REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1383 OF 2007

SRI INDRA DAS                            .. Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

STATE OF ASSAM                      ..          Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.  Service of Notice of  

Lodgment of petition of Appeal is complete, but no one has entered  

appearance on behalf of the sole respondent-State.

2. The facts of the case are similar to the facts in Arup Bhuyan  

vs.   State  of  Assam Criminal  Appeal  No.889 of  2007,  which we  

allowed on 3.2.2011.

3. As  in  the  case  of  Arup  Bhuyan  (supra),  the  only  evidence  

against the appellant in this case is his alleged confession made to a  

police  officer,  for  which  he  was  charged  under  the  Terrorist  and  

Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short ‘TADA’).

4. The facts of the case are that one Anil Kumar Das went missing  

from the evening of  6.11.1991,  and his dead body was recovered  

after two months on 19.1.1992 from the river Dishang.  Five persons  

including the appellant were charged for his death.   The appellant  

was not named in the FIR.  No prosecution witness has attributed any  

role to the appellant.  The charge sheet in the case was filed after a  

gap of nine years from the date of the commission of the offence, and  

charges were framed more than four years after filing of the charge  

sheet.   There  is  no  evidence  against  the  appellant  except  the  

confessional statement.

5. The  alleged  confession  was  subsequently  retracted  by  the  

appellant.  The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other  

material.   We  have  held  in  Arup  Bhuyan’s  case  (supra)  that  

confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged  

to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its  

basis unless there is adequate corroborative material.  In the present  

case there is no corroborative material.   

6. However, the appellant has been convicted under Section 3(5)  

of TADA which makes mere membership of a banned organization a

criminal act, and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and  

Rs.2000/- fine.

7. In  Arup  Bhuyan’s case (supra)  we  have  stated  that  mere  

membership of a banned organization cannot incriminate a person  

unless he is proved to have resorted to acts of violence or incited  

people  to  imminent  violence,  or  does  an  act  intended  to  create  

disorder  or  disturbance  of  public  peace  by  resort  to  imminent  

violence.  In the present case, even assuming that the appellant was  

a  member  of  ULFA  which  is  a  banned  organization,  there  is  no  

evidence to show that he did acts of the nature above mentioned.  

Thus, even if he was a member of ULFA it has not been proved that  

he was an active member and not merely a passive member.  Hence  

the decision in Arup Bhuyan’s case (supra) squarely applies in this  

case.

8. In our judgment in State of Kerala  vs.  Raneef 2011(1) Scale  

8  we had referred to  the judgment  of  the  U.S.  Supreme Court  in  

Elfbrandt vs.  Russell 384 US 17(1966) which rejected the doctrine  

of ‘guilt by association’.

9. In  Elfbrandt’s case (supra) Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for  

the Court observed :

“Those who  join  an  organization  but  do  not  share  its  unlawful  purposes  and  who  do  not  participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no  threat.  This Act threatens the cherished freedom of  association  protected  by  the  First  Amendment,  made  applicable  to  the  States  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.   ………A  law  which  applies  to  membership  without  the  ‘specific  intent’  to  further  the  illegal  aims  of  the  organization  infringes  unnecessarily  on protected freedoms.   It  rests  on  the doctrine of ‘guilt  by association’  which has no  place here.”    

10. The decision relied on its earlier judgments in  Schneiderman  

vs.  U.S. 320  US  118(136)  and  Schware vs.  Board  of  Bar  

Examiners 353 US 232(246).   The judgment  in  Elfbrandt’s case  

(supra) also referred to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court  in  

Scales  vs.   U.S. 367  US  203  (229)  which  made  a  distinction  

between an active and a passive member of an organization.

11. In Scales case (supra) Mr. Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme  

Court observed :

“The clause (in the McCarran Act, 1950) does  not  make  criminal  all  associations  with  an

organization which has been shown to engage in  illegal advocacy.  There must be clear proof that a  defendant  ‘specifically  intends  to  accomplish  the  aims of the organization by resort to violence’.  A  person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely  optimistic,  but  he  is  not  by  this  statute  made  a  criminal.”

    (emphasis supplied)

12. Elfbrandt’s case (supra) also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court  

decisions in Apthekar vs. Secretary of State 378 US 500, Baggett  

vs. Billit 377 US 360, Cramp vs. Board of Public Instructions 368  

US 278, Gibson vs. Florida 372 US 539, etc.

13. In Noto  vs.  U.S. 367 US 290(297-298) Mr. Justice Harlan of  

the U.S. Supreme Court observed :

“………The  mere  teaching  of  Communist  theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety  or  even moral  necessity  for  a resort  to  force and  violence, is not the same as preparing a group for  violent action and steeling it to such action.  There  must  be  some substantial  direct  or  circumstantial  evidence of a call to violence now or in the future  which  is  both  sufficiently  strong  and  sufficiently  pervasive to lend colour to the otherwise ambiguous  theoretical  material  regarding  Communist  Party  teaching.”

14. In Noto’s case (supra) Mr. Justice Hugo Black in a concurring  

judgment wrote :

“In 1799, the English Parliament passed a law  outlawing  certain  named  societies  on  the  ground  that they were engaged in ‘a traitorous Conspiracy  ……….. in conjunction with the Persons from Time  to  Time  exercising  the  Powers  of  Government  in  France …….’  One of the many strong arguments  made by those who opposed the enactment of this  law  was  stated  by  a  member  of  that  body,  Mr.  Tierney :

‘The remedy proposed goes to the putting an  end to all these societies together.  I object to the  system, of which this is only a branch; for the Right  Hon. gentleman has told us he intends to propose  laws from time to time upon this subject, as cases  may arise  to  require  them.   I  say these attempts  lead to consequences of the most horrible kind.  I  see that government are acting thus.  Those whom  they cannot prove to be guilty, they will  punish for  their  suspicion.   To support  this system, we must  have a swarm of spies and informers.  They are the  very pillars of such a system of government.’

The  decision  in  this  case,  in  my  judgment,  dramatically illustrates the continuing vitality of this  observation.

The conviction of the petitioner here is being  reversed  because  the  Government  has  failed  to  produce  evidence  the  Court  believes  sufficient  to  prove  that  the  Communist  Party  presently  advocates  the  overthrow  of  the  Government  by  force.”

                                        (emphasis supplied)  

15. In  Communist  Party  vs.   Subversive  Activities  Control  

Board,  367 US 1 (1961) Mr.  Justice Hugo Black in his dissenting

judgment observed :

“The first banning of an association because it  advocates hated ideas – whether that  association  be called a political party or not — marks a fateful  moment  in  the  history  of  a  free  country.   That  moment seems to have arrived for this country……  This  whole  Act,  with  its  pains  and  penalties,  embarks  this  country,  for  the  first  time,  on  the  dangerous  adventure  of  outlawing  groups  that  preach doctrines nearly all Americans detest.  When  the practice of outlawing parties and various public  groups begins, no one can say where it will end.  In  most  countries  such  a  practice  once begun ends  with a one party government.”      

16. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee  vs.  McGrath, 341  

US 123, 174 (1951) Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring judgment  

observed :

“In  days  of  great  tension  when  feelings  run  high,  it  is  a  temptation  to  take  short  cuts  by  borrowing  from  the  totalitarian  techniques  of  our  opponents.   But when we do, we set in motion a  subversive  influence  of  our  own  design  that  destroys us from within.”

                                        (emphasis supplied)  

17. In Keyishian  vs.  Board of Regents of the University of the  

State of New York, 385 US 589, 606 (1967) the U.S. Supreme Court  

struck down a law which authorized the board of regents to prepare a

list  of  subversive  organizations  and  to  deny  jobs  to  teachers  

belonging to those organizations.  The law made membership in the  

Communist  Party  prima  facie  evidence  for  disqualification  from  

employment.  Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court held that  

the law was too sweeping,  penalizing “mere knowing membership  

without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims.”

18. In Yates  vs.  U.S., 354 US 298 (1957), Mr. Justice Harlan of  

the U.S. Supreme Court observed :

“In failing to distinguish between advocacy of  forcible  overthrow  as  an  abstract  doctrine  and  advocacy  of  action  to  that  end,  the  District  Court  appears to have been led astray by the holding in  Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at  some future time was enough.  The District Court  apparently  thought  that  Dennis  obliterated  the  traditional  dividing  line  between  advocacy  of  abstract doctrine and advocacy of action.”

19. In Brandenburg  vs.  Ohio, 395 US 444(1969), which we have  

referred to in our judgment, the U.S. Supreme Court by a unanimous  

decision reversed its earlier decision in Whitney  vs.  California, 274  

US 357 (1927) and observed :

“The Constitutional guarantees of free speech

and free press do not  permit  a State to  forbid or  proscribe  advocacy of  the  use  of  force  or  of  law  violation except where such advocacy is directed to  inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is  likely to incite or produce such action.”

20. In  Whitney  vs.  California (supra) Mr. Justice Brandeis, the  

celebrated  Judge  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  in  his  concurring  

judgment (which really reads like a dissent) observed :

“Fear  of  serious  injury  cannot  alone  justify  suppression  of  free  speech  and  assembly.   Men  feared witches and burned women.  It is the function  of  free  speech  to  free  men from the  bondage of  irrational  fears.   To  justify  suppression  of  free  speech  there  must  be  reasonable  ground  to  fear  that  serious  evil  will  result  if  free  speech  is  practiced.   There  must  be  reasonable  ground  to  believe that the danger apprehended is imminent… …..  The  wide  difference  between  advocacy  and  incitement,  between  preparation  and  attempt,  between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne  in mind.”

                                        (emphasis supplied)  

21. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the same judgment went on to observe :

“Those  who  won  our  independence  by  revolution  were  not  cowards.   They  did  not  fear  political change.  They did not exalt order at the cost  of  liberty.   To  courageous,  self-reliant  men,  with  confidence  in  the  power  of  free  and  fearless  reasoning applied through the processes of popular  government, no danger flowing from speech can be  deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of

the  evil  apprehended  is  so  imminent  that  it  may  befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.  If  there be time to expose through discussion the  falsehood  and  fallacies,  to  avert  the  evil  by  the  process of education, the remedy to be applied is  more speech, not enforced silence.”

22. In  Gitlow  vs.   New York,  268  US 652  (1925)  Mr.  Justice  

Holmes  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  (with  whom  Justice  Brandeis  

joined) in his dissenting judgment observed :

………..“If  what  I  think  the  correct  test  is  applied,  it  is  manifest  that  there  was  no  present  danger of an attempt to overthrow the government  by force on the part of the admittedly small minority  who shared the defendant’s views.  It  is said that  this Manifesto was more than a theory, that it was  an incitement.  Every idea is an incitement.  It offers  itself for belief, and, if believed, it is acted on unless  some other belief  outweighs it,  or  some failure of  energy stifles the movement at its birth.  The only  difference  between  the  expression  of  an  opinion  and  an  incitement  in  the  narrower  sense  is  the  speaker’s enthusiasm for the result.  Eloquence my  set fire to reason.  But whatever may be thought of  the redundant discourse before us, it had no chance  of  starting a present conflagration.   If,  in the long  run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship  are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces  of the community, the only meaning of free speech  is that they should be given their chance and have  their way.  

If  the publication of this document had been  laid  as  an  attempt  to  induce  an  uprising  against  government at once, and not at some indefinite time

in  the  future,  it  would  have  presented  a  different  question.   The  object  would  have  been  one  with  which  the  law  might  deal,  subject  to  the  doubt  whether there was any danger that the publication  could  produce  any  result;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  it  was  not  futile  and  too  remote  from  possible consequences.  But the indictment alleges  the publication and nothing more.”

23. In  Terminiello  vs.   Chicago,  337 US 1 (1949)  Mr.  Justice  

Douglas  of  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  speaking  for  the  majority  

observed :

“….[A] function of free speech under our system of  government is to invite dispute.  It may indeed best  serve its high purpose when it induces a condition  of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as  they are, or even stirs people to anger.  Speech is  often provocative and challenging.  It may strike at  prejudices and preconceptions and have profound  unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an  idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not  absolute,…is  nevertheless  protected  against  censorship  or  punishment,  unless  shown likely  to  produce a  clear  and present  danger  of  a  serious  substantive  evil  that  rises  far  above  public  inconvenience, annoyance or unrest….There is no  room under our Constitution for  a more restrictive  view.   For  the  alternative  would  lead  to  standardization  of  ideas  either  by  legislatures,  courts, or dominant political or community groups.”

24. In  DeJonge  vs.  Oregon,  299 US 353 (1937) Chief Justice  

Hughes of the U.S. Supreme Court  wrote that the State could not  

punish a person making a lawful speech simply because the speech  

was sponsored by a subversive organization.

25. In Abrams  vs.  U.S., 250 US 616 (1919) Mr. Justice Holmes of  

the U.S. Supreme Court in his dissenting judgment wrote :

“Persecution  for  the  expression  of  opinions  seems to me perfectly logical.  If you have no doubt  of your premises or your power and want a certain  result with all your heart you naturally express your  wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.  To  allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that  you think the speech impotent, as when a man says  that he has squared the circle, or that you do not  care  whole-heartedly  for  the  result,  or  that  you  doubt  either  your  power  or  your  premises.   But  when men have realized that  time has upset many  fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more  then they believe the very foundations of their own  conduct  that  the  ultimate  good  desired  is  better  reached by free trade in ideas, --  that the best test  of  truth  is  the  power  of  the  thought  to  get  itself  accepted in the competition of the market; and that  truth  is  the  only  ground  upon  which  their  wishes  safely can be carried out.  That, at any rate, is the  theory of our Constitution.  It is an experiment, as all  life is an experiment.  Every year, if not every day,  we  have  to  wager  our  salvation  upon  some  prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.  While  that experiment is part of our system I think that we  should  be  eternally  vigilant  against  attempts  to  check the expression of opinions that we loathe and

believe  to  be  fraught  with  death,  unless  they  so  imminently threaten immediate interference with the  lawful  and  pressing  purposes  of  the  law  that  an  immediate check is required to save the country.  I  wholly  disagree  with  the  argument  of  the  government  that  the  1st Amendment  left  the  common law as to seditious libel in force.  History  seems to me against the notion.”

                                        (emphasis supplied)  

26. It  has  been  submitted  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

Government  before  the  TADA  Court  that  under  many  laws  mere  

membership of an organization is illegal e.g. Section 3(5) of Terrorists  

and Disruptive Activities, 1989, Section 10 of the Unlawful Activities  

(Prevention ) Act 1967, etc.  In our opinion these statutory provisions  

cannot be read in isolation, but have to be read in consonance with  

the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by our Constitution.

27. The Constitution is the highest law of the land and no statute  

can violate it.  If there is a statute which appears to violate it we can  

either declare it unconstitutional or we can read it down to make it  

constitutional.  The first attempt of the Court should be try to sustain  

the validity of the statute by reading it down.  This aspect has been  

discussed in great  detail  by this Court  in  Government of Andhra

Pradesh  vs.  P. Laxmi Devi 2008(4) SCC 720.

28. In  this  connection,  we  may  refer  to  the  Constitution  Bench  

decision in Kedar Nath Singh  vs.  State of Bihar  AIR 1962 SC 955  

where the Supreme Court was dealing with the challenge made to the  

Constitutional validity of Section 124A IPC (the law against sedition).

29. In Kedar Nath Singh’s case this Court observed(vide para 26):

………….“If, on the other hand, we were to hold that  even without any tendency to disorder or intention  to create disturbance of law and order, by the use of  words  written  or  spoken  which  merely  create  disaffection  or  feelings  of  enmity  against  the  Government,  the  offence  of  sedition  is  complete,  then such an interpretation  of  the  sections  would  make  them  unconstitutional  in  view  of  Article  19(1)(a) read with clause (2).  It is well settled that if  certain  provisions  of  law  construed  in  one  way  would make them consistent with the Constitution,  and  another  interpretation  would  render  them  unconstitutional,  the Court would lean in favour of  the  former  construction.  The  provisions  of  the  sections  read  as  a  whole,  along  with  the  explanations,  make  it  reasonably  clear  that  the  sections aim at rendering penal only such activities  as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create  disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to  violence.”…………….

30. Section  124A which was enacted  in  1870 was subsequently

amended  on  several  occasions.   This  Court  observed  in  Kedar  

Nath’s case (supra) observed that now that we have a Constitution  

having Fundamental Rights all statutory provisions including Section  

124A  IPC  have  to  be  read  in  a  manner  so  as  to  make  them in  

conformity with the Fundamental Rights.  Although according to the  

literal  rule of interpretation we have to go by the plain and simple  

language of a provision while construing it, we may have to depart  

from the plain meaning if  such plain meaning makes the provision  

unconstitutional.   

31. Similarly,  we are of the opinion that the provisions in various  

statutes i.e. 3 (5) of TADA or Section 10 of the Unlawful Activities  

(Prevention) which on their plain language make mere membership of  

a banned organization criminal have to be read down and we have to  

depart from the literal rule of interpretation in such cases, otherwise  

these provisions will become unconstitutional as violative of Articles  

19 and 21 of  the Constitution.   It  is  true that  ordinarily  we should  

follow  the  literal  rule  of  interpretation  while  construing  a  statutory  

provision,  but  if  the  literal  interpretation  makes  the  provision  

unconstitutional we can depart from it so that the provision becomes

constitutional.   

32. As observed by this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh  

vs.  P. Laxmi Devi (supra) every effort should be made by the Court  

to try to uphold the validity of the statute, as invalidating a statute is a  

grave step. Hence we may sometimes have to read down a statute in  

order to make it constitutional.   

33. This  principle  was  examined  in  some  detail  by  the  Federal  

Court in In re Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, AIR 1941 F.C 12  

in considering the validity of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property  

Act, 1937.  The Act, which was passed by the Council of State after  

commencement  of  Part  III  of  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1935,  

when  the  subject  of  devolution  of  agricultural  land  had  been  

committed  exclusively  to  Provincial  Legislatures,  dealt  in  quite  

general  terms with the ‘Property’  or  ‘separate property’  of  a Hindu  

dying intestate or his ‘interest in joint family property’.   A question,  

therefore, arose whether the Act was ultra vires of the powers of the  

Central  Legislature.  The Federal  Court  held the Act  intra vires by  

construing  the  word  ‘property’  as  meaning  ‘property  other  than  

agricultural land’.  In the aforesaid decision Gwyer, CJ. observed : “If

that word (property) necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of  

property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond  

the powers of the Legislature; but when a Legislature with limited and  

restricted powers makes use of  a word of  such wide and general  

import,  the  presumption  must  surely  be  that  it  is  using  it  with  

reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent  

to  legislate  and  to  no  other.”  The  learned  Chief  Justice  further  

observed: “There is a general presumption that a Legislature does  

not intend to exceed its jurisdiction, and there is ample authority for  

the proposition that general words in a statute are to be construed  

with reference to the powers of the Legislature with enacts it.”

34. The rule  was applied  by  the  Supreme Court  in  Kedar  Nath  

Singh  vs.  State of Bihar (we have already referred to this decision  

earlier) in its construction of Section 124A of the IPC.  The Section  

which relates to the offence of sedition makes a person punishable  

who  ‘by  words,  either  spoken  or  written  or  by  sign  or  visible  

representations, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred  

or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the  

Government established by law’.  The Section, as construed by the

Privy Council in Bal Gangadhar Tilak vs.  Queen Empress ILR 22  

Bom 528 (PC); Annie Besant vs.  A-G of Madras AIR 1919 PC 31;  

and Emperor vs.  Sadasiv Narain AIR 1947 PC 84;  did not make it  

essential  for  an  activity  to  come within  its  mischief  that  the  same  

should involve intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance  

of  law and order  or  incitement  to  violence.   The Federal  Court  in  

Niharendra  Dutta vs.   Emperor AIR 1942 FC 22 had,  however,  

taken a  different  view.   In  the  Supreme Court  when the  question  

came up as to the Constitutional  validity of the Section,  the Court  

differing from the Privy Council adopted the construction placed by  

the  Federal  Court  and  held  that  on  a  correct  construction,  the  

provisions  of  the  Section  are  limited  in  their  application  “to  acts  

involving intention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of  

law and order or incitement to violence; and one of the reasons for  

adopting  this  construction  was  to  avoid  the  result  of  

unconstitutionality  in  view  of  Articles  19(1)(a)  and  19(2)  of  the  

Constitution.

35.  In Sunil Batra vs.  Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 1675  

the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 30(2) of the Prisons

Act, 1894, which provides for solitary confinement of a prisoner under  

sentence of death in a cell and Section 56 of the same Act, which  

provides  for  the  confinement  of  a  prisoner  in  irons  for  his  safe  

custody,  by  construing  them  narrowly  so  as  to  avoid  their  being  

declared invalid on the ground that they were violative of the rights  

guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.   

36. In  New India Sugar Mills vs.  Commissioner of Sales Tax  

AIR 1963 SC 1207, a wide definition of the word ‘sale’ in the Bihar  

Sales  Tax  Act,  1947,  was  restricted  by  construction  to  exclude  

transactions, in which property was transferred from one person to  

another  without  any  previous  contract  of  sale  since  a  wider  

construction would have resulted in attributing to the Bihar Legislature  

an intention to legislate beyond its competence.

37. In  Section  6(a)  of  the  Hindu Minority  and  Guardianship  Act,  

1956 which provides that the natural guardian of a minor’s person or  

property will be ‘the father and after him, the mother’, the words ‘after  

him’ were construed not to mean ‘only after the lifetime of the father’  

but  to mean ‘in the absence of’,  as the former construction would  

have  made  the  section  unconstitutional  being  violative  of  the

constitutional  provision  against  sex  discrimination  vide  Githa  

Hariharan vs.  Reserve Bank of India AIR 1999 SC 1149.

38. In  Govindlalji  vs.  State of Rajasthan AIR 1963 SC 1638,  

where  a  question  arose  as  to  the  Constitutional  validity  of  the  

Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (13 of 1959), the words’affairs of  

the temple’ occurring in Section 16 of the said Act were construed as  

restricted to secular affairs as on a wider construction the Section  

would have violated Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

39. This Court in R.L. Arora vs.  State of U.P. AIR 1964 SC 1230  

applied the same principle in construing Section 40(1), clause (aa) of  

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by Act 31 of 1962 so as  

to confine its application to such ‘building or work’ which will subserve  

the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company, for  

which  acquisition  is  made,  is  engaged.  A  wider  and  a  literal  

construction of the clause would have brought it in conflict with Article  

31(2) of the Constitution and would have rendered it unconstitutional.  

40. In  Indian Oil  Corporation vs.   Municipal  Corporation AIR  

1993 SC 844 Section 123 of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act,

1976 which empowered the Corporation to levy octroi on articles and  

animals ‘imported into the city’ was read down to mean articles and  

animals  ‘imported  into  the  municipal  limits  for  purposes  of  

consumption, use or sale’ only, as a wide construction would have  

made the provision unconstitutional being in excess of the power of  

the State Legislature conferred by Entry 52 of List II of Schedule VII  

of the Constitution.

41. A further illustration, where general words were read down to  

keep  the  legislation  within  permissible  constitutional  limits,  is  

furnished in the construction of Section 5 of the Lotteries (Regulation)  

Act, 1998 which reads: ‘A State Government may, within the State  

prohibit  the  sale  of  tickets  of  a  lottery  organized  conducted  or  

promoted by every other State’.  To avoid the vice of discrimination  

and excessive delegation, the Section was construed to mean that a  

State can only ban lotteries of  other States,  when it  decides as a  

policy to ban its own lotteries, or in other words, when it decides to  

make the State a lottery free zone vide BR Enterprises vs.  State of  

U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867.

42. It  may  be  mentioned  that  there  were  Constitutions  in  our

country even under British Rule e.g.  the Government of India Act,  

1935, and the earlier Government of India Acts.  These Constitutions,  

however, did not have fundamental right guaranteed to the people.  In  

sharp  contrast  to  these  is  the  Constitution  of  1950  which  has  

fundamental rights in Part III.  These fundamental rights are largely  

on the pattern of the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution.  

43. Had there been no Constitution having Fundamental Rights in it  

then of course a plain and literal meaning could be given to Section 3  

(5) of TADA or Section 10 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.  

But  since  there  is  a  Constitution  in  our  country  providing  for  

democracy and Fundamental Rights we cannot give these statutory  

provisions such a meaning as that would make them unconstitutional.  

44. In  State of of  Maharashtra & Ors.  Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao  Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613 (para 23) this Court observed :

“...Personal liberty is a precious right. So did the Founding  Fathers  believe because,  while  their  first  object  was to  give  unto  the  people  a  Constitution  whereby  a  government was established, their second object, equally  important,   was  to  protect  the  people  against  the  government.   That  is  why,  while  conferring  extensive  powers on the government like the power to declare an

emergency,  the  power  to  suspend  the  enforcement  of  fundamental rights or the the power to issue ordinances,  they assured to the people a Bill of Rights by Part III of the  Constitution, protecting against executive and legislative  despotism those  human  rights  which  they  regarded  as  fundamental.  The  imperative  necessity  to  protect  these  rights  is  a  lesson  taught  by  all  history  and  all  human  experience.  Our  Constitution  makers  had  lived  through  bitter years and seen an alien Government trample upon  human  rights  which  the  country  had  fought  hard  to  preserve.  They believed like Jefferson that “an elective  despotism was not the Government we fought for”.  And,  therefore, while arming the Government with large powers  to prevent anarchy from within and conquest from without,  they  took  care  to  ensure  that  those  powers  were  not  abused to mutilate the liberties of the people. (vide A.K.  Roy  Vs.  Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 271,  and Attorney  General  for  India   Vs.  Amratlal  Prajivandas,   (1994) 5  SCC 54.”   [emphasis supplied]

In  M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs.  Union of India &Ors. (2006) 8  

SCC 212, (para 20) this Court observed :

“It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from  the State to its citizens.  Individuals possess basic human  rights independently of any Constitution by reason of the  basic fact that they are members of the human race.”

In I.R. Coelho (dead) By LRs.  Vs.  State of T.N., (2007)  

2 SCC 1 (vide paragraphs 109 and 49), this Court observed :  

“It is necessary to always bear in mind that fundamental  rights have been considered to be heart and soul of the  Constitution.....Fundamental rights occupy a unique place  in the lives of civilized societies and have been described  in  judgments  as  “transcendental”,  “inalienable”,  and  primordial”.

45. The  appeal  is  consequently  allowed  and  the  impugned  

judgment is set aside.           

        ………................................J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

...........................................J. (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 10, 2011.