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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  7965-7966 of 2004

PETITIONER: State of Kerala & Ors

RESPONDENT: M/s Kurian Abraham Pvt. Ltd. & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/2008

BENCH: S. H. Kapadia & B. Sudershan Reddy

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7965-7966 OF 2004

KAPADIA, J.

       M/s Kurian Abraham Pvt. Ltd.-assessee is engaged in the business of  buying rubber, processing the same and selling the processed rubber.  Assessee purchases field latex (raw-material) in Kerala, but, since its  processing factories are in Tamil Nadu, it transports field latex to Tamil  Nadu for processing into centrifuged latex and returns it back into Kerala.  Thereafter, the centrifuged rubber is sold by the assessee either locally in  Kerala or inter-State.

2.      In respect of its sales turnover, respondent is an assessee under Kerala  General Sales Tax Act, 1963 ("1963 Act") as well as under  the Central  Sales Tax Act, 1956 ("1956 Act").          3.      For the assessment year 1997-98, with respect to centrifuged latex  sold locally, the assessee furnished Form No. 25, declaration from the  concerned buyers, and claimed exemption from payment of tax on the  purchase Turnover of field latex (raw-rubber). With respect to inter-State  sale of centrifuged latex, the assessee paid the tax under the 1963 Act on the  purchase of field latex and claimed exemption in respect of Central Sales  Tax ("CST") under Notification SRO 1731/93 read with SRO 215/97. The  returns filed by the assessee were accepted by the AO vide Order dated  14.5.2001 under the 1963 Act and vide assessment order dated 31.5.2001  under the 1956 Act. Similar returns were filed by the assessee for 1998-99  onwards.

4.      At this stage, it may be stated that returns filed by the assessee were  accepted by the Department on the basis of Circular No. 16/98 dated  28.5.1998 (for short "the said circular") issued by the Board of Revenue  under Section 3(1A)(c). Under the said Circular, field and centrifuged latex  were treated as one and the same commodity in view of Entry 110 of the  First Schedule to the 1963 Act.

5.      At this stage, it may be noted that, during the interregnum, in the case  of Padinjarekara Agencies Ltd.  v.  Assistant Commissioner reported in  1996 (2) KLT 641, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court took the  view that centrifuged latex is a commercially different product from field  latex.  

6.      It needs to be clarified that the judgment of the Kerala High Court in  Padinjarekara case (supra) related to assessment years 1983-84 to 1986-87  during which time Entries 38 and 39 were in force whereas in the present  case, we are concerned with the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99

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when Entry 110 was in force. That, the structure of Entries 38 and 39 which  existed in the past was materially different from the structure of Entry 110.

7.      Be that as it may, in view of the judgment of the High Court in   Padinjarekara case (supra) notices were issued by the Department under  Section 19 of the 1963 Act proposing to reopen KGST and CST completed  assessments for 1997-98 on the ground that purchase turnover of field latex  and sales turnover of centrifuged latex had escaped assessments.  Accordingly, the Department proposed to assess the entire purchase turnover  of field latex in the hands of the assessee under Entry 110(a)(i) on the  ground that the centrifuged latex obtained by processing field latex is a  different commodity and, accordingly, the assessee was the last purchaser of  field latex within Kerala. Similarly, with regard to inter-State sales of  centrifuged latex, the Department alleged that the benefit of exemption taken  by the assessee under the above two exemption Notifications was not  admissible on the ground that the field latex purchased in Kerala and the  centrifuged latex sold inter-State were two different commodities and,  accordingly, the KGST paid by the assessee on the field latex was not  sufficient to claim exemption for CST on the sale of centrifuged latex. The  Department also reopened the assessments on the ground that the assessee  had taken the field latex out of Kerala to its factory in Tamil Nadu and had  brought it back as centrifuged latex and, therefore, the assessee was liable to  sales tax on the sales turnover of centrifuged latex under Entry 110(a)(ii) on  the ground that the assessee had sold centrifuged latex brought from outside  the State of Kerala. In other words, the assessee was sought to be reassessed  both for purchase turnover of field latex and for sales turnover of centrifuged  latex, both under the 1963 Act and under the 1956 Act. At this stage, it may  be noted that, till today the said Circular No. 16/98 issued by the Board of  Revenue has remained in force. It has not been withdrawn till today.

8.      Aggrieved by reopening of assessments, respondent-assessee herein  moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the  orders of reassessments inter alia on the ground that they were contrary to  the said circular No. 16/98 issued by the Board of Revenue (Taxes). By the  impugned judgment, the writ petition filed by the assessee stood allowed,  hence, these civil appeals are filed by the Department.

9.      We quote Section 3(1A) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963,  which reads as follows: 3.  Sales tax authorities

(1A)    The Board of Revenue shall have superintendence  over all officers and persons employed in the execution  of this Act and Board of Revenue may-

(a)     call for returns from such officers and persons;

(b)     make and issue general rules and prescribe forms  for regulating the practice and proceedings of such  officers and persons;

(c)     issue such orders, instructions and directions to  such officers and persons as it may deem fit, for the  proper administration of this Act."

10.     Entries 38 and 39 of the First Schedule of the Kerala General Sales  Tax Act, 1963, as they then stood, are as follows: "THE FIRST SCHEDULE Goods in respect of which single point tax is leviable under sub-section (1)  or sub-section (2) of section 5

Sl.  No. Description of goods Point of Levy

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Rate of  tax (%) 38 Rubber Rubber excluding synthetic rubber

At the point of last  purchase in the State by  a dealer who is liable to  tax under section 5

5 39 Rubber products other than those  specifically mentioned in this Schedule At the point of first sale  in the State by a dealer  who is liable to tax  under section 5

8"

11.     Entry 110 of the First Schedule of Kerala General Sales Tax Act,  1963 reads as follows:   "SCHEDULE I GOODS IN RESPECT OF WHICH SINGLE POINT TAX IS LEVIABLE  UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OR SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 5

Sl.  No. Description of goods Point of Levy Rate of  tax (per cent) 110 Rubber, that is to say :- (a)  raw rubber, latex, dry ribbed sheet of  all RMA Grades, trees, lace, earth scrap,  ammoniated latex, preserved latex, latex  concentrate, centrifugal latex, dry crepe  rubber, dry block rubber, crumb rubber,  skimmed rubber and all other qualities  and grades of latex.

(i) purchased within the State

At the point of last  purchase in the State by  a dealer who is liable to  tax under section 5 10

(ii) brought from outside the State

At the point of first sale  in the State by a dealer  who is liable to tax  under section 5

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10

(b)  Reclaimed rubber, all grades and  qualities do 10

( c) Synthetic rubber do 10"          12.     Circular No. 16/98 dated 28.5.1998 issued by the Board of Revenue  reads as follows:

"CIRCULAR No. 16/98

Dated: 28.5.1998

Sub:   KGST Act 1963 \026 Conversion of field latex into  Centrifuged Latex \026 Impact of the decision of Hon’ble High  Court in Padinjarekara Agencies Limited Vs. Asst.  Commissioner (Assmt) \026 clarification issued.

A doubt has been raised as to the rate of tax and point of levy to  be adopted in respect of Centrifuged Latex in view of the  Judgement of the Kerala High Court in Padinjarekkara  Agencies limited Vs. Asst. Commissioner (Assessment)  Kottayam (OP No. 2016/1987-M).

2. In Padinjarekkara Agencies Limited Vs. Assistant  Commissioner (Assessment), Kottayam (Judgement dated  24.07.1995 in OP No. 2016/87/M) (1997 5 KTR 26) the  Hon’ble High Court had held that a unit engaged in the  processing of centrifuged  latex is eligible for the concessional  rate contemplated under Section 5(7) of the KGST Act, as it  stood at the relevant time in respect of the purchase of drum and  is eligible to issue declaration in Form 18 as "centrifuged latex"  would come under the term "finished product" used in section  5(7) of the KGST Act. In the O.P. therefore the Court was not  concerned with the levy of tax on "centrifuged latex" and also  interpretation of the entries in the first schedule. In the case of  assessment the assessing authority has to take into account the  entries in the schedule and decide the entry in which an item  can be properly classified. During the years 83-84 to 86-87,  with which the Hon’ble Court was concerned in the above O.P,  the entries relating to rubber and rubber product in the first  schedule to the KGST Act were as follows:

"38

Rubber excluding  synthetic rubber

At the point of last purchase in  the State by a dealer who is

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liable to tax under Section 5.

39.

Rubber products other  than those specifically  mentioned in this  Schedule At the point of first sale in the  State by a dealer who is liable to  tax under Section 5"

The scope and ambit of entry 38 was not clarified in the statute.  So judicial interpretation may have to be relied on. In the case  of assessments relating to the period upto 86-87, to which  period the judgment mentioned above also related the judgment  in O.P. 2816/87 can be relied upon for interpreting the scope of  the term rubber or rubber product falling under entry 38 & 39  respectively. The Court  had held that "centrifuged latex" would  be a "finished product". So "centrifuged latex" will fall under  entry 39 "rubber products other than those specifically  mentioned in this schedule" and the appropriate rate may have  to be applied i.e., a dealer engaged in the processing of  centrifuged latex will have to pay tax on field latex purchased  within the State and also pay tax on centrifuged latex sold  within the State or inter state as goods falling under entry 39.  This position would continue till 31.03.1988 (Even though with  effect from 01.07.1987 the first schedule was substituted and  the Serial No. relating to the entry rubber was changed as 161,  the entry remained the same namely "rubber excluding  synthetic rubber").

3. But from 1.04.1988 entry 161 was substituted as follows: "161. Rubber, that is to say:

(a)

Raw rubber latex, dry  rubber sheet of all R  M A grades, tree lace,  earth scrap,  ammoniated latex,  preserved latex,  concentrate,  centrifuged latex, dry  crape rubber, dry

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block rubber, crumb  rubber, skimmed  rubber, and  

At the point of last  purchase in the State by a  dealer also is liable to tax  under Section 5.

(b)

Reclaimed rubber, all  grades and qualities.

At the point of sale within  the State by a dealer, a  dealer who is liable to tax  under Section 5.

So rubber latex and centrifuged latex are treated as one and the  same commodity for the purpose of taxation. So with effect  from 01.04.1988, the judgment in Padinjarekkara Agencies case  mentioned earlier (5 KTR 26) cannot have any application for  deciding whether centrifuged latex is a commodity  commercially different from latex, both being treated as a single  commodity for the purpose of taxation. So with effect from  01.04.1988, if a dealer purchased field latex converted it into  centrifuged latex and sold centrifuged latex within the State to a  registered dealer, he could claim exemption from tax if the  buyer had issued the declaration in form No. 25. If on the other  hand the processed latex (centrifuged latex) is sold inter state,  the dealer may have to pay tax on purchase of field latex, he  being the last purchaser within the State and also pay Central  Sales Tax on the inter state sales of centrifuged latex. But from  01.04.1997 if a tax is paid on field latex under the KGST Act  no tax will be payable on centrifuged latex sold inter state.

4. As per notification SRO 585/80 a reduction  in the rate of tax  payable on the purchase of rubber by small scale rubber  Industrial units from 5% to 3% was granted provided the rubber  was used in the manufacture of rubber products within the  State.

5. In the light of the position of law discussed above for the  period from 01.07.1980, i.e., the date of taking effect of  notification SRO 585/80, to 31.03.1988, this concession will be  available, since "centrifuged latex" has to be treated as a  finished product in the light of the judgment.

6. But from 01.04.1988, since field latex and centrifuged latex  are one and the same commodity, by the change of law, the  decision mentioned above will not have any application and by  operation of law no new products emerges when field latex is  converted into "centrifuged latex". So notification SRO 585/90  will not have application in the case of such SSI Units from  01.04.1988. From 09.11.1990, however, a specific exclusion

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clause has also been added to notification 641/81 specifically  excluding even "compounded rubber" from the term "finished  rubber products".

7. As per notification SRO 1003/91 exemption was granted,  inter alia, in respect of the tax payable by Small Scale Industrial  Units on the purchase of rubber for use in the manufacture of  rubber goods subject to the condition that tax is levied on the  products manufactured out of such rubber. Here again, since  during 1991-92 the entry relating to rubber, namely entry 161,  takes within its ambit field latex and centrifuged latex, no new  commodity emerges in the conversion of field latex into  centrifuged latex. Such Industrial units will not therefore be  eligible for exemption under SRO 1003/91 and SRO 1727/93 in  respect of the purchase of field latex for conversion on  centrifuged latex."

13.     Notification S.R.O. No. 946/2007 dated 13.11.2007 reads as follows: "S.R.O.No.946/2007.?In exercise of the powers conferred by  section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (Act 15 of  1963), read with sub-section (5) of Section 98 of the Kerala  Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (30 of 2004), the Government of  Kerala, having considered it necessary in the public interest so  to do hereby, rescind the notification issued as per G.O. (P)  No.43/2005/TD. Dated 31st March, 2005 and published as  S.R.O. No.316/2005 in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary  No.676 dated 31st March, 2005, and exempt manufacturers and  subsequent sellers of Centrifuged latex and Crumb rubber from  payment of tax payable under the Kerala General Sales Tax  Act, 1963 on the sales or purchase turnover of Centrifuged latex  and Crumb rubber on condition that purchase tax has been  levied and collected on the purchase turnover of field latex,  used for the manufacture of Centrifuged latex and Crumb  rubber, under Kerala General Salex Tax Act, 1963.

       Tax if any, collected shall be paid over to Government  and tax if any, already paid shall not be refunded.  This  notification shall be deemed to have been in force during the  period from 10th October, 2001 to 31st March, 2004."

14.     At this stage it may be stated that Entry 161 was followed by Entry  110.

15.     The basic contention raised on behalf of the State (appellant herein)  was that under section 3(1) the Board of Revenue ("the Board") was  required to exercise all the powers conferred or imposed upon it by the Act.  Under section 3(1A), the Board had power of superintendents over all  officers and persons employed in the execution of the said Act and under  that sub-section the Board was empowered to issue orders, instructions and  directions to such officers, as it may deem fit, for the proper administration  of the Act. Placing reliance on section 3(1A), Mr. Venkataramani, learned  senior counsel appearing for the State, submitted that the said circular No.  16/98 issued by the Board was without authority as the Board had exercised  its authority under the said sub-section without the existence of a condition  precedent, namely, that when the legislature had earmarked each item in  Entry 110 as distinct commodity, it was not open to the Board to treat field  latex and centrifuged latex as the same commodity, namely, rubber, thus,  according to the learned counsel, this amounts to legislation by the Board.  According to the learned counsel, by  equating field latex with centrifuged  latex, the impugned circular violates the very legislative intent of  introducing Entry 110 w.e.f. 1.4.1988 and thereby obliterating the difference  between the law as it stood pre-April, 1988 and post 1988. According to the  learned counsel, on a bare reading of Section 3(1A), it is clear that the said

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Board was only authorized to issue administrative circulars. That, prior to  1.4.1988, raw rubber excluding synthetic rubber attracted KGST at the rate  of 5% at the point of last purchase in the State by a dealer liable to tax under  Section 5 whereas under Entry 110, field latex is a separate taxable  commodity vis-a-vis centrifuged latex. According to the learned counsel,  each item of Entry 110 is a separate commodity which is exigible to KGST  at the point of last purchase in the State by a dealer liable to tax under  Section 5 at 10%. According to the learned counsel, by equating field latex  with centrifuged latex, the former escapes duty. According to the learned  counsel, the power to grant exemption from payment of duty was not  conferred on the Board. The power to grant exemption was a matter of  policy. It was for the State to grant or not to grant such exemption. In the  circumstances, it was urged that the power of the Board was executive in  nature. According to the learned counsel, Section 3(1A) did not confer on  the Board the power to issue Orders/Notifications which may partake the  character of legislative exercise. According to the learned counsel, the said  section did not empower the Board to encroach upon the domain reserved  for the Government under the Act. Further, according to the learned counsel,  the Board had no power to construe/interpret entries or to lay down the  scope and extent of each entry. According to the learned counsel, the scope  of Section 3(1A) cannot be equated to Section 37B of the Central Excise  Act, 1944. As the words used in Section 3(1A) are distinct and separate from  the words used in Section 37B of the Central Excise Act. Learned counsel  submitted that circulars such as the one herein do not bind the Court or even  Tribunal in the matter of interpretation/classification. In short, the case of the  State Government was that the Board had exceeded its authority under  Section 3(1A) of taking over interpretation of Entry 110, which function  could only be exercised by the quasi-judicial authority under the Act and  that the said circular constituted an interference in the assessment  proceedings before the assessing officers. 16.     Learned counsel for the State also relied upon Notification dated  13.11.2007 issued by the Government of Kerala (Tax Department). The said  Notification has been issued under Section 10 of the 1963 Act read with  Section 98 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 granting exemption to  manufacturers and subsequent sellers of centrifuged latex from payment of  tax payable under the said Act on the sales or purchase turnover on the  condition that purchase tax has been levied and collected on the purchase  turnover of field latex, used for the manufacture of centrifuged latex. This  circular is relied upon to show that the power is conferred on the  Government to grant or not to grant exemption under Section 10 of the 1963  Act. That, such power was not conferred on the Board. According to the  learned counsel, the effect of the circular is to grant exemption from  payment of tax on the sale or purchase turnover of centrifuged latex, which  could not have been done by the Board vide the above circular.  

17.     We find no merit in the above contentions. At the outset, it may be  stated that in the case of field latex there is 60% water and 40% is the rubber  content. On the other hand, centrifuged latex produced from field latex  reverses the ratio whereby the rubber content is increased to 60% and the  water content is reduced to 40%. Basically, field latex is raw rubber whereas  centrifuged latex is a product. This is the rationale behind giving or setting- off/deduction under Notification dated 13.11.2007.

18.     Tax administration is a complex subject. It consists of several aspects.  The Government needs to strike a balance in the imposition of tax between  collection of revenue on one hand and business-friendly approach on the  other hand. Today, Governments have realized that in matters of tax  collection, difficulties faced by the business have got to be taken into  account. Exemption, undoubtedly, is a matter of policy. Interpretation of an  Entry is undoubtedly a quasi-judicial function under the tax laws. Imposition  of taxes consists of liability, quantification of liability and collection of  taxes. Policy decisions have to be taken by the Government. However, the  Government has to work through its senior officers in the matter of  difficulties which the business may face, particularly in matters of tax  administration. That is where the role of the Board of Revenue comes into

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play. The said Board takes administrative decisions, which includes the  authority to grant Administrative Reliefs.  This is the underlying reason for  empowering the Board to issue orders, instructions and directions to the  officers under it. In the present case, we are not concerned with deciding the  scope and extent of each item in Entry 110. We are essentially concerned in  this case with the nature of the powers exercised by the  Board/Commissioners under Section 3(1A). Take the case of centrifuged  latex. It is a product made from field latex (raw-rubber). Even for the sake of  argument and even assuming that centrifuged latex and field latex are two  different items of taxation under the 1963 Act, as contended on behalf of the  State, double taxation avoidance comes within the domain of the Board of  Revenue. It was open to the Board to grant administrative relief vide  Circular No. 16/98 if the Board in its expertise was of the opinion that  treatment of field latex and centrifuged latex as separate and distinct items  could result in double taxation. Therefore, the Board was entitled to give  administrative relief to the business. In fact, what we have stated is borne out  by Notification dated 13.11.2007 issued by the State Government. We are  informed that in November, 2007, the Board of Revenue (Taxes) did not  exist. However, the point to be noted that even the Notification dated  13.11.2007 indicates that there was a possibility of double taxation on  centrifuged latex produced from field latex and, therefore, ultimately the  Government had to step in and grant exemption under Section 10 of the  1963 Act. In this case, we are not concerned with the exemption. Power to  grant exemption is certainly with the State Government. The point to be  noted is that such exemption was not there during the assessment years  1997-98 and 1998-99. Therefore, the Board consisting of senior officers  were aware about the propensity of double taxation. In such circumstances,  it was not open to the State to contend before the High Court that the said  circular No. 16/98 was not legal.

19.     One more aspect needs to be mentioned. Provisions of Section 3(1A)  are similar to the provisions of Section 119(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961  ("1961 Act") inasmuch as both the sections have used the expression "for  the proper administration of this Act". According to the Law of Income-tax  by Kanga and Palkivala, the Board is entrusted with the power to give effect  to the provisions of the Act and to provide "fair and just administration" in  the matter of imposition and collection of tax. This is where it becomes the  incumbent duty of the Board to grant administrative relief in appropriate  cases. In such exercise, incidentally the Board has to consider the effect of  the items enumerated in the Entry. Therefore, it is not open to the State  Government to contend that the Board in this case had entered into an area  which is earmarked for the legislature/executive. In our view, the said  circular grants administrative relief to the business. It was entitled to do so.  Therefore, it cannot be said that the Board had acted beyond its authority in  issuing the said circular. One more reason needs to be stated. Whenever such  binding circulars are issued by the Board granting administrative relief(s)  business arranges its affairs relying on such circulars. Therefore, as long as  the circular remains in force, it is not open to the subordinate officers to  contend that the circular is erroneous and not binding on them.  20.     In the case of Union of India and anr.  V.  Azadi Bachao Andolan  and anr. Reported in (2004) 10 SCC 1 a circular was issued by CBDT  under Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It was challenged inter alia  on the ground that it was ultra vires the provisions of Section 19(1). The  argument was rejected by this Court in the following words: "47.  It was contended successfully before the High  Court that the circular is ultra vires the provisions of  Section 119. Sub-section (1) of Section 119 is  deliberately worded in a general manner so that CBDT is  enabled to issue appropriate orders, instructions or  directions to the subordinate authorities "as it may deem  fit for the proper administration of this Act". As long as  the circular emanates from CBDT and contains orders,  instructions or directions pertaining to proper  administration of the Act, it is relatable to the source of  power under Section 119 irrespective of its

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nomenclature. Apart from sub-section (1), sub-section (2)  of Section 119 also enables CBDT  

’for the purpose of proper and efficient  management of the work of assessment and  collection of revenue, to issue appropriate  orders, general or special, in respect of any  class of income or class of cases, setting  forth directions or instructions (not being  prejudicial to the assessees) as to the  guidelines, principles or procedures to be  followed by other Income Tax Authorities in  the work relating to assessment or collection  of revenue or the initiation of proceedings  for the imposition of penalties’.  

In our view, the High Court was not justified in reading  the circular as not complying with the provisions of  Section 119. The circular falls well within the parameters  of the powers exercisable by CBDT under Section 119 of  the Act."  

21.     Lastly, the binding effect of the said circular No. 16/98 needs to be  kept in mind. As stated above, the said circular was issued by the Board by  exercising statutory powers vested in it under Section 3(1A). As stated  above, Section 3(1A) provides for an enabling power of the Board which  was recognized as an Authority under the 1963 Act. The said power was to  be exercised in special cases. As stated above, granting of administrative  reliefs by the Board came within its authority. As stated above, the said  circular was issued for just and fair administration of the 1963 Act. As stated  above, Section 3(1A) is similar to Section 119(1) of the 1961 Act. The  circulars of this nature are issued by the Board consisting of highest senior  officers in the Revenue Department. These circulars are to be respected by  the officers working under the supervision of the Board. These circulars are  binding on all the authorities administering the tax department. The power of  the Board to issue such circular is traceable to Section 3(1A)(c) of the Act.  The said circular is statutory in nature. Therefore, it is binding on the  Department though not on the courts and the assessees. In the present case,  as stated above, completed assessments were sought to be reopened by the  AO on the ground that the said circular No. 16/98 was not binding. Such an  approach is unsustainable in the eyes of law.  If the State Government was of  the view that such circulars are illegal or that they are ultra vires Section  3(1A), which it is not, it was open to the State to nullify/withdraw the said  circular under Section 60 of the 1963 Act. Till today, the circular continue to  remain in force. Till today, it has not been withdrawn. In the circumstances,  it is not open to the officers administering the law working under the Board  of Revenue to say that the said circular is not binding on them. If such a  contention was to be accepted, it would lead to chaos and indiscipline in the  administration of tax laws.  

22.     In the case of Steel Authority of India  v.  Collector of Customs,  Bombay reported in 2000 (115) ELT 42 (SC) a similar situation arose. It  was submitted on behalf of the revenue in that case that the Trade Notice  had been issued only by Bombay Customs and, therefore, it was not binding  on other Customs. This argument was repelled by the Division Bench of this  Court by stating that the Trade Notice issued by one Customs House must  bind all Customs Authorities and, if it is erroneous, it should be first  withdrawn or amended. In the present case also, it is not open to the  assessing officers to reopen the completed assessments on the ground that  said circular No. 16/98 was erroneous. Till today, the said circular has  neither been withdrawn nor amended. 23.     For the aforestated reasons, we find no infirmity in the impugned  judgment of the High Court and, accordingly, the State’s civil appeals stand  dismissed with no order as to costs.