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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.854 OF 2011

SIRAJUL & ORS.                     …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

THE STATE OF U.P. & ANR.                   …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. The appellants have called in question the order dated

6th July,  2009 of  the  High Court  of  Judicature,  Allahabad,

Bench at Lucknow in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.2428

of 2009.  Thereby, the High Court declined to interfere with

the order of summoning and to quash the complaint dated

3rd May,  2008  registered  as  Criminal  Complaint  Case

No.1066  of  2008  under  Section  307  of  the  Indian  Penal

Code, P.S. Atrauli,  District Hardoi,  pending in the Court of

Judicial Magistrate-II,  Hardoi.  According to the appellants,

the  complaint  and  the  proceedings  were  gross  abuse  of

process of the Court having been filed after gross delay of

16 years after the incident.

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2. The incident in question took place on 11th February,

1992.  In respect of the said incident, there were two cross

cases  being  Crime Case  No.37/92  under  Section  307 IPC

registered  against  the  appellants,  and  Crime  Case

No.37A/92 under Section 307 IPC registered at the instance

of the appellants at Police Station Atrauli,  District  Hardoi.

The investigating Agency charge sheeted respondent No.2,

which gave rise to Session Trial Case No.760 of 1995. After

trial,  respondent  No.2  and  three  others  were  convicted

under  Section  307/34  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo

rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of

Rs.5,000/- each vide judgment dated 23rd September, 2009

by Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-I, Hardoi.  However, an

appeal  against  the  said  judgment  is  said  to  be  pending.

Respondent No.2, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

stated that he had also lodged a cross case.  He also led

defence evidence in support of the cross version.  Having

regard to the nature of injuries received on the side of the

appellants  and  other  evidence,  version  of  the  appellants

was  accepted  and respondent  No.2  and two others  were

convicted.   

3. What  is  significant  and  undisputed  is  the  fact  that

though  respondent  No.2  had  registered  Crime  Case

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No.37/92 on 11th February, 1992 against the appellants and

no  action  was  taken  thereon,  he   

kept quiet till  11th August, 2005.   Meanwhile, respondent

No.2  and  other  co-accused  were  charge  sheeted  on  21st

January, 1993 and session trial commenced against them in

the  year  1995.  It  was  only   

on  11th August,  2005  that  respondent  No.2  filed  an

application for summoning progress report  of  Crime Case

No.37/1992, so that the cross case against the appellants

could also be tried along with the trial against respondent

No.2.   

4. Case of respondent No.2 is that no order was passed

on the application but it was only on 1st February, 2008 that

respondent No.2 filed another application.  There is nothing

to show if  any other step was taken by respondent No.2

except  on  11th August,  2005   

and 1st February, 2008.   

5. Application filed on 1st February, 2008 was disposed of  

on 20th February, 2008 in view of the report of the police

that  the  appellants  were  exonerated  during  investigation

and the report was filed before the Court.  On 3rd May, 2008,

respondent No.2 filed the impugned complaint alleging that

the appellants  had committed offence under  Section 307

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IPC  on  11th February,  1992.   The  said  complaint  led  to

summoning  of  the  appellants  vide  order  dated   

3rd June, 2009 which was impugned before the High Court.

The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the appellants

for quashing on the ground that allegation in the complaint

and preliminary evidence led in support thereof made out a

case  for  summoning  and  thus  no  case  for  quashing  was

made out.

6. We have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and

perused the record.

7. While issuing notice on 23rd November, 2009 further

proceeding in Criminal Case No.1066 of 2008 pending in the

Court  of  Judicial  Magistrate-II,  Hardoi  was stayed and the

said order has been operative till date.   

8. Main contention raised on behalf of the appellants is

that the impugned complaint has been filed 16 years after

the incident and for 13 and a half years after the incident,

respondent  No2  did  not  persue  the  matter.   It  is  thus

submitted  that  since  the  complainant  kept  quiet  for  13

years after the incident and the complaint has been filed

after 16 years, respondent No.2 having been convicted in

the  cross  case,  the  prosecution  of  the  appellants  at  this

stage will be unfair and futile.   

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9. On  the  other  hand,  respondent  No.2-complainant

submitted that bar of limitation does not apply beyond the

statutory bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C.  A crime never dies.

A  criminal  offence  is  a  wrong  against  the  society  even

though  committed  against  an  individual  and  thus  the

prosecution cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of

delay.   In  support  of  this  submission,  reliance  has  been

placed in Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty  1.

10. In response to this stand of the complainant, learned

counsel for the accused submitted that even if it is assumed

that the appellants had caused the injury in question, the

nature of injury, in the circumstances can at best fall under

Section 324 IPC in which case bar under Section 468 Cr.P.C.

is  applicable.   In  any  case,  even  cases  not  covered  by

statutory bar of limitation could be held to be liable to be

quashed on the ground of violation of right of speedy trial

under Article21 of the Constitution.

11. We  have  given  due  consideration  to  the  rival

submissions.   The  question  whether  the  proceedings  in

criminal cases not covered by Section 468 Cr.P.C. could be

quashed  on  the  ground  of  delay  has  been  gone  into  in

several  decisions.   While it  is  true that cases covered by

statutory  bar  of  limitation  may  be  liable  to  be  quashed

1 (2007) 7 SCC 394

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without  any  further  enquiry,   cases  not  covered  by  the

statutory  bar  can be quashed  on the  ground  of  delay  in

filing of a criminal complaint  in appropriate cases.  In such

cases,  the  question  for  consideration  is  whether  there  is

violation of right of speedy trial which has been held to be

part of Article 21 of the Constitution having regard to the

nature of offence,  extent of delay,  person responsible for

delay and other attending circumstances.   In  this  regard,

observations in judgments of this Court may be referred to.

12. In Japani Sahoo (supra), it was observed :

“16. At  the  same  time,  however,  ground reality  also  cannot  be  ignored.  Mere  delay may  not  bar  the  right  of  the  “Crown”  in prosecuting “criminals”. But it also cannot be overlooked that no person can be kept under continuous  apprehension  that  he  can  be prosecuted  at  “any  time”  for  “any  crime” irrespective of  the nature or  seriousness  of the  offence.  “People  will  have  no  peace  of mind if there is no period of limitation even for petty offences.”

13. In  Vakil  Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar  2,  it  was

observed :

“18. Time  and  again  this  Court  has emphasised  the  need  for  speedy investigations and trial as both are mandated by the letter  and spirit  of  the provisions of CrPC [in  particular,  Sections  197,  173,  309, 437(6) and 468, etc.] and the constitutional protection  enshrined  in  Article  21  of  the Constitution.  Inspired  by  the  broad  sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by a seven-Judge  Bench of  this  Court  in  Maneka

2 (2009) 3 SCC 355

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Gandhi v.  Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] and  in  Hussainara  Khatoon  (1) v.  State  of Bihar  [(1980)  1  SCC  81]  this  Court  had observed  that  Article  21  confers  a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except according to  procedure  established  by  law;  that  such procedure  is  not  some  semblance  of  a procedure  but  the  procedure  should  be “reasonable,  fair  and  just”;  and  therefrom flows, without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It  was  also  observed  that:  [Hussainara Khatoon (1) case, SCC p. 89, para 5].

“5. … No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial  can be regarded as  ‘reasonable,  fair  or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21.”

The  Court  clarified  that  speedy trial  means reasonably  expeditious  trial  which  is  an integral and essential part of the fundamental right  to  life  and liberty  enshrined in  Article 21.

19. The exposition of Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon  (1)  case was  exhaustively considered afresh by the Constitution Bench in  Abdul  Rehman  Antulay v.  R.S.  Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225]. Referring to a number of decisions  of  this  Court  and  the  American precedents on the Sixth Amendment of their Constitution,  making  the  right  to  a  speedy and  public  trial  a  constitutional  guarantee, the  Court  formulated  as  many  as  eleven propositions with a note of caution that these were not exhaustive and were meant only to serve as guidelines.

xxxxxx

22. Speaking  for  the  majority  in  P. Ramachandra  Rao  [(2002)  4  SCC 578,  R.C. Lahoti,  J.  (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  while affirming that the dictum in A.R. Antulay case as correct and the one which still  holds the field  and  the  propositions  emerging  from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the  right  to  speedy  trial  laid  down  as

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guidelines in  the said case adequately take care of the right to speedy trial, it was held that:   (P. Ramachandra case, SCC p. 603, para 29)

“(3) … guidelines laid down in  A.R. Antulay case are not exhaustive but only  illustrative.  They  are  not intended to operate as hard-and-fast rules  or  to  be  applied  [as]  a straitjacket  formula.  Their applicability  would  depend  on  the fact situation of each case [as] [i]t is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalisation can be made.”

23. It  has  also  been  held  that:  (P. Ramachandra case, SCC p. 603, para 29)

“(4)  It  is  neither  advisable,  nor feasible, nor judicially permissible to draw or prescribe an outer limit for conclusion  of  all  criminal proceedings.”

Nonetheless,

“(5)  [t]he  criminal  courts  should exercise their available powers, such as  those  under  Sections  309,  311 and 258 CrPC to effectuate the right to  speedy  trial.  …  In  appropriate cases, jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be  invoked  seeking  appropriate relief or suitable directions”  **  .

                     (emphasis added)

The  outer  limits  or  power  of  limitation expounded in the aforenoted judgments were held  to  be  not  in  consonance  with  the legislative intent.

24. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions)  is  an  inalienable  right  under Article  21  of  the  Constitution.  This  right  is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the

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preceding police  investigations  as  well.  The right  to  speedy  trial  extends  equally  to  all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any  particular  category  of  cases.  In  every case,  where  the  right  to  speedy  trial  is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration  all  the  attendant circumstances,  enumerated  above,  and determine in each case whether the right to speedy  trial  has  been  denied  in  a  given case.”

14. In  Ranjan  Dwivedi vs. CBI  3,  declining  to  quash

proceedings even after 37 years of delay in completion of

trial, it was observed :

“23. The length of the delay is not sufficient in itself to warrant a finding that the accused was deprived of the right to a speedy trial. Rather,  it  is  only  one  of  the  factors  to  be considered,  and  must  be  weighed  against other factors. Moreover, among factors to be considered in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused is violated, the length  of  delay  is  least  conclusive.  While there  is  authority  that  even  very  lengthy delays do not give rise to a per se conclusion of  violation  of  constitutional  rights,  there  is also authority that long enough delay could constitute  per  se  violation  of  the  right  to speedy trial. In our considered view, the delay tolerated varies  with  the  complexity  of  the case,  the  manner  of  proof  as  well  as  the gravity  of  the  alleged  crime.  This,  again, depends on case-to-case basis. There cannot be  universal  rule  in  this  regard.  It  is  a balancing  process  while  determining  as  to whether  the  accused’s  right  to  speedy trial has been violated or not. The length of delay in and itself, is not a weighty factor.”

3 (2012) 8 SCC 495

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15. In  Sajjan  Kumar vs.  CBI  4,  even  after  23  years  of

delay in completion of trial, proceedings were not quashed

and it was observed:  

“39. In the case on hand, though delay may be  a  relevant  ground,  in  the  light  of  the materials  which  are  available  before  the Court through CBI, without testing the same at  the  trial,  the  proceedings  cannot  be quashed merely on the ground of delay.  As stated  earlier,  those  materials  have  to  be tested  in  the  context  of  prejudice  to  the accused only at the trial.”

16. In NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. vs. NOIDA  5, even  

delay of 17-18 years was held not to be adequate to stop  

criminal proceedings having regard to the gravity of  

offence, it was observed :

“21. Thus, it is evident that question of delay in  launching criminal  prosecution  may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving at a final decision,  but it  cannot itself  be  a  ground  for  dismissing  the   complaint. More so, the issue of limitation has to be examined in the light of the gravity of the charge.

xxxx

42. In  view  of  the  above,  we  are  of  the considered  opinion  that  these  allegations being of a very serious nature and as alleged, Respondent  4  had  passed  orders  in colourable  exercise  of  power  favouring himself  and  certain  contractors,  require investigation. Thus, in view of the above, we direct CBI to have preliminary enquiry and in case the allegations are found having some substance warranting further proceeding with criminal  prosecution,  may  proceed  in

4 (2010) 9 SCC 368 5 (2011) 6 SCC 508

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accordance with law. It may be pertinent to mention  that  any  observation  made  herein against  Respondent  4  would  be  treated necessary to decide the present controversy. CBI shall investigate the matter without being influenced by any observation made in  this judgment.”

17.  It is thus clear from the above observations that mere

delay in completion of proceedings may not be by itself a

ground to  quash proceedings where offences are serious,

but the Court having regard to the conduct of the parties,

nature of offence and the extent of delay in the facts and

circumstances  of  a  given case,  quash the proceedings in

exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Section  482  Cr.P.C.  in  the

interest of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the

Court.

18. In the present case, conduct of the complainant can

certainly  be  taken  into  account.   Admittedly,  the

complainant stood convicted in a cross case.  At least for

ten years after commencement of the trial, the complainant

did not even bother to seek simultaneous trial of the cross

case, the step which was taken for the first time in the year

2005  which could certainly have been taken in the year

1995  itself   when  the  trial  against  respondent  No.2

commenced. Having regard to the nature of allegations and

entirety  of  circumstances,  it  will  be  unfair  and  unjust  to

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permit respondent No.2 to proceed with a complaint filed 16

years after the incident against the appellants

19. We  accordingly,  allow  this  appeal  set  aside  the

impugned  order  and  quash  the  proceedings  in  Criminal

Complaint Case No.1066 of 2008 pending in the Court of

Judicial Magistrate-II, Hardoi.

…………..…………………………….J.   [ J. CHELAMESWAR ]

.…...….………………………………..J.                   [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

NEW DELHI JULY 6, 2015

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