Gurjar (PW 10).  Complainant Remsewak (PW 4)  

and  his  brothers  Ramnaresh  (PW  6),  Vinod  (PW  7)  and  

deceased  Satish  were  standing  near  the  temple.   An  

altercation  took  place  on  account  of  Mukesh  taking  some  

sugar  cakes  without  the  permission  of  PW  10.    The  

respondent slapped PW 4 and his brothers.  This led to further  

altercation between the accused and the complainant party.  

The accused went inside his house, brought the licensed gun  

of his brother and fired a shot hitting the deceased on the  

stomach.   Apart  from  the  accused,  acquitted  co-accused  

Shrichand  and  Shyamsunder  had  Kattas and  Mukesh  and  

Badshah were having      12 bore single barrel guns.  The  

acquitted   co-accused  also  fired  in  the  air.   The  deceased  

succumbed to his injuries.  Thereafter, Ramsewak lodged First  

Information  Report.   After  investigation,  the  accused  were  

sent up for trial.  The prosecution case against the respondent  

was  proved  by  three  eye  witnesses  Ramsewak  (PW  4),  

Ramnaresh (PW 6) and Vinod (PW 7) who were brothers of the  

deceased,  apart  from  other  corroborating  evidence.   The  

respondent was convicted under Section 302, IPC while others  

were acquitted.    

4. The  respondent  preferred  an  appeal  before  the  High  

Court, but in view of clear evidence of firing of gun shot by  

him causing death of the deceased, only challenge was to the

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nature  of  the  offence.   It  was  submitted  that  quarrel  took  

place suddenly and the accused had no intention to cause the  

death of the deceased.  Firing in the air by the co accused  

showed that the intention was not to cause the death.  The  

accused  fired  only  one  shot  and  in  the  circumstances  no  

offence under Section 302, IPC was made out.  

5. The above plea prevailed with the High Court.  It was  

held as follows :

“10.   Considering the entire scenario of the case, it   is  clear  that  the  incident  occurred  suddenly  and  without  premeditation  and  therefore  it  cannot  be   gathered that the intention of the appellant was to   intentionally cause the death of the deceased and   therefore,  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  under   Section 302 of I.P.C. is not sustainable in law.  But at   the same time, it is equally important to note that   the  appellant  brought  the  licensed  gun  from  his   house and then he fired which hit over the abdomen   of the deceased resulting into his death.  Thus, we  are of the considered view that looking to the facts   and  circumstances,  this  is  a  case  of  culpable   homicide  not  amounting  to  murder  which  is   punishable under Section 304 (part-I) of I.P.C.”

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

7. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the view  

taken by the High Court is patently erroneous in law as the  

offence under Section 302,  IPC was clearly made out.  It was  

not a case of ‘fight’ as the deceased side did not cause any  

assault nor had any weapon.  There was time for the accused  

to cool down.  His conduct in going to his house and bringing  

the  gun  and  thereafter  firing  from  the  said  gun  clearly

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established  that  neither  the  firing  was  accidental,  nor  

unintentional  nor  in  the  heat  of  sudden  fight.   Thus  the  

offence was clearly a murder falling under Section 302, IPC  

and not falling in any of the exceptions.  Reliance has been  

placed  on  judgment  of  this  Court  in  State  of  Orissa Vs.  

Khaga Alias Khageswar Naik & Ors. 1         8.Learned  

counsel for the respondent supported the view taken by the  

High Court.

9. After due consideration of the rival submissions, we are  

of the view that the High Court has clearly erred in holding  

that the offence falls under Section 304 Part-I, IPC.

10. It is clear from the case of the prosecution mentioned  

above that the accused first slapped the complainant which  

was followed by verbal  abuses  and thereafter  the accused  

brought the licensed gun and fired at the deceased, who died.  

It was, thus, a voluntary and intentional act of the accused  

which caused the death.  Intention is a matter of inference  

and when death is as a result of intentional firing, intention to  

cause death is patent unless the case falls under any of the  

exceptions.  We are unable to hold that the case falls under  

Exception  4  of  Section  300,  IPC  as  submitted  by  learned  

counsel  for  the  respondent.   Exception  4  is  attracted  only  

when  there  is  a  fight  or  quarrel  which  requires  mutual  

1   (2013) 14 SCC 649

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provocation and blows by both sides in which the offender  

does not take undue advantage.  In the present case, there is  

no  giving  of  any  blow  by  the  complainant  side.   The  

complainant  side did  not  have  any  weapon.   The  accused  

went  to  his  house  and  brought  a  gun.    There  is  neither  

sudden fight  nor  a  case where the accused has  not  taken  

undue advantage.    

In State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya 2 , it was held :

“12. In  the  scheme  of  the  Penal  Code,  “culpable  homicide” is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder”   is  “culpable  homicide”  but  not  vice-versa.  Speaking   generally,  “culpable  homicide”  sans “special  characteristics  of  murder”,  is  “culpable  homicide  not   amounting  to  murder”.  For  the  purpose  of  fixing  punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic   offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of   culpable  homicide.  The  first is,  what  may  be  called,   “culpable  homicide  of  the  first  degree”.  This  is  the   greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in   Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as  “culpable  homicide  of  the  second  degree”.  This  is   punishable  under  the  first  part  of  Section  304.  Then,   there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is   the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment   provided  for  it  is,  also,  the  lowest  among  the   punishments  provided  for  the  three  grades.  Culpable   homicide of this degree is punishable under the second   part of Section 304. 13. The  academic  distinction  between  “murder”  and  “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” has vexed   the  courts  for  more  than  a  century.  The  confusion  is   caused,  if  courts  losing  sight  of  the  true  scope  and  meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these  sections,  allow  themselves  to  be  drawn  into  minutae  abstractions.  The  safest  way  of  approach  to  the   interpretation and application of these provisions seems  to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various   clauses of Sections 299 and 300.”

In Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra 3 ,  2   (1976) 4 SCC 382  3   (1978) 3 SCC 330

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this Court held as under :

“6.   ….   It  is  true  that  some of the conditions  for  the  applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 exist here, but   not all. The quarrel had broken out suddenly, but there   was  no  sudden  fight between  the  deceased  and  the  appellant.  ‘Fight’  postulates  a  bilateral  transaction  in   which  blows  are  exchanged.  The  deceased  was   unarmed. He did not cause any injury to the appellant or   his  companions.  Furthermore  no  less  than  three  fatal   injuries  were  inflicted  by  the  appellant  with  an  axe,   which is  a formidable weapon on the unarmed victim.   Appellant,  is  therefore,  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of   Exception 4, either.”

In In Sridhar Bhuyan v. State of Orissa 4 , this Court held  

as under :

                 “7. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section   300  IPC,  it  has  to  be  established  that  the  act  was   committed without premeditation,  in a sudden  fight in  the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the  offender having taken undue advantage and not having   acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

8. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts   done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a   case of prosecution not covered by the first exception,   after which its place would have been more appropriate.   The exception is founded upon the same principle, for in   both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the   case  of  Exception  1  there  is  total  deprivation  of  self- control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of   passion  which  clouds  men’s  sober  reason  and  urges   them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There  is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the   injury  done  is  not  the  direct  consequence  of  that  provocation.  In  fact  Exception  4  deals  with  cases  in   which  notwithstanding  that  a  blow  may  have  been  struck,  or  some provocation given in  the origin of  the   dispute  or  in  whatever  way  the  quarrel  may  have  originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties   puts  them  in  respect  of  guilt  upon  equal  footing.  A   “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on   each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not   

4   (2004) 11 SCC 395

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traceable  to  unilateral  provocation,  nor  in  such  cases   could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it   were  so,  the  exception  more  appropriately  applicable   would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation   or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place,   for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It   may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had  not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have   taken  the  serious  turn  it  did.  There  is  then  mutual   provocation  and  aggravation,  and  it  is  difficult  to   apportion  the  share  of  blame which  attaches  to  each  fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death   is  caused:  (a)  without  premeditation;  (b)  in  a  sudden  fight;  (c)  without  the  offender’s  having  taken  undue  advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and  (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To   bring  a  case  within  Exception  4  all  the  ingredients   mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the   “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not   defined  in  IPC.  It  takes  two  to  make  a  fight.  Heat  of   passion  requires  that  there  must  be  no  time  for  the   passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have   worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal   altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between   two and more persons whether with or without weapons.   It  is  not  possible  to  enunciate  any  general  rule  as  to   what  shall  be deemed to be a sudden quarrel.  It  is  a   question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not   must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each   case.  For  the  application  of  Exception  4,  it  is  not   sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and  there was no premeditation.  It  must further be shown  that  the  offender  has  not  taken  undue  advantage  or   acted  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  manner.  The  expression   “undue  advantage”  as  used  in  the  provision  means  “unfair advantage”.

Similar observations were made in    State of Orissa v.  

Khaga alias Khageswar Naik and Ors.  (supra),   which  

reads as under :

“8. The  rival  submission  necessitates  examination  of   Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, same reads as follows:

“300. Murder.—* * *

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Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is   committed without  premeditation  in  a  sudden fight  in   the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without   the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted  in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation.—It  is  immaterial  in  such  cases  which  party  offers  the  provocation  or  commits  the  first   assault.” From a  plain  reading  of  the  aforesaid  Exception  it  is   evident  that  it  shall  be  attracted  only  if  the  death  is   caused (i)  without premeditation, (ii)  in a sudden fight  and (iii) in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. If all   these ingredients are satisfied, the Exception will come  into play only when the court comes to the conclusion   that  the  offender  had  not  taken  undue  advantage  or   acted  in  a  cruel  or  unusual  manner.  Above  all,  this   section  would  be  attracted  when  the  fight  had  taken   place with the person killed.

9. The aforesaid view finds support from a judgment of   this Court in Pappu v. State of M.P.2 in which it has been  held as follows: (SCC pp. 394-95, para 13) “13. … The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is   caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight;   (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage  or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight  must have been with the person killed. To bring a case  within  Exception  4  all  the  ingredients  mentioned  in  it   must be found. It is to be noted that the ‘fight’ occurring   in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It   takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that   there must be no time for the passions to cool down and  in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a   fury  on  account  of  the  verbal  altercation  in  the  beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more   persons  whether  with  or  without  weapons.  It  is  not   possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall   be deemed to be a sudden quarrel.  It is a question of   fact  and  whether  a  quarrel  is  sudden  or  not  must   necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case.”

11. Then,  can  it  be  said  that  the  crime  has  been  committed in a heat of passion? If time is taken to cool   down,  then  the  crime  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  committed in a heat of passion. It is the specific case of   the prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted  by the High Court that “when her father Tikeswar abused  them, the accused Khageswar being annoyed brought a   budia from his house, which is nearby, and dealt blows to   her father and the accused Dusasan brought a lathi and  

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assaulted her father”. This clearly shows that both the  convicts had sufficient time to cool down and therefore,   it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a heat   of passion.”

11. The above observations fully support the view that the  

present case falls under Section 302, IPC.   

12. Accordingly,  we  allow  this  appeal,  set  aside  the  

judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court,  

i.e., 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Bhind, Madhya Pradesh in  

Sessions  Trial  No.285  of  1999.   The  respondent  stands  

convicted under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo  

Life  Imprisonment  and  to  pay  fine  imposed  by  the  Courts  

below, in default to undergo further imprisonment as directed  

by the Courts below.

..…………………………….J. [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

….………………………………..J. NEW DELHI                [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ] September 16, 2014

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ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment     COURT NO.14               SECTION IIA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Crl.A. …..../2014 arising from petition(s) for Special Leave to  Appeal (Crl.)  No(s).  1235/2012  STATE OF M.P.                                      Petitioner(s)                                 VERSUS SHIVSHANKAR                                        Respondent(s)

Date : 16/09/2014 This petition was called on for Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s)                      Mr. C. D. Singh,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)  Mr. Vipin Kumar, Adv.                      Mr. Deepak Goel,Adv.                       

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  Adarsh  Kumar  Goel  pronounced  the  judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala  Gowda and His Lordship.

Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

     (VINOD KUMAR)    (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

COURT MASTER COURT MASTER (Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)