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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.354 OF 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7553 of 2008)

State of Haryana … Appellant

Versus

Eros City Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others …Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.355 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27588 of 2008)

J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.

Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.

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2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order  

dated 21.01.2008, passed by the High Court of  Punjab and  

Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No. 10611 of 2004 whereby said  

Court  has  quashed  the  notifications  dated  08.10.2003  and  

07.05.2004 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of Land Acquisition  

Act,  1894,  respectively,  by  the  State  of  Haryana  regarding  

acquisition of land measuring 129 kanals 14 marlas in village  

Lakarpur,  District  Faridabad.   The  High  Court  has  further  

quashed the Award dated 05.05.2006, passed by respondent  

No. 4 in respect of land owned by respondent No. 1 Eros City  

Developers Pvt. Ltd., which was acquired through the above  

mentioned notifications.  

3. Succinctly  stated  total  area  of  172  kanals  19  marlas  

situated  in  village  Lakharpur  Tehsil  Ballabgarh  in  District  

Faridabad  was  proposed  to  be  acquired  by  the  State  of  

Haryana through notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under  

Section  4  of  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  out  of  which  129  

kanals  14  marlas  (for  short  subject  land)  belonged  to

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respondent  no.1  M/s.  Eros  City  Developers  Pvt.  Ltd.   The  

details of the persons whose land is acquired is as under:

S.  No.

Name of owner Total Area Status

1. Shri Sekher  S/o Shri Roshan  Lal

6 kanal 2 ½ marla  

Compensation  paid.  Possession taken over.

2. Shri  Sissar  S/o  Shri Roshan Lal

6 kanal 2 ½ marla

Compensation  paid.  Possession taken over.

3. M/s.  Eros  City  Developers  Pvt.  Ltd.(Respondent  No.1 herein)

129 kanal 14 marla

Compensation  deposited  before  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector.  Acquisition  quashed  vide  impugned judgment.

4. Shri  Vikram  Bakshi S/o Shri  DN Bakshi

25 kanal 2 marla

C.W.P.  No.  1510  of  2005  pending  before  the  High  Court.   Status  quo  with  regard to the possession of  the  land  ordered  during  the  pendency  of  the  writ  petition  vide  order  dated  22.5.2006.  Compensation  deposited before the Land  Acquisition Collector.

5. M/s.  Faridabad  Compex

2 kanal 18 marla

Compensation  paid.  Possession taken over.

The subject  land was  stated to  have  been acquired for  the  

purpose  of  expansion  and  systematic  development  of

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Surajkund  Tourist  Complex  which  included  development  of  

parking area adjacent to the Surajkund Tourist Complex near  

annual Surajkund Fair.

4. Admittedly,  earlier  in  1992  an  attempt  was  made  to  

acquire the same land but the acquisition proceedings were  

dropped after this court passed order dated 10.05.1996 in WP  

(C) No. 4677 of 1985 i.e.,  M.C. Mehta’s case restraining the  

constructions  in  the  area.   Meanwhile  in  1993  contesting  

respondent  appears  to  have  purchased  the  land  indicated  

above.  It is in 1998, the order dated 10.05.1996 said to have  

been modified, and Municipal Corporation Faridabad and the  

State Government were directed to consider the plan of hotel  

project submitted by the respondent No.1.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that  

annual  Surajkund  Mela,  is  held  every  year  in  February  in  

Faridabad  District,  and  has  become  a  regular  feature  of  

international  fame.   As  such,  there  was  need  to  develop  

Surajkund  Tourist  Complex  by  acquiring  land  adjoining  to

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Surajkund Mela ground in Faridabad.  It is also pointed out  

that significance of Surajkund fair was noticed by this Court  

in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985 (M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India  

and ors.) wherein effective directions were issued in the year  

1996 to protect and maintain the sanctity of the area.  The  

acquisition of subject-land is thus not only in public interest  

but  also  to  maintain  the  integral  development  of  the  

Surajkund Complex in a unified and planned manner.  It is  

contended  that  while  quashing  the  notifications  mentioned  

above, the High Court has erred in not considering the public  

interest  and  public  purpose  over  private  interest  of  the  

respondent/writ petitioner, a private colonizer.  The impugned  

order  passed  by  the  High  Court  has  been  assailed  by  the  

appellant,  also  on  the  ground  that  the  equity  doctrines  of  

promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation were wrongly  

applied by the High Court in favour of respondent No. 1.  It is  

stated that before issuance of notification under Section 6 of  

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) objections  

filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 under Section 5A of the Act

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were duly considered by the authority concerned, and there  

was no illegality in the acquisition.

6. On the other hand, on behalf of respondent No. 1, Shri  

Shyam Divan Senior Counsel contended that Government of  

Haryana which earlier attempted to acquire the same land in  

the year 1992, itself dropped the acquisition proceedings as  

such it cannot be said that the land in question is genuinely  

required for any public purpose.  The contesting respondent  

has pleaded that the land in question was purchased by it in  

the year 1993 with the object to construct a hotel complex of  

international  standard.  In  the  counter  affidavit,  it  is  stated  

that the answering respondent got the permission for change  

of  land  use  and  submitted  the  plan  for  sanction  from the  

Municipal  Corporation.   It  also  obtained  permission  from  

Public Works Department for construction of approach road to  

the  land.   Even  the  Director,  Tourism,  Government  of  

Haryana,  had  accorded  approval  for  the  hotel  project  of  

respondent No.  1.   However,  the answering respondent was  

prevented from raising construction due to the restraint order

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dated 10.5.1996, passed by this Court in  M.C. Mehta’s  case  

(in W.P. (C) No. 4677 of 1985).  Said order was modified on  

13.05.1998.   On  application  filed  by  the  answering  

respondent, vide order dated 12.10.1998, this Court directed  

the Municipal Corporation, Faridabad, and State Government  

to accept option plan A with regard to hotel project (ground  

plus four floors), submitted by it.  It is submitted that there  

was malice on the part of the State Government in acquiring  

the land in question through the notification dated 08.10.2003  

issued under Section 4 of the Act.  It is also pleaded that there  

were overwhelming circumstances in favour of the answering  

respondent to invoke doctrine of promissory estoppel, and that  

of legitimate expectation.  In this connection, it is pointed out  

that  permission of  change of  land use  was  also  granted in  

favour of the answering respondent.  Lastly,  it  is submitted  

that  the  High  Court  has  rightly  quashed  the  notifications  

issued by  the  State  Government  for  acquisition  of  the  land  

owned by the answering respondent.  

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7.  In reply to this, on behalf of the State of Haryana, it is  

submitted that since the construction did not start within six  

months  as  required  under  the  terms  of  order  by  which  

permission for change of land use was granted as such merely  

for the reason that permission to change of land use granted,  

the acquisition cannot be questioned.  It is further submitted  

that the acquisition proceedings have been upheld by the High  

Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram  

Bakshi, who was owner of another piece of land acquired by  

same notification dated 08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of  

the  Act  read  with  consequential  notification  issued  under  

Section 6 of the Act.

8. We  have  also  gone  through  the  copy  of  order  dated  

07.07.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in  

Civil Writ Petition No. 1510 of 2005 filed by Vikram Bakshi,  

said writ petition was filed challenging the notification dated  

08.10.2003 issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act,  

1894, and the consequential notification issued under Section  

6  of  the  Act.   The land for  which acquisition  sought  to  be

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quashed  by  Vikram  Bakshi  relates  to  32  kanal  of  land  

comprising of rectangle no. 40 khasra Nos. 14, 17/1, 17/2,  

18/1,  23/1,  and   24/1  of  Village  Lakharpur  Tehsil  

Ballabhgarh District  Faridabad. In said petition also,  public  

purpose  i.e.  expansion  and  systematic  development  of  

Surajkund  Tourist  Complex  was  questioned,  and  issue  

relating to consideration of objections filed under Section 5-A  

was  raised.   The  High  Court  after  considering  the  rival  

submissions and going through the record opined that there  

was  no  illegality  in  the  acquisition  and  dismissed  the  Writ  

Petition No. 1510 of 2005 on 07.07.2010.

9. In  Sooraram  Pratap  Reddy  and  Others vs.  District  

Collector, Ranga Reddy District and others  (2008) 9 SCC  

552, this  Court has held that  the project for  which land is  

acquired  should  be  taken  as  a  whole  and  must  be  judged  

whether it is in the larger public interest.  It cannot be split  

into different components and to consider whether each and  

every component will serve public good.  A holistic approach  

has  to  be  adopted  in  such  matters.   This  Court  further

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observed  in  said  case  that  development  of  infrastructure  is  

legal  and  legitimate  public  purpose  for  exercising  power  of  

eminent domain.  In deciding whether acquisition is for “public  

purpose”  or  not,  prima  facie,  the  Government  is  the  best  

judge.  Although the decision of the Government is not beyond  

judicial  scrutiny,  normally,  in  such  matters  a  writ  court  

should  not  interfere  by  substituting  its  judgment  for  the  

judgment  of  the  Government.   In  Sooraram Pratap  Reddy  

(supra), this Court has further explained that the meaning of  

expression  “public  purpose”  is  wider  than  that  of  “public  

necessity”.

10. Clause (f) of Rule 26-D of the Punjab Scheduled Roads  

and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated Development  

Rules,  1965 (for  short  “1965 Rules”)  requires  the  applicant  

seeking change of land use for construction to undertake to  

start construction on the land within a period of six months  

and complete the construction within a period of  two years  

from the date of order permitting the change of land use. It  

appears that no construction was done in terms of Clause (f) of

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Rule 26-D of 1965 Rules on the land in question, for which  

acquisition is quashed by the impugned order.   

11. In  State  of  Haryana and  Others vs.  Vinod  Oil  and  

General Mills and Another (2014) 15 SCC 410, this Court has  

held that permission for change of land use has no relevance  

while  considering  the  validity  of  acquisition.  It  is  further  

observed in said case that there is no bar to the subsequent  

acquisition of a land, after the land was released from earlier  

acquisition.     

12. In  A.P.  Pollution  Control  Board  II  vs. M.V.  Nayudu  

(Retd.) and Others (2001) 2 SCC 62, this Court has observed  

in para 69 as under:

“69.  The  learned  Appellate  Authority  erred  in  thinking that because of the approval of plan by the  Panchayat,  or  conversion  of  land  use  by  the  Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central  Government,  a  case  for  applying  principle  of  “promissory  estoppel”  applied  to  the  facts  of  this  case.  There  could  be  no  estoppel  against  the  statute…...”

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13. As  far  as  the  argument  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent  relating to the promissory estoppel and legitimate  

expectation  is  concerned,  in  Monnet  Ispat  and  Energy  

Limited vs. Union of India and Others (2012) 11 SCC 1, this  

Court while enumerating the principles relating to doctrine of  

promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation has clearly held  

that the protection of legitimate expectation does not require  

the fulfillment of  the expectation where an overriding public  

interest requires otherwise.  In other words, personal benefit  

must give way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate  

expectation  cannot  be  invoked  which  would  block  public  

interest for private benefit.

14.  In  Hira Tikkoo  vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh and  

Others (2004) 6 SCC 765, this Court explaining the scope of  

principle of  legitimate expectation has held that the doctrine  

cannot  be  pressed  into  service  where  the  public  interest  is  

likely to suffer as against the personal interest of a party. In  

paragraph 22 this Court has observed as under:

“22. In public law in certain situations, relief to the  parties  aggrieved  by  action  or  promises  of  public  authorities  can  be  granted  on  the  doctrine  of

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“legitimate  expectation”  but  when  grant  of  such  relief  is  likely  to  harm larger  public  interest,  the  doctrine  cannot  be  allowed  to  be  pressed  into  service. We may usefully call in aid the legal maxim:  “Salus Populi est suprema lex:  regard for the public   welfare is the higher law.” This principle is based on  the implied agreement of  every member of  society  that  his  own  individual  welfare  shall  in  cases  of  necessity yield to that of community. His property,  liberty and life shall under certain circumstances be  placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public  good.”

15.   In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court as  

above, in our opinion the High Court has erred in quashing the  

acquisition  of  land  in  question,  by  applying  doctrine  of  

promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, in the facts of  

the present case.  We have no hesitation in holding that  the  

purpose  i.e.  for  expansion  and  systematic  development  of  

Surajkund Tourist Complex, is a public purpose. It included  

development  of  parking  area  adjacent  to  Surajkund  Tourist  

Complex near annual Surajkund Fair. We are of the view that  

the High Court is incorrect in holding that the State has not  

acted  bonafide,  after  1992  acquisition  proceedings  were  

dropped. It is apparent from the record that earlier proceedings  

were  dropped in  the  light  of  orders  passed in M.C.  Mehta’s

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Case in the year 1996, restraining construction in the area,  

and after modification in the said order in the year 1998, the  

State took fresh decision to acquire the land for public purpose  

and there is no illegality in the same.  

16. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and impugned  

judgment  and  order  dated  21.01.2008  passed  by  the  High  

Court in CWP No.10611 of 2004, is set aside. No order as to  

costs.

………………………….J (Ranjan Gogoi)

………………………..J (Prafulla C. Pant)

New Delhi Dated: January 19, 2016