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                                  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3498 OF 2008  

STATE OF M.P. & ANR. ……APPELLANTS Vs.

ANSHUMAN SHUKLA ……RESPONDENT     WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1145 OF 2009

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008 arises out of order  

dated 30.6.2005 in C.R.No.1330 of 2003 passed by the

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Division  Bench  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  at  

Jabalpur  relying  on  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

13.4.2005  passed  by  the  Full  Bench  of  the  Madhya  

Pradesh  High  Court  in  C.R.No.633  of  2003  etc.  The  

connected Civil Appeal No.1145 of 2009 arises out of  

judgment  and  order  dated  4.7.2006  passed  by  the  

Division  Bench  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  at  

Jabalpur in C.R.No.1 of 2006.  

2. Civil  Appeal  No.3498  of  2008  was  heard  by  a  

Division  Bench  of  this  Court,  wherein  by  way  of  

judgment dated 12.05.2008, it was opined that the case  

of  Nagar  Palika  Parishad,  Morena  v.  Agrawal  

Construction  Company1 was not  correctly  decided  and,  

thus,  the  matter  required  consideration  by  a  larger  

bench. It was further opined that the record of the  

case be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of  

India for constituting an appropriate Bench. That is  

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2004 (II) MPJR SN 55

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how this matter has come up for consideration before  

us.  

3. As both the appeals are identical, for the sake of  

convenience, we would refer to the necessary facts of  

C.A.No.3498 of 2008 which are stated hereunder:

The respondent filed a petition under Section 7 of  

the  Madhya  Pradesh  Madhyastham  Adhikaran  Adhiniyam,  

1983 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1983”)  

raising  certain  claims  about  the  works  contract  

executed between the parties. The petition was partly  

allowed by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal vide  

its award dated 18.6.2003. An amount of Rs.6,05,624/-  

with  interest  @12%  per  annum  was  awarded  from  

24.04.1998 till the date of realisation.

4. Being  aggrieved,  the  appellants  filed  a  Civil  

Revision  No.1330  of  2003  before  the  High  Court  of  

Madhya Pradesh under Section 19 of the Act of 1983,  

along  with  an  application  under  Section  5  of  the

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Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the  

“Limitation Act”) to condone the delay in filing the  

revision.

5. The  High  Court  observed  in  its  order  dated  

07.05.2004  in the Revision that the view expressed by  

the Division Bench of the High Court in  Nagar Palika  

Parishad,  Morena  v.  Agrawal  Construction  Company2  

required  consideration  by  a  larger  Bench  on  the  

question of:   

“Whether  Provision  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation Act is applicable to revision  filed  under  Section  19  in  the  High  Court?”

6. After  the  reference  was  made,  the  matter  in  

Nagarpalika  Parishad,  Morena  (supra)  came  up  for  

consideration before a division bench of this Court.  

While dismissing the petition at the threshold, it was  

observed in an order dated 27.08.20043: 2

2004 MLJ 374

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“……In our view there is no infirmity in  the impugned judgment. The authority in  the case of  Nasiruddin and Ors.  v.  Sita  Ram  Agarwal  (2003)  2  SCC  577  has  been  correctly  followed.  Same  view  has  also  been taken by this Court in the case of  Union  of  India  v. Popular  Construction  Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470.

The  Special  Leave  Petition  stands  dismissed with no order as to costs.”

7. The full bench of the High Court in the order dated  

13.04.2005, held that the dismissal of a special leave  

petition at the threshold stage by the Supreme Court is  

a binding precedent, and must be followed by the courts  

below. It was however also observed that no specific  

time limit can be fixed for exercising the  suo motu  

revisional power under Section 19 of the Act of 1983.  

It was further held that the power has to be exercised  

within reasonable time which depends upon the nature of  

the  order  to  be  revised  and  other  facts  and  

circumstances of the case. The full bench of the High  

Court directed to place the revision petition before  

2004(II) MPJR SN 374

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the appropriate bench for consideration in accordance  

with law.

8. The  Civil  Revision  No.  1330  of  2003  which  was  

barred by time of 80 days was dismissed by the High  

Court for the reasons given by the Full Bench in its  

order dated 13.04.2005.

9. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the  

appellants filed a special leave petition before this  

Court against the dismissal of revision. The Division  

Bench of this court vide order dated 12.05.2008 was of  

the opinion that the case of  Nagar Palika Parishad,  

Morena  (supra) had been incorrectly dismissed at the  

threshold and that the same requires consideration by a  

larger Bench and further directed that the records of  

the case be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice  

of India for constituting an appropriate Bench. Thus,  

the matter came before us for consideration.

10. First of all, in order to appreciate rival legal  

submissions, it would be necessary to consider Section

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19 of the Act of 1983, which relates to revision and  

its limitation, which reads as under :-

“19. High Court’s power of revision –(1)-  The High Court  may suo motu at any time  or on an application made to it within  three months of the award by an aggrieved  party, call for the record of any case in  which an award has been made under this  Act  by  issuing  a  requisition   to  the  Tribunal,  and  upon  receipt  of  such  requisition  the  Tribunal  shall  send  or  cause  to  be  sent  to  that  Court  the  concerned award and record thereof.

(2) If it appears to the High Court  that the Tribunal –

(a) has exercised a jurisdiction  not vested in it by law; or  

(b) has  failed  to  exercise  a  jurisdiction  so vested; or

(c) has acted in exercise of its  jurisdiction  illegally,  or  with  material  irregularity;  or  

(d) has  misconducted  itself  or  the proceedings; or

(e) has  made  an  award  which  is  invalid  or  has  been  improperly  procured by any  party to the proceedings,

the High Court may make such order in the  case as it thinks fit.

(3) The High Court shall in deciding  any  revision  under  this  section

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exercise  the  same  powers  and  follow the same procedure as far  as may be, as it does in deciding  a revision under Section 115 of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908(No.5 of 1908).

(4) The High Court shall cause a copy  of  its order  in revision  to be  certified to the Tribunal.

Explanation.-For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  an  award  shall  include  an  “interim” award.”

11. Following  submissions  were  made  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties in support of their claim.

12. Learned  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  

contended that the High Court failed to consider that  

the revision petition has been preferred under Section  

19 of the Act of 1983 and the delay of 80 days should  

have been condoned by it.

13. It was further contended by the learned counsel on  

behalf of the appellants that the High Court should  

have  considered  that  provision  of  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation Act, would be applicable while entertaining  

a  revision  petition  under  Section  19  of  the  Act  of

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1983. There was also failure on the part of the High  

Court for having not exercised the suo motu revisionary  

powers under the Act in the circumstances of the case.

14. It  was  further  contended  that  the  judgments  

referred in the Full Bench order before the High Court  

are not applicable in the circumstance of the case.

15. Regarding Section 19 of the Act of 1983, it was  

contended by the learned counsel that the proviso to  

Section 19 was added only in the year 2005 though the  

issue  is  concerned  with  the  pre-amendment  provision,  

when  such  proviso,  specifically  conferring  power  to  

condone delay was not there.

16. It was also contended that the question - whether  

the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a  

“Court” or not, need not be decided as Section 19(3) of  

the  Act  of  1983  provides  that  while  exercising  the  

power of revision, the High Court will exercise the  

same powers and will follow the same procedures as it

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does in deciding a revision under Section 115 of the  

Civil Procedure Code.

17. It  was  further  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  

appearing on behalf of the appellants that the order in  

the case of  Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena  (supra) does  

not lay down the correct legal position. The order was  

passed  sub-silentio  and is  per incurium  as it neither  

considers  the  aforesaid  legal  issues  and  submissions  

nor  does  it  take  into  account  the  relevant  legal  

provisions and the Scheme of the Act or various case  

laws  on  the  point.  The  judgments  relied  on  by  this  

Court  in  the  case  of  Nagarpalika  Parishad,  Morena  

(supra) are not applicable to the issues arising here  

and are distinguishable on facts.  

18. On the other side, in the counter affidavit filed  

by the respondents in the connected C.A. No. 1145 of  

2009, it is stated that the appellants have been trying  

to  mislead  this  Hon’ble  Court  by  stating  that  the  

Application  was  preferred  under  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation  Act.  However,  by  a  bare  perusal  of  the

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application for the condonation of delay, it can be  

seen  that  the  application  was  preferred  under  the  

amended  provisions  of  Section  19  of  the  Act.  The  

benefit of the amended Section 19 of the Act could not  

be given to the appellants as the provisions were not  

made with retrospective effect. The amendment came into  

effect on 29.08.2005, much after the expiry period to  

prefer an application under Section 19 of the Act. The  

High Court has very rightly held that the Revision was  

time barred. Since no such provision existed on the  

date of filing of application for condonation of delay,  

the  appellants  were  not  entitled  to  get  the  delay  

condoned.  

19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties  

and with reference to the above factual and rival legal  

contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the  parties  the  

following points would arise for our consideration:

1)Whether  the  provisions  of  Limitation  Act  are  

applicable to the provisions of Madhya Pradesh  

Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983?

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2)What Order?

Answer to Point No.1

20. The Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam,  

1983 came into force with effect from 01.03.1985. It  

was  enacted  to  provide  for  the  establishment  of  a  

Tribunal to arbitrate on disputes to which the State  

Government  or  a  Public  Undertaking  (wholly  or  

substantially  owned  or  controlled  by  the  State  

Government),  is  a  party  and  for  matters  incidental  

thereto or connected therewith.

21. The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of  

Section  3  of  the  Act  of  1983,  for  resolving  all  

disputes and differences pertaining to works contract  

or  arising  out  of  or  connected  with  execution,  

discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract.

22. Section  7  of  the  Act  provides  for  reference  to  

Tribunal. Such reference may be made irrespective of  

whether the agreement contains an arbitration clause or  

not.  Section  7-A  of  the  Act  provides  for  the

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particulars on the basis whereof the reference petition  

is to be filed.

23. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of revision  

on the High Court. It provides that the aggrieved party  

may make an application for revision before the High  

Court within three months of the date of the award.  

This Section was amended in 2005, to confer the power  

on  the  High  Court  to  condone  the  delay.  Since  this  

dispute pertains prior to 2005, thus, the provision of  

the unamended Act shall apply in the present case.

24. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation  

on the law of limitation.

25. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that an  

appeal may be admitted after the limitation period has  

expired,  if  the  appellant  satisfies  the  court  that  

there was sufficient cause for delay.

26. Section  29  of  the  Limitation  Act  is  the  saving  

section. Sub-section (2) reads as follows:

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“(2) Where  any  special  or  local  law  prescribes  for  any  suit,  appeal  or  application  a  period  of  limitation  different from the period prescribed by  the Schedule, the provisions of section 3  shall apply as if such period were the  period prescribed by the Schedule and for  the purpose of determining any period of  limitation  prescribed  for  any  suit,  appeal or application by any special or  local  law,  the  provisions  contained  in  sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply  only in so far as, and to the extent to  which, they are not expressly excluded by  such special or local law.”

Sub section (2) thus, provides that Sections 4 to 24 of  

the Limitation Act shall be applicable to any Act which  

prescribes a special period of limitation, unless they  

are expressly excluded by that special law.

27. This  Court  in  the  case  of  Mukri  Gopalan  v.  

Cheppilat  Puthanpuravil  Aboobacker4 examined  the  

question of whether the Limitation Act will apply to  

the  Kerala  Buildings  (Lease  and  Rent)  Control  Act,  

1965. While holding that the appellate authority under  

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(1995) 5 SCC 5

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the Kerala Act acts as a Court, it was held that since  

the Act prescribes a period of limitation, which is  

different  from  the  period  of  limitation  prescribed  

under  the  Limitation  Act,  and  there  is  no  express  

exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, in  

the  above  (Lease  &  Rent)  Control  Act,  thus,  those  

Sections shall be applicable to the Kerala Act.

While examining the provisions of Section 29(2) of  

the Limitation Act, it was observed:

“8.  A  mere  look  at  the  aforesaid  provision  shows for  its applicability to the facts of  a given case and for importing the machinery of  the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of  the  Limitation  Act  the  following  two  requirements  have  to  be  satisfied  by  the  authority invoking the said provision:  

(i) There must  be a provision for period of  limitation under any  special or local law in  connection  with  any  suit,  appeal  or  application.

(ii)  The  said  prescription  of  period  of  limitation  under  such  special  or  local  law  should be different from the period prescribed  

by the schedule to the Limitation Act.”

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28. It  was  further  held  that  if  the  two  above  

conditions  are  satisfied,  then  the  following  

implications would follow:

“9.  If  the  aforesaid  two  requirements  are  satisfied  the consequences  contemplated by  Section  29(2)  would  automatically  follow.  These consequences are as under:

(i) Insuch a case  Section  3  of  the  Limitation Act would apply as if the period  prescribed by the special or local law was  the period prescribed by the schedule.  

(ii) For determining any period of limitation  prescribed by such special or local law for a  suit,  appeal  or  application  all  the  

provisions  containing  Sections  4  to  24(inclusive) would apply insofar as and to  the extent to which they are not expressly  excluded by        such special or local law  .”

[emphasis laid by this Court]

29. Further, in the case of  Hukumdev Narain Yadav v.  

Lalit  Narain  Mishra5,  a  three  judge  Bench  of  this  

court, while examining whether the Limitation Act would  

be applicable to the provisions of Representation of  

People Act, observed as under:

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(1974)2 SCC 133

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“17. ....but what we have to see is whether  the scheme of the special law, that is in  this  case  the  Act,  and  the  nature  of  the  remedy  provided  therein  are  such  that  the  Legislature intended it to be a complete code  by  itself  which  alone  should  govern  the  several  matters  provided  by  it.  If  on  an  examination of the relevant provisions it is  clear that the provisions of the Limitation  Act  are  necessarily  excluded,  then  the  benefits conferred therein cannot be called  in aid to supplement the provisions of the  Act. In our view, even in a case where the  special law does not exclude the provisions  of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by  an express reference, it would nonetheless be  open to the Court to examine whether and to  what extent the nature of those provisions or  the nature of the subject-matter and scheme  of the special law exclude their operation.”

30. According to Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra), even if  

there exists no express exclusion in the special law,  

the court reserves the right to examine the provisions  

of the special law, and arrived at a conclusion as to  

whether  the  legislative  intent  was  to  exclude  the  

operation of the Limitation Act.

31. Section 19 of the Act of 1983 prescribes a period  

of limitation of three months. This limitation period

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finds no mention in the schedule to the Limitation Act.  

Further,  Section  19  does  not  expressly  exclude  the  

application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,  

1963.  

32. We now turn our attention to the case of Nasiruddin  

and Ors. (supra), on which reliance was placed by this  

court  in  the  case  of  Nagarpalika  Parishad,  Morena  

(supra), while dismissing the Special Leave Petition.  

The issue in that case was whether the deposit of rent  

under section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control  

of  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1950  by  a  tenant  is  an  

application  for  the  purpose  of  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation Act.

33. While  examining  the  nature  of  the  deposit  by  

tenant, it was held:

“46. ...the deposit by the tenant within  15 days is not an application within the  meaning  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963.  Since  the  deposit  does  not  require  any  application,  therefore,  the  provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended  where the default takes place in complying

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with  an  order  under  Sub-section  (4)  of  Section 13 of the Act.”

34. Further,  explaining  as  to  why  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation Act is not applicable, the Court observed:

“The  provisions  of  Section  5  of  the  Limitation  Act  must  be  construed  having  regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an  application after the expiry of the period  prescribed under the Limitation Act or any  special  statute  a  cause  of  action  must  arise. Compliance of an order passed by a  Court  of  Law  in  terms  of  a  statutory  provision does not give rise to a cause of  action. On failure to comply with an order  passed  by  a  Court  of  Law  instant  consequences  are  provided  for  under  the  statute. The Court can condone the default  only when the statute confers such a power  on  the  Court  and  not  otherwise.  In  that  view of the matter we have no other option  but  to  hold  that  Section  5  of  the  Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in  the instant case.”

[emphasis laid by this Court]

It is evident on a plain reading of the judgment in  

that  case,  that  the  reason  why  Section  5  of  the  

Limitation  Act  was  said  to  be  inapplicable  to  the  

Rajasthan Act, Section 13(4), was because of the nature  

of the specific provision in question. It was held that

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Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to  

Section 13(4), as the deposit of rent by the tenant  

cannot be said to be an application for the purpose of  

Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This case cannot be  

said to be relevant to the facts of the present case,  

as Section 5 of the Limitation Act has got application  

for the purpose of  Section 19 of the Act of 1983, and  

the cause of action accrued to the appellant when the  

Tribunal passed the award.

35. We now direct our attention to the second case i.e.  

Union of India v. Popular Construction (supra)on which  

reliance was placed by this Court while dismissing the  

Special  Leave  Petition  in  the  case  of  Nagarpalika  

Parishad,  Morena  (supra). The  issue  therein  was  

whether Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act  would  

be applicable to Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,  

1996.  

36. The  wording  of  Section  34(3)  of  the  Arbitration  

Act, 1996, reads thus:

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“34.  (3)  An  application  for  setting  aside  may  not  be  made  after  three  months have elapsed from the date on  which  the  party  making  that  application had received the arbitral  award or, if a request had been made  under  section  33,  from  the  date  on  which that request had been disposed  of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided  that  if  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  applicant  was  prevented  by  sufficient  cause  from  making the application within the said  period  of  three  months  it  may  entertain  the  application  within  a  further period of thirty days, but not  thereafter."

       [emphasis laid by this Court]

While examining the provision of Section 34, the Court  

in  Popular  Construction   case  (supra)  observed  as  

under:

“8. Had the proviso to Section 34  merely  provided  for  a  period  within  which  the  Court  could  exercise  its  discretion,  that  would not have been sufficient to  exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the  Limitation  Act  because  "mere  provision  of  a  period  of  limitation  in  howsoever  peremptory or imperative language

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is not sufficient to displace the  applicability of Section 5.”

   [emphasis laid by this Court]

While holding that Section 5 is not applicable to  

Section 34(3), it was held that the presence of the  

words  “but  not  thereafter”  operate  as  an  express  

exclusion to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

“12.  As  far  as  the  language  of  Section  34  of  the  1996  Act  is  concerned, the crucial words are  'but not thereafter' used in the  proviso to sub-section (3). In our  opinion, this phrase would amount  to an express exclusion within the  meaning  of  Section  29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act,  and  would  therefore bar the application of  section 5 of that Act. Parliament  did  not  need  to  go  further.  To  hold  that  the  Court  could  entertain  an  application  to  set  aside  the  Award  beyond  the  extended period under the proviso,  would render the phrase 'but not  thereafter'  wholly  otiose.  No  principle of interpretation would  justify such a result.”

           (Emphasis laid down by the Court)

37. Section 19 of the Act of 1983, does not contain any  

express  rider  on  the  power  of  the  High  Court  to

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entertain an application for revision after the expiry  

of  the  prescribed  period  of  three  months.  On  the  

contrary, the High Court is conferred with  suo moto  

power, to call for the record of an award at any time.  

It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  the  legislative  

intent was to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of  

the Limitation Act to Section 19 of the Act of 1983.

38. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the  

question of whether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted  

under the Act is a Court or not for answering the issue  

in  the  present  case,  as  the  delay  in  filing  the  

revision has occurred before the High Court, and not  

the Arbitral Tribunal.

Answer to Point No.2

39. In light of the reasons recorded above, we are of  

the opinion that the case of  Nagar Palika Parishad,  

Morena (supra) was decided erroneously. Section 5 of  

the Limitation Act is applicable to Section 19 of the  

Act of 1983. No express exclusion has been incorporated

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therein, and there is neither any evidence to suggest  

that the legislative intent was to bar the application  

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on Section 19 of the  

Act  of  1983.  The  cases  which  were  relied  upon  to  

dismiss the Special Leave Petition, namely  Nasiruddin  

(supra)  and  Popular  Construction (supra)  can  be  

distinguished both in terms of the facts as well as the  

law applicable, and thus, have no bearing on the facts  

of the present case.

40. For the reasons stated supra, we answer the points  

framed  by  us  in  the  affirmative  in  favour  of  the  

appellants. The impugned judgments and orders are set  

aside and both the appeals are allowed. The delay in  

filing revision petitions is condoned and the cases are  

remanded  to  the  High  Court  to  examine  the  same  on  

merits. We request the High Court to dispose of the  

cases as expeditiously as possible.  

    ………………………………………………………………………J.   

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    [T.S. THAKUR]   

                     ………………………………………………………………………J.       [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

    ………………………………………………………………………J.                            [C. NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, August 6, 2014