Page 1

1

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8378 OF 2015 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 29250 of 2008]

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. .. APPELLANTS

VERSUS

NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES LTD. .. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1     Leave granted.

2    The Appellant, State of Haryana, is assailing the Judgment dated 11.12.2007  

passed by the High Court of Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 3750 of 2005  

whereby the Notice to resume the land of the Respondent has been set aside.  

The Appellant State has been directed to comply with the principles of natural  

justice  as  perceived  by  the  High  Court,  and,  in  consonance  with  its  tenets,  

rehear the Respondent as well as the subsequent purchasers, and thereafter to  

decide the issue of resumption of the subject land by the Appellant State.

Page 2

2

3     It  is  unfortunate,  and indeed  remarkable,  that  the  fate  of  the  subject  

agricultural land, measuring 358 kanals and 7 marlas, located in village Sankhol  

of  Tehsil  Bahadurgarh of  District  Rohtak,  has been in a state of  uncertainty  

since the year of its acquisition in 1973. The Respondent had approached the  

Appellant State on 18.5.1971 with a proposal to set up an industrial undertaking  

having  20,000  tonnes  capacity  for  manufacture  of  sheet  glass,  requiring  an  

investment plan of  4 crore,.  It was projected that this industry would provide  

employment for as many as one thousand workmen.   Keeping in perspective  

the palpable public purpose of generating employment and spurring industrial  

growth, the Appellant State approved the said proposal and issued a Notification  

and a Declaration under Sections 4 and 6 respectively of the Land Acquisition  

Act, 1894 (referred to as “the Act” hereinafter) in 1973.  The Award came to be  

passed in the following year 1974 which computed the compensation for the  

landowners  at  3,93,688.12.  Immediately  after  the  passing  of  the  Award  on  

16.10.1974, the Appellant State executed a Deed of Conveyance in favour of the  

Respondent, the relevant clauses of which shall hereafter be adverted to.  

4     Being  aggrieved  with  the  quantum  of  compensation  the  landowners  

approached the Additional District Judge in Reference proceeding under Section  

18 of the Act, who enhanced the compensation by  59,349/- vide Order dated  

29.1.1979.  The compensation was thereafter further enhanced to 8.10 lakh by

Page 3

3

the High Court vide Judgment dated 2.6.1988, which was not interfered with by  

this Court by the dismissal of the SLP of the Respondent.  In the interregnum,  

on 1.8.1986, some of the landowners filed Execution proceedings under Order  

XXI Rule 11 of the CPC against the Respondent and the Appellant State for  

recovery  of  the  enhanced  compensation  awarded  to  them.   It  is  these  

proceedings which have supplied the bedrock for the dispute portrayed before  

us.  In that execution case, the Additional District Judge proceeded to attach the  

acquired land, vide Orders dated 29.8.1987; and then directed its sale by way of  

auction vide Order dated 4.3.1989.  The Respondent thereupon presented the  

Executing Court with an ingenious offer of private sale on the predication that  

the barren and water-logged land would not fetch sufficient funds to satisfy the  

decreed  compensation  through  court  auction.   Suffice  to  note  that  the  

application  of  the  Respondent  for  private  sale  seems  to  have  received  the  

imprimatur of the District Judge on 7.5.1991, and thence several portions of the  

subject land had been sold by the Respondent. Knowledge of these execution  

proceedings  has  been  unconvincingly  denied  by  the  Appellant  State  which  

asserts that it came to know about them only in 1991, when some of the original  

landowners successfully challenged the acquisition proceedings on the ground  

of non-utilization of the subject land in CWP No. 14735 of 1991.  The High  

Court quashed the acquisition proceedings in its entirety vide Judgment dated  

5.3.1992  and  directed  that  the  land  be  returned  to  the  original  landowners.

Page 4

4

These Orders were overturned by this Court on 29.10.2002 in  Northern India  

Glass  Industries  v.  Jaswant  Singh (2003)  1  SCC  335  inter  alia with  the  

observations that in the event “the land was not used for the purpose for which  

it was acquired, it was open to the Appellant State to take action but that did not  

confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land.  As already  

noticed, the Appellant State in this regard has already initiated proceedings for  

resumption of  the land.  In  our  view,  there  arises  no  question  of  any unjust  

enrichment to the Appellant Company.”

5     The Appellant State thereupon initiated resumption proceedings, pursuant  

to which a Committee was constituted by it  on 27.5.2004, which visited the  

subject land and submitted its Report dated 16.6.2004. This Report has provided  

the primary plank for the Notice of Resumption dated 6.1.2005 issued by the  

Appellant State to the Respondent, which was challenged by the Respondent  

before the High Court in the CWP No. 3750 of 2005.   This Notice has been  

annulled by the High Court vide the impugned Judgment on the ground of non  

adherence to the  audi alteram partem principle, since the Respondent and the  

subsequent purchasers had not been given an opportunity of hearing.  This is the  

solitary issue which arises before us.   In the Writ Petition of the Respondent,  

the Appellant State essayed to justify the impugned Notice of Resumption on  

the basis of the terms and conditions set out in the Deed of Conveyance. The

Page 5

5

relevant clauses of the Deed, whence the rights and the duties of the parties  

flow, inter alia state:

“2. The Company hereby covenants with the Government that it  shall:

(i)   Use  the  said  land  exclusively  for  all  or  any  of  the  purposes  of a factory for the manufacture of sheet glass  and such other products as the Government may approve  and for no other purpose.

XXXXXX

(iv) Not to transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage  or  otherwise  the  said  land  or  the  buildings  constructed  thereon or  any right,  title  or  interest  therein without prior  written  permission  of  the  Government.  However,  the  Government hereby agrees that the company shall have the  liberty  to  mortgage  the  said  land  together  with  building  erected/to  be  erected  thereon  in  favour  of  the  Industrial  Finance  Corporation  of  India  (IFCI);  Industrial  Development Bank of India (IDBI); and the Industrial Credit  and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI).

XXXXXX

4(i)   In  the  event  of  the  company  being  up  whether  compulsorily  or  voluntarily  (save  for  the  purposes  of  amalgamation or reconstruction) and the company, through  its liquidator, failing to obtain the Government’s permission  to  transfer  the  said  land  with  the  buildings  constructed  thereon in terms of the clause 2(iv) hereof or if the company  shall fail to observe and perform any of the covenants on its  part contained in this deed, then and in either such case the  Government may resume the said land by serving a notice  on the company by sending it to the registered office of the  company  by  registered  post  (acknowledgment  due).  The  notice shall indicate the reasons for resumption of the said

Page 6

6

land and shall require the company to remove and dispose of  for  its  own  benefit  all  buildings  and  other  structures  constructed  on the said  land and all  machinery and other  fittings fixed therein or lying thereon within a period of not  more than 15 months from the date of service of the notice  on the company.

(ii)  That from the date of service of the notice referred to in  sub-clause (i) the said land shall subject to the provisions of  sub-clause (iv) hereinafter appearing stand resumed and vest  in the Government.

6     Even a cursory glance at clause 2(iv) of the Deed would manifest that the  

Respondent was specifically precluded from selling, gifting or transferring the  

subject land without prior “written permission” of the Appellant State. When  

clause 2(iv) and clause 4(i) of the Deed are read in conjunction, it is at once  

apparent  that  the Appellant  State was empowered to resume the land in the  

event of their violation by the Respondent. Such resumption, the Appellant State  

vehemently argues, could be done merely by serving on the Respondent a notice  

containing the reasons therefor.   The Appellant State further contends that the  

Deed bestows no right on the Respondent to be heard before resumption and  

hence no corresponding duty is cast on the Appellant State to comply with the  

principles of  natural  justice;  that  the rights  and the duties  of  the parties  are  

strictly circumscribed by the contractual rights contained in the Deed, which  

alone should be the determining factor to resolve disputes arising between the  

parties.   The argument of the Appellant  State did find favour with the High  

Court which held that the power of the Appellant State to convey the land to the

Page 7

7

Respondent is subject to extant Rules.  It opined that the Appellant State has  

exercised its power to convey the land by virtue of Chapter VII of the Act, but  

Clause  2(iv)  is  also  borrowed from Section  44A of  the  Act.  Section  41,  as  

provided in the Chapter VII of the Act read with the preceding provisions, lays  

down several general conditions, such as, cost of acquisition, terms on which  

the land transferred should be held by a company, time period for fulfilment of  

conditions etc.   Section 44A thereafter  forbids the concerned company from  

disposing of the land transferred to it by any mode of conveyance, except with  

the  previous  written  sanction  of  the  concerned  Government.  The  clause  for  

resumption  mentioned  in  the  Deed  has  not  been  prescribed  in  the  Act,  but  

nevertheless empowers the State to resume the land in certain situations.   Sub-

Rule 2 of Rule 5 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 provides that  

in case a company breaches any of the terms of the Agreement, the appropriate  

Government shall not make an order declaring the transfer of the acquired land  

as null and void, unless the company has been given an opportunity of being  

heard in the matter.  

7     We agree with the High Court that the Deed of Conveyance is founded on  

the Act and, therefore, contractual rights would not be the only determinative  

elements in the dispute.   We also endorse the High Court’s opinion that  the  

principles of natural justice are an “inalienable part of the rule of law”; abidance

Page 8

8

with  these  principles  is  necessary  even  de  hors specific  stipulation  in  this  

regard.   We reiterate, however, that the Deed of Conveyance does not permit  

the Respondent to sell the land without prior written permission of the Appellant  

State. The Respondent, while admitting that it never sought permission of the  

Appellant State, endeavours to defend its conduct by asserting that since the  

Appellant State was a party to the execution proceedings, it impliedly consented  

to the sales.  

8      We have  perused  the  Orders  of  the  Executing Court  adduced  by  the  

Respondent where the Appellant State through its Land Acquisition Officer has  

been  shown  as  a  party  in  the  application  filed  on  1.8.1986  by  the  original  

landowners under Order XXI Rule 11 of the CPC.   As a matter of fact, the  

Appellant State has also been mentioned as one of the Judgement Debtors along  

with the Respondent in the Orders passed by the Executing Court from time to  

time.  It must be immediately underscored that neither has it been pleaded that  

the Appellant State was notified of the Execution proceedings nor has any effort  

been made to show that the Appellant State was represented and heard by the  

Executing Court.  Mere inclusion of a party in a proceeding falls far too short of  

proving that its views or stance had been laid and duly considered.   We have no  

hesitation in holding that there was no permission either in law or as per the  

Deed which authorised the Respondent to sell the land.  We think that had the

Page 9

9

Executing  Court  been  properly  apprised  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  

Conveyance Deed and the true factual circumstances of the case, its conclusions  

would have been diametrically different. The Respondent cannot take advantage  

of its own transgressions and legal duplicity and shenanigans.   

9     The plea of the Respondent is that it was saddled with higher compensation  

awarded  by  the  District  Court  and  thereafter  by  the  High  Court,  and  that  

requisite resources were not available with it to satisfy the decreed amount and  

that  consequently  it  filed  in  Court,  instead  with  the  Appellant  State,  the  

application for permission for private sale.  It must immediately be highlighted  

that the said higher compensation was computed at a mere 8.8 lacs which stands  

in stark contrast to the quantum of 4 crore which was planned to be invested by  

the Respondent in the manufacture of sheet glass.    

10 Significantly, the Respondent was neither asked nor did it proffer details  

of  its  other  properties  against  which  the  decree  in  favour  of  the  original  

landowners could have been satisfied and satiated.  The Respondent also hid  

from  the  Executing  Court  the  fact  that  the  burden  to  pay  any  enhanced  

compensation  lay,  in  the  first  place,  on  the  Appellant  State  and  not  the  

Respondent.  Class 2(v) is relevant on this point, and reads as:

2(v) pay to the Government any additional amount which may have  to be paid by the Government in addition to the sum of Rupees three  lacs ninety three thousand five hundred eighty eight and twelve paise

Page 10

10

only  on  account  of  assessment  or  enhancement  of  compensation  payable in respect of the acquisition of the said land and all costs,  charges  and  other  expenses  whatsoever  relating  thereto  resulting  from  any  reference,  appeal  or  writ  petition,  etc  to  any  court  or  authority. (emphasis is ours)

11     The Respondent has also argued that it had intimated the Appellant State  

about the enhanced compensation, but it failed to elicit any response.  Even if  

the  Appellant  State  failed  to  act  upon  its  intimation,  it  would  have  been  

appropriate for the Respondent to bring the relevant clause to the notice of the  

Executing Court or invoke arbitration in terms of  Clause 4(viii) of the Deed.  It  

could not arrogate to itself the power to take unilateral action inconsonant with  

the contractual clauses.

12     Clause 2(iv) of the Deed of Conveyance, in pellucid terms, enables the  

Respondent to mortgage the subject land along with any structure thereon in  

favour  of  the  Industrial  Finance  Corporation  of  India  (IFCI),  the  Industrial  

Development  Bank of  India  (IDBI),  or  the Industrial  Credit  and Investment  

Corporation of India (ICICI) in order to obtain loans. Whilst conveyance of the  

property  was  forbidden,  its  mortgage  to  the  named  entities  was  permitted.  

There was neither disposition of power nor any justification for the Respondent  

to have sold the acquired land or even a portion of it.  As reflected in the Deed  

of Conveyance, the Respondent was required to construct the factory within two  

years from the date of delivery of possession of the acquired land or within one

Page 11

11

year from the date of execution of the Deed, whichever period expired later. The  

Deed of Conveyance was executed on 16.10.1974 whereas the possession was  

given on 20.06.1974, and it is an admitted fact that no factory building has been  

constructed  till  date.   The  Appellant  State  cancelled  the  allotment  of  the  

acquired land to  the Respondent.   However the petition for  quashing of  the  

acquisition proceedings was allowed on 5.03.1992, which was ultimately set  

aside by this Court on 29.10.2002.   During the period 5.03.1992 to 29.10.2002,  

the land was returned to the original landowners, so the Respondent could have  

done nothing.  Thereafter, resumption took place on 6.1.2005.  

13     The Respondent pleads all the said factors, but without basis halted its  

efforts to construct the factory building and establish the sheet glass industry.  

What  is  evident  from  the  abovementioned  facts  is  that,  at  least  before  

05.03.1992, the only excusable factor  could be of  flood,  which also did not  

recur  regularly  since  the  date  of  possession,  i.e.  20.10.1974  for  nearly  two  

decades. Enhanced compensation and economical constraint had already been  

discoursed  above  and  even  if  the  factor  of  flood  is  kept  in  sight,  cannot  

discharge the Respondent of the duty to establish the industry.  Significantly, the  

Respondent had not sought extension of time from the Appellant State as per the  

Rules of 1963.   The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the  

Respondent  failed  altogether  to  perform  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the

Page 12

12

Conveyance, which throws serious doubts on its intention to establish a sheet  

glass factory and commence production on the acquired land.  

14     The  Committee  constituted  by the  Appellant  State  had submitted  its  

Report  dated  16.6.2004 which categorically  stated  that  no  plant,  machinery,  

electric connection etc, which may have some semblance of industrial activity,  

was found on the site; instead, only an Office engaged in dealership of plots has  

been set up.   Indeed, the Committee had reported that the acquired land had  

been divided into different plots, foretelling a forthcoming unauthorised colony.  

The Report of the Committee remains uncontroverted; rather, the endeavour of  

the Respondent  is  focused on explaining the  predicament  it  was supposedly  

trapped in. Recapitulating the facts noted above, it is clearly evident that the  

Respondent  failed  to  establish  and  commence  production  in  the  sheet-glass  

factory within the time frame provided in the Deed of Conveyance; that it used  

the subject acquired land for purposes other than those allowed by the Deed;  

that  it  sold the acquired land,  without written permission or  any permission  

worth  mentioning,  to  third  parties.   Despite  all  these  happenings,  the  

Respondent failed to make even a single representation before the Appellant  

State.

15     The question to be answered is whether the Respondent should have been  

given an opportunity of being heard by the Appellant State before the Appellant

Page 13

13

State  could  resume  the  subject  land  acquired  on  its  behalf  for  a  specified  

purpose.   In State of Gujarat v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust, (1994) 3 SCC 552  

it  was contended by the respondent Trust that taking away the power of the  

Trust  to  nominate  certain  number  of  students  in  the  concerned Government  

Medical College by the Appellant State was bad in law inasmuch as the State  

Government had passed the impugned resolution without notice to the Trust.  

This Court while allowing the appeal of the State has observed thus:

“22. We are unable to see any substance in the argument that the  termination  of  arrangement  without  observing  the  principle  of  natural justice (audi alteram partem) is void. The termination is  not a quasi-judicial act by any stretch of imagination; hence it was  not necessary to observe the principles of natural justice. It is not  also an executive or administrative act to attract  the duty to act  fairly. It was — as has been repeatedly urged by Shri Ramaswamy  — a matter governed by a contract/agreement between the parties.  If  the  matter  is  governed by a  contract,  the writ  petition is  not  maintainable since it is a public law remedy and is not available in  private  law field,  e.g.,  where  the  matter  is  governed by a  non- statutory contract”.  

16     In State of Chhattisgarh v. Dhiroj Kumar Sengar, (2009) 13 SCC 600  a  

compassionate appointment was cancelled because the incumbent had procured  

it on the prediction of the services of his deceased uncle, but without proving  

that he had been validly adopted by him.  The High Court allowed his writ  

petition challenging the cancellation of appointment on the ground that he had  

adduced an Adoption Deed as well as a Succession Certificate. This Court found

Page 14

14

the said documents to be deficient of proving the claim of adoption since the  

Deed of Adoption was unregistered and the Succession Certificate included the  

name of the incumbent as well as his real father.  This Court noted that the  

appointment  had  been  obtained  by  suppression  of  the  facts  including  the  

rejection of the first application and therefore, principles of natural justice were  

not required mandatorily to be complied with.  

17      Nirma Industries v. SEBI (2013) 8 SCC 20, involved interpretation of  

Regulation  27  of  the  Takeover  Code.  The  appellant  company  therein  after  

making a public announcement for proposed open offer up to 20 per cent of the  

shares of  the existing shareholders  of  Shree Ram Multi  Tech Ltd (SRMTL)  

under Regulation 10 of the Takeover Code, sought to withdraw that offer in the  

light of certain Reports in the public domain post  the open-offer,  unearthing  

fraudulent transactions and siphoning off of funds by the promoters of SRMTL.  

SEBI declined the request for withdrawal inter alia, holding that the appellant  

company should have conducted due diligence before making an open public  

offer.  The failure by SEBI to grant any opportunity of being orally heard was  

held by both the Securities Appellate Tribunal and this Court not to vitiate the  

order of SEBI inter alia, because  SEBI had all the necessary information and  

materials  before  it  to  make  a  fair  decision,  all  of  which  had  been  duly  

considered.

Page 15

15

18 In the Chairman Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of  

Mines  v.  Ramjee,  (1977)  2  SCC 256,  Krishna  Iyer  J,  one  of  the  foremost  

apostles  of  human  rights  and  natural  justice,  advocated  that  the  Court  “....  

cannot look at law in the abstract or natural justice as a mere artefact.  Nor can  

we  fit  into  a  rigid  mould  the  concept  of  reasonable  opportunity.....  If  the  

authority which takes the final decision acts mechanically and without applying  

its own mind, the order may be bad, but if the decision-making body, after fair  

and  independent  consideration,  reaches  a  conclusion  which  tallies  with  the  

recommendations  of  the  subordinate  authority  which  held  the  preliminary  

enquiry, there is no error in law. ...” It  would  also  be  useful  to  recollect  the  

observations of this Court in Union of India v. Jesus Sales Corporation, (1996) 4  

SCC 69 wherein it has been enunciated that the dictat of natural justice, viz.  

affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case would be  

met if the person concerned had the opportunity to present his case and that all  

points were taken into consideration.  More recently, in Patel Engineering Ltd.  

v. Union of India (2012) 11 SCC 257, this Court has opined “that there is no  

inviolable rule that a personal hearing of the affected party must precede every  

decision of the State”.

19     In the instant case, the conduct of the Respondent has not only been  

utterly unfair but, in fact, it smacks of fraud, malpractice and malfeasance.  It

Page 16

16

cannot be justified as a simple error which may exonerate it of the allegations  

levelled against it by the Appellant State.  According to its own affidavit filed  

before the High Court, the Respondent has executed 118 Sale Deeds in favour  

of various third parties, with several sales being in 2004-05. This is sought to be  

vindicated by the Respondent on the ground that since the land was returned to  

it in 2004 after the quashing of the acquisition was set aside by this Court, it  

could have executed final Sale Deeds in respect of Agreements to Sell of 1991  

post repossession of the land. Whether it had entered into Agreements to Sell  

with third parties  in 1991 or accepted Earnest  Money thereagainst  is  not  an  

enquiry to be made here.  It is also the case of the Respondent that after the land  

remained in possession of the original landowners for twelve long years, it was  

beyond its control to establish the unit as was proposed and postulated at the  

time of acquisition and so in bona fide belief it sold the remaining land as well.  

The Respondent cannot predicate that after paying the cost of the land to the  

Appellant State and the enhanced compensation to the original landowners, it  

had become absolute owner of the land and consequently it could use the land in  

the manner it liked.  

20 Some brief words with regard to persons who have purchased plots from  

the Respondent.   If a diligent title-search had been conducted by them it would  

indubitably have disclosed that the sale transaction was contrary to the purpose

Page 17

17

of the acquisition, was not consonant with the clauses of the contract executed  

by the  Appellant State and the Respondent and was intrinsically inconsistent  

with the terms and the tenor of law.  Equities cannot emerge in favour of such  

purchasers who cannot but be presumed to have purposefully transgressed the  

law.  Suchlike persons are not justified or entitled to seek impleadment in these  

proceedings.  The impleadment applications are meritless and are dismissed.

21 The prayer in the writ petition was for the issuance of a writ of Certiorari  

quashing the Resumption Notice dated 6.1.2005 issued by the Appellant State.  

In the impugned Judgment the Division Bench has opined that the principles of  

natural  justice  applied irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  cause  or  the gravity  

thereof and are not mere platitudes.   In our analysis of the exposition of law  

contained hereinabove, we think that this unjustly sets far too broad and wide a  

parameter to the perceptions of natural justice.  Quite to the contrary, Courts  

should  be  “pragmatic  rather  than  pedantic,  realistic  rather  than  doctrinaire,  

functional  rather  than  formal  and  practical  rather  than  precedential”.    We  

cannot lose perspective of the fact that protracted litigation had already taken  

place between the parties as a consequence of which the legal position of all  

affected parties had already become well-known. It seems to us that in the writ  

petition, the challenge was predicated on the perceived failure to adhere to the  

audi alterem partem rule and not to the correctness of the decision to resume

Page 18

18

possession of the land.  In any event, we harbour no manner of doubt that the  

circumstances of the case warrant the issuance of the Resumption Notice of the  

land by the  Appellant State.  We also note that the ‘Resumption Notice’ has  

been issued to the Respondent alone which, because of its actions, has forfeited  

whatsoever rights it may have enjoyed over the land in question.  In fact the  

Respondent may be liable to make over to the Appellant State all the profit that  

it has illegally and unjustifiably reaped in its misutilization of the lands acquired  

for it for the purpose of setting up an industrial unit for manufacture of sheet  

glass with the accompanying projection of providing employment to almost a  

thousand workmen.  How this Resumption Notice will be implemented against  

third parties is a matter on which we would think it prudent not to make any  

observations.  The Appellant State may not treat the observations made by us  

above pertaining to third parties who have purchased land from the Respondent  

as  conclusively  circumscribing  any  relief  to  them  and/or  rendering  it  

unnecessary to give any hearing to them.  The Appellant State will avowedly  

have to proceed in accordance with law, especially since it has not maintained a  

watchful  eye  on  the  manner  in  which  the  land  was  dealt  with  by  the  

Respondent.   

22 The Appeal  is accordingly allowed and the Impugned Judgment is set  

aside.   We  are  mindful  of  the  legally  reprehensible  manner  in  which  the

Page 19

19

Respondent has abused the acquisition of land in their favour.  The Respondent  

is therefore liable to pay costs of legal proceedings which are quantified by us at  

2 lakhs.  Costs to be paid within two months.

…………………………………J. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

…………………………………J. [PRAFULLA  C.  PANT]

New Delhi, October  07,  2015.