Page 1

1

REPORTABLE         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    CIVIL APPEAL NO.7729 OF 2009

 SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE    …………APPELLANT

Vs. SIDDHA MATH & ORS.  ……RESPONDENTS

WITH     CIVIL APPEAL NO.7730 OF 2009 CIVIL APPEAL NO.142  OF 2010 CIVIL APPEAL NO.221  OF 2010 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2981 OF 2010 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3414 OF 2010 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3415 OF 2010 CIVIL APPEAL NO.3446 OF 2010

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.14631-14632 OF 2015 (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.9167-9168 of 2010)

AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.9627 OF 2010

 J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.

Page 2

2

2. The  present  appeals  arise  out  of  the  impugned

judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original

Jurisdiction  Case  No.  2421  of  2000  and  other  Writ

Petitions  which  were  disposed  of  in  terms  of  the

judgment dated 07.07.2009 by the High Court of Orissa at

Cuttack,  whereby  the  High  Court  allowed  the  Writ

Petitions filed by the respondents herein and held that

as the disputed land was earlier settled in the name of

Shri  Jagannath  Mahaprabhu  Bije  Puri,  Marfat  Siddha

Brundaban  Ramanuj  Das  and  thus,  the  subsequent

settlement  made  in  favour  of  the  Temple  Managing

Committee  in  OEA  Claim  Case  No.  68/90  was  without

jurisdiction.  3.  As the facts in all the appeals are common, for

the sake of convenience, we refer to the facts of Civil

Appeal  No.  7729  of  2009,  which  are  stated  in  brief

hereunder:      The present case revolves around the ancient temple

of Lord Jagannath of Puri. The lands in question have

been accorded the status of ‘amrutamanohi’ properties.

On 18.03.1974, the State Government of Orissa issued a

notification  under  Section  3-A  of  the  Orissa  Estate

Page 3

3

Abolition Act, 1951(hereinafter referred to as the “OEA

Act,  1951”),  whereby  the  estate  of  Lord  Jagannath

Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri vested in the State Government.

The vesting notification was challenged by the Temple

before the High Court of Orissa in Original Jurisdiction

Case No. 233 of 1977. The High Court rejected the claim

of the Temple. The same was upheld by this Court vide

its  judgment  in  the  case  of  Lord  Jagannath  through

Jagannath Singri Narasingh Das Mahapatra Sridhar Panda

and Ors v. State of Orissa1. We will advert to this

judgment in detail at a later part of this judgment. The

State  Government  of  Orissa  subsequently  issued  a

notification dated 18.04.1989 and extended the time for

filing claims under Section 8-A of the OEA Act, within

which the Temple filed Claim Case No. 68 of 1990 for

recording  the  lands  in  question  in  favour  of  Shree

Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat Shree Jagannath

Temple Managing Committee. Vide order dated 30.11.1992,

the OEA Collector and Tahsildar, Puri observed that the

suit lands in question have been recorded in the name of

1 1989 (1) Suppl.SCC 553

Page 4

4

Shri  Jagannath  Mahaprabhu  Bije,  Srikhetra,  and

accordingly  settled  the  suit  lands  in  favour  of  the

Temple. In the year 2000, the respondent-Math filed a

Writ Petition before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack

in  Original  Jurisdiction  Case  No.  2421  of  2000,

challenging the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992

on  the  ground  that  the  lands  in  question  have  been

accorded the status of ‘amrutamanohi’ and that they were

recorded as Trust Estate as defined under Section 2(oo)

of the OEA Act, 1951 and that lands had wrongly been

settled in favour of the Temple. The High Court by the

impugned judgment dated 07.07.2009 set aside the order

of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 and held as under:

“……it is seen in the instant case, the property has been dedicated as Amrutmonahi to Lord Sri Jagannath  of  Puri  and  the  marfatdar  of  the property  is  Mahanta  Siddha  Brundaban  Ramanuj Das.  Thus,  the  property  is  attached  with  a charge of rendering service to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs threof as food offering to Lord Jagannath. It is further found that on the above analysis, the property cannot be held to be under the control of the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple but is a trust property attached with a charge and the trustee has to fulfil the wish of the dedicator

Page 5

5

of the said property by offering the usufructs to  Lord  Jagannath  as  food  offering.  However, since  the  trustee/marfatdar  is  the  Mahanta  of Siddha Math, it cannot be said that the math has absolutely  no  interest  over  the  said  property just  because  it  is  recorded  as  Amrutmonohi. Applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Mahanta Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das (supra) of the Supreme Court, it is seen that the Siddha Math is an institution, which comes within the definition of ‘Math’ as given in section 3 (vii) of  the  Orissa  Hindu  Religious  Endowments  Act, 1951.  The  property  involved  in  this  Writ Petition comes within the definition of “Trust Estate” as defined in section 2(oo) of the O.E.A Act and vested in the State Government pursuant to the notification made under Section 3-A of the O.E.A Act issued on 18.03.1974. It is also an admitted position that upon such vesting, the intermediary had a right to make an application under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.A Act. As a matter  of  fact,  as  stated  earlier,  such application  was  made  by  the  marfatdar  of  the property,  i.e  Mahanta  of  Siddha  Math  and  the land was settled in the name of Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu  Bije,  Puri  marfat  Mahanta  Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Hence there was no scope for the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple to make a subsequent application under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.A Act for re-settlement of the land and the impugned order dated 30.11.1992 having been passed without jurisdiction cannot be sustained and the said order is accordingly quashed.”

Hence,  the  present  appeals  have  been  filed  by  the

appellant Temple and State Government and others.

Page 6

6

4. We have heard the learned senior counsel for both

the parties. We have also heard Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, the

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Math in the

C.As. @ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9167-9168 of

2010 and Ms. V.S. Lakshmi, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the Math in C.A. No. 9627 of 2010. On the

basis of the factual evidence on record produced before

us, the circumstances of the case and also in the light

of  the  rival  legal  contentions  urged  by  the  learned

senior counsel for both the parties, we have broadly

framed the following points which require our attention

and consideration:- 1)  Whether  the  suit  lands  can  vest  in  the

respondent Math in the light of the provisions of

the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955? 2)  Whether even otherwise, the Math had the right

to prefer claim rights in respect of the Temple

Lands and initiate the proceedings under the OEA

Act, 1951 by virtue of being an intermediary? 3)  What order?

Page 7

7

Answer to Point No.1 5. At the outset, before we advert to the rival legal

contentions of the learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of both the parties, it is important for us to

examine the provisions of the relevant Acts, as well as

the previous judgments of this Court on the issue. There

are  two  important  acts  which  operate  in  the  instant

case. The first is the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955

(hereinafter referred to as the “Temple Act, 1955”). The

long title of the Act reads as follows:

“An Act to provide for better administration and  governance  of  Shri  Jagannath  Temple  at Puri and its endowments.”

The Preamble of the Temple Act, 1955 states as under:

“Whereas the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has ever since its inception been an institution of unique national importance in which millions of Hindu devotees from regions far  and  wide  have  reposed  their  faith  and belief and have regarded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. And whereas by Regulation IV of 1809 passed by the Governor-General in Council on 28th April, 1809  and  thereafter  by  other  laws  and regulations  and  in  pursuance  of  arrangement entered into with the Raja of Khurda, later designated  the  Raja  of  Puri,  the  said  Raja

Page 8

8

came  to  be  entrusted  hereditary  with  the management of the affairs of the Temple and its  properties  as  Superintendent  subject  to the  control  and  supervision  of  the  ruling power; And  whereas  in  view  of  grave  and  serious irregularities  thereafter  Government  had  to intervene on various occasions in the past; And  whereas  the  administration  under  the Superintendent has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize  the  scheme  of  management  of  the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide  better  administration  and  governance therefore  in  supersession  of  all  previous laws,  regulations  and  arrangements,  having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional  nitis and rituals contained  in  the  Record-of-Rights  prepared under  the  Puri  Shri  Jagannath  Temple (Administration) Act, 1952 (Orissa Act XIV of 1952)…………”

                 (emphasis laid by this Court)

Section 2 of the Temple Act, 1955 bars the operation of

the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 on the

Temple, and reads as follows:

“2  (1):  The  provisions  of  the  Orissa  Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa Act 2 of  1952)  shall  cease  to  apply  to  the  said Temple except with respect to actions taken, things done and contributions levied and the same  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  validly taken, done and levied as if this Act had not been passed: (2) All laws, regulations and other enactments passed for the purpose of providing for the management of the affairs of the Temple and

Page 9

9

its  properties  and  all  deeds  executed  in favour of and all arrangements entered into for the said purpose with the Raja of Khurda or the Raja of Puri, as the case may be, prior to the commencement of this Act, in so far as such  enactments,  deeds  or  arrangements  are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall cease to have any effect.”

Section  5  of  the  Temple  Act,  1955  provides  for  the

setting up of a Temple Managing Committee as under:

“5. Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or contract, Sanad, deed or engagement, the administration  and  the  governance  of  the Temple  and  its  endowments  shall  vest  in  a Committee  called  the  Shri  Jagannath  Temple Managing Committee constituted as such by the State Government, and it shall have the rights and privileges in respect thereof as provided in Section 33.”

Section  30  of  the  Temple  Act,  1955  grants  power  of

general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments

to the State Government which may pass orders for the

maintenance  and  administration  of  the  temple,  which

reads as under:

“30. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the general superintendence of the Temple and its  endowments  shall  vest  in  the  State Government which may pass any orders that may be deemed necessary for the proper maintenance

Page 10

10

or  administration  of  the  Temple  or  its endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple.”

Section  33  of  the  Temple  Act,  1955  empowers  the

Committee to be in possession of all the moveable and

immoveable properties belonging to the Temple. It reads

as under:

“33. (1) The Committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable  properties  including  the  Ratna Bhandar  and  funds  and  jewelries,  records, documents  and  other  assets  belonging  to Temple.”

6. A Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion

to examine the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 in

detail,  while  adjudicating  upon  its  constitutional

validity in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State

of Orissa2. Wanchoo, J., speaking for the bench observed

as under:

“This review of the provisions of the Act shows that broadly speaking the Act provides for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not interfere, with the religious affairs thereof, which have to be performed according to the record of rights prepared  under  the  Act  of  1952  and  where

2  AIR 1964 SC 1501

Page 11

11

there is  no  such  record  of  rights  in accordance with custom and usage obtaining inthe Temple. It is in this background that we  have  to  consider  the  attack  on  the constitutionality of the Act.”

After adverting to the history of the administration of

the Temple, it was also held:

“Finally  the  preamble  says  that  the administration under the superintendent has further  deteriorated  and  a  situation  has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better  administration  and  governance therefore in supersession of all       previous laws, regulations and arrangements, having regard  to  the  ancient  customs  and  usages and  the  unique  and  traditional  nitis  and rituals contained in the record of rights prepared under the  1952  Act.  So  for  all these  reasons  the  appellant  was  removed from the sole superintendence of the Temple and a committee was appointed by s. 6 of the Act for its management.”

                 (emphasis laid by this Court)

A perusal of the provisions of the Act and the decision

of this Court in the case of  Raja Bira Kishore Deb

referred to supra clearly shows that as far as Shri

Jagannath Temple of Puri is concerned, the position of

law is that all the endowments and properties belonging

Page 12

12

to the Temple vest in the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing

Committee.

7. We now turn our attention to the OEA Act, 1951. The

Act received the assent of the President on 23.01.1952.

The long title of the Act reads as follows:

“An act to provide for the abolition of all the rights,  title  and  interest  in  land  of intermediaries by whatever name known, including the  mortgagees  and  lessees  of  such  interest, between the raiyat and the state of Orissa, for vesting in the said state of the said right, title and  interest  and  to  make  provision  for  other matter connected therewith……”

All estates of the intermediaries were thus, abolished

and by way of a notification, stood vested in the State

Government. Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 (which

was inserted by way of an Amendment in 1974) defines a

Trust Estate as under:

“‘trust estate’ means an estate the whole of the  net  income  whereof  under  any  trust  or other  legal  obligation  has  been  dedicated exclusively  to  charitable  or  religious purposes  of  a  public  nature  without  any reservation  of  pecuniary  benefit  to  any individual :  Provided  that  all  estates  belonging  to  the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates

Page 13

13

by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates.”

(emphasis laid by this Court) Section 3 of the OEA Act, 1951 provides for vesting of

an  estate in  the State  by way  of a  notification as

under:

“3.  Notification  vesting  an  estate  in  the State  –  (1) The  State  Government,  may  from time to time by notification, declare that the estate  specified  in  the  notification  has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances.” “(3) Such  publication  shall  be  conclusive evidence of the notice of the declaration to everybody whose interest is affected by it.”

8. Section 2(oo) was inserted by way of an amendment

on 26.02.1974. On 18.03.1974, a notification was issued

by the State Government under Section 3-A whereby the

estate  of  Lord  Jagannath  vested  with  the  State

Government.  The  validity  of  the  notification  was

challenged,  which  came  for  consideration  before  a

Division  Bench  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Lord

Jagannath referred  to  supra.  This  Court  upheld  the

validity of the notification declaring the estate of

Page 14

14

Lord  Jagannath  as  ‘trust  estate’  after  giving  the

reasons as follows:

“It is true that an order was passed under s.13-G declaring the petitioner's estate as a trust estate" and further by  the insertion  of  clause  (oo)  in  s  2  the petitioner's  estate  continued  to  be  a 'trust estate", but  the  question  is  as to  what  is  the  legal  effect  flowing from  such  a  declaration  This  aspect  is dealt within s 13-I, which is quoted as under (omitting sub-section (2) which is not relevant in the present context):

"13-1.  Effect  of  orders  passed under section 13-G: (I)  All estates declared under this Chapter to  be  trust  estates    by  the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may       be, shall  he deemed to  have  been  excluded  from  the operation of the  vesting notification  and  never  to  have vested  in  the  State  in  pursuance thereof."        

It is manifest  from  the  language  of the  Section  that  it  saves  a  ''trust estate" so declared under s. 13-G from the operation of a notification issued under s. 3 or 3-A, but  does  not  extend  the benefit any further The provisions do not confer protection from the Act itself and cannot be interpreted to clothe  it  with a permanent immunity from being vested by a later notification issued under the Act Such  an  estate  could  be  vested  in  the State  of  Orissa  by  a  subsequent

Page 15

15

notification was made clear by clause (b) of s 13-K which reads as follows:

‘(a) . . . (b)nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to debar the State Government from vesting any trust estate by the issue  of  a  notification  under Section 3.’

Sections 7-A, 8-A, 8-D and X-E of the Act include  special  provisions  for  a  trust estate  and  unmistakably  indicate  that trust estates" are within the purview of the Act. The benefit they receive from a declaration  under  s.13-G  is  limited  and referable only to a vesting notification issued earlier. There is thus, no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the petitioner's estate could  not  be  vested  in  the  State  by  a notification issued subsequently.”

It  is  important  to  note  at  this  stage  that  while

upholding the validity of the notification, this Court

did not advert to the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955

at all.

9. Another judgment of this Court which is important

to be examined is the Constitution Bench decision in the

case  of  Mahant  Shri  Srinivas  Ramanuj  Das  v.

Page 16

16

Surjanarayan  Das3,  which  examined  the  nature  of

‘amrutamanohi’ properties.

10.  Mr.  M.L.  Varma,  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent Math contends that

the controversy in the instant case is squarely covered

by  two  judgments  of  this  Court,  the  Division  Bench

judgment  in  the  case  of  Lord  Jagannath and  the

Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Surjanarayan

Das referred to supra. The learned senior counsel places

strong  reliance  on  the  following  paragraphs  of  the

decision in the case of Surjanarayan Das (supra):

“40.  We  may  now  consider  the  properties  in schedule  Kha  said  to  be  the  Amruta  Monohi properties of Lord Jagannath and held by the plaintiff as marfatdar. The plaintiff alleges that these properties were acquired either by purchase  or  'krayadan'  or  by  way  of  gift subject to a charge of some offering to Lord Jagannath  which  depended  upon  the  individual judgment and discretion of the plaintiff, and that  the  public  had  no  concern  with  the enjoyment  or  management  of  the  usufruct thereof.  The  Gazetteer  makes  a  reference  to such properties and states:-

‘Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The lands of the latter are known as  Amruta  Manohi  (literally  nectar food), because they were given with the

3  AIR 1967 SC 256

Page 17

17

intention  that  the  proceeds  thereof should be spent in offering bhoga before Jagannath and that the Mahaprasad thus obtained  should  be  distributed  among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics; they are distinct from the Amrut Manohi lands of the Temple itself which are under the superintendence of the Raja.’

This  statement  makes  it  clear  that  lands endowed  to  the  temple  of  Lord  Jagannath  are distinct from the lands or property endowed to the  Vaishnava  Maths  for  the  purpose  of utilising the proceeds of those properties for offering bhoga before Lord Jagannath and the subsequent  distribution  of  that  Mahaprasad among  pilgrims,  beggars  and  ascetics, presumably  visiting  the  Math,  or  approaching its  authorities  for  a  portion  of  the  Maha Prasad. The mere fact that the proceeds of the properties  were  to  be  so  used,  would  not justify  the  conclusion  that  these  properties were not endowed to the Maths but were endowed to  the  temple  of  Lord  Jagannath.  Properties endowed to the temple of Lord Jagannath were, according to this statement, in the Gazetteer, not under the superintendence of any Math or Mahant  but  under  the  superintendence  of  the Raja of Puri himself. 41.  As  already  stated,  these  Amrut  Manohi properties are properties which are endowed to the  Math  by  the  devotees  for  a  particular service, which is done to Lord Jagannath by the Mahant on behalf of the Math. The properties are therefore properties endowed to the Math and not merely gifted to the plaintiff or, as had been suggested, to Lord Jagannath.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

Page 18

18

11. The learned senior counsel contends that since an

earlier  decision  of  this  Court  already  covers  the

controversy in the instant case, the same is binding on

the parties as well as this Court and this Court should

respect  the  principle  of  stare  decisis. He  further

contends that the judgments delivered in the case of

Surjanarayan  Das  and  Lord  Jagannath  have  held  field

since 1967 and 1989, respectively. The learned senior

counsel places reliance on a seven judges Bench decision

of  this  Court  in  State  of  Gujarat  v. Mirzapur  Moti

Kureshi  Kassab  Jamat,4 wherein,  while  examining  the

scope of the doctrine of stare decisis, it was held as

under:

“111. Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means "to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudication". This  principle  is  expressed  in  the  maxim "stare  decisis  et  non  quieta  movers"  which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as "Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to  rest  in  peace".  However,  according  to Justice  Frankfurter,  the  doctrine  of  stare decisis  is  not  "an  imprisonment  of  reason" (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd

4  (2005) 8 SCC 534

Page 19

19

Edition  2005,  Volume  4,  p.  4456).  The underlying  logic  of  the  doctrine  is  to maintain  consistency  and  avoid  uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not be  disturbed  only  because  another  view  is possible.  

xxx              xxx                 xxx

119.  Sir  John  Salmond,  while  dealing  with precedents  and  illustrating  instances  of departure by the House of Lords from its own previous decisions, states it to be desirable as 'it would permit the House (of Lords) to abrogate previous decisions which were arrived at in different social conditions and which are  no  longer  adequate  in  present circumstances. This view has been succinctly advocated by Dr. Goodhart who said: "There is an  obvious  antithesis  between  rigidity  and growth, and if all the emphasis is placed on absolutely binding cases then the law looses the capacity to adapt itself to the changing spirit of the times which has been described as the life of the law". This very principle has been well stated by William O' Douglas in the  context  of  constitutional  jurisprudence. He  says:  "So  far  as  constitutional  law  is concerned, stare decisis must give way before the  dynamic  component  of  history.  Once  it does, the cycle starts again".”

    The learned senior counsel further places reliance

on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  R.

Unnikrishnan  v. V.K. Mahanudevan5, wherein it was held

5  (2014) 4 SCC 434

Page 20

20

as under:

“19. It is trite that law favors finality to binding  judicial  decisions  pronounced  by Courts  that  are  competent  to  deal  with  the subject  matter.  Public  interest  is  against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of  judgments  pronounced  by  the  Courts  of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State of U.P. where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words:

‘It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the  binding  decisions  pronounced  by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The  binding  character  of  judgments pronounced  by  courts  of  competent jurisdiction  is  itself  an  essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.’

20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res-judicata is also fairly well settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court.  In  Mohanlal  Goenka  v.  Benoy  Kishna Mukherjee this Court observed:

‘There  is  ample  authority  for  the proposition  that  even  an  erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of

Page 21

21

a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as 'res judicata.’

21.  Similarly,  in  State  of  West  Bengal  v. Hemant  Kumar  Bhattacharjee  this  Court reiterated  the  above  principles  in  the following words:

‘A  wrong  decision  by  a  court  having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded  only  by  appeals  to  higher tribunals  or  other  procedure  like review which the law provides.’

22.  The  recent  decision  of  this  Court  in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India is  a  timely  reminder  of  the  very  same principle.  The  following  passage  in  this regard is apposite:

‘In  our  opinion,  if  the  parties  are allowed to reagitate issues which have been  decided  by  a  court  of  competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the  law  then  all  earlier  litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, every  time  either  a  statute  or  a provision  thereof  is  declared  ultra vires,  it  would  have  the  result  of reopening of the decided matters within the period of limitation following the date of such decision.”

12. The  learned  senior  counsel  contends  that  the

decision rendered by this Court in the case of  Lord

Jagannath referred to supra cannot be wished away by

branding it as per incuriam. It is an extremely serious

matter to contend that a judgment is per incuriam. It is

Page 22

22

contended  that  in  order  to  render  a  judgment  per

incuriam, it must be first shown that the oversight or

inadvertence is a glaring and obtrusive omission.

13.  Mr.  Harin  P.  Raval,  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee,

on the other hand, contends that the decision of this

Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra is

per incuriam as it was passed in ignorance of the Temple

Act, 1955. The learned senior counsel contends that the

judgment does not even notice Section 5 of the Temple

Act, 1955. The judgment was passed only on considering

the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951.  The judgment held

that it cannot be said that the estate of Lord Jagannath

could  not  be  vested  in  the  State  government  by  a

notification  issued  subsequently.  The  learned  senior

counsel contends that the OEA Act, 1951 is an Act which

was principally enacted for the purpose of abolishing

all  rights  in  land  of  “intermediaries”  between  the

Raiyats and the state by whatever name known and for the

vesting of the same in the state. It could thus, only

divest  the  intermediaries  of  its  rights  in  land  by

Page 23

23

vesting it in the State but cannot affect the statutory

vesting  of  all  endowments  in  the  managing  committee

under  Section  5  of  the  Temple  Act,  1955.  Thus,  the

provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 even by way of insertion

of Section 3A and the issue of a subsequent notification

cannot divest the absolute ownership of the endowments

of the Temple. The learned senior counsel submits that

the  endowments  vested  in  the  managing  committee  and

hence  it  ceased  to  be  an  intermediary  interest  and

became the absolute vested property of Lord Jagannath.

The  learned  senior  counsel  contends  that  a  decision

given in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the

force of a statue can be held to be per incuriam, as was

held by a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of

Muncipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  v.  Gurnam  Kaur6.   The

learned  senior  counsel  further  places  reliance  on

another decision of this Court in the case of State of

U.P  v. Synthetics  and  Chemicals  Ltd.,7 wherein  the

principle of per incuriam was discussed as under:

6  (1989) 1 SCC 101 7  (1991) 4 SCC 139

Page 24

24

“'Incuria  literally  means  'carelessness'.  In practice  per  in  curium  appears  to  mean  per ignoratium.' English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority' (Young v. Bristol  Aeroplane  Ltd.).  Same  has  been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while  interpreting  Article  141  of  the Constitution  which  embodies  the  doctrine  of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, this Court while pointing out  the  procedure  to  be  followed  when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench extracted  a  passage  from  Halsbury  Laws  of England incorporating  one  of  the  exceptions when the decision of an Appellate Court is not binding.”

The learned senior counsel further places reliance on

the decision of this Court in the case of  Fuerst Day

Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.,8 wherein this Court

examined  the  prior  decisions  on  the  issue  of  per

incuriam  at  length  and  arrived  at  the  following

conclusion:

“23.  A  prior  decision  of  this  court  on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. This is not  an  exceptional  case  by  inadvertence  or oversight  of  any  judgment  or  statutory provisions running counter to the reason and

8  (2001) 6 SCC 356

Page 25

25

result reached. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive  omission,  it  is  not  desirable  to depend  on  the  principle  of  judgment  'per incuriam'. It is also not shown that some part of the decision based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, hence the principle of per incuriam cannot be applied………”

14. The  learned  senior  counsel  contends  that  in  the

Lord Jagannath case, not only did the Court ignore the

provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, it also ignored the

decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raja

Kishore Deb referred to supra, wherein this Court has

held that the Lord Jagannath Temple occupies a unique

position  in the  State of  Odisha and  is a  temple of

national importance and no other temple in that state

can be compared with it. It stands in a class by itself

and  with  respect  to  be  a  subject  of  special

consideration by the State Government and thus requires

special treatment.

15. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced

by Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent Math. The decision of this

Court in the case of Lord Jagannath (supra) does not bar

Page 26

26

the present case by res judicata. The principle of res

judicata, codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil

Procedure has been examined in a catena of cases by this

Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in  Sheodan

Singh v. Daryao Kunwar9, held as under:

“A  plain  reading  of  s.  11  shows  that  to constitute a matter res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, namely - (i) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them  claim;  (iii)  The  parties  must  have litigated under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The court which decided the former suit  must  be  a  court  competent  to  try  the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is  subsequently  raised;  and  (v)  The  matter directly  and  substantially  in  issue  in  the subsequent  suit  must  have  been  heard  and finally  decided  by  the  Court  in  the  first suit.”

The above legal principles laid down by this Court have

been reiterated in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai

& Ors. v. Mohd.Hanifa & Ors.10, as under:  

9  AIR 1966 SC 1332 10  AIR 1976 SC 1569

Page 27

27

“…….it may be necessary to mention that before a plea of res judicata can be given effect, the following conditions must be proved- (1) that the litigating parties must be the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the suit also must be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between the parties; and (4) that the suit must be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

In the Lord Jagannath case referred to supra, this Court

was  concerned  only  with  the  validity  of  the  vesting

notification dated 18.03.1974, whereas in the instant

case, it is the validity of the order dated 30.11.1992

that is being examined, along with the question whether

land once vested for a particular purpose, namely, as

property of Lord Jagannath can be divested by operation

of another legislation. Since the subject matter of the

two cases is not identical, the bar of res judicata does

not  operate  on  the  proceedings  in  the  instant  case.

Further, it is well settled law that a question of law

can be raised at any time during the proceedings. In the

case  of  National  Textile  Corporation  Ltd.  v.  Naresh

Kumar Badrikumar Jagad11, it was held as under:-

11  (2011) 12 SCC 695

Page 28

28

“19. There  is  no  quarrel  to  the  settled legal proposition that a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising a pure legal issue for which no inquiry/proof is required can be permitted to be raised by  the  court  at  any  stage  of  the proceedings.”

16.  We  agree  with  the  contention  advanced  by  the

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellant Temple Committee. Most respectfully, we opine

that the decision of this Court in the case of  Lord

Jagannath referred to supra, wherein this Court upheld

the validity of the notification dated 18.03.1974 in so

far as it pertains to the estate of Lord Jagannath is

per-incuriam for non-consideration of the provisions of

Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 and the law

laid  down  by  this  Court  as  regards  between  the  two

State enactments, which one will be the Special Act

over other.  While the doctrine of stare decisis is

crucial to maintain judicial discipline, what cannot be

lost  sight  of  the  fact  is  that  decisions  which  are

rendered in ignorance of existing statutes and law laid

down by this Court cannot bind subsequent Benches of

Page 29

29

this Court. In the case of Moti Kureshi Jamat referred

to supra, it was held as under: “112. The trend of judicial opinion, in our view, is that stare decisis is not a dogmatic rule  allergic  to  logic  and  reason;  it  is  a flexible  principle  of  law  operating  in  the province  of  precedents  providing  room  to collaborate with the demands of changing times dictated  by  social  needs,  State  policy  and judicial conscience.”

It becomes clear from a perusal of the case law adverted

to by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant Temple Committee that a judgment can be

said  to  be  per  incuriam  when  it  is  passed  in

forgetfulness or ignorance of a statute operating in

that field. The notification dated 18.03.1974 vested the

estates of Lord Jagannath, Puri in the State Government

in  view  of  the  amended  provision  of  the  proviso  to

Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 inserted by way of an

Amendment in the year 1974. The judgment in the case of

Lord Jagannath was passed only on consideration of the

OEA Act, 1951. The provisions of the Temple Act, 1955,

which is the principal Act that applies to the Lord

Jagannath Temple, Puri were not adverted to at all.

Page 30

30

17. We now turn our attention to the validity of the

vesting order dated 30.11.1992 passed by the Tahsildar

of Puri in O.E.A Claim Case No. 68 of 1990, by which the

suit lands were settled in favour of the Temple. 18. Mr.  Harin  P.  Raval,  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee

contends that in view  of Section 5 of the Temple Act,

1955  read with Sections 16 and   33 of the  said Act,

all endowments of the temple, including the properties

belonging to or given or endowed for the support of the

Temple or given or endowed for the performance of any

service including the service of offerings to the deity

or  charity  connected  therewith  vest  in  Temple

Committee. The learned senior counsel contends that the

Temple Act,1955 is a special legislation enacted by the

State  Government  of  Odisha  and  thus  overrides  any

general  law  enacted.  The  learned  senior  counsel

contends  that  by  Section  5  of  the  said  Act,  the

property vested in Temple Committee. The vesting of the

property in the Temple Committee is statutory in nature

by  virtue  of  Section  5  of  the  Temple  Act,1955.  He

Page 31

31

further contends that once land has been vested with

the State, the same is not available for vesting again

merely  on  the  application  of  the  amended  provisions

inserted  later  in  another  Act.  The  learned  senior

counsel further contends that the Temple Act,1955 is a

special law enacted by which the properties      and

endowments  of  Lord  Jagannath  Temple,  Puri  stood

statutorily  vested  in  the  Temple  Committee.  The  OEA

Act,  1951,  on  the  other  hand,  was  enacted  for  the

purpose of abolishing all rights of  ‘intermediaries’

between  the  raiyats  and  the  State  by  whatever  name

known and for the vesting of the same in the State.

Thus, the provisions of the OEA Act, even by way of

insertion of Section 3A and the issue of a subsequent

notification cannot divest the absolute ownership of

the  endowments  of  the  Temple.  The  learned  senior

counsel  contends  that  the  endowments  vested  in  the

Temple  Committee,  and  thus,  ceased  to  be  an

intermediary interest and became the absolute vested

property of Lord Jagannath. The learned senior counsel

places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the

Page 32

32

case of  U.P State Electricity Board & Anr.  v. Hari

Shankar Jain & Ors.12, wherein this Court while holding

that the provisions of a special statute must prevail

over those of a general statute held as under:

“8.  The  maxim  "Generalia  Specialibus  non derogant"  is  quite  well  known.  The  rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary Seward v. The Owner of the "Vera Cruz" as follows: Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly  repealed,  altered,  or  derogated from merely by force of such general words, without  any  indication  of  a  particular intention to do so. 9.  The  reason  for  the  rule  that  a  general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes  its  entire  consideration  to  a particular  subject.  When  a  General  Act  is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament………”

The learned senior counsel further places reliance on a

more  recent  judgment  of  this  Court,  in  the  case  of

12  (1978) 4 SCC 16

Page 33

33

Commercial  Tax  Officer,  Rajasthan  v. Binani  Cements

Ltd. & Anr.13,  wherein after adverting to a number of

previous decisions on the aspect, it was held as under:

“46. In  Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar this  Court  has  observed  that  while determining the question whether a statute is a general or a special one, focus must be on the  principal  subject-matter  coupled  with  a particular perspective with reference to the intendment  of  the  Act.  With  this  basic principle  in  mind,  the  provisions  must  be examined to find out whether it is possible to construe harmoniously the two provisions. If it is not possible then an effort will have to be made to ascertain whether the legislature had  intended  to  accord  a  special  treatment vis-à-vis the general entries and a further endeavour will have to be made to find out whether  the  specific  provision  excludes  the applicability  of  the  general  ones.  Once  we come to the conclusion that intention of the legislation  is  to  exclude  the  general provision  then  the  rule  "general  provision should yield to special provision" is squarely attracted. 47. Having noticed the aforesaid, it could be concluded  that  the  rule  of  statutory construction  that  the  specific  governs  the general is not an absolute rule but is merely a strong indication of statutory meaning that can be overcome by textual indications that point  in  the  other  direction.  This  rule  is particularly applicable where the legislature has  enacted  comprehensive  scheme  and  has deliberately  targeted  specific  problems  with specific  solutions.  A  subject  specific

13  (2014) 8 SCC 319

Page 34

34

provision relating to a specific, defined and descriptable  subject  is  regarded  as  an exception to and would prevail over a general provision relating to a broad subject.”

19. Mr.  M.L.  Varma,  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent Math, on the other

hand, contends that Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955

only pertains to the administration and governance of

the  Temple  and  its  endowments  that  vest  in  the

committee. The Temple Act, 1955 was enacted because of

serious  irregularities  in  the  administration  and

governance  of  the  Temple  and  its  endowments  and  for

reorganizing the scheme of management of the affairs of

the  temple  and  its  properties.  Only  what  was  being

managed by the Raja of Puri was taken over under the

Temple  Act,  1955.  The  learned  senior  counsel  places

reliance on B.K Mukherjea’s ‘The Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust’ and contends that the respondent Math  is a  Vaishnava Math  of Puri.  The Math  and the

Jagannath Temple have co existed for centuries. Each is

a  separate  legal  entity,  holding  its  properties

separately  and  performing  its  religious  and  other

Page 35

35

functions  in  accordance  with  religious  customs  and

usage. The Math and the Temple hold their own properties

separately. Acquisition of property can be done only

through  transfer  or  succession.  The  learned  senior

counsel contends that the appellant Temple Committee has

not produced any evidence on record through which it

could  claim  the  ownership  over  the  property  of  the

respondent  Math.  The  learned  senior  counsel  contends

that the ‘amrutamanohi’ properties are endowed to two

different legal entities- the Temple and the Math. Thus,

it cannot be contended that the properties of the Math

belong to the Temple.

20.  The learned senior counsel further contends that

Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 which defines Trust

Estate,  was  inserted  in  the  year  1974.  Under  the

proviso, all estates belonging to the temple of Lord

Jagannath were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the

estate of Lord Jagannath came to be vested in the State

Government  vide  notification  dated  18.03.1974.  The

amendments to the OEA Act, 1951 were effected when the

Temple  Act,  1955  was  in  force.  The  learned  senior

Page 36

36

counsel contends that it is a well settled principle of

law that a subsequent legislation prevails over a prior

legislation.

21.  We accept the contentions advanced by the learned

senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant

Temple  Committee  and  are  unable  to  agree  with  the

contentions  advanced  by  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The Temple

and the Math are two distinct legal entities. The OEA

Act, 1951 was enacted to provide for the abolition of

all  rights,  title  and  interest  in  the  land  of

intermediaries and vesting the same in the State. The

Act  was  thus  meant  to  abolish  the  interest  of  the

intermediaries in the land. A Constitution Bench of this

Court, upholding the constitutional validity of the Act

in the case of K.C Gajapati Narayan Deo & Ors. v. State

of Orissa14 held as under:

“The primary purpose of the Act is to abolish all zamindari and other proprietary estates and interests  in  the  State  of  Orissa  and  after eliminating  all  the  intermediaries,  to  bring the ryots or the actual occupants of the lands

14  AIR 1953 SC 375

Page 37

37

in direct contact with the State Government. It may be convenient here to refer briefly to some of the provisions of the Act which are material for  our  present  purpose.  The  object  of  the legislation is fully set out in the preamble to the  Act  which  discloses  the  public  purpose underlying it. Section 2(g) defines an "estate" as meaning any land held by an intermediary and included under one entry in any of the general registers  of  revenue-paying  lands  and revenue-free  lands  prepared  and  maintained under the law for the time being in force by the  Collector  of  a  district.  The  expression "intermediary" with reference to any estate is then  defined  and  it  means  a  proprietor, sub-proprietor,  landlord,  land-holder... thikadar,  tenure-holder,  under-tenure-holder and includes the holder of inam estate, jagir and maufi tenures and all other interests of similar nature between the ryot and the State. Section  3  of  the  Act  empowers  the  State Government  to  declare,  by  notification,  that the estate described in the notification has vested in the State free from all encumbrances. Under  section  4  it  is  open  to  the  State Government,  at  any  time  before  issuing  such notification,  to  invite  proposals  from "intermediaries" for surrender of their estates and  if  such  proposals  are  accepted,  the surrendered estate shall vest in the Government as soon as the agreement embodying the terms of surrender  is  executed.  The  consequences  of vesting either by issue of notification or as a result of surrender are described in detail in section 5 of the Act. It would be sufficient for  our  present  purpose  to  state  that  the primary consequence is that all lands comprised in  the  estate  including  communal  lands, non-ryoti lands, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture  lands,  forests,  mines  and  minerals, quarries  rivers  and  streams,  tanks,  water

Page 38

38

channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazars, and buildings or structures together with the land on which they stand shall, subject to the other provisions of the Act, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the intermediary shall cease to have any interest in them.”

                    (emphasis laid by this Court)

On  the  other  hand,  keeping  in  view  the  growing

irregularities in the management of the affairs of the

temple, the Temple Act, 1955 was enacted by the state,

which  received  the  assent  of  the  President  on

15.10.1955. We agree with the contention advanced by Mr.

Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant Temple Committee that as far as

the  Jagannath  Temple  of  Puri  and  its  endowments  are

concerned, the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, being

the special law, take priority over the provisions of

any other legislation. Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955

makes it clear that the properties and endowments of the

Temple stand statutorily vested in the Temple Committee.

The  Constitution  Bench  judgment  in  the  case  of

Surjanarayan Das referred to supra draws a distinction

between the ‘amrutamanohi’ properties of the Math and

Page 39

39

the Temple in the following terms:

“40. The Gazetteer makes a reference to such properties and states:-

"Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The lands of the latter are known as Amruta Manohi (literally nectar food), because  they  were  given  with  the intention  that  the  proceeds  thereof should be spent in offering bhoga before Jagannath  and  that  the  Mahaprasad  thus obtained  should  be  distributed  among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics; they are distinct from the Amruth Manohi lands of the  Temple  itself  which  are  under  the superintendence of the Raja".

This  statement  makes  it  clear  that  lands endowed  to  the  temple  of  Lord  Jagannath  are distinct from the lands or property endowed to the  Vaishnava  Maths  for  the  purpose  of utilising the proceeds of those properties for offering bhoga before Lord Jagannath and the subsequent  distribution  of  that  Mahaprasad among  pilgrims,  beggars  and  ascetics, presumably  visiting  the  Math,  or  approaching its  authorities  for  a  portion  of  the  Maha Prasad. The mere fact that the proceeds of the properties  were  to  be  so  used,  would  not justify  the  conclusion  that  these  properties were not endowed to the Maths but were endowed to  the  temple  of  Lord  Jagannath.  Properties endowed to the temple of Lord Jagannath were, according to this statement, in the Gazetteer, not under the superintendence of any Math or Mahant  but  under  the  superintendence  of  the Raja of Puri himself.”

                  (emphasis laid by this Court)

Page 40

40

22.  The  OEA  Act,  1951  was  enacted  with  a  view  to

abolish  the  rights,  title  and  interest  of

intermediaries in the land in the State of Odisha. The

Statement of Objects and Reasons of the OEA Act, 1951

reads as under: “……in the interest of the cultivators of the soil and for the general, material and social advancement of the Province, it is necessary to remove  all  intermediaries  between  the Government and the ryots. The general consensus of  opinion  is  that  the    zamindari   system  has perpetuated assessment which has no relation to the  productive  capacity  of  the  land  and  has further  led  to  loss  of  contact  between  the Government and the actual cultivator and has acted as a break in agricultural improvement…… It  seems  without  a  social  change  in  the existing system of land tenure no coordinated plan  of  agricultural  reconstruction  can  be undertaken with a fair rent, fixity of tenure, proper  maintenance  of  irrigation  sources  and consequent  increases  of  crop  yield  and extension of cultivation.......”

                   (emphasis laid by this Court)

The  OEA  Act,  1951  was  thus  enacted  with  a  view  to

protecting the interest of the cultivators of the soil

and to do away with the evils of the zamindari system.

In the light of the same, it cannot be said that the

provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 will apply to the land

of the appellant Temple Committee over the provisions of

Page 41

41

the  Temple  Act,  1955,  which  is  clearly  the  special

legislation in the instant case. At this stage, it is

also crucial to examine the statement of objects and

reasons of the Amendment Act of 1974 by virtue of which

Section 2(oo) was inserted in the OEA Act, 1951. It

states as under:

“The  Orissa  Estates  Abolition  Act,  1951 provides for the abolition of temporarily and permanently  settled  zamindaris  and  other intermediary interests and tenures in the State of  Orissa.  All  estates  except  trust  estates have  vested  in  the  Government  by  virtue  of notifications  issued  in  that  behalf  by  the Government under the Act. For carrying out the purposes of trusts efficiently and to ensure proper  performance  of  traditional  rites  and rituals  in  the  religious  institutions  when trust estates are vested in the Government……and that  any  land  or  building  (being  part  of  a trust estate) vested in the Government maybe settled  in  certain  circumstances  with  the person who immediately before such vesting was an  intermediary  in  respect  of  such  land  or building.”

                    (emphasis laid by this Court)

A  perusal  of  the  aforementioned  objects  and  reasons

makes  it  clear  that  the  said  amendment  clearly

encroaches upon the field of the Temple Act, 1955.

Page 42

42

The  said  amendment  has  been  enacted  with  a  view  to

ensuring the proper performance of traditional rites and

rituals in the religious institutions. As far as the

Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri is concerned, the State

Legislature had already enacted the Temple Act, 1955 and

vested the land belonging to the Temple in the Temple

Management Committee by virtue of Sections 5 and 30 of

the Act of 1955. The object of the said Act was to

provide for better administration and governance of the

affairs of the Temple and its properties.      Thus,

proviso to Section 2(oo) of the            OEA Act,

1951, by which the estates belonging to the Temple of

Lord  Jagannath  at  Puri  within  the  meaning  of  the

Temple Act, 1955   are    deemed to  be Trust Estates is

in  direct  contravention  and    subversion  of  the

provisions  of the Temple Act, 1955. Further, even the

contention    advanced   on  behalf      of    the

respondent  Math  that  a   subsequent legislation takes

precedence  over  a  prior  decision  is  liable  to  be

rejected as the same is not tenable in law. The same

becomes clear from the decision of this Court in the

Page 43

43

case of U.P State Electricity Board referred to supra,

wherein  a  three  judge  bench  had  to  adjudicate  the

operation of a subsequent general legislation in the

following terms:

“We have already shown that the Industrial Employment  (Standing  orders)  Act  is  a Special Act dealing with a Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments. It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to  abrogate  the provisions  of  the  Industrial  Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying as they do hard-won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing  as  they  do  an  elaborate procedure,  including  a  quasi-judicial determination,  by  a  general,  incidental provision like Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act  and  Parliament  never  meant  that  the Standing orders Act should stand protanto

re pealed by Sec. 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act. We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must  prevail  over  S.  79(c)  of  the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.”

Further, Justice Krishna Iyer in the case of  LIC  v.

D.J. Bahadur15,  while examining the difference between

general and special statutes held as under:

15  AIR 1980 SC 2181

Page 44

44

“In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal  subject  matter  plus  the  particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity not absolutes-so too in life. The ID Act is a special statute devoted wholly to investigation and settlement of  industrial  disputes  which  provides definitionally  for  the  nature  of  industrial disputes coming within its ambit. It creates an infrastructure for investigation into, solution of and adjudication upon industrial disputes. It also provides the necessary machinery for enforcement  of  awards  and  settlements.  From alpha  to  omega  the  ID  Act  has  one  special mission-the resolution of industrial disputes through  specialised  agencies  according  to specialised  procedures  and  with  special reference to the weaker categories of employees coming  within  the  definition  of  workmen. therefore,  with  reference  to  industrial disputes between employers and workmen, the ID Act is a special statute, and the L.I.C. Act does not speak at all with specific reference to  workmen.  On  the  other  hand,  its  powers relate  to  the  general  aspects  of nationalisation,  of  management  when  private businesses are nationalised and a plurality of problems which, incidentally, involve transfer of service of existing employees of insurers. The workmen qua workmen and industrial disputes between workmen and the employer as such are beyond the orbit of and have no specific or special place in the scheme of the L.I.C. Act. And  whenever  there  was  a  dispute  between workmen and management the ID Act mechanism was resorted to.”

Page 45

45

Further, on the point of a subsequent legislation taking

precedence  over  a  prior  legislation,  he  observed  as

under:

“The general rule, that prior statutes are held to  be  repealed  by  implication  by  subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant, is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general, the rule of law being, as stated by Lord Selbourne in Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884) 10 AC 59 "that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force  of  such  general  words,  without  any indication of a particular intention to do so", "There  is  a  well-known  rule  which  has application  to  this  case,  which  is  that  a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. That this is the law cannot be doubted, and the cases on the subject will be found collected in the third edition of Maxwell is generalia specialibus non derogant-i.e.  general  provisions  will  not abrogate  special  provisions.  "When  the legislature  has  given  its  attention  to  a separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption  is  that  a  subsequent  general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special  provision  unless  it  manifests  that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

Page 46

46

23.   In the instant case, there is a clear conflict

between the proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act,

1951 and Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple Act, 1955. It

is also clear that both the above statutory provisions

of the Acts cannot survive together. While the rule of

harmonious construction must be given effect to as far

as possible, when the provisions of two statutes are

irreconcilable,  it  needs  to  be  decided  as  to  which

provision must be given effect to. In the instant case,

Section 2(oo) proviso in its entirety is not violative

of the provisions of the Temple Act. At the cost of

repetition, we reproduce the relevant part of Section

2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as under:

“Provided  that  all  estates  belonging  to  the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa Estate Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates.”

                    (emphasis laid by this Court)

It is only the first part of the proviso which is in

contravention of the Temple Act, 1955. If that part of

the proviso continues to be given effect, Sections 5 and

Page 47

47

30 of the Temple Act, 1955, by which the estates of Lord

Jagannath  Temple  at  Puri  are  vested  in  the  Temple

Committee  will  lose  their  meaning.  By  striking  down

Section  2(oo)  proviso  to  that  extent,  both  the

provisions will be able to operate.  

In  Commercial Tax Officer v. Binani Cements Ltd.16

this Court held as under:

“It is well established that when a general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the  rule  adopted  and  applied  is  one  of harmonious  construction  whereby  the  general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law,  is  impliedly  repealed. This  principle finds  its  origins  in  the  latin  maxim  of generalia  specialibus  non  derogant,  i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field on same subject.”

                 (emphasis laid by this Court)

   In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.

v. State of U.P.17,  a three judge bench of this Court

held as under:

“9. ...We reach the same result by applying another well known rule of construction that general provisions yield to special provisions. The learned Attorney-General seemed to suggest that  while  this  rule  of  construction  is

16  (2014) 8 SCC 319 17  (1961) 3 SCR 185

Page 48

48

applicable to resolve the conflict between the general provision in one Act and the special provision in another Act, the rule cannot apply in  resolving  a  conflict  between  general  and special  provisions  in  the  same  legislative instrument.  This  suggestion  does  not  find support in either principle or authority. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific  provisions  is  not  an  arbitrary principle  made  by  lawyers  and  Judges  but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions  one  covering  a  large  number  of matters in general and another to only some of them  his  intention  is  that  these  latter directions  should  prevail  as  regards  these while  as  regards  all  the  rest  the  earlier direction  should  have  effect.  In Pretty  v. Solly (quoted in Craies on Statute Law at p.m. 206,  6th Edn.)  Romilly,  M.R.,  mentioned  the rule thus: The  rule  is,  that  whenever  there  is  a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute and the latter, taken in its most  comprehensive  sense,  would  overrule  the former,  the  particular  enactment  must  be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. The rule has been applied as between different provisions  of  the  same  statute  in  numerous cases some of which only need be mentioned: De Winton v. Brecon, Churchill v. Crease, United States v. Chase and Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co. 10. Applying this rule of construction that in cases of conflict between a specific provision and a general provision the specific provision prevails  over  the  general  provision  and  the general provision applies only to such cases which are not covered by the special provision,

Page 49

49

we  must  hold  that  Clause  5(a)  has  no application  in  a  case  where  the  special provisions of Clause 23 are applicable.”

                  (emphasis laid by this Court)

It becomes clear from a perusal of the above mentioned

two judgments of this Court that while provisions of

different statutes must be harmoniously constructed as

far as possible, in cases where it is not possible, the

Court needs to examine as to which provision must be

given effect to.

24. In the case in hand, the first part of the proviso

of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 cannot be allowed

to sustain. Clearly, the intention of the legislature

could  not  have  been  to  render  virtually  the  entire

Temple  Act,  enacted  on  the  specific  subject,

meaningless, by way of enacting a proviso to Section

2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as an amendment in 1974,

which is the general legislation in the instant case.

Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951, thus, to that extent

requires to be struck down so that both the OEA Act,

1951 as well as the Temple Act, 1955 can be given due

effect  in  their  respective  field  of  operation.  In

Page 50

50

exercise of the powers conferred under Article 142 of

the Constitution, this Court can pass any order as may

be  “necessary  for  doing  complete  justice”  in  a  case

before it. In the instant case, great injustice will be

caused to the appellant Temple if the rights conferred

upon it by the Temple Act are allowed to be taken away

by operation of the proviso to Section 2(oo) of the OEA

Act. Therefore, we have to strike down the proviso to

Section  2(oo)  of  the  OEA  Act  and  also  quash  the

notification dated 18.03.1974 in so far as it relates to

the property of Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri.

25. Further, it is a settled principle of law that once

a  property  is  vested  by  an  Act  of  legislature,  to

achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested

by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest

such  property  under  such  law.  Similarly,  if  in  the

instant case, we were to accept the contentions advanced

by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent Math, then Sections 5 and 30 of the Temple

Act,  1955  will  be  rendered  useless  and  nugatory  and

thereby the laudable object and intendment of the Temple

Page 51

51

Act will be defeated and  the interest of the public at

large will be affected. Thus, the notification dated

18.03.1974 issued by the State Government under Section

3-A of the OEA Act, 1951, whereby the estate of Lord

Jagannath  Mahaprabhu  Bije,  Puri  vested  in  the  State

Government (in terms of Point (ii) of the notification),

is  liable  to  be  quashed  to  that  extent.  As  a

consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 passed by the

OEA Tahsildar, who falls within the inclusive definition

of Collector in terms of Section 2 (d) of the OEA Act,

1951, settling the land in favour of the Mahantas of

various  Maths  as  Marfatdars  of  the  Shri  Jagannath

Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the provisions

of the Temple Act, 1955 and is thus, liable to be set

aside.

Answer to Point No. 2 26. We will now examine whether even according to the

provisions of the OEA Act, 1951, the respondent Math had

the right to file an application for settlement of the

suit lands in terms of Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act,

Page 52

52

1951. There are certain provisions of the OEA Act, 1951

which need to be appreciated at this stage.

   Section 2(hh) of the OEA Act, 1951 defines an

intermediary interest as follows:

“‘Intermediary  interest’  means  an  estate  or any rights or interest therein held or owned by  or  vested  in  an  Intermediary  and  any reference  to  ‘estate’  in  this  Act  shall  be construed  as  including  a  reference  to ‘Intermediary Interest’ also”

   Section 8-A provides for filing of claims under

Section 6,7 and 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 which reads as

under:

“8-A. Filing of claims under Section 6, 7 and 8  and  dispute  relating  thereto  –  (1)  The Intermediary  shall  file  his  claim  in  the prescribed manners for settlement of fair and equitable  rent  in  respect  of  lands  and building which are deemed to be settled with him under Section 6 or Section 7 before the Collector within 6 (six) months from the date of vesting.”

27. Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent Math contends that Section

2(oo)of the OEA Act,1951 was amended in the year 1974, in

terms of which all estates belonging to the temple of

Lord Jagannath were deemed to be trust estates. Thus, the

Page 53

53

same vested in the State Government after notification of

18.03.1974. Thus, the provisions of Section 8A of the OEA

Act, 1951 come into play, and accordingly an intermediary

had the right to file its claim before the Collector

within six months. The learned senior counsel contends

that the lands of the respondent Math were recorded in

the Record of Rights, and the Tahsildar issued an inquiry

report which stated that the said respondents were in

possession  of  the  lands.  The  lands  were  accordingly

settled in favour of the respondent Math vide order dated

30.09.1981. The learned senior counsel further contends

that  the  application  filed  by  the  appellant  Temple

Committee  under  Section  8-A,  in  which  an  order  dated

30.11.1992 settling the lands in their favour was passed

was liable to be set aside, as the respondent Math herein

was not a party to the same. It is further contended that

the  order  was  liable  to  be  set  aside,  as  the  lands

already  settled  by  way  of  order  dated  12.01.1982  in

favour of the respondent Math, could not be re-settled as

the same were not available for the Collector to do so in

view of the earlier order, referred to supra.

Page 54

54

28. Mr. Shibasis Mishra, the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the State of Odisha, the appellant in Civil

Appeal No.142 of 2010 contends that after the decision

of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to

supra,  the  State  Government  vide  notifications  dated

18.04.1989 and 20.11.1990, extended the time period for

filing  of  claims  in  respect  of  estates  of  Lord

Jagannath. On 20.11.1990, the Temple Committee lodged

its claim recording the estates of Lord Jagannath in

favour of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat

through  Shri  Jagannath  Temple  Managing  Committee  by

filing Claim Case No. 68 of 1990. On 30.11.1992, the

order  was  passed  by  the  OEA  Collector  recording  the

properties in favour of the Temple Committee.

29. We cannot accept the contentions advanced by the

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

respondent Math. The Form ‘H’ submitted in terms of the

OEA Act, 1951 in Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that

while Column 9 “[Whether with respect to the lands in

possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or

Page 55

55

mortagagee on the date of vesting]” is marked as ‘Self

Possession’, and Column 11 “[If in the possession of a

temporary lessee or mortgagee give full details of the

lessee or mortgagee……]” has been left blank. Therefore,

the claim of the respondent Math and the basis of its

claim  is  not  stated  in  the  claim  petition.  In  the

absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer

claim under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951

before  the  Tahsildar  is  wholly  untenable  in  law.

Further, the order dated 12.01.1982, passed in OEA Claim

Case No. 58 of 1975 filed by the respondent Math to

settle the lands in their favour has been passed by the

Tahsildar, Puri. Section 8-A of the Act clearly provides

that the claims have to be filed before the Collector.

Mr.  L.  Nageshwar  Rao,  the  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the Tahsildar contends that the

definition  of  Collector  in  the  OEA  Act,  1951  is  an

inclusive one, and therefore he had the authority to

determine the rights of the respondent. We cannot agree

with  this  legal  contention  advanced  by  the  learned

senior counsel. The proceedings under Section 8-A, OEA

Page 56

56

Act, 1951 are quasi judicial in nature. The Orissa High

Court in the case of Bharat Bihari Mishra v. State of

Orissa18, has held as under:

“All the above provisions of the Act and the Rules go to indicate that the proceeding under Section 8-A(1) is quasi judicial in nature. The procedure for conduct of the proceeding has been provided in the Act and the different Rules as noted above.”

30. It is well settled in law that a quasi judicial

function  cannot  be  delegated  and  therefore,  the

inclusive reading of the definition of Collector under

Section  2(d)  of  the  OEA  Act,  1951  to  also  include

Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it pertains to

the discharge of administrative powers of the Collector.

In reference to the role of the Tahsildar under the OEA

Act,  1951,  this  Court  has  held  that  the  Tahsildar

performs  an  administrative  function  and  not  a  quasi

judicial  one.  In  the  case  of  Basanti  Kumar  Sahu  v.

State of Orissa19  a three judge bench of this Court has

held as under:

18  2012 (II) OLR 968 19  (1998) 8 SCC 722

Page 57

57

“If  it  had  been  an  order  made  on  the quasi-judicial side, the High Court would have held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under Section  38-B  and  there  would  have  been  no occasion to interfere with the order. The High Court justified the Board's order to the extent it  annulled  the  Tahsildar's  order  dated 17-12-1977 but interfered with it solely on the ground that the Board had no jurisdiction since the Tahsildar's order was not a quasi-judicial order. In other words, according to the High Court,  the  Tahsildar's  order  was  an administrative order. If that be so, one fails to understand why the matter should be remitted to  the  Tahsildar  once  again  to  take  an administrative decision? The order of the High Court is, therefore, unsustainable.”

31. Since the Tahsildar performs only an administrative

function  under  the  OEA  Act,  1951  and  not  a  quasi

judicial function, thus, he was not competent to pass

the order of settlement of claim either under Section 6

or 7 or 8 of the OEA Act, 1951. For the reasons stated

in answer to Point No.1 above, vesting of the suit lands

in favour of the Math is bad in law. Further, as we have

already held supra that once the land already vested in

the Temple Committee under Sections 5 and 30 of the

Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to deal

with  the  properties  endowed  to  the  appellant  Temple

Page 58

58

Committee,  the  same  could  not  have  been  divested  by

applying the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 by way of

an amendment to the Act by insertion of Sections 2(oo)

and 3A in the OEA Act, 1951, as the operation of the

said  Act  and  the  Temple  Act,  1955  are  in  different

fields  and  the  objects  and  intendment  of  the

abovementioned  two  Acts  are  entirely  different.  A

constitution  bench  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of

Calcutta  Gas  Company  Ltd.  v.  State  of  West  Bengal20

held  that  in  case  of  a  conflict  or  overlap  between

different entries, the rule of harmonious construction

must be applied to give effect to all the entries. This

Court held as under:  

“8.  ……Before  construing  the  said  entries  is would  be  useful  to  notice  some  of  the  well settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and this Court in the matter of  constructing  the  entries.  The  power  to legislate  is  given  to  the  appropriate Legislatures  by  Article  246  of  the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are  only  legislative  heads  or  fields  of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But

20  AIR 1962 SC 1044

Page 59

59

some of the entries in the different List or in the same List may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to reconcile the entries and bring about harmony between  them. When  the  question  arose  about reconciling  entry  45  of  List  I,  duties  of excise, and entry 18 of List II, taxes on the sale  of  goods,  of  Government  of  India  Act, 1935,  Gwyer,  C.J.,  in  In  re  The  Central Provinces  and  Berar  Act  No.  XIV  of  1938, observed :

"A grant of the power in general terms,  standing  by  itself,  would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other  express  provisions  in  the same enactment, by the implication of  the  context,  and  even  by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act."

The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state : "........... an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee  have  said  by  having recourse  to  the  context  and scheme  of  the  Act,  and  a reconciliation  attempted  between two  apparently  conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries  together  and  by interpreting,  and,  where necessary, modifying the language of the one by that of the other. If  indeed  such  a  reconciliation should  prove  impossible,  then, and  only  then,  will  the non-obstante  clause  operate  and the federal power prevail."

The Federal Court in that case held that the

Page 60

60

entry  "taxes  on  the  sale  of  goods"  was  not covered by the entry "duties of excise" and in coming to that conclusion, the learned Chief Justice observed :

"Here  are  two  separate enactments,  each  in  one  aspect conferring the power to impose a tax  upon  goods;  and  it  would accord  with  sound  principles  of construction  to  take  the  more general power, that which extends to the whole of India, as subject to  an  exception  created  by  the particular  power,  that  which extends to the provinced only. It is not perhaps strictly accurate to speak of the provincial power as  being  excepted  out  of  the federal  power,  for  the  two  are independent  of  one  another  and exist  side  by  side.  But  the underlying  principle  in  the  two cases  must  be  the  same,  that  a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a  particular  power  conferred  by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in  its  ordinary  and  natural meaning."

The  rule  of  construction  adopted  by  that decision for the purpose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting entries in the two Lists would  equally  apply  to  an  apparent  conflict between two entries in the same List. Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, held in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas Jethabai, that the words "administration of justice" and "constitution and organization of all courts" in item one of

Page 61

61

List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Government  of  India  Act,  1935,  must  be understood in a restricted sense excluding from their scope "jurisdiction and powers of courts" specifically dealt with in item 2 of List II. In the words of the learned Judge, if such a construction  was  not  given  "the  wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber." This rule of construction has not been dissented  from  in  any  of  the  subsequent decisions of this Court. It may, therefore, be taken as a well settled rule of construction that every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory.”

                    (emphasis laid by this Court)

   In the light of the reasons assigned by us in answer

to Point No.1 and held in favour of the Temple, there

was  no  need  for  the  Temple  Committee  to  file  claim

proceedings under Section 8-A of the OEA Act, 1951, in

respect of its own lands which were already vested in it

under Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The suit lands

vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, in view of

the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the settlement

of  the  suit  lands  in  favour  of  the  respondent  Math

cannot be sustained, as it is bad in law.

Page 62

62

Answer to Point No. 3 32. In view  of the  findings and  reasons recorded  on

Point Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the appellant Temple

Committee,  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated

07.07.2009 passed in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421

of 2000 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is liable

to be set aside and accordingly, we set aside the same.

33. Since  we  have  categorically  recorded  the  finding

both on facts and in law while answering Point No. 1 in

favour of the appellant Temple Committee holding that

the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 have no application

to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there

is no need for us to pass an order in favour of the

Temple under the OEA Act, 1951 as the suit lands were

already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple at

Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act,

1955.

Page 63

63

34. For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following

order :-

i)  C.A. Nos.7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009,142

of 2010, 221 of 2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414

of 2010,3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are

allowed. The impugned judgment and order

dated  07.07.2009  passed  in  Original

Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 by the

High Court of Orissa at Cuttack is hereby

set aside.

ii)  We strike down the first part of the

proviso of Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act,

1951, which pertains to the properties of

Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri.   iii)The notification dated 18.03.1974 issued

by the State Government under Section 3A

of the OEA Act, 1951 in so far as point

No. (ii) is concerned, is also quashed by

this Court, to the extent, it applies to

Page 64

64

the lands and estate of Lord Jagannath

Temple at Puri.   iv)  We make it very clear that the striking

down of the first part of the proviso to

Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act, 1951 as

mentioned  above  and  quashing  of  the

notification  referred  to  supra  will  be

prospective and this judgment shall not

be applicable to the settled claim of the

claimants hitherto under the provisions

of the OEA Act of 1951 in so far as the

lands  of  the  Lord  Jagannath  Temple  at

Puri are concerned.

v) In  view  of  the  disposal  of  appeals

above-mentioned in favour of the Temple

Managing Committee, C.A. Nos. @ SLP (C)

Nos.  9167-9168  of  2010  (filed  by  Sri

Raghab Das Math) and C.A. No. 9627 of

2010 (filed by Bauli Matha) are hereby

dismissed.  

Page 65

65

vi) No  costs  are  awarded  in  these

proceedings.  

 …………………………………………………………J.

            [V. GOPALA GOWDA]   

 …………………………………………………………J.

            [C. NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, December 16, 2015

Page 66

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

I.A. NO.7 OF 2016 IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   7729  OF 2009 Sri Jagannath Temple Mng. Committee Appellant (s)                  VERSUS Siddha Math & Ors. Respondent(s)

O R D E R

Heard learned counsel for the parties. We have perused the I.A. No. 7 of 2016.  It is

pointed out that in the judgment dated 16.12.2015 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7729/2009 and other connected appeals  in Paragraph  Nos.   16,  22,  23,  25  and  31  there  is  an inadvertent typographical error with regard to mentioning the correct provisions of the Temple Act, 1955.  Therefore, we  direct  that  in  the  aforesaid  paragraphs   wherever Section 30 is written it shall be substituted with Section 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 after deleting Section 30 of the Act.

Accordingly, I.A. No. 7 of 2016 is allowed. The  office  is  directed  to  issue  corrigendum  in

these matters and issue the copy of the corrected copy of the  judgment  along  with  corrigendum  to  all  concerned parties.  The  Registry  is  also  further  directed  to communicate the corrigendum to all the recognized Reporters for effecting correction.

........................J. (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

........................J. (C. NAGAPPAN)

New Delhi; Date: 27.04.2016.

Page 67

ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment      COURT NO.10               SECTION XIA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  7729/2009 SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MNG. COMMITTEE                Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS SIDDHA MATH & ORS.                                 Respondent(s)

WITH  C.A. No. 7730/2009  C.A. No. 142/2010  C.A. No. 221/2010  C.A. No. 2981/2010  C.A. No. 3414/2010  C.A. No. 3415/2010  C.A. No. 3446/2010  C.A. Nos.14631-14632 of 2015 @ SLP(C) No. 9167-9168/2010  C.A. No. 9627/2010   Date : 16/12/2015 These matters were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s)  Mr. Swetaketu Mishra, Adv.

Mr. Sanjay R. Das, Adv.                      Mr. V. K. Monga,Adv.                                            Mr. Shibashish Misra,Adv.                      Mr. Radha Shyam Jena,Adv.

                   Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, Adv.                      Mr. Rutwik Panda,Adv.

Ms. Anshu Malik, Adv.                      Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv.

Page 68

For Respondent(s)  Mr. Rajiv S. Roy, Adv.  Mr. Pranab Kumar Mullick, Adv.  Mr. Avrojyoti Chatterjee, Adv.  Mr. Sukumar, Adv.  Mrs. Soma Mullick, Adv.  Mr. Sebat Kumar Devria, Adv.  Mr. Abhijit S. Roy, Adv.

                    Mr. Satya Mitra,Adv.                      Mr. S. K. Verma,Adv.

Mr. Atul Kumar, Adv.                       CA 7730/09, 221/10  Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, Adv. and 3414/2010        Mr. Rutwik Panda,Adv.

Ms. Anshu Malik, Adv.                      Mr. Kunal Verma,Adv.                      Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra,Adv.

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010. C.A. Nos.7729 of 2009, 7730 of 2009,142 of 2010, 221 of

2010, 2981 of 2010, 3414 of 2010,3415 of 2010 and 3446 of 2010 are allowed and C.A. Nos.14631-14632 of 2015 @ SLP(C) Nos.  9167-9168  of  2010  and  C.A.  No.9627  of  2010  are dismissed in terms of the Signed Reportable Judgment.

         (VINOD KUMAR)        (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)

  COURT MASTER       COURT MASTER         (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

Page 69

69

ITEM NO.301               COURT NO.9               SECTION XIA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS I.A. 7/2016 in Civil Appeal  No(s).  7729/2009 SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MNG. COMMITTEE                Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS SIDDHA MATH & ORS.                                 Respondent(s) (for correction of typographical error and office report) Date : 27/04/2016 This application was called on for hearing today. CORAM :           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. GOPALA GOWDA          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN For Appellant(s)  Mr. J.K.Das,Sr.Adv.

Mr. Sanjay Kumar Das,Adv.  Mr. Swetaketu Mishra,Adv.  Mr. Sandeep Devashish Das,Adv.

                    Mr. V. K. Monga,Adv.                      For Respondent(s)                      Mr. Satya Mitra,Adv.                      Mr. S. K. Verma,Adv.                                 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

I.A. No. 7/2016 is allowed in terms of the signed order.

  (SUMAN WADHWA)          AR-cum-PS

      (CHANDER BALA)         COURT MASTER

Signed order is placed on the file.