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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL     APPEAL     NO.612     OF     2002   

State of Gujarat & another    …Appellants

VERSUS

Manoharsinhji Pradyumansinhji Jadeja    …Respondent

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. The State of Gujarat and the Mamlatdar & Agriculture are  

the appellants. The appellants are aggrieved by the  

judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat  

at Ahmedabad dated 11.10.2000 and the final order of the  

Division Bench dated 20.10.2000 passed in Letters Patent  

Appeal No.597/2000 in Special Civil Application No.4015 of  

1990. By the said impugned judgment and the final order,  

the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants came  

to be dismissed confirming the judgment of the learned  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  1 of 105

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Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No.4015 of  

1990 dated 06.05.1999.

2. The second appellant herein initiated proceedings under  

the provisions of The Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling  

Act, 1960 (hereinafter called as ‘the Act of 1960’) and after  

hearing the interested party, passed an order dated  

24.08.1982 in Ceiling Case No.2 of 1976 holding that the  

land to an extent of 587 acres 35 Gunthas was in excess of  

ceiling limit and the respondent was entitled to retain only  

balance land i.e. 51 acres.

3. The respondent preferred an appeal under Section 35 of  

the 1960 Act to the Deputy Collector, Rajkot. The Deputy  

Collector dismissed the appeal by an order dated  

10.11.1983. The respondent preferred a revision under  

Section 38 of the Act of 1960 which was registered as  

TEN.B.R.4/84 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The  

Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its judgment dated  

08.09.1989 partly allowed the revision and directed that  

Randarda lands admeasuring 40 acres to be included in  

the total holding, that Bhomeshwar Temple admeasuring  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  2 of 105

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12 acres 34 Gunthas to be excluded from the holding of the  

respondent and remanded the matter back to the second  

appellant for taking evidence regarding the age of the  

members of the family.

4. Aggrieved by the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal,  

the respondent preferred the writ petition in Special Civil  

Application No.4015 of 1990. Before the learned Single  

Judge, the respondent took the stand that his lands were  

covered by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,  

1976 (hereinafter called the ‘Act, 1976’) and was not  

governed by the Act of 1960. In fact, the said stand of the  

respondent was raised for the first time in the writ petition.  

The stand of the respondent was accepted by the learned  

Single Judge and by the judgment and order dated  

06.05.1999 passed in Special Civil Application No.4015 of  

1990, the judgment and order of the Gujarat Revenue  

Tribunal dated 08.09.1989 in Revision Application  

No.TEN.B.R.4/84 was set aside and the Rule was made  

absolute.

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  3 of 105

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5. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal  

No.597/2000 and by the order impugned in this civil  

appeal, the said LPA having been dismissed, the appellants  

have come forward with this appeal.

6. We heard Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for  

the appellants and Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior  

counsel for the respondent. Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned  

senior counsel for the appellants in the first instance traced  

the existence of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood which  

was enforced on 15.06.1961 and, thereafter, the initiative  

taken by the Gujarat State Legislative Assembly by passing  

a resolution on 14.08.1972 under Article 252 (1) of the  

Constitution of India authorizing the Parliament to legislate  

with respect to ‘imposition of ceiling on the holding of  

urban immovable property’. Learned senior counsel also  

referred to the amendment passed by the State Legislature  

to the definition of ‘land’  in the Act of 1960 by way of  

‘removal of doubts’ to the expression ‘Bid lands’ also to be  

included in the definition of ‘land’  on 23.02.1974 which  

amendment was notified on 01.04.1976 under the Gujarat  

Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972. Learned  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  4 of 105

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senior counsel also brought to our notice the coming into  

force of the Act, 1976 on and from 17.02.1976.

7. While elaborating his submissions on the various  

provisions contained in the different enactments, in the  

foremost, the learned senior counsel referred to the  

expressions ‘agriculture’  under Section 2(1) and ‘land’  

under Section 2(17) of the un-amended, Act of 1960.  

Learned counsel also referred to Section 6 which sought to  

fix the ceiling on holding of such agricultural land. In that  

context, learned senior counsel brought to our notice the  

Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing out the  

Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling (Amendment) Act, 1972  

(being Gujarat Act No.2 of 1974) (hereinafter called the  

Amendment Act, 1974) wherein, inter alia, it sought to  

remove doubts relating to ‘Bid lands’  of former Princes, as  

well as, Girasdars and Barkhalidars in the Saurashtra area  

which were duly covered under the definition of ‘land’ and  

submitted that it was only with a view to remove doubts  

that the Amendment Act was brought out and that it was  

not by virtue of the said amendment alone ‘Bid lands’  fell  

within the definition of ‘land’.

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  5 of 105

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8. In other words, according to learned senior counsel, even  

as per the definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) read  

along with the definition of “agriculture” under Section 2(1)  

of the un-amended Act of 1960, ‘Bid lands’  were duly  

covered within the said expression of ‘land’  and the  

Amendment Act, 1974 only sought to remove any doubt in  

the mind of anyone as regards the character of the ‘Bid  

lands’.

9. The learned senior counsel then referred to Section 2(q),  

namely, the definition of ‘vacant land’ and Section 2(o), the  

definition of ‘urban land’  under the provisions of the Act,  

1976 to contend that even going by the said definitions,  

such land within the urban agglomeration which fall within  

the definition of ‘agricultural land’  stood excluded for the  

purpose of application of the Act, 1976.

10. Learned senior counsel also brought to our notice the  

definition of ‘Bid land’ under Section 2(a) of the Saurashtra  

Estates Acquisition Act, 1952 (hereinafter called as the  

“Saurashtra Act No. III of 1952”) as well as the definition of  

the very same expression, namely, ‘Bid land’  under the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  6 of 105

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Saurashtra Land Reforms Act, 1951 (hereinafter called as  

the “Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951) as well as Saurashtra  

Barkhali Abolition Act (hereinafter called as the  

“Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951) and contended that even  

long prior to the Amendment Act 1974 ‘Bid land’ has been  

defined to mean a land used by Girasdars or Barkhalidars  

for grazing cattle or for cutting grass, for the use of cattle,  

meaning thereby that such lands were nonetheless  

‘agricultural lands’. In the light of the above statutory  

provisions relating to the ‘Bid land’  learned counsel  

submitted that de hors the Amendment Act 1974 which  

came to be notified on 01.04.1976 ‘Bid land’ fell within the  

definition of ‘land’ under the Act of 1960 and consequently  

there was no scope for the respondent to fall back upon the  

Act, 1976 in order to challenge the order passed by the  

second appellant which ultimately came to be confirmed by  

the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was set aside by the  

judgment of the Division Bench in the order impugned in  

this appeal.

11. The learned senior counsel further contended that this very  

issue was considered by this Court in a recent decision in  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  7 of 105

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Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar Vs. State of Gujarat reported in  

(2010) 10 SCC 594 which has taken the view that the  

definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) read along with  

Section 2(1) of the Act of 1960 ‘Bid land’ would fall within  

the definition of ‘agriculture’ and consequently governed by  

the definition Section 2(17) which define the expression  

‘land’  and, therefore, the ceiling limit prescribed under  

Section 6 of Act of 1960 would be applicable to the ‘Bid  

lands’  of the respondent.  The learned senior counsel also  

relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in London  

Jewellers Limited Vs. Attenborough – (1934) 2 K.B. 206;  

the House of Lords decision in Jacobs Vs. London County  

Council –  (1950) 1 All E.R. 737; and the Queens Bench  

decision in Behrens and another Vs. Bertram Mills  

Circus Ltd. – (1957) 1 All E.R. 583 for the proposition that  

wherein a decision more than one reason is assigned to  

support the ultimate conclusion, both the reasons will have  

binding effect and that one cannot be excluded under any  

pretext. The learned senior counsel also relied upon Smt.  

Somawanti and others Vs. State of Punjab and others -  

AIR 1963 SC 151 wherein it was held that the binding  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  8 of 105

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effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a  

particular argument was considered therein or not,  

provided that the point with reference to which an  

argument was subsequently advanced was actually  

decided. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended  

that in the recent judgment of this Court in Nagbhai  

Najbhai Khackar (supra) when the ultimate decision was  

reached based on two grounds, both the grounds, would be  

the ratio of the decision and, therefore, the said decision  

will be complete answer to the question involved in this  

appeal.

12. In the alternate learned senior counsel submitted that the  

argument of the respondent which weighed with the  

learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the  

High Court in the impugned judgment based on the Act,  

1976 vis-à-vis the Act of 1960 read along with Amendment  

Act 1974 was not sustainable. According to learned senior  

counsel, in the first place, there could not be any  

repugnancy as between the Act of 1960 and the Act, 1976,  

inasmuch as the amendment of the definition of ‘land’  in  

the Act of 1960 was amended as early as on 23.02.1974,  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  9 of 105

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namely, long prior to the coming into force of the Act, 1976.  

According to learned senior counsel the relevant date is the  

date when the Amendment Act came to be passed in the  

Assembly on 23.02.1974 and the subsequent notification  

dated 01.04.1976 bringing into effect the Amendment Act  

1974 was not the relevant date. In other words, according  

to him, when once the amending legislation was passed in  

the Assembly in the year 1974 the subsequent notification  

though was made in the year 1976 for bringing into force  

the amendments, the relevant date would be the date when  

the Act was passed and not the date when it was notified.  

The learned counsel then contended that in any case the  

resolution dated 14.08.1972 was passed under Article  

252(1) of the Constitution relating to the legislation with  

respect to ceiling on ‘urban immovable property’ and it had  

nothing to do with the ‘agricultural land’. The learned  

counsel, therefore, contended that the conclusion of the  

learned Single Judge, as well as, that of the Division Bench  

in having non-suited the appellants on the specific ground  

that by virtue of the provisions of the Act, 1976 the  

appellants’  action in proceeding against the respondent  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  10 of 105

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under the Act of 1960 was null and void was unsustainable  

in law. Learned senior counsel contended that once the  

Act, 1976 stood repealed, as a corollary, the Act of 1960  

with all the Amendments carried to it would automatically  

get revived and it will not become a dead letter as  

contended on behalf of the respondent. Learned senior  

counsel referred to the decision of this Court in M.P.V.  

Sundararamier & Co. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh &  

another - 1958 SCR 1422 in support of the said  

submission. Learned senior counsel also relied upon  

Thumati Venkaiah and others Vs. State of Andhra  

Pradesh and others -  (1980) 4 SCC 295 for the said  

proposition. The learned counsel, therefore, contended  

that, in the light of the recent decision of this Court in  

Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra), which squarely covers  

the case on hand, the order impugned is liable to be set  

aside.

13. As against the above submission, Mr. Naphade, learned  

senior counsel prefaced his submission by contending that  

the stand of the appellants that ‘Bid lands’ were agriculture  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  11 of 105

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lands under the Act was not correct. Learned senior  

counsel pointed out that the appellant initiated proceedings  

against the respondent both under the Act of 1960, as well  

as, the Act, 1976 and that in fact they were also keen to  

proceed under the Act, 1976.  While referring to the  

submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr.  

Naphade contended that the argument based on Article  

252 of the Constitution and its effect was almost given up  

by the appellant.  The learned senior counsel after referring  

to the unamended Act of 1960 and the definition of  

‘agriculture’, ‘agriculturist’ and ‘to cultivate personally’ and  

the definition of ‘agricultural land’  and ‘Bid Land’  of  

Girasdar under the Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951  

contended that the various definitions under the Act of  

1960 were more concerned with the ‘agriculturists’  and  

their close proximity to the land held by them, while under  

the Saurashtra Reforms Act the stress was more on the  

lands held by the grantees as tenure holders in some form  

or the other. In that context, learned senior counsel  

submitted that the definition between the ‘Bid land’ and the  

‘agriculture land’  was clearly known to the Legislature as  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  12 of 105

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could be seen from the definition so drawn in the  

provisions contained under the Act of 1960, as well as, the  

Saurashtra Land Reforms Act. According to learned senior  

counsel, the reference to the description of ‘Bid lands’  

under Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951 and the ‘Act XXVI of  

1951 disclose that the Legislature was conscious of the fact  

that the Act of 1960 did not include ‘Bid lands’  in the  

definition of ‘land’.

14. While referring to the amendment which was brought  

out to the definition of ‘land’  in the Act of 1960, in  

particular Sections 4, 5 and 10 of the Amendment Act by  

which amendment was brought into Sections 2(1) and 2(17)  

and introduction of Section 2(27A) in the principal Act the  

learned counsel contended that the intention of the  

Legislature to bring into effect certain consequences  

pursuant to the amendment after the specified date,  

namely, 01.04.1976 was clearly spelt out. According to  

learned counsel, it was not merely by way of removal of  

doubt that the Amendment Act of 1974 was brought in but  

a significant purport was intended in bringing out such  

amendments to take effect on and after 01.04.1976 which  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  13 of 105

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has been specifically mentioned in Section 2 (27A) which  

came to be introduced by Amendment Act of 1974.  

15. The learned senior counsel then contended that even  

assuming that the Amendment Act of 1974 would apply to  

the case on hand, since the respondent did not fall under  

the definition of ‘Ruler’  as stipulated in Section 2(17)(ii)(d)  

of the Amended Act, the Act of 1960 cannot be applied to  

the case of the respondent. Learned senior counsel by  

referring to Article 366 of the Constitution pointed out that  

under sub-clause 22 of Article 366 a ‘Ruler’  has been  

defined to mean the Prince, Chief or other person who at  

any time before the commencement of the Constitution  

(26th Amendment) Act, 1971 was recognized by the  

President as the ‘Ruler’  of an Indian State or any person  

who at any time before such commencement was  

recognized by the President as the successor of such ‘Ruler’  

and a person thus fulfill the above criteria alone would  

come within the definition of ‘Ruler’. The learned senior  

counsel contended that the respondent was never  

recognized in accordance with such constitutional  

provision and, therefore, the said Section 2(17)(ii)(d) of the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  14 of 105

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Amended Act can have no application to the case of the  

respondent. It was further contended that the respondent  

would neither fall under the category of Girasdar or  

Barkhalidar or in the category of ‘Ruler’  and, therefore,  

even if the Amended Act of 1974 is applied, the respondent  

stood excluded from the coverage of the Act.

16. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that the  

argument that ‘Bid lands’  were already governed by the  

definition of ‘agriculture’ (i.e.) long prior to the coming into  

force of the 1974 Act, namely, from 01.04.1976 cannot be  

accepted.  A fortiori, learned senior counsel contended that  

when the statute is clear in its ambit and scope and there  

being no ambiguity, there was no necessity to rely upon or  

refer to the Objects and Reasons to understand the purport  

of the enactment and relied upon the Constitution Bench  

decision of this Court reported in Pathumma & Others Vs.  

State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (1978) 2 SCC 1. The  

learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that whatever  

argument now raised based on the expression ‘Bid lands’  

on behalf of the appellant may hold good only after  

01.04.1976 and that the heavy reliance placed upon  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  15 of 105

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Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) cannot also come to the  

aid of the appellant since the various principles set out in  

the said decision were solely based on the Amendment Act,  

1974 as has been specifically spelt out in various  

paragraphs of the said decision.  The learned senior  

counsel pointed out that the said decision, does not, apply  

to the facts of this case, inasmuch as, there was no  

reference to the implication of the Act, 1976 which came  

into effect as early as on 17.02.1976 vis-à-vis the Act of  

1960 and the said Act being an Act of Parliament, the  

appellant was bound by the provisions contained therein  

which would negate the entire submission made on behalf  

of the appellant.

17. According to learned senior counsel when the application of  

Act, 1976 was not the subject matter of consideration while  

deciding the scope of the amendment Act of 1974 in the  

judgment reported in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra),  

reliance placed upon the said decision on behalf of the  

appellant is of no relevance.

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  16 of 105

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18. The next submission of Mr. Naphade was that the Act,  

1976 and the Act of 1960 were operating in their respective  

fields, though relatable to holding of lands. Learned  

counsel after making reference to Section 1(2), 2 (A), 2 (C),  

2(N) and the Schedule to the Act, 1976 pointed out that  

Rajkot where the disputed land situate, fell within the  

urban agglomeration area, that the land in question is  

admittedly a land referred to in the Master Plan as has  

been stipulated under Section 2(o) of the Act, 1976 and,  

therefore, there is a world of difference for considering the  

land classified as ‘agricultural land’  under both the  

enactments. According to learned senior counsel, having  

regard to the Explanations A, B & C of Section 2(q) of the  

Act, 1976 a conscious departure has been made with  

reference to the description of ‘agricultural land’ inasmuch  

as under the said Act it must be shown that the land was  

being ‘used’  for agricultural purposes in contradistinction  

to the Act of 1960 where a land simpliciter falling under the  

definition of ‘agriculture’ would alone be the relevant factor.  

Mr. Naphade in his submissions contended that having  

regard to the emergence of Act, 1976 on and from  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  17 of 105

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17.02.1976 and by virtue of the Constitutional mandate,  

the Act of 1960 ceased to have any effect on any  

‘agricultural land’  in the State of Gujarat. In other words,  

according to learned senior counsel, since admittedly the  

lands belonged to the respondent were lying within the  

urban agglomeration specified under the Schedule to the  

Act, 1976 the application of Act of 1960 ceased to have any  

effect on the said land and, therefore, the appellant had no  

authority to invoke the provisions of the Act of 1960 for the  

purpose of acquisition.   

19. Learned senior counsel contended that the 1974  

Amendment to the Act of 1960 was a ‘still born child’  

inasmuch as it came into effect only from 01.04.1976  

whereas the Act, 1976 was brought into force on  

17.02.1976 itself and was holding the field. The learned  

counsel stressed the point that the date of passing of the  

Act was not the relevant date and what was relevant was  

the date of implementation of the Act which legal principle  

was well settled as per the decision reported in In the  

matter of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act,  

1937  - AIR 1941 F.C. 72. Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  18 of 105

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20. While meeting the argument of Shri Soli Sorabjee, the  

contention of Mr. Naphade on Article 252 was that having  

regard to the invocation of the said Article by the State of  

Gujarat, there was a virtual surrender of its power to  

legislate and thereby it was denuded of bringing out any  

legislation afresh or by way of amendment on the subject  

governed by this legislation brought out pursuant to  

invocation of Article 252 of the Constitution.  In that  

context, learned senior counsel brought to our notice  

Section 103 of the 1935 Act which was the comparative  

provision to Article 252 of the Constitution and pointed out  

that under Section 103 of the 1935 Act while the States  

could approach the Federal Government for bringing out a  

legislation, having regard to the specific provisions  

contained in the said Section, the power to deal with such  

legislation for any future contingency was retained by the  

State Government, while on the contrary the framers of our  

Constitution even after a specific point raised in the  

Constituent Assembly proceedings for retention of such a  

power by the State Government, Article 252 (2) ultimately  

came to be framed making it clear that once the power of  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  19 of 105

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the legislative competence of the State was surrendered to  

the Parliament, thereafter any future legislation on the  

subject could only be dealt with by the Parliament and the  

state was completely denuded of such power. In support of  

the said submission, learned senior counsel relied upon  

M/s R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Private Ltd. (supra) and State of  

U.P. Vs. Nand Kumar Aggarwal and others - (1997) 11  

SCC 754.

21. Learned senior counsel after referring to the orders of  

the Mamlatdar dated 24.08.1982, the Deputy Collector  

dated 10.11.1983 and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated  

08.09.1989 as compared to the return filed by the  

respondent under Section 6 of the Act, 1976 dated  

13.08.1976, the order of the competent authority dated  

25.05.1983 and the order of the Tribunal under the Act,  

1976 dated 18.09.1991 contended that even according to  

the appellants themselves as stated in their reply affidavit  

no agricultural operation was carried out in survey  

No.111/2-30 and thereby virtually admitting the position  

that the lands in question can never be held to be  

‘agricultural lands’.  The learned counsel contended that  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  20 of 105

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the appellants were blowing hot and cold, that for the  

purpose of coverage under the Act, 1976 they wanted to  

contend that the lands were not agricultural land, while  

when it came to the question of coverage under the Act of  

1960, they contended that the very same lands as ‘Bid  

lands’  would fall within the definition of ‘agriculture’.  The  

learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the impugned  

judgment of the High Court was well justified and does not  

call for interference.   

22. Lastly, it was contended by the learned senior counsel for  

the respondent that the case of the appellant is also hit by  

the principle of res judicata. The learned senior counsel by  

referring to an order passed by the Deputy Collector,  

Bhavnagar relating to Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  in his order  

dated 09.11.1979 specifically held that the Act of 1960 was  

not applicable to the said lands and that only Act, 1976  

would apply. It was pointed out that when the issue went  

before the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application  

No.941 of 1980 a joint affidavit of two Deputy Collectors  

dated 06.10.1980 came to be filed with reference to  

Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’ wherein it was reiterated on behalf of  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  21 of 105

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the Government that only Act, 1976 would apply to ‘Bid  

land’ in urban agglomeration of Bhavnagar and that the Act  

of 1960 was not applicable. Learned senior counsel also  

referred to an affidavit dated 16.02.2000 filed by the  

Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of  

Gujarat in relation to Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’ before the High  

Court of Gujarat in Civil Application No.15529/1999 in  

S.C.A. No, 10108/1994 wherein a clear stand was taken by  

the State Government that possession of Bhavnagar ‘Bid  

land’  not having been acquired and taken under the Act,  

1976 when the Act was in force, after its repeal, there was  

no scope to take possession of those lands.  

23. The learned senior counsel also referred to the decision of  

this Court in Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. and another  

Vs. State of Gujarat and others - (2004) 12 SCC 645 and  

contended that in a contempt petition filed at the instance  

of a purchaser of Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  this Court after  

tracing the history of the earlier litigation wherein it was  

concluded that Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  were controlled by  

the provisions of the Act, 1976 and not by the Act of 1960  

and consequently the matter having been finally decided by  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  22 of 105

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the Courts and reached its finality the authorities cannot  

reopen the same. The learned senior counsel, therefore,  

contended that since the decision on the applicability of the  

Act of 1960 vis-à-vis the Act, 1976 in relation to ‘Bid lands’  

of the ‘Ruler’  of erstwhile Bhavnagar State having been  

examined and ultimately concluded that in respect of such  

lands only the Act, 1976 would apply, in the case on hand  

as the lands in question were lying within the ‘urban  

agglomeration’ area, the said conclusion which reached its  

finality in this Court would operate as res judicata.  The  

learned senior counsel contended that though this  

contention was raised before the High Court, the Division  

Bench after referring to the contention felt it unnecessary  

to decide the issue since the stand of the appellant was  

rejected on other grounds.

24. While meeting the last of the submission of learned senior  

counsel for the respondent, Mr. Soli J. Sorabji contended  

that the principle of res judicata can have no application to  

the case on hand since none of the earlier proceedings  

relating to Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  had anything to do with  

the lands of the respondent with reference to which alone  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  23 of 105

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we are concerned and, therefore, on that score itself the  

said contention should be rejected. According to learned  

senior counsel, the application of the principle of res  

judicata, as set out in Section 11 of CPC, was not fulfilled  

and, therefore, the said submission made on behalf of the  

respondent cannot be considered. The learned senior  

counsel pointed out to the specific facts which were  

referred to in the joint affidavits of two Deputy Collectors  

filed in S.C.A. No.941/1980 wherein it was specifically  

averred to the effect that since a long time to the knowledge  

of the land holder, the land in question were  demonstrated  

or meant for residential purpose in the master plan which  

was prepared since August 1976, that the land in question  

fell within the definition of ‘urban land’ under Section 2(o)  

of the Act, 1976 and, therefore, the overriding effect of  

Section 42 of the Act, 1976 excluded the application of the  

Act of 1960. The learned senior counsel contended that in  

the light of the above peculiar facts relating to Bhavnagar  

‘Bid lands’  which ceased to be a ‘Bid land’  and was  

classified as residential plot in the Master Plan at the  

relevant point of time, the stand of the authorities as  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  24 of 105

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regards the exclusive application of Act, 1976 continued to  

be maintained even after the said Act came to be repealed.  

The learned senior counsel contended that it will be  

preposterous if a decision reached in regard to a case  

which was governed by its own special facts to apply the  

principle of res judicata to a different case where the fact  

situations are entirely different and in which case in no  

prior proceedings it was admitted by the authorities  

concerned that Act, 1976 alone would apply to the  

exclusion of the Act of 1960.

25. Having heard the eloquent submissions of Shri Soli J.  

Sorabjee, learned senior counsel for the appellant and the  

enlightening submissions of Shri Naphade, learned senior  

counsel for the respondent, we find that while the simple  

case of the appellant, namely, the State of Gujarat is that  

the respondents’  lands being ‘Bid lands’  are agricultural  

lands and thereby governed by the provisions of Act of  

1960, the whole endeavour of the respondent was that the  

lands were never classified as “agricultural lands”, that  

they were indisputably “urban lands”  governed by the  

provisions of the Act, 1976 and consequently the  

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application of the Act of 1960 stood excluded.  The  

enlightening submissions of the respective counsel oblige  

us to set out various legal principles highlighted before us  

in order to appreciate the respective submissions and  

thereby arrive at a just conclusion.

26. In the forefront, we want to make a detailed reference to  

certain relevant provisions of the Act of 1960 prior to its  

amendment and after its amendment, Saurashtra Act No.III  

of 1952, Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951, Saurashtra Act  

No. XXVI of 1951, Section 103 of The Government of India  

Act, 1935 and Article 252 of the Constitution. The relevant  

provisions under the unamended Act of 1960 are Section  

2(1), Section 2(3), Section 2(11), Section 2 (12), Section  

2(17) and Section 6. Under the amended Act of 1960, the  

relevant provisions are Section 2(1) (a) (b), (c), Section 2(17)  

(i) (ii) (a), (b), (c), (d) and Section (27A). Under Saurashtra  

Act No.III of 1952, the relevant provisions are Section 2(a),  

(b), (e), (f), Section 4 and Section 5(1), (2). Under  

Saurashtra Act XXV of 1951, the relevant provision are  

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Sections 2(6), 2 (15) and 2(18). Under the Saurashtra Act  

No.XXVI of 1951, the relevant provision is Section 2 (ii).

27. For easy reference, the above provisions are extracted  

hereunder:

The     Gujarat     Agricultural     Lands     Ceiling     Act,     1960   

Section 2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the  context requires otherwise-

(1) “agriculture”  includes horticulture, the  raising of crops, grass or garden produce,  the use by an agriculturist of the land held  by him or part thereof for grazing but does  not include-

(i) the use of any land, whether or not  an appenage to rice or paddy land,  for the purpose of rab-mannure;

(ii) the cutting of wood, only;

(iii) dairy farming;

(iv) poultry farming;

(v) breeding of live-stock; and

(vi) such other pursuits as may be  prescribed.

Explanation – If any question arises as to  whether any land or part thereof is used  for any of the pursuits specified in any of  the sub-clauses (i) to (vi), such question  shall be decided by the Tribunal;

(3) “agriculturist”  means a person who  cultivates land personally”

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(11)  “to cultivate”  with its grammatical  variations and cognate expressions means to  till or husband the land for the purpose of  raising or improving agricultural produce,  whether by manual labour or by means of  cattle or machinery or to carry on any  agricultural operation thereon;

Explanation- A person who enters into a  contract only to cut grass or to gather the  fruits or other produce of trees, on any land,  shall not on that account only, be deemed to  cultivate such land;

(12) “to cultivate personally”  means to  cultivate land on one’s own account-

(i) by one’s own labour, or

(ii) by the labour of any member of  one’s family, or

(iii) under the personal supervision of  oneself or any member of one’s family by hired  labour or by servants on wages payable in  cash or kind but not in crop share;

Explanation- I.-A widow or a minor or a  person who is subject to any physical or  mental disability, or a serving member of the  armed forces shall be deemed to cultivate land  personally, if such land is cultivated by her or  his servants or hired labour;

Explanation II.- In the case of a joint family,  land shall be deemed to be cultivated  personally, if it is so cultivated by any member  of such family;

(17) “land”  means land which is used or  capable of being used for agricultural  

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purposes and includes the sites of farm  buildings appurtenant to such land;

Section 6. Ceiling on holding land –  (1)  Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for  the time being in force or in any agreement usage or  decree or order of a Court, with effect from the  appointed day no  person shall, subject to the  provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) be entitled to  hold whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner  and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling  area.

(2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a  member of a family, not being a joint family and  land is also separately held by such individual’s  spouse or minor children, then the land held by the  individual and the said members of the individual’s  family shall be grouped together for the purposes of  this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to  the total land so grouped together as if such land  had been held by one person.

(3) Where on the appointed day a person holds  exempted land along with other land then-

(i) if the area of exempted land is equal to or  more than the ceiling area he shall not be entitled  to hold other land; and

(ii) if the area of exempted land is less than the  ceiling area, he shall not be entitled to hold other  land in excess of the area by which the exempted  land is less than the ceiling area.

(4)   Land which under the foregoing provisions of  this section a person is not entitled to hold shall be  deemed to be surplus land held by such person.

The     Gujarat     Agricultural     Lands     Ceiling     Act     1960     (After     the    amendment)

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2. In this Act, unless the context requires otherwise-

(1) “agriculture” includes-

(a) horticulture,

(b) the raising of crops, grass or garden produce,

(c) the use by an agriculturist of the land held by  him or part thereof for grazing

17. “land” means-

(i) in relation to any period prior to the specified  date, land which is used or capable of being  used for agricultural purpose and includes the  sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such  land;

(ii) In relation to any other period, land which is  used or capable of being used for agricultural  purposes, and includes-

(a) the sites of farm buildings appurtenant  to such land;

(b) the lands on which grass grows  naturally;

(c) the bid lands held by the Girasdars or  Barkhalidars under the Saurashtra  Land Reforms Act, 1951, the Saurashtra  Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 or the  Saurashtra Estates Acquisition Act,  1952, as the case may be;

(d) such bid lands as are held by a person  who, before the commencement of the  Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment)  Act, 1971 was a Ruler of an Indian  State comprised in the Saurashtra area  of the State of Gujarat, as his private  property in pursuance of the covenant  entered into by the Ruler of such State:

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(27A) “specified date” means the date of coming  into force of the Amending Act of 1972.

Under Saurashtra Act No.III of 1952 the relevant  

provisions are Section 2(a), (b), (e), (f), Section 4 and Section  

5(1), (2):

“2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant  to the subject or context-

(a) “Bid land”  means such land as on the 17th  April, 1951 was specifically reserved and was  being used by a Girasdar or Barkhalidar for  grazing cattle or for cutting grass:

(b) “cultivable waste” means cultivable land which  has remained uncultivated for a period of  three years or more before the 17th April, 1951

(c) xxx xxx xxx  

(d) xxx xxx xxx

(e)  “land”  means land of any description  whatsoever and includes benefits arising out  of land and things attached to the earth, or  permanently fastened to anything attached to  the earth.

(f) words and expressions used but not defined,  in this Act, and defined in the Saurashtra  Land Reforms Act, 1951 and the Saurashtra  Barkhali Abolition Act, 1951 shall have the  meanings assigned to them in those Acts.

3. xxx xxx xxx

4. When a notification is issued by the  Government in respect of an estate or any part  

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thereof under section 3, then, with effect from the  date specified in the notification, the following  consequences shall, in respect of that estate or part  thereof, ensue, namely:-

(a) (i) all public roads, lanes, paths, bridges,  ditches, dikes and fences on, or beside the  same, the bed of the sea and/or harbours,  creeks below high water mark, and of rivers  streams, nalas, lakes, public wells and tanks,  all bunds and palas, standing and flowing  water and gauchars; (ii) all cultivable and uncultivable waste lands  (excluding land used for building or other non  agricultural purposes), (iii)  all bid lands, (iv)  all unbuilt village site lands and  

village site lands on which dwelling  houses of artisans and landless  labourers are situated, and

(v) all schools, Dharmashalas, village  choras, public temples and such other  public buildings or structures as may  be specified in the notification together  with the sites on which such buildings  and structures stand,

Which are comprised in the estates so notified shall,  except in so far as any rights of any person other  than the Girasdar or the Barkhalidar may be  established in and over the same, and except as  may otherwise be provided by any law, for the time  being in force, vest in, and shall be deemed to be,  with all rights in or over the same or appertaining  thereto, the property of the State of Gujarat and all  rights held by a Girasdar or a Barkahalidar in such  property shall be deemed to have been extinguished  and it shall be lawful for the Collector, subject to  the general or special orders of the Collector, to  dispose of them as he deems fit, subject always to  the rights of way and of other rights of the public or  of individuals legally subsisting.

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(b) A Girasdar or a Barkhalidar shall,  subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to  be an occupant in respect of all other land held by  him.

5. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in  section 3, or section 4 –  

(a) no bid land which is also uncultivable  waste, wadas and kodias shall vest in, and be  the property of the State of Gujarat (b) no bid land comprised in the estate of a  Girasdar who is considered to be of B and C  class for the purpose of making rehabilitation  grant under the Saurashtra Land Reforms Act  1951, or of a Barkhalidar, the total area of  agricultural land comprised in whose estate  does not exceed eight hundred acres, shall  vest in and be the property of the State of  Gujarat] and (c) no bid land which is also cultivable waste  or no village site land shall be acquired unless  it is in excess of the requirements of the  Girasdar or Barkhalidar in accordance with  the rules to be made in this behalf; and (d) in the case of Girasdari Majmu villages,  one fourth of the total area of bid land in the  village shall not be acquired.

(2) If any bid land or village site, land is not  acquired under the provisions of sub-section (1) and  such bid land or village site land is use by the  Girasdar or Barkhalidar for a different purpose, it  shall be liable to be acquired under the provision of  section 4.”

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Under Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951, the relevant  

provisions are Sections 2 (6), 2(15) and 2(18).  They are as  

follows:

“2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant  in the subject or context:-

(6) “bid land” means such land as has been used  by the Girasdar for grazing his cattle or for cutting  grass for the use of his cattle.

(15) “Girasdar”  means any talukdar, bhagdar,  bhayat, cadet or mulgirasia and includes any  person whom the Government may, by notification  in the Official Gazette, declare to be a Girasdar for  the purposes of this Act.

(18) “land”  means any agricultural land, bid land  or cultivable waste”

Under Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951 the relevant  

provision is Section 2(ii).

2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant  to the subject or context-

(i) xxx xxx xxx

(ii) “bid land” means such land as has been  used by Barkhalidar for grazing his cattle  or for cutting grass for the use of his  cattle;”

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28. In order to appreciate the contentions raised before us,  

we wish to make a specific reference to the Preamble as  

well as the object of the Act of 1960. The Preamble shows  

that the Act was contemplated and was brought into effect  

since it was felt expedient in public interest to make a  

uniform provision for the whole of the State of Gujarat and  

in particular in respect of restrictions upon holding  

agricultural land in excess of certain limits.  The  

expediency so noted was for securing the distribution of  

agricultural land to subserve the common good for the  

purpose of allotment of some lands to persons who are in  

need of land for agriculture and also to appreciate for other  

consequential and incidental matters. As far as the object  

of the Act was concerned, it is stated therein that the said  

enactment came to be enacted only for the purpose of fixing  

the ceiling area and not with any intention directly to  

interfere with the rights and liabilities of landlords and  

tenants.

29. Keeping the above perspective of the law makers in mind,  

when we examine Section 2(17) which defines the  

expression ‘land’  it means the land which is used or  

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capable of being used for agricultural purposes including  

the sites of farm, building appurtenant to such land.  

Section 6 of the 1960 act imposes restriction in the holding  

of the land which has been defined under Section 2(17) of  

the Act which is in excess of the ceiling area.  The ceiling  

area has been set out under Section 2(5) of the Act. The  

definition of ‘land’ in its cognates and expression is specific  

in its tenor and mentions about its usage as well as its  

capability of usage for agricultural purposes. The  

expression “agriculture”  has been defined under section  

2(1) of the act which inter alia includes horticulture, raising  

of crops, grass or garden produce and the use by an  

agriculturist of the land held by him either in full or part  

for grazing purposes. The definition of “agriculturist” under  

Section 2(3) read along with Section 2(11) and 2(12) which  

define the expression ‘to cultivate’  and ‘to cultivate  

personally’ make the position clear that it would include a  

person who indulges in the avocation of agriculture by way  

of cultivation of the land either by himself or through other  

persons again under the supervision of his own men.

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30. A careful consideration of the above provisions under the  

Act of 1960 gives a clear idea that lands which are used as  

well as which are capable of being used for the purpose of  

agriculture including lands used for raising grass or either  

full or part of it used for grazing purposes would come  

within the ambit of the Act, which in turn would be subject  

to the restrictions imposed for the purpose of ascertaining  

the ceiling limit.  Consequently, the excess or surplus land  

in the holding of a person who is an agriculturist is to be  

ascertained in order to initiate and ultimately acquire such  

surplus land.  Such acquisition as expressed in the  

Preamble to the Act would be for the purpose of equal  

distribution of land to other landless persons.

31. Keeping the above statutory provisions in mind, when we  

consider the respective submissions, the following broad  

legal principles are required to be dealt with by us.

(i) Whether ‘Bid Land’ would fall within the definition  ‘Land' read along with the definition of  ‘Agriculture’  as defined under Sections 2(17) and  2(1) of the Act of 1960 ?

(ii) In order to ascertain the nature of description of  ‘Bid Land’ can the definition of the said expression  under the earlier statutes viz. Act No.XXV of 1951,  

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Act No.XXVI of 1951 and Act No.III of 1952 can be  imported ?

(iii) What is the implication of the Urban Land Ceiling  Act, 1976 vis-à-vis the Act of 1960 in respect of  ‘Bid Land’ ?

(iv) Whether the Amendment Act of 1974 which came  into effect from 01.04.1976 and the definition of  ‘Bid Land’ under the said Amendment Act of 1974  can be applied for the purpose of deciding the  issue involved in this litigation ?

(v) Whether the ratio decidendi of this Court in  Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra) can be  applied to the facts of this case ?

(vi)  Whether the orders of the authorities under the  Act of 1960 impugned before the High Court were  hit by the principles of Res Judicata ?

(vii) What is the effect of the repealing of the Urban  Land Ceiling Act over the Act of 1960 ?

32. Though the definition of ‘land’  and ‘agriculture’  read  

together would include a ‘land’  used for raising grass or  

used for grazing purposes, the question for our  

consideration is whether ‘Bid lands’ can be brought within  

the scope of the said expression, namely, the definition of  

‘land’  read along with the definition of ‘agriculture’  under  

the Act of 1960 as has been so construed by the authorities  

constituted under the provisions of Act of 1960 up to the  

level of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.  On behalf of the  

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appellant it was contended that the subsequent  

amendment brought out under the 1974 amending Act  

which came to be notified on 01.04.1976 was only by way  

of clarification about ‘Bid lands’  in consonance with the  

definition of ‘agriculture’. According to the respondent even  

such a clarification sought to be made under the amending  

Act 1974 by way of removal of doubts only revealed that as  

on the date when Act, 1976 which came into effect from  

17.02.1976 ‘Bid lands’  were not part of agricultural lands  

as defined under Section 2(1) read along with 2(17) of the  

1960 Act.

33. Mr. Soli Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, to support the  

submission made on behalf of the appellant, would draw  

succor to the definition of the very same expression ‘Bid  

land’ under Act No.XXV of 1951 as well as Act No.XXVI of  

1951 and Act No.III of 1952.  Under Act XXV of 1951 in  

Section 2(6) definition of ‘Bid land’  has been defined to  

mean such land raised by Girasdar for grazing his cattle or  

for cutting grass for the use of his cattle. Under Section  

2(18) of Act No.XXV of 1951, the definition of ‘land’  under  

said Act included ‘Bid land’.  The purport of the said  

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enactment was to end Girasdar system and while doing so  

regulate the relationship between the Girasdars and their  

tenants and to enable the latter to become occupants of the  

‘land’  held by them as tenants and simultaneously to  

provide for the amount of compensation payable to  

Girasdars for the extinguishment of their rights.  Whatever  

be the purport of the enactment, the definition of ‘land’ as  

defined under Section 2(18) and ‘Bid land’ as defined under  

Section 2(6) discloses that ‘Bid land’ would be a land which  

was treated on par with agricultural land and such land is  

none other than the land which is used for grazing by cattle  

as well as for cutting grass for the use of cattle.

34. With that when we come to the nature of description of  

‘Bid land’ in the Act No.III of 1952, under Section 2(a) ‘Bid  

land’  has been defined to mean such land as on  

17.04.1951 specifically reserved for being used by a  

Girasdar or Barkhalidar for grazing cattle or for cutting  

grass. Under Section 4 the manner of vesting of such of  

those lands described therein vested in the State and  

thereby assuming the character of the property of the State  

of Gujarat and consequently all rights held by Girasdars or  

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Barkhalidars in such property deemed to have been  

extinguished.  For our limited purpose, it will be sufficient  

to confine our consideration to the definition under Section  

2 (a) of Act No.III of 1952 which defines ‘Bid land’.  As  

stated earlier ‘Bid land’ is a land used for grazing by cattle  

or for cutting grass in the tenure lands held by Girasdar or  

Barkhalidar. When we refer to Saurashtra Abolition Act  

1951 i.e. Act XXVI of 1951 the definition under section 2 (ii)  

which defines ‘Bid land’  to mean such land as has been  

used by Barkhalidars for grazing his cattle or for cutting  

grass for the use of his cattle.  The purport of the said  

enactment was for improvement of the land revenue  

administration and agrarian reforms which necessitated  

abolition of Barkhalidars tenure prevailing in certain parts  

of Saurashtra.  Under Section 6(1) of Act XXVI of 1951, the  

right of allotment of land under the said act in favour of  

Barkhalidar is stipulated. The manner in which the  

application for allotment is to be made is also provided  

therein. Under sub-section (2) of Section 6 while making an  

application for allotment the details to be furnished by  

Barkhalidar has been set out wherein under clause (c) (iii)  

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of sub clause (2) of Section 6 it is stipulated that full  

particulars of a Barkhalidar’s estate containing the area of  

agriculture also, ‘Bid land’  and ‘cultivable waste' in his  

estate should be furnished.  Apparently in order to fulfill  

the said obligation by a Barkhalidar, the definition of ‘Bid  

land’  has been set out in Section 2(ii) of Act No.XXVI of  

1951.

35. Keeping the above statutory prescription relating to the  

description of ‘Bid land’  in the above enactments which  

were all prior to coming into force of Act, 1976 namely,  

17.02.1976 the nature of ‘Bid land’  has been succinctly  

described to mean a land which was used for grazing of  

cattle or for cutting grass for the use of rearing of cattle. To  

recapitulate the definition of ‘agriculture’  under Section  

2(1), as well as, the definition of ‘land’ under Section 2(17)  

of the unamended Act of 1960, the expression ‘agriculture’  

included inter alia, the land used for raising of grass, as  

well as, the land held by the agriculturist for grazing  

purpose. When we consider the explanation part of sub  

section (1) of Section 2 which contains as many as Clauses  

(i) to (vi) the lands used for grazing purposes as well as  

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cutting of grass for rearing of cattle are not the lands to be  

excluded from the definition of ‘agriculture’. The definition  

of ‘land’ under Section 2(17) categorically mentions that the  

land which is either used or capable of being used for  

agriculture purposes would fall within the said definition.  

Therefore reading the above definitions together a ‘land’  

where grass is grown or used for grazing purposes fall  

within the inclusive provision of the definition of  

‘agriculture’.  The definition of ‘Bid land’  in the earlier  

enactments namely Act Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951  

and Act No.III of 1952 make the position clear that the ‘Bid  

land’ is nothing but the land used for grazing of cattle and  

for raising grass for the purpose of rearing of cattle.

36. Under the amended Act of 1960 the definition of  

agriculture under Section 2(1) as it existed prior to the said  

amendment was maintained. In addition, some of those  

excluded categories, namely, the one mentioned in sub  

clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) were also included as falling  

within the definition of the expression ‘agriculture’. Further  

the nature of exclusion as mentioned in sub-clause (vi) of  

clause 1 of Section 2, namely, such other pursuits as may  

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be described was also mentioned by stating that such of  

those pursuits which have been prescribed prior to the  

specified date would continue to stand excluded for that  

period which was prior in point of time to the specified date  

as mentioned in the Amendment Act which was notified on  

01.04.1976. Here and now it is relevant to mention the  

date which was specified under the Amendment Act which  

as per Section 2 (27A) meant the date of the coming into  

force of the amended act of 1972, namely, 01.04.1976.  

Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn would be that while  

as from 01.04.1976 the definition of ‘agriculture’ under the  

amended Act was wider in scope which included land used  

whether or not as an appendage to rice or paddy land for  

the purpose of rabmanure, dairy farming, poultry farming,  

breeding of livestock and the cutting of woods and such of  

those lands which were in the excluded category under the  

unamended Act cease to have effect of such exclusion on  

and after 01.04.1976.

37. Having regard to the reference to the specified date,  

namely, the date of notification (i.e.) 01.04.1976, the  

expanded definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) was  

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brought to our notice wherein specific reference to the ‘Bid  

lands’  held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars under Act  

Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and III of 1952 and also  

such ‘Bid lands’  held by a person prior to the  

commencement of the Constitution 26th Amendment Act  

1971 as a ‘ruler’  of an Indian State comprised in the  

Saurashtra Area of State of Gujarat. The endeavour of  

learned counsel for the respondent while drawing our  

attention to the new Section 2(17), in particular, the  

reference to ‘Bid lands’ in clause (c) and (d) of Section 2 (17)  

(ii) was to stress upon the point that a clear distinction was  

drawn as regards the land falling within the said definition  

held by a person prior to the specified date and after the  

specified date. Under Section 2(17) (i) after the amendment  

the provision relating to the definition of ‘land’ was sought  

to be distinguished as was existing prior to the specified  

date while under Section 2(17)(ii) a wider scope of such  

definition of ‘land’  was introduced. Having regard to such  

distinction shown in respect of a ‘land’  one prior to the  

specified date and the one in relation to any other period,  

learned counsel contended that the specific reference to  

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‘Bid lands’  held by Girasdar and Barkhalidar under sub  

clause (c) and (d) in Section 2 (17) (ii) makes a world of  

difference, as the scope of inclusion of the ‘Bid lands’  

within the ambit of the expression ‘land’  under Section  

2(17) was introduced on and after 01.04.1976 namely the  

specified date which was not the position prior to the said  

date.  

38. The submission of leaned counsel was two fold, namely,  

that the specific reference to ‘Bid lands’ under Section 2(17)  

sub clause (ii) (c) and (d) came to be introduced for the first  

time on and after 01.04.1976 and hence the said situation  

requires a different consideration in the light of the Central  

enactment namely the Act, 1976 which had already come  

into force from 17.02.1976 by the State Legislature  

surrendering its legislative competence to the Union  

Government by invoking Article 252 (1) of the Constitution.  

The further submission is that in the light of the field being  

occupied by the Central Act, having regard to the  

restriction contained in Article 252 (2) of the Constitution  

there could not have been any competence for State  

Government to bring about an amendment effective from  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  46 of 105

Page 47

01.04.1976 in relation to the Act and the subject with  

reference to which the State Government has surrendered  

its legislative power that bringing any amendment was  

exclusively within the competence of the Parliament and  

thereby the State amendment had no effect and was void as  

from its inception.

39. Before considering the said submission it is necessary to  

also refer to the provisions contained in the Act, 1976 for  

an effective consideration and to reach a just conclusion.  

Under the Act, 1976 by virtue of Section 1(2) of the Act, the  

Act was applied to the whole of the State of Gujarat. Under  

Section 2(a) the appointed day was defined to mean in  

relation to any State to which the Act applied in the first  

instance the date of introduction of the Act, 1976 in the  

Parliament which was admittedly 17.02.1976. Under  

Section 2(n) what is an ‘urban agglomeration’  has been  

defined and it is not in dispute that district Rajkot where  

the lands in question situate falls within the definition of  

urban agglomeration mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Act.  

Under Section 2(o) ‘Urban Land’ has been defined to mean  

any land situated within the limits of an urban  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  47 of 105

Page 48

agglomeration referred to as such in the Master Plan.  

However, it does not include any such ‘land’  which is  

mainly used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’. Under Section  

2 (q) ‘vacant land’ has been defined to mean land not being  

mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban  

agglomeration subject to other exclusions contained in the  

said sub-clause (q). The expression ‘agriculture’  has been  

specifically defined under the Explanation (A) to Section  

2(o) by which it is stated that agriculture would include  

‘Horticulture’ but would not include ‘raising of grass’, ‘dairy  

farming’, ‘poultry farming’, ‘breeding of livestock’ and such  

cultivation or growing of such plant as may be prescribed.  

Under Explanation (B) it is mentioned that lands are not  

being used mainly for the purpose of ‘agriculture’  if such  

land has not entered in the revenue or land records before  

the appointed day as for the purpose of ‘agriculture’. Under  

Explanation (C) it is further stipulated that notwithstanding  

anything contained in Explanation (B) ‘land’  shall not be  

deemed mainly used for the purpose of agriculture if the  

land has been specified in the Master Plan for the purpose  

other than agriculture.  Section 6 of the Act, 1976  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  48 of 105

Page 49

prescribes the ceiling limit of vacant land which a person  

can hold in an urban agglomeration of the Act, 1976. If a  

person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit at  

the commencement of the Act, he should file the statement  

before the competent authority of all vacant land to enable  

the State Government to acquire such vacant land in  

excess of ceiling limit under the Act.

40. In the light of the above provisions contained in the Act,  

1976 Mr. Naphade learned senior counsel contended that  

Amendment Act of 1974 would be a ‘still born child’ having  

regard to the existence of the Act, 1976 as from  

17.02.1976. The learned counsel also sought to repel the  

contention of the appellants that the date of passing of the  

Act alone would be relevant and not the date of notification.  

For that purpose, learned counsel relied upon In the  

matter of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act,  

1937 (supra). In the said decision the Federal Court  

considered the question referred to by His Excellency the  

Governor General under Section 213 of the Constitution  

Act.  The first question is relevant for our purpose which  

reads as under:- Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  49 of 105

Page 50

“(1) Does either the Hindu Women’s Rights to  Property Act, 1937 (Central Act, 18 of 1937) which  was     passed     by     the     Legislative     Assembly     on     4  th    February,     1937,   and   by     the     Council     of     State     on     6  th    April     1937,   and which received   the     Governor-   General  ’  s     assent     on     14  th     April     1937  , or the Hindu  Women’s rights to Property (Amendment) Act, 1938  (Central Act, 11 of 1938) which was passed in all its  stages after 1st April 1937, operate to regulate  (a)succession to agricultural land? (b) devolution by  survivorship of property other than agricultural  land?  

(underlining is ours)

41. At page 75 the Federal Court has answered the said  

question in the following words:-

“………….It is not to be supposed that a legislative  body will waste its time by discussing a bill which,  even if it receives the Governor-General’s assent,  would obviously be beyond the competence of the  Legislature to enact, but if it chooses to do so, that  is its own affair, and     the     only     function     of     a     Court     is    to     pronounce     upon     the     bill     after     it     has     become     an    Act.  In the opinion of this Court, therefore, it is  immaterial that the powers of the Legislature  changed during the passage of the bill from the  Legislative Assembly to the Council of State.  The  only     date     with     which     the     Court     is     concerned     is     14  th    April     1937,     the     date     on     which     the     Governor-   General  ’  s     assent     was     given;     and     the     question    whether     the     Act     was     or     was     not     within     the    competence     of     the     Legislature     must     be     determined    with     reference     to     that     date     and     to     none     other  .”  

(underlining is ours)

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  50 of 105

Page 51

42. By relying upon the said decision, learned counsel  

contended that the date of passing of the Act was irrelevant  

and what was relevant is the date when the Act was  

notified, namely, 01.04.1976. We find force in the said  

submission and without diluting much on the said  

contention we proceed to consider the other contentions  

raised on the footing that the amendment came into effect  

only from 01.04.1976 i.e. after the coming into force of the  

Act, 1976, namely, 17.02.1976. We have kept ourselves  

abreast of the various provisions of the unamended Act of  

1960, the definition of ‘Bid land’  under Act XXV of 1951,  

XXVI of 1951 and III of 1952 and keeping aside whatever  

amendment sought to be introduced by the Amendment act  

of 1974 with effect from 01.04.1976 we proceed to examine  

whether the contention of the respondent can be  

countenanced.

43. In this context, we are also obliged to note the definition  

of ‘vacant land’  under the Act, 1976 as defined under  

Section 2(q) and also the definition of ‘Urban Land’  under  

Section 2(o).  Since the respondent strongly relied upon the  

operation of the Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976 in order to  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  51 of 105

Page 52

contend that the Amendment Act of 1974 will be of no  

consequence being a still born child after the coming into  

force of the Act, 1976 it will be appropriate to examine the  

said contention in the first instance.

44. Under the Act, 1976 while defining ‘vacant land’, the  

said definition specifically excludes a ‘land’  used for the  

purpose of ‘agriculture’. The definition of ‘Urban Land’  

again makes the position clear that any land situated  

within the urban agglomeration referred to as such in the  

Master Plan would exclude any such land which is mainly  

used for the purpose of ‘agriculture’. Under the Explanation  

A to Section 2(o) such of those lands which are used for  

‘raising of grass’  stood excluded from the use of  

‘agriculture’. It is worthwhile to note that the ‘land used for  

grazing’  has however not been specifically excluded from  

the definition of ‘agriculture’  in the said Explanation ‘A’.  

The conspectus consideration of the above provisions leads  

us to conclude that the apparent purport and intent,  

therefore, was to exclude lands used for agriculture from  

the purview of Act, 1976 which would enable the holders of  

lands of such character used for agriculture to be benefited  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  52 of 105

Page 53

by protecting their holdings even if such lands are within  

the urban agglomeration limits and thereby depriving the  

competent authority from seeking to acquire those lands as  

excess lands in the hands of the holder of such lands.

45. That being the position, by the implication of the Act,  

1976 in respect of the land used for agriculture within the  

urban agglomeration, the question for consideration is  

whether such exclusion from acquisition having regard to  

the character of the land as used for agriculture would  

entitle the owner of such land to contend that such  

exclusion would deprive the competent authorities under  

the 1960 Act to restrict their powers to be exercised under  

the said Act and from resorting to acquisition by applying  

the provisions contained in the said Act. We are of the  

considered opinion that the conspectus consideration of  

the various provisions of the Act, 1976 considered again in  

the light of the object and purport of the 1960 Act which  

was intended for equal distribution of agricultural lands to  

the landless poor agriculturists, the application of the said  

Act will have to be independently made and can be so  

applied as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act,  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  53 of 105

Page 54

1976 as from 17.02.1976. At this juncture it will have to be  

noted and stated that the subject namely, the ‘land’  being  

an item falling under Entry 18 of List II of Schedule VII of  

the Constitution, by virtue of the so-called surrender of  

power of legislation in respect of the said entry namely  

‘land’ by way of Central Legislation namely Act, 1976 to be  

enacted by the Parliament pursuant to a State resolution  

by invoking Article 252 (1) of the Constitution, there would  

be every justification in the submission on behalf of the  

respondent that any subsequent legislation by way of  

Amendment or otherwise with regard to the said Entry,  

namely, ‘land’  will be directly hit by the specific embargo  

contained in Article 252 (2) of the Constitution.

46. Once we steer clear of the said legal position and  

proceed to examine the contention raised, as was  

highlighted by us in the initial part of our judgment the  

concept of ‘Bid land’  was not a new phenomenon to the  

1960 Act. The definition of ‘Bid land’ under Section 2 (6) of  

the Saurashtra Act, 1951 clearly stated that it would refer  

to the lands used for grazing of cattle and for cutting grass  

for the use of cattle. The said definition was consistently  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  54 of 105

Page 55

maintained in the Saurashtra Act No.XXVI of 1951, as well  

as, Saurashtra Act No.III of 1952. When we examine the  

definition of the expression ‘agriculture’ under Section 2(1)  

of the 1960 Act uninfluenced by the Amendment Act of  

1974, it specifically define ‘agriculture’  to include the land  

used for raising of grass, crops or garden produce, the use  

by an agriculturist of the land held by him or part thereof  

for grazing. Grazing as per the dictionary meaning “graze  

land suitable for pasture”. The word “pasture”  means the  

land covered with grass etc. suitable for grazing animals  

especially cattle or sheep or herbage for animals or for  

animals to graze. Therefore, the land meant for grazing has  

got its own intrinsic link with the cattle for its pasturing.  

The apparent intention of the legislature in including the  

land used for grazing or for raising grass as per the  

definition of ‘agriculture’  under the 1960 Act is quite  

explicit, inasmuch as, the use of cattle in farming operation  

was inseparable at the relevant point of time. Therefore,  

when the Legislature thought it fit to include the land for  

raising grass and used for grazing as part of definition of  

‘agriculture’  there is no need to seek succour from any  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  55 of 105

Page 56

other definition which was sought to be introduced at any  

later point of time by way of amendment under the  

Amendment Act of 1974.

47. While rebutting the submission of the appellant in  

placing reliance upon the definition of ‘Bid land’ under the  

provisions of Saurashtra Act Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of  

1951 and III of 1952, Mr. Naphade learned senior counsel  

for the respondent contended that the definition of ‘Bid  

land’  in these enactments was with particular reference to  

the land held and used by Girasdars and Barkhalidars and  

that there was no reference to the lands held by any Ruler  

of an erstwhile State. It was the further submission of  

learned senior counsel that those legislations were  

specifically dealing with the tenure holdings of Girasdars  

and Barkhalidars and that the purport of those legislations  

were to denude those large scale tenure holders of the  

lands held by them with a view to entrust such lands with  

the cultivating tenants themselves and, therefore import of  

the definition of ‘Bid land’  in those legislations will not be  

appropriate while considering the implication of the  

provisions contained in the 1960 Act.

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  56 of 105

Page 57

48. Though, we appreciate the ingenious submissions put  

forth before us on behalf of the respondent, we are not in a  

position to accept such an argument for more than one  

reason. The said submission cannot be accepted for the  

simple reason that what we are concerned with is the  

definition of ‘Bid land’  de hors the ownership or in whose  

possession such land remain or vest on any particular  

date. In other words, the character of ‘Bid land’ cannot vary  

simply because it is in the hands of Girasdars and  

Barkhalidars or with any other person including a former  

Ruler of a State. The reference to the definition of ‘Bid land’  

under those enactments can be definitely considered in  

order to find out as to what is the nature and character of a  

‘land’ and not as to who was holding it.   

49. The Saurashtra Act No.XXV of 1951 was introduced for  

the improvement of land revenue administration and for  

ultimately putting an end to the Girasdari system. The  

purport of the legislation was to regulate the relationship of  

Girasdars and their tenants in order to enable the latter to  

become occupants of the lands held by them and to provide  

for the payment of compensation to the Girasdars for the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  57 of 105

Page 58

extinguishment of their rights.  Again Saurashtra Act  

No.XXVI of 1951 was brought in to provide for certain  

measures for the abolition of Barkhalidar tenure for  

Saurashtra and also for the improvement of the land  

revenue administration.  In other words, the said  

legislation was for the improvement of land revenue  

administration and for agrarian reforms which necessitated  

abolition of Barkhalidar tenure prevailing in certain parts of  

Saurashtra.  In order to ascertain the extent of lands held  

by the Girasdars and Barkhalidars the definition of  

‘agricultural land’, ‘agriculture’ and ‘Bid Land’ was specified  

in the respective statutes.  Such definition was required in  

order to ascertain the extent of lands held by Girasdars and  

Barkhalidars.  ‘Bid land’ was one type of land held by such  

tenure holder by way of grant and it was in that context the  

character of ‘Bid Land’  was defined for the purpose of  

ascertaining the total extent of land held by each of the  

Girasdar and Barkhalidar.  Under Section 3 and 4 of  

Saurashtra Act No. III of 1952 which Act was introduced to  

provide for acquisition of certain estates of Girasdars and  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  58 of 105

Page 59

Barkhalidars ‘Bid Land’  was defined under Section 2(a) of  

the Act.

50. Section 3 of the Act empowered the Government to issue  

notification from time to time in the Official Gazette and  

declare that with effect from such date that may be  

specified in the notification, all rights, title and interest of  

Girasdars or Barkhalidars in respect of any estate or part of  

an estate comprised in the notification would cease and  

vest in the State of Gujarat.  As a sequel to such vesting, all  

the incidents of the tenure attached to any land comprised  

in such estate or part thereof would be deemed to have  

been extinguished. What are all the consequences that  

would follow pursuant to issuance of notification, has been  

set out in Section 4. However, under Section 5(1) which is a  

non-obstante clause which makes it clear that  

notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3 or Section  

4 ‘Bid Land’ were exempted from such acquisition.

51. It is true that though under the Saurashtra Act XXV of  

1951, Saurashtra Act XXVI of 1951 and Saurashtra Act III  

of 1952, the purport of the enactments were to extinguish  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  59 of 105

Page 60

all rights held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars as well as the  

Rulers of the State in the State of Gujarat in respect of their  

estates which among other kinds of lands included ‘Bid  

Land’ also.  

52. Here again, it will have to be stated that this Act was  

also enacted to provide certain measures for the abolition  

of the Barkhalidars tenure in Saurashtra.  Therefore, while  

the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the  

respondent that the above enactments were brought into  

effect with particular reference to the holding of certain  

estates by Girasdars and Barkhalidars as well as erstwhile  

Rulers of State, such restricted application of the Act  

cannot be held to mean that the definition of ‘Bid land’  

should also be read out in a restricted fashion.   As stated  

by us earlier, the operation of extinguishment of the rights  

of such specific persons viz., Girasdars and Barkhalidars  

as well as the Rulers does not mean that the definition  

assigned to ‘Bid land’  should be restricted in respect of  

those specific persons alone and cannot be applied in  

general for any other purpose. After all, the attempt of the  

appellants in relying upon the definition of ‘Bid land’  in  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  60 of 105

Page 61

those enactments was to understand the nature and use  

for which the ‘Bid land’  is put to.  It cannot be said that  

merely because those enactments were brought out for the  

purpose of extinguishment of the rights of certain class of  

persons viz. Girasdars and Barkhalidars, the definition of  

‘Bid land’ contained in those Legislations should under no  

circumstances be considered by any other authority  

functioning under other enactments.  We are convinced  

that though Saurashtra Act Nos.III of 1952, XXV of 1951  

and XXVI of 1951 pertain to the estates held by Girasdars  

and Barkhalidars as well as the Rulers of the erstwhile  

Saurashtra State, the definition of ‘Bid land’  contained in  

those legislations could however be taken into account for  

the purpose of understanding the meaning of ‘Bid land’.  

Therefore, the arguments of the learned senior counsel for  

the respondent in seeking to restrict the meaning of ‘Bid  

land’  in the Saurashtra Act Nos.XXV of 1951, Act XXVI of  

1951 and Act III of 1952 exclusively to those specified  

persons viz., Girasdars, Barkhalidars and the Rulers  

cannot be accepted. In other words once the ‘Bid land’ can  

be defined to mean such land used for grazing of cattle or  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  61 of 105

Page 62

for cutting grass for the use of cattle irrespective of the  

nature of possession of such lands with whomsoever it may  

be, a ‘Bid land’  would be a ‘Bid land’  for all practical  

purposes. It is also to be noted that nothing was brought to  

our notice that a ‘Bid land’  is capable of being defined  

differently or that it was being used for different purpose by  

different persons.

53. We shall deal with the object of the Amendment Act  

1974, namely, for removal of doubts a little later. For the  

present, inasmuch as, we have to a very large extent  

accepted the submission of learned counsel for the  

respondent that the invocation of the Amendment Act of  

1974 cannot be made having regard to its subsequent  

emergence, namely, 01.04.1976 i.e. after the coming into  

force of Act, 1976 as from 17.02.1976, we confine our  

consideration to the position that prevailed under the  

unamended Act of 1960. After all our endeavour is only to  

find out whether the 1960 Act is applicable in respect of  

the lands held by the respondent for the purpose of its  

enforcement or otherwise against the respondent.  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  62 of 105

Page 63

54. One other submission of the learned senior counsel for  

the respondent was that the respondent was once a Ruler  

cannot be held to be an ‘agriculturalist’, inasmuch as, the  

definition of ‘agriculturist’  under Section 2(3) means a  

person who cultivate the land personally. We were not  

impressed by the said submission, inasmuch as, the  

definition of an ‘agriculturist’  is not merely confined to  

Section 2(3) alone. The said definition has to be necessarily  

considered along with the definition “to cultivate”  as  

defined under Section 2(11), as well as, the expression “to  

cultivate personally”  as defined under Section 2(12) of the  

Act.  Those expressions considered together make the  

position clear that even a person cultivating the lands by  

ones own labour or by any other member of one’s family or  

under the personal supervision of oneself or any member of  

ones’  family by hired labour or by servants on wages  

payable in cash or kind would nonetheless fall within the  

four corners of the expression “agriculturist”. Therefore, the  

expression “agriculturist” used in the definition Clause 2(3)  

or “agriculture”  under Section 2(1) is wide enough to  

include the respondent who though was once a ‘Ruler’ and  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  63 of 105

Page 64

was not tilling the land by himself would still fall within the  

definition of ‘agriculturist’ when such agricultural operation  

namely cultivation of land is carried out with the support of  

any one of his family members by supervising such  

operation or by engaging any labour to carry out such  

cultivation. We are therefore of the firm view that the ‘Bid  

land’, the nomenclature of which was categorically  

admitted by the respondent and having regard to its nature  

and purpose for which it was put to use would squarely fall  

within the definition of ‘agriculture’  as defined under  

Section 2(1) of the Act of 1960 as it originally stood  

unaffected by the coming into force of the Act, 1976 as well  

as the Amendment of 1974. In the result, its application to  

those ‘Bid lands’  held by the respondent cannot be  

thwarted.

55. We shall now deal with the question whether the  

amendment Act of 1974 which was notified as from  

01.04.1976 does in any way affect the application of 1960  

Act as it originally stood having regard to the enforcement  

of the Amendment Act by drawing a clear distinction as  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  64 of 105

Page 65

between the position which was existing prior to the  

specified date namely 01.04.1976 and after the said date.

56. According to learned senior counsel for the respondent  

the definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) after the  

amendment, namely, after 01.04.1976 seeks to differentiate  

between the nature of land which would be governed by the  

provisions of the 1960 Act i.e. one prior to the specified  

date and thereafter. Under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(17) of  

the 1960 Act while defining the ‘land’  it is specifically  

mentioned that the same would mean “in relation to any  

period prior to the specified date, ‘land’  which is used or  

capable of being used for agricultural purpose and includes  

the sites of farm buildings appurtenant to such “land”. For  

that purpose when we refer to the definition of ‘agriculture’  

under Section 2(1) of the Amended Act a wider definition  

was brought in by including in the said definition clauses  

(d) to (h) which, inter alia, covered the use of any land,  

whether or not an appanage to rice or paddy land for the  

purpose of rabmanure, dairy farming, poultry farming,  

breeding of live-stock, and the cutting of wood which class  

of lands were specifically excluded from the definition of  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  65 of 105

Page 66

‘agriculture’  prior to the amendment. The proviso to the  

said sub-clause (1) of Section 2 also specifies that such  

inclusion in the definition of ‘agriculture’  was not  

applicable in relation to any period prior to the specified  

date, namely, 01.04.1976. That apart, under Section 2(17)

(ii) in regard to the period subsequent to the specified date,  

namely, 01.04.1976 the definition of ‘land’  would include  

the lands on which grass grown on its own, the ‘Bid land’  

held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars under the Saurashtra  

Act Nos.XXV of 1951, XXVI of 1951 and III of 1952 as well  

as such ‘Bid lands’ which were held by a person who before  

the commencement of the Constitution was a ‘Ruler’  of an  

Indian State comprised in the Saurashtra area of the State  

of Gujarat. The contention, therefore, was that but for such  

inclusion of ‘Bid lands’ in the amended definition of Section  

2(17)(ii) there was no scope to proceed against such ‘Bid  

lands’  held by Girasdars and Barkhalidars as well as the  

‘Rulers’ of erstwhile State.

57. In this context learned senior counsel for the respondent  

placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in State of  

Karnataka Vs. Union of India & another - (1978) 2 SCR 1  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  66 of 105

Page 67

and contended that when the language is clear and  

unambiguous one need not have to delve into the Objects  

and Reasons in order to find out its implication. The said  

contention was by way of rebuttal to the submission of  

learned senior counsel for the appellants that the Objects  

and Reasons of the 1974 Act disclose that the same was  

brought into effect only with a view to remove certain  

doubts as regards ‘Bid lands’  and, therefore, the  

amendment was not contemplated to include ‘Bid lands’ for  

the first time in addition to the other type of lands  

described under the unamended Act of 1960.

58. There can be no quarrel about the proposition of law as  

propounded by the learned senior counsel for the  

respondent and as has been stated by the Constitution  

Bench of this Court in paragraphs 38 and 39 of Pathumma  

(supra). In paragraph 39 this Court did say:  

“39.….We are, however, unable to agree with this  argument because in view of the clear and  unambiguous provisions of the Act, it is not  necessary for us to delve into the statement of  objects and reasons of the Act…..”

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  67 of 105

Page 68

59. We too are not inclined to go by the argument based on  

the objects and reasons in relation to a ‘Bid land’. We have  

considered the definition of ‘agriculture’ under Section 2(1),  

the definition of ‘agriculturist’ under Section 2(3) along with  

the expressions ‘a person who cultivates land personally’  

and the definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) of the  

unamended Act. Having examined the nature of description  

of those expressions contained therein, we are convinced  

that the legislature intended and did include ‘lands’ held by  

‘agriculturist’  where grass is raised or used for grazing  

purposes as part of agricultural land which was in the  

possession of agriculturist. Such lands where grass is  

grown or used for grazing purpose are always known as  

‘Bid land’.  Such ‘Bid land’  was ultimately brought within  

the definition of ‘land’  under Section 2(17) of the Act of  

1960. Therefore, even by keeping aside the implication of  

the wider definition which was introduced by the  

Amendment Act of 1974 in regard to ‘Bid lands’ and going  

by the definition of ‘agriculture’  and ‘land’  under Section  

2(1) and 2(17) of the Act of 1960, we have no difficulty in  

taking a definite conclusion that such definition contained  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  68 of 105

Page 69

in the Act as it originally stood did include ‘Bid lands’  

which lands were exclusively meant for cutting grass for  

cattle or used for grazing purposes. Therefore, there was no  

necessity for this Court to draw any further assistance  

either from the Objects and Reasons or from the provisions  

of the Amended Act of 1974 in order to hold that ‘Bid lands’  

were part of agricultural land governed by the provisions of  

the Act of 1960.

60. In that respect when reliance was placed upon the recent  

decision of this Court in Nagbhai Najbhai Khackar (supra)  

on behalf of the appellant, we find that the said decision  

fully support the stand of the appellant. Of course, in the  

said decision the question posed for consideration was  

“whether Bid lands were required to be taken into  

consideration for the purpose of land ceiling under the  

1960 Act as amended by the Act of 1974 which came into  

force on 01.04.1976”. This Court while examining the said  

question posed for its consideration however dealt with a  

specific submission made on behalf of the appellant herein  

which has been set out in paragraph 11:

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  69 of 105

Page 70

“11. It was further submitted that the lands in  question are in fact “agricultural”  lands. They  survived acquisition under the earlier three Acts  only because they were “bid lands”  which by  definition under those Acts were lands “being used”  by Girasdars/Barkhalidars for grazing cattle. That,  under the Ceiling Act, Section 2(1) defines the use  of land for the purposes of grazing cattle as  agricultural purpose and thus, according to the  learned counsel, by their very definition “bid lands”  are capable of being used for agricultural purpose,  namely, grazing cattle.”

61. In paragraphs 20 and 21 it has been held as under:

“20. There is one     more     reason   for not accepting the  argument of the appellants. The subject lands  survived acquisition under the 1952 Act only  because they were “bid lands”  which by definition  under those Acts were treated as lands being used  by the girasdars for grazing cattle (see Section 2(a)  of the 1952 Act). Now, under the present Ceiling  Act, Section 2(1) defines the use of land for the  purpose of grazing cattle as an agricultural  purpose. Thus, “bid lands” fall under Section 2(1) of  the Ceiling Act. This is one     more     reason   for coming  to the conclusion that the Ceiling Act as amended  applies to “bid lands”. (underline ours)

21. It is also important to note that under Section  5(1) of the 1952 Act all lands saved from acquisition  had to be “bid lands”  which by definition under  Section 2(a) of the 1952 Act were the lands being  used by a Girasdar or a Barkhalidar for grazing  cattle or for cutting grass. If the lands in question  were put to any other use, they were liable to  acquisition under Section 5(2). Because the subject  lands were used for grazing cattle, they got saved  under the 1952 Act and, therefore, it is now not  open to the appellants to contend that the subject  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  70 of 105

Page 71

lands are not capable of being used for agricultural  purpose.”

62. In fact our conclusion on this aspect in the earlier part of  

our judgment is in tune with what has been propounded by  

this Court in the said paragraph. The learned senior  

counsel for the respondent contended that the said  

decision cannot be applied to the facts of this case. The  

submission of the learned counsel was twofold.  According  

to him, the said decision came to be rendered in the light of  

the definition of ‘Bid land’ which came to be introduced for  

the first time after the coming into force of the Amendment  

Act of 1974 and, therefore, whatever decided in the said  

decision was exclusively in the context of the Amendment  

Act of 1974 which cannot be applied to the case on hand.  

The second submission of the learned senior counsel was  

that in the said decision the implication of the Act, 1976  

was not considered and, therefore, whatever said in the  

said decision was applicable only to the facts involved in  

that case and can have no universal application. To  

buttress the former argument, Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the  

learned counsel for the appellants contended that though  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  71 of 105

Page 72

the question posted for consideration in the said decision  

was in the context of the definition of ‘Bid land’  as  

described in the Amendment Act 1974, this Court while  

holding that ‘Bid land’  would fall within the definition of  

‘agricultural land’ under the Act of 1960 also examined the  

issue as to what is a ‘Bid land’  under the 1952 Act  

independent of the definition of ‘Bid land’ introduced in the  

Amendment Act 1974.  The learned senior counsel by  

drawing our attention to paragraph 20 of the said decision  

contended that the said independent consideration of what  

is a ‘Bid land’  was an added reason to hold that the said  

kind of land would also fall within the definition of  

‘agricultural land’  as defined in Section 2(1) of the Act of  

1960.  

63. Having considered the respective submissions, we find  

force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for  

the appellants. A close reading of paragraph 20 is clear to  

the pointer that irrespective of the definition of ‘Bid land’  

under the Amendment Act 1974, having regard to the  

definition of ‘Bid land’  under Act III of 1952, such land  

would fall within the definition of ‘Agricultural Land’  as  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  72 of 105

Page 73

defined in Section 2(1) of the Act of 1960.  This Court in  

fact made it very clear in its perception while stating the  

said position by holding that it was an added reason for  

holding that the Land Ceiling Act, as amended, applied to  

‘Bid land’.  One more reason which this Court mentioned  

was that the land in question survived acquisition under  

the 1952 Act only because they were ‘Bid lands’ which, by  

virtue of its character was being used by Girasdars for  

grazing by cattle and thereby stood excluded from  

acquisition.  Therefore, when this Court examined the  

character of the ‘Bid land’  which was used for grazing  

purpose as one falling within the definition of ‘agriculture  

land’ even without the implication of the Amendment Act of  

1974, the reliance placed upon the said decision merits  

acceptance. The said submission of the learned senior  

counsel for the appellants is supported by the decisions in  

London Jewellers (supra), Jacobs (supra), Behrens  

(supra) and Smt.Somawanti (supra). In the decision in  

London Jewellers (supra), it has been held as under:

“……..I cannot help feeling that if we were  unhampered by authority there is much to be said  for this proposition which commended itself to Swift  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  73 of 105

Page 74

J. and which commended itself to me in Folkes v.  King, but that view is not open to us in view of the  decision of the Court of Appeal in Folkes v King.  In  that     case     two     reasons     were     given     by     all     the    members     of     the     Court     of     Appeal     for     their     decision    and     we     are     not     entitled     to     pick     out     the     first     reason    as     the     ratio     decidendi     and     neglect     the     second,     or     to    pick     out     the     second     reason     as     the     ratio     decidendi    and     neglect     the     first;     we     must     take     both     as     forming    the     ground     of     the     judgment  .”

(Emphasis added)  

64. The ratio of the said decision was followed in Jacobs  

(supra).  In the decision in Behrens (supra), it has been  

held as under:

“……..This question depends, I think, on the  language used by Cozens-Hardy, M.R. It     is     well    established     that,     if     a     judge     gives     two     reasons     for     his    decision,     both     are     binding.      It     is     not     permissible     to    pick     out     one     as     being     supposedly     the     better     reason    and     ignore     the     other     one;     nor     does     it     matter     for     this    purpose     which     comes     first     and     which     comes     second  .  The practice of making judicial observations obiter is  also well established.  A judge may often give  additional reasons for his decision without wishing to  make them part of the ratio decidendi; he may not be  sufficiently convinced of their  cogency as to want  them to have the full authority of precedent, and yet  may wish to state them so that those who later may  have the duty of investigating the same point will  start with some guidance.  This is a matter which the  judge himself is alone capable of deciding and any  judge who comes after him must ascertain which  course has been adopted from the language used  and not by consulting his own preference.”

(Emphasis added) Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  74 of 105

Page 75

65. The proposition of law has thus been so lucidly expressed  

in the above decisions, it will have to be held that the  

additional reasons adduced in our decision in Nagbhai  

Najbhai Khackar (supra) directly covers the issue raised  

before us.  One more reason, which weighed with this  

Court for holding that ‘Bid land” falls within the definition  

of ‘Agriculture Land’  as defined under Section 2(1) of the  

Act of 1960 is binding and thus there is no scope to  

exclude the said decision from its application.  Therefore,  

we reiterate that merely because the question posed for  

consideration related to the character of ‘Bid lands’  after  

the 1974 amendment what has been held in paragraphs 20  

and 21 mutantis mutandis is in tune with what has now  

been held by us based on the definition of ‘agriculture’  as  

well as ‘land’  under Sections 2(1) and 2(17) of the un-

amended Act of 1960 itself.

66. As far as the next submission is concerned, the  

argument raised was that the said decision never dealt with  

the issue which has been presently raised in this appeal,  

namely, the implication of the Act, 1976 which came into  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  75 of 105

Page 76

force on 17.02.1976 while the Amendment Act of 1974 was  

brought into force subsequently i.e. on and after  

01.04.1976 and, therefore, the said decision can have no  

application to the facts of this case. In so far as the said  

contention is concerned, the same is liable to be rejected  

inasmuch as the said decision is for the simple proposition  

as to how a land where grass is raised or used for grazing  

purposes is to be included under the definition of  

‘agriculture’ and consequently within the definition of ‘land’  

as provided under Sections 2(1) and 2(17) of the Act of  

1960. Therefore, non-consideration of the implication of  

Act, 1976 in the said decision does not in any way deter us  

from relying upon the ratio laid down in the said decision to  

support our conclusion.

67. The next submission of learned counsel for the respondent  

related to the supervening effect of the Act, 1976 in the  

State of Gujarat on and after 17.02.1976 which according  

to learned senior counsel has made the Act of 1974 a ‘still  

born child’  and also the submission that after the coming  

into force of the Act, 1976 there was no authority in the  

respondent to invoke the 1960 Act in order to acquire the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  76 of 105

Page 77

lands of the respondent. As we have refrained from relying  

upon the Amended Act of 1974 while approving the action  

of the appellant in seeking to proceed against the  

respondent for acquiring the surplus lands of the  

respondent under the Act of 1960, we do not find any dire  

necessity to deal with the said contention in extenso. The  

formidable submission raised on behalf of the respondent  

related to the supremacy of the Act, 1976 over the 1960  

Act. The learned counsel pointed out that the respondent  

filed its return under the provisions of the Act, 1976 on  

13.08.1976, that the said return was considered by the  

competent authority by passing its Order dated 21.05.1983  

which was thereafter considered by the Tribunal in its  

order dated 08.09.1989 and that the appellant/State while  

dealing with the respondent and the Act, 1976 themselves  

have mentioned in the reply affidavit in paragraph 4.1 that  

the lands in Survey No.111/2-3 situated in Madhopur  

village was reserved for site and service project meaning  

thereby that they were not agricultural lands. The learned  

counsel would, therefore, contend that while on the one  

hand when it came to the question of determining the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  77 of 105

Page 78

surplus lands under the provisions of the Act, 1976 the  

appellant would contend that the lands held by the  

respondent were not classified as agricultural land and  

thereby not entitled for exclusion under the said Act, when  

it came to the question of applicability of 1960 Act they  

contend that such lands are to be treated as agricultural  

lands.

68. We do not find any such contradiction in the stand of the  

appellant even in the reply affidavit. At page 5 of the reply  

affidavit while referring to the lands in Survey No.111/2-3  

of Madhopur village it is specifically mentioned that those  

lands are ‘Bid lands’  and are located within the industrial  

development industrial area. What was contended was that  

admittedly no agricultural operation was being carried out  

in respect of Survey No.111/2-3 along with Survey  

Nos.91/3 and 129. In this respect it will also be necessary  

to refer to the stand of the respondent himself in his appeal  

filed under Section 33 of the Act, 1976. In paragraphs 9  

and 10 the appellant claimed the character of the land in  

the following manner:

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  78 of 105

Page 79

“9. Land admeasuring 30 acres and 30 Gunthas  i.e. 1,24,412 sq. mts., of survey No.111/2 of village  Madhopur is a vidi land of the Appellant and that has  been brought under the recreational zone of RUDA.  That should not have been included in the holding of  the Appellant. Here also the application under section  20 is pending with the Government for exemption.

10. Survey     No.111/3     of     village     Madhopur    admeasuring     579     acres     27     Gunthas     is     falling     in    agricultural     zone     of     RUDA.     A     certificate     has     been    produced     before     the     Competent     Authority     and     this    should     not     be     included     in     the     holding     of     the    Appellant. The Competent Authority has shown  Appellant’s flat in Bombay admeasuring 223 sq. mts.  From the records the Bombay flat was shown as  575.06 sq. mts., being built up property it should not  be declared as surplus. Of course the flat is situated  in Bombay it should be calculated as 1725.18 sq.  mts.”  (underlining is ours)

69. In paragraph 9 respondent has referred to the land  

admeasuring 30 acres and 30 Gunthas i.e. 1,24,412 sq.  

mts. in survey No.111/2 of village Madhopur as vidi land  

which was brought under the recreational zone of RUDA  

and, therefore, those lands should not have been included  

in the holding of the appellant. As far as the land  

admeasuring 579 acres 27 Gunthas in the very same  

village Madhopur in survey No.111/3 is concerned, it was  

specifically claimed that those lands fell in the  

‘AGRICULTURAL ZONE’  of RUDA and, therefore, it should  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  79 of 105

Page 80

not have been brought within the category of excess lands  

held by the respondent. In fact, the above submission  

made on behalf of the appellant far from supporting the  

stand of the respondent fully supports the stand of the  

appellant. We, therefore, do not find any conflict in the  

stand of the appellant while dealing with the nature of land  

held by the respondent which was earlier dealt with under  

the Act of 1960 which came to be considered by the  

authorities under the Act, 1976 pursuant to the return  

submitted by the respondent on 13.08.1976 under Section  

6(1) of the Act, 1976.

70. When we consider the submission of the learned senior  

counsel for the respondent pertaining to the implication of  

the Act, 1976 vis-à-vis Act of 1960, the submission was  

again two fold.  In the first place, it was contended that as  

the entire lands were lying within the urban agglomeration  

of the scheduled area viz., Rajkot, the Act, 1976 would  

alone govern the subject land and thereby exclude the  

application of the Act of 1960.  Though in the first blush,  

the argument appears to be appealing, on a deeper  

scrutiny, it will have to be held that the said submission  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  80 of 105

Page 81

cannot be accepted.  Even according to the respondent, the  

subject land having been classified as ‘agricultural land’  

stood excluded from the application of the provisions of the  

Act, 1976 though lying within the urban agglomeration  

area. It was, therefore, axiomatic that de hors the  

implication of the provision of the Act, 1976 by virtue of the  

character of the Land held by the respondent, the  

application of the Act of 1960, as it originally stood prior to  

17.2.1976 was imperative. Such a legal consequence  

existed. Even accepting the arguments of the learned senior  

counsel for the respondent, that being agricultural land  

lying within the urban agglomeration, the application of the  

Act, 1976 stood excluded, we fail to see as to how there  

would be any scope at all for the respondent to contend on  

that score the application of the Act of 1960 should also be  

excluded. Therefore, taking note of the categorical stand of  

the respondent himself, having claimed exclusion of such  

of those lands which were classified as ‘agricultural land’,  

which included ‘Bid land’  as well, to be excluded from the  

application of the provisions of the Act, 1976 and thereby  

the authorities competent under the provisions of such  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  81 of 105

Page 82

other enactments which would govern such agricultural  

lands would be free to exercise their powers under these  

enactments.  The respondent cannot be heard to contend  

that there would be a vacuum in so far as the application of  

any Statute over the lands held by the respondent that  

have been classified as ‘agricultural land’. Such a  

proposition, expounded on behalf of the appellants can  

never be countenanced.  Therefore, the legal position that  

would emerge would be that going by the stand of the  

respondent, his lands to an extent of 579 acres 27 Gunthas  

being ‘agricultural land’  if stood excluded from the  

application of the provisions of the Act, 1976 such lands  

were already governed by the provisions of the Act of 1960  

as it originally stood and applied and there can be no  

demur to it.  

71. On this aspect, the next submission of the learned  

senior counsel for the respondent was that since the Act,  

1976 having been passed by the Parliament, at the  

instance of the appellant State which came into effect from  

17.02.1976, no other law on the said subject viz, ‘land’  

would operate in the field. The sum and substance of the  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  82 of 105

Page 83

submission was that having regard to the emergence of the  

Act, 1976 on and from 17.02.1976, the application of the  

Act of 1960 would automatically cease to operate. To some  

extent, we appreciate the submission in so far as it related  

to the implementation of the Act of 1974 by which the  

amendment was introduced to the Act of 1960. In that  

respect, we consider the invocation of Article 252 of the  

Constitution wherein Sub-clause (2) specifically stipulated  

that in future, amendments could be carried out only by  

the Parliament and not by the State.  Here we are  

concerned with the Act of 1960 in its un-amended form  

which was holding the field insofar as it related to the  

agricultural lands.  We do find some logic to accede to the  

contention of the learned senior counsel in regard to the  

application of 1974 Act after the emergence of the Act,  

1976 but same is not the position in relation to the un-

amended Act of 1960.  In the first place, such an argument  

does not find support by the specific embargo contained in  

Article 252(2) of the Constitution. Going by the specific  

stipulation contained in Article 252 (2) of the Constitution,  

such an extended meaning cannot be imported into the  

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Page 84

said provision in order to nullify the effect and operation of  

the un-amended Act of 1960 in so far as it related to  

‘agricultural lands’  in the appellant State.  We, therefore,  

hold that the Act of 1960 in its un-amended form applied  

on its own and continue to hold the field and was in  

operation over the ‘agricultural lands’  over which the  

implication of the Act, 1976 had no effect.  The said legal  

position has to be necessarily understood in the said  

manner and cannot be stated in any other manner, much  

less in the manner contended on behalf of the respondent.  

Thus the said contention made on behalf of the respondent,  

therefore, stands rejected.

72. In support of the said submission, reliance was placed  

upon a decision of this Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs.  

Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary & Ors. reported in (1979) 3  

SCC 324.  Having bestowed our serious consideration in  

the reliance placed upon the said decision, we find that the  

said decision has no application to the legal issues involved  

in the case on hand.  That was a case where in regard to  

the passing of the Act, 1976 itself, based on the resolution  

passed by the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly on  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  84 of 105

Page 85

08.04.1972.  The challenge was made to the vires of the Act  

in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.  The ground raised  

was that the Parliament lacked legislative competence.  

Such lack of competence was raised on two grounds.  In  

the first place, it was contended that the Governor of  

Andhra Pradesh did not participate in the process of  

authorization in the passing of the Act by the Parliament  

and the second ground was that the resolution of the State  

Legislature gave authorization to the imposition of ceiling  

on the basis of the valuation of the immovable property i.e.  

for ceiling on ownership on immovable property and not on  

the area of land.  It was contended that the ultimate act in  

imposing ceiling on the area of the land was not in  

conformity with the real intendment of the resolution of the  

State and therefore it lacked competence.  On the first  

ground viz., due to the non participation of the Governor of  

Andhra Pradesh, the Parliament lacked competence found  

favour with the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which struck  

down the Act on that ground itself.  While dealing with the  

said ground, this Court dealt with the scope of Article 252  

(1) & (2) of the Constitution and by relying upon the earlier  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  85 of 105

Page 86

decision of this Court in State of Bihar Vs. Sir  

Kameshwar Singh reported in AIR 1952 SC 252, ruled that  

in the passing of the resolution of the State Legislature, the  

Governor nowhere comes in the picture.

73. As far as the second contention was concerned, it was held  

as under in Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (supra) at  

paragraphs 28, 31 and 32.

“28. We are afraid, the contention cannot be  accepted.  It is not disputed that the subject-matter of  Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule, i.e. ‘land’  covers ‘land and building’  and would, therefore,  necessarily include ‘vacant land’.  The expression  ‘urban immovable property’  may mean ‘land and  buildings’, or ‘buildings’  or ‘land’.  It would take in  lands of every description, i.e., agricultural land,  urban land or any other kind and it necessarily  includes vacant land.

* * *

31. It is but axiomatic that once the legislatures of  two or more States, by a resolution in terms of Article  252(1), abdicate or surrender the area, i.e., their  power of legislation on a State subject, the Parliament  is competent to make a law relating to the subject.  It  would indeed be contrary to the terms of Article 252  (1) to read the resolution passed by the State  legislature subject to any restriction.  The resolution,  contemplated under Article 252(1) is not hedged in  with conditions.  In making such a law, the  Parliament was not bound to exhaust the whole field  of legislation.  It could make a law, like the present  Act, with respect to ceiling on vacant land in an urban  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  86 of 105

Page 87

agglomeration, as a first step towards the eventual  imposition of ceiling on immovable property of every  other description.  

32. There is no need to dilate on the question any  further in this judgment, as it can be better dealt with  separately.  It is sufficient for purposes of these  appeals to say that when Parliament was invested  with the power to legislate on the subject, i.e. ‘ceiling  on immovable property’, it was competent for the  Parliament to enact the impugned Act i.e., a law  relating to ‘ceiling on urban land’.”

74. Whatever stated in Paragraph 28 can only be understood  

to mean that when the State Legislature authorizes the  

Parliament to pass a legislation in respect of the subject  

matter of Entry 18, List II of the Seventh Schedule, i.e.  

‘land’  it would cover ‘land and building’  and would  

necessarily include ‘vacant land’ and would take in land of  

every description including ‘agriculture land’  or any other  

kind of land.  It also went on to hold that the resolution  

passed by the State Legislature cannot be said to impose  

any restriction as it would be contrary to the terms of  

Article 252 (1) of the Constitution.  It was further held that  

the Parliament was empowered to enact the law pursuant  

to the surrender of the State to enact a law with said  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  87 of 105

Page 88

subject by formulating its own prescription as to the nature  

of urban land in different stages. Beyond that, we do not  

find any other statement of law propounded in the said  

decision. Applying the said legal principle, it can only be  

held that the Act, 1976 in having imposed a restriction by  

way of ceiling on urban land within the urban  

agglomeration by excluding agricultural land it was a valid  

piece of legislation. In this respect, the contention of Mr.  

Soli J. Sorabji that the State Legislature only intended in  

its authorization to bring about a legislation only on ‘urban  

immovable land’  and not on any agriculture land is quite  

appealing.  We can also state that in paragraph 32 of the  

said decision, this Court consciously decided not to dilate  

on the question any further in that judgment as it can be  

better dealt with separately at a later point of time.  We now  

hold that the situation has now come where the position  

has to be made loud and clear to state that the Act, 1976  

would govern only such of those lands which would fall  

within its area of operation within urban agglomeration to  

the specific exclusion of the agriculture lands and  

Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  88 of 105

Page 89

consequently the continued application of the un-amended  

Act of 1960 remain without any restriction.  

75. On the other hand Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, the learned senior  

counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon a  

Constitutional Bench decision of this Court in Thumati  

Venkaiah (supra). Almost an identical situation was dealt  

with by this Court in the said decision. That case also arose  

from the State of Andhra Pradesh.  To briefly refer to the  

facts, in the State of Andhra Pradesh a ceiling of  

agricultural holdings was sought to be imposed by enacting  

an Act called The Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling  

on Agricultural Holdings) Act (Act 1 of 1973 (hereinafter  

referred to as the ‘Andhra Pradesh Act’).  It was enacted by  

the Andhra Pradesh Legislature on 01.01.1973.  The Act  

was challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.  

However a Full Bench of the High Court negatived the  

challenge by its judgment dated 11.04.1973.  The Act was  

however brought into force on and from 01.01.1975.  The  

amendments were brought to the said Act by Amendment  

Act of 1977 with retrospective effect from 01.01.1975.  After  

the amendments, again the Act was challenged on the main  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  89 of 105

Page 90

ground that by reason of enactment of the Act, 1976, the  

Andhra Pradesh Act has become void and inactive.   It can  

be validly mentioned that the subsequent contention of the  

respondent herein was the focal point in the said decision.  

Dealing with the said contention, the Constitutional Bench  

has held as under in paragraph 5:

“5. Now, as we have already pointed out above, the  Andhra Pradesh Legislature had, at the time when  the Andhra Pradesh Act was enacted, no power to  legislate with respect to ceiling on urban immovable  property.  That power stood transferred to Parliament  and as a first step towards the eventual imposition of  ceiling on immovable property of every other  description, Parliament     enacted     the     Central     Act     with     a    view     to     imposing     ceiling     on     vacant     land,     other     than    land     mainly     used     for     the     purpose     of      agriculture,     in    an     urban     agglomeration  . The argument of the  landholders was that the Andhra Pradesh Act sought  to impose ceiling on land in the whole of Andhra  Pradesh including land situate in urban  agglomerations and since the concept of urban  agglomeration defined in Section 2(n) of the Central  Act was an expansive concept and any area with an  existing or future population of more than one lakh  could be notified to be an urban agglomeration, the  whole of the Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires and  void as being outside the legislative competence of  the Andhra Pradesh Legislature.  This argument,  plausible though it may seem, is in our opinion,  unsustainable.  It     is     no     doubt     true     that     if     the     Andhra    Pradesh     Act     seeks     to     impose     ceiling     on     land     falling    within     an     urban     agglomeration,     it     would     be     outside    the     area     of     its     legislative     competence,     since     it     cannot    provide     for     imposition     of     ceiling     on     urban     immovable    property. But the only urban agglomerations in the  

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State of Andhra Pradesh recognized in the Central  Act were those referred to in Section 2(n)(A)(i) and  there     can     be     no     doubt     that,     so     far     as     these     urban    agglomerations     are     concerned,     it     was     not     within     the    legislative     competence     of     the     Andhra     Pradesh    Legislature     to     provide     for     imposition     of     ceiling     on     land    situate     within     these     urban     agglomerations.      It     is,    however,     difficult     to     see     how     the     Andhra     Pradesh     Act    could     be     said     to     be     outside     the     legislative     competence    of     the     Andhra     Pradesh     Legislature     insofar     as     land    situate     in     the     other     areas     of     the     State     of     Andhra    Pradesh     is     concerned  . We agree that any other area  in the State of Andhra Pradesh with a population of  more than one lakh could be notified as an urban  agglomeration under Section 2(n)(A)(ii) of the Central  Act, but     until     it     is     so     notified     it     would     not     be     an     urban    agglomeration     and     the     Andhra     Pradesh     Legislature    would     have     legislative     competence     to     provide     for    imposition     of     ceiling     on     land     situate     within     such     area  .  No sooner such area is notified to be an urban  agglomeration, the Central Act would apply in relation  to land situate within such area, but     until     that    happens,     the     Andhra     Pradesh     Act     would     continue     to    be     applicable     to     determine     the     ceiling     on     holding     of    land     in     such     area  . It may be noted that the Andhra  Pradesh Act came into force on January 1, 1975 and  it     was     with     reference     to     this     date     that     the     surplus    holding     of     land     in     excess     of     the     ceiling     area     was    required     to     be     determined     and     if     there     was     any    surplus,     it     was     to     be     surrendered     to     the     State    Government. It     is     therefore     clear     that     in     an     area     other    than     that     comprised     in     the     urban     agglomerations    referred     to     in     Section     2(n)(A)(i),     land     held     by     a     person    in     excess     of     the     ceiling     area     would     be     liable     to     be    determined     as     on     January     1,     1975     under     the     Andhra    Pradesh     Act     and     only     land     within     the     ceiling     area    would     be     allowed     to     remain     with     him.      It     is     only     in    respect     of     land     remaining     with     a     person,     whether     an    individual     or     a     family     unit,     after     the     operation     of     the    Andhra     Pradesh     Act,     that     the     Central     Act     would    apply, if and when the area in question is notified to  be an urban agglomeration under Section 2(n)(a)(ii) of  

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the Central Act. We     fail     to     see     how     it     can     at     all     be    contended     that     merely     because     an     area     may     possibly    in     the     future     be     notified     as     an     urban     agglomeration    under     Section     2(n)(A)(ii)     of     the     Central     Act,     the     Andhra    Pradesh     Legislature     would     cease     to     have     competence    to     legislate     with     respect     to     ceiling     on     land     situate     in    such     area,     even     though     it     was     not     an     urban    agglomeration     at     the     date     of     enactment     of     the     Andhra    Pradesh     Act  . Undoubtedly, when an area is notified  as an urban agglomeration under Section 2(n)(A)(ii),  the Central Act would apply to land situate in such  area and the Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to  have application, but     by     that     time     the     Andhra    Pradesh     Act     would     have     already     operated     to    determine     the     ceiling     on     holding     of     land     falling     within    the     definition     in     Section     3(j)     and     situate     within     such    area. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the  contention of the landholders that the Andhra  Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being outside  the legislative competence of the Andhra Pradesh  Legislature.”

(Emphasis added)

76. In the first blush, it appears as though the said decision  

support the contention of the respondent. But in paragraph  

5, we have highlighted certain relevant conclusions which  

fully support the stand of the appellants.  This Court made  

it clear thereunder that the Parliament enacted the Central  

Act with a view to impose ceiling on vacant land other than  

the land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an  

urban agglomeration. The arguments of the land holders  

that the concept of urban agglomeration defined in Section  

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2(n) was an expansive concept and any area which was  

already notified as urban agglomeration, as well as, which  

can be notified in future based on the increase in  

population as urban agglomeration and, therefore, the  

Andhra Pradesh Act was ultra vires lacking legislative  

competence was held to be unsustainable.  It was also held  

that the Andhra Pradesh Act seeks to impose ceiling on  

land falling within the urban agglomeration, it would be  

outside the area of its legislative competence as it cannot  

provide for imposition of ceiling on urban immovable  

property after the emergence of Act, 1976. It was thus  

made clear that after the coming into force of the Act, 1976  

by virtue of Article 252 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, there  

would have been no scope for the State Legislature to bring  

about a legislation for imposing a ceiling on an urban  

immovable property which falls within the urban  

agglomeration.  It was also made clear that other areas  

which were not declared as urban agglomeration came to  

be subsequently declared as urban agglomeration and  

notified as such, the Central Act would automatically apply  

and in relation to such notified area also, the State  

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Legislature would be incompetent to make any legislation  

by way of imposition of ceiling on and after such  

declaration is made. While referring to such a situation,  

this Court made it clear that the Andhra Pradesh Act  

continue to be applicable for determining the ceiling of  

holding of lands in such area, prior to any such  

subsequent notification under the Act, 1976.  It was  

further made clear that since the Andhra Pradesh Act came  

into force on and from 01.01.1975, the surplus holding of  

land in excess of the ceiling area were required to be  

determined with reference to that date and if there was any  

surplus, it was to be surrendered to the State Government.  

It was further reinforced by stating that in an area other  

than that comprised in the urban agglomeration, the land  

held by a person in excess of the ceiling area would be  

liable to be determined as on 01.01.1975 under the Andhra  

Pradesh Act and the land within the ceiling area alone  

would be allowed to remain with him.  

77. The crucial words in the said paragraph can be  

mentioned again in order to appreciate and understand the  

legal position noted. They are:

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Page 95

“It may be noted that the Andhra Pradesh Act came  into force on January 1, 1975 and it was with  reference to this date that the surplus holding of land  in excess of the ceiling area was required to be  determined and if there was any surplus, it was  required to be determined and if there was any  surplus, it was to be surrendered to the State  Government. It is, therefore, clear that in an area  other than that comprised with Urban Agglomeration  referred to in Section 2(n)(A) (i), land held by a person  in excess of the ceiling area would be liable to be  determined as on January 1, 1975 under the Andhra  Pradesh Act and only Land within the ceiling area  would be allowed to remain with him. It is only in  respect of Land remaining with a person, whether an  individual or a family unit, after the operation of the  Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central Act would  apply….”

“Undoubtedly, when an area is notified as an urban  agglomeration under Section 2(n)(A)(ii), the Central  Act would apply to land situate in such area and the  Andhra Pradesh Act would cease to have application,  but     by     that     time     the     Andhra     Pradesh     Act     would     have    already     operated     to     determine     the     ceiling     on     holding    of     land     falling     within     the     definition     in     Section     3(j)     and    situate     within     such     area  . It is therefore not possible to  uphold the contention of the landholders that the  Andhra Pradesh Act is ultra vires and void as being  outside the legislative competence of the Andhra  Pradesh Legislature.”

(Emphasis added)

A close and careful reading of the said statement of law  

declared by this Court makes it clear that if as on the date  

when the Andhra Pradesh Act was already in force i.e. as on  

01.01.1975, the determination of surplus land as per the  

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Page 96

provisions of the said Act should have been determined and  

only thereafter the implication of the Act, 1976 could be  

applied.  The specific statements “It is only in respect of land  

remaining with a person, whether an individual or a family unit,  

after the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act, that the Central  

Act would apply…..” “…..but by that time the Andhra Pradesh  

Act would have already operated to determine the ceiling on  

holding of land falling within the definition in Section 3(j) and  

situate within such area…..” makes the above position clear  

without any ambiguity.  

78. Afortiori if  the said ratio decided by the Constitution  

Bench of this Court is applied, there would be no difficulty  

in holding that as held by us earlier, since as per the un-

amended Act of 1960, ‘Bid land’ held by the respondent fell  

within the definition of ‘agriculture’ under Section 2(1) and  

consequent definition of ‘land’ as defined in Section 2(17) of  

the Act of 1960, the determination of holding of such  

excess agriculture land under the said Act of 1960 prior to  

the coming into force of the Act, 1976 should be operated  

upon.  Having regard to the said legal position, we hold that  

the action of the appellants in having passed the orders  

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Page 97

impugned before the High Court were fully justified and  

interfering with the same by the learned Single Judge and  

the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned  

order in this Civil Appeal are liable to be set aside.

79. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the  

High Court proceeded mainly on the footing that the  

Amended Act of 1974 cannot form the basis for proceeding  

against the respondent for the purpose of acquisition under  

the 1960 Act in the light of the field being occupied by the  

Act, 1976 which came into force prior to the coming into  

force of the 1974 Act, namely, on 17.02.1976 and the  

Amendment Act of 1974 which came to be notified only on  

01.04.1976. The said conclusion was based on the  

implication of Article 252(2) of the Constitution wherein  

once at the instance of the State Government even in  

relation to any entry in List II an enactment came to be  

made by the Parliament, any subsequent amendment  

relating to the said subject can only be made by the  

Parliament and not by the State. The Division Bench  

referred to the claim of the appellant that even by ignoring  

the Amendment Act 1974 which came into effect from  

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Page 98

01.04.1976 having regard to the existence of the Act, 1976  

as from 17.02.1976, the ceiling with regard to the  

agricultural land has to be determined as it was existing  

prior to 17.02.1976, namely, as agricultural land and the  

same being not part of urban agglomeration the 1960 Act  

would apply.  We find that the said argument was simply  

brushed aside. The submission was not dealt with in the  

proper perspective.

80. It was lastly contended by the learned senior counsel for  

the respondent that the case of the appellants was hit by  

the principle of res judicata.  In support of the said  

submission, reliance was placed upon the joint affidavit  

filed by two Deputy Collector dated 06.10.1980, filed in a  

different case viz., in Special Civil Application No.941 of  

1980 before the High Court of Gujarat where on behalf of  

the State of Gujarat, it was contended that in respect of  

‘Bid land’ only Act, 1976 would apply where such ‘Bid land’  

lie within the agglomeration of Bhavnagar and that Act of  

1960 was not applicable.  Reliance was also placed upon  

another affidavit dated 16.02.2000, filed by the Deputy  

Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat in  

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Page 99

relation to Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  before the High Court of  

Gujarat in S.C.A.No.15529 of 1999, wherein a stand was  

taken by the State Government that possession of  

Bhavnagar ‘Bid land’  not having been acquired and taken  

under the Act, 1976 prior to its repeal, there was no scope  

to take possession of those lands.  Reliance was placed  

upon the decision of this Court in Palitana Sugar Mills (P)  

Ltd. and another Vs. State of Gujarat and others  

(supra)wherein, it was concluded by this Court that  

Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  were controlled by the provisions of  

Act, 1976 and not by the Act of 1960.  By referring to those  

affidavits and the decision of this Court, the contention was  

that the stand taken by the appellant in regard to the  

Bhavnagar ‘Bid lands’  would apply in all force to the ‘Bid  

lands’  belonging to the respondent though they were  

situated in Rajkot.

81. In reply to the said submission Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee,  

learned senior counsel for the appellants contended that  

the principle of res judicata cannot be applied as the parties  

were different and the subject lands were different and the  

respondent had nothing to do with the issue raised in the  Civil Appeal No.612 of 2002  99 of 105

Page 100

decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the  

respondent. It was also submitted that since the  

ingredients to support the principle of res judicata as set  

out under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure not  

having been fulfilled, the submission of the learned senior  

counsel for the respondent cannot be considered. The  

learned senior counsel for the appellants brought to our  

notice the facts set out in the joint affidavits of the two  

Deputy Collectors in S.C.A. No.941 of 1980, wherein it was  

specifically averred to the effect that since long time, to the  

knowledge of the land holders, the land in question was  

demonstrated as meant for residential purpose in the  

Master Plan which was prepared since August, 1976 and  

that the land in question fell within the definition of ‘urban  

land’ under Section 2(o) of the Act, 1976 and therefore the  

overriding effect of Section 42 of the Act, 1976 excluded the  

application of the Act of 1960.

82. When we refer to the facts mentioned in the joint affidavit  

of the two Deputy Collector in S.C.A.No.941 of 1980, we  

find that the submissions of the learned senior counsel for  

the appellants were clearly set out therein. The lands which  

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Page 101

were originally classified as ‘Bid lands’  came to be  

specifically classified as land meant for residential purpose  

in the Master Plan prepared in the year August, 1976 and  

thereby came within the definition of ‘urban land’  under  

Section 2(o) of the Act, 1976.  Whatever decision rendered  

based on those facts cannot be equated to the facts  

involved in the case on hand, in order to apply the principle  

of res judicata and thereby non-suit the appellants.  The  

principle of res judicata is governed by Section 11 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure.  Applying the ingredients set out in  

the said provision, the respondent is bound to show that  

the issue which was directly and substantially involved  

between the same parties in the former suit and was tried  

in the subsequent suit, in order to fall within the principles  

of res judicata. Applying the substantive part of Section 11  

of C.P.C. we fail to see how any of the ingredients set out  

therein are fulfilled in order to apply the principle of res  

judicata. The parties are entirely different, the fact in issue  

as pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the  

appellants would disclose that they were based on entirely  

different set of facts and circumstances and therefore we do  

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Page 102

not find any substance in the said submission raised on  

behalf of the respondent. The said submission, therefore,  

stands rejected.

83. When we come to the submission relating to the concept of  

eclipse in relation to the Act of 1960, as it originally stood  

as well as after the Amendment Act of 1974 by virtue of the  

coming into force of the Act, 1976 w.e.f. 17.02.1976, we  

wish to only touch upon the position that occurred due to  

the subsequent repeal of the Act, 1976 in the year 2000.  

We are conscious of the fact that we are not solely  

concerned with the said issue of eclipse of the Act of 1960  

and its revival after the repeal of the Act, 1976. However,  

since the said issue was argued by the respective counsel  

and reliance was placed upon a Constitution Bench  

decision of this Court on this issue in M.P.V.  

Sundararamier (supra) we are obliged to deal with the said  

submission. In the said decision among other contentions a  

contention was raised on behalf of the petitioner therein  

which was as under:

“Section 22 having been unconstitutional when it  was enacted and, therefore, void, no proceedings  

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Page 103

could be taken thereunder on the basis of the  Validation Act as the effect of unconstitutionality of  the law was to efface it out of the statute book.”

Dealing with the said contention, the Constitution Bench  

has held at page 1469 and 1474-75 as under:

“…..If a law is on a field not within the domain of  the legislature, it is absolutely null and void, and a  subsequent cession of that field to the legislature  will not have the effect of breathing life into what  was a still-born piece of legislation and a fresh  legislation on the subject would be requisite. But     if    the     law     is     in     respect     of     a     matter     assigned     to     the    legislature     but     its     provisions     disregard    constitutional     prohibitions,     though     the     law     would    be     unenforceable     by     reason     of     those     prohibitions,    when     once     they     are     removed,     the     law     will     become    effective     without     re-enactment  .

The result of the authorities may thus be  summed up: Where an enactment is  unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest,  assuming of course that the two portions are  severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out  of the statute book as it admittedly must remain  there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid  portion thereof, and being on the statute book, even  that     portion     which     is     unenforceable     on     the     ground    that     it     is     unconstitutional     will     operate     proprio     vigore    when     the     Constitutional     bar     is     removed,     and     there    is     no     need     for     a     fresh     legislation     to     give     effect    thereto. On this view, the contention of the  petitioners with reference to the Explanation in s.22  of the Madras Act must fail….”

(emphasis added)

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Page 104

In the light of the said proposition of law laid down by  

the Constitution Bench decision of this Court, it will have to  

be held that once the Act, 1976 came to be repealed whatever  

constitutional embargo that was existing as against the Act of  

1960 as well as the Amendment Act of 1974 ceased to exist  

and the Act would operate in full force.  In the light of the said  

settled legal position, we need not dilate much on this issue  

and we leave it at that.

84. Having regard to our above conclusions, the judgment  

impugned in this appeal is liable to be set aside. The  

appeal, therefore, stands allowed. The order of the learned  

Single Judge as well as the impugned judgment of the  

Division Bench are set aside. The judgment dated  

08.09.1989 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in  

Revision Application No.TEN.B.R.4/84 confirming the  

orders of the Deputy Collector and Mamlatdar and A.L.T in  

so far as Bid lands in survey No.111/2 admeasuring 30  

acres 30 Gunthas and survey No.111/3 admeasuring 579  

acres 27 Gunthas stands restored. In the facts and  

circumstances of the case where we have dealt with pure  

questions of law there will be no order as to costs.  

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Page 105

             ………………………….J .

                                 [Dr. B.S. Chauhan]

   ……….…….………………………………J.

            [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]

New Delhi;  December 04, 2012

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