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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1533-1534 OF 2005

SOMAN                    … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF KERALA … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Aftab Alam, J.

1. The  short  question  that  arises  for  consideration  in  these  

appeals is whether or not the social consequences of a culpable  

act and its impact on other people can be a relevant consideration  

for giving a heavier punishment, of course, within the limits fixed by  

the law. The facts and circumstances in which the question arises  

may be briefly stated thus. In October 2000, 31 people died, and

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more than 500  developed serious  sicknesses,  of  which  six  lost  

their  vision completely as a result  of consuming spurious liquor,  

contaminated  with  methyl  alcohol  at  different  places  in  Kollam  

district,  Kerala.  Cases were initially  registered at  different  police  

stations, but, later on, all the cases were consolidated into a single  

case and on the basis of  investigations made by the police,  48  

accused  in  all  were  put  on  trial.  The  accused  were  broadly  

classified into three groups: one, the maker and manufacturers of  

the spurious liquor; two, the distributors and suppliers of the killer  

brew;  and  third  the  retail  vendors  who  sold  the  stuff  to  the  

consumers. The appellant who was accused No.41 before the trial  

court fell in the third category. The prosecution case, insofar as the  

appellant is concerned, was that he was engaged in the sale of  

liquor and he received his supplies from accused Nos. 25 & 26.

2. Before the trial court the prosecution was able to successfully  

establish that on October 21,  2000, two days prior  to the tragic  

occurrence, fresh supply was brought to the appellant on a motor  

cycle.  The arrack received by him on that date was sold to various  

persons  and on consuming it,  they  became very  ill  and one of  

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them,  namely,  Yohannan  died.   The  post-mortem  report  of  

Yohannan showed that he died of methanol poisoning. At the time  

of  post-mortem  his  blood  and  urine  samples  were  taken  for  

chemical analysis and the report (Ext.P1059) showed presence of  

methyl  alcohol  in  the  samples.   Further,  on  the  basis  of  a  

disclosure statement made by the appellant [Ext.P413(a)] a plastic  

can (M.O.98) containing the residue of the spirit sold by him was  

recovered and seized from his  shop.  On chemical  analysis,  the  

contents of the can were found adulterated with methyl alcohol. On  

the basis of the evidences led before it, the trial court found and  

held,  and quite  rightly,  that  the  spirit  sold  by the  appellant  that  

caused  the  death  of  Yohannan  and  sickness  to  several  other  

persons  was  spurious,  being  contaminated  with  highly  injurious  

and poisonous substances and held him guilty of Sections 55(a) &  

(i),  57A and 58 of the (Kerala) Abkari Act (hereinafter ‘the Act’).  

The  trial  court  sentenced  the  appellant  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment for two years on each count and a fine of Rs.One  

Lakh on each count except under Section 57A and in default to  

undergo simple imprisonment for one year on each count. The trial  

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court also found the appellant guilty under Section 201 of the Penal  

Code and on that count sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment  

for six months and a fine of Rs.5,000/- with the default sentence of  

simple imprisonment for one month.  The trial court directed that  

the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.   

3. Against  the  judgment  and order  passed by  the  trial  court,  

appeals were preferred both by the accused, including the present  

appellant and the State.  The State in its appeal questioned the  

acquittal of some of the accused and also demanded enhancement  

of sentence in respect of those who were convicted and sentenced  

by the trial court. The High Court by its judgment and order dated  

October 8, 2004 dismissed the appeals of the accused, including  

the one by the appellant.  However, dealing with the question of  

sentence  on  the  basis  of  the  State’s  appeal  deemed  it  fit  to  

enhance the appellant’s sentence of imprisonment from two years  

to five years. In this connection, the High Court made the following  

observations:-

“….Evidence adduced in this  case clearly  establishes  that  A  41  sold  illicit  arrack  on  21.10.2000  and  22.10.2000  and  Yohannan  died  due  to  methanol  poisoning of taking liquor from him and several persons  

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were sustained injuries also.  His conviction for offences  under Section 55(a) and (i) and under Section 58 are  confirmed.   Even  though  he  was  only  a  small  retail  seller, who got liquor from A 25, one person died and  several persons were injured.  But, he is punished only  for  two  years  under  Section  55(a)  and  (i)  and  punishment  should  commensurate  with  the  offence.  Hence, his conviction and sentence under Section 57A  (2)  (ii)  is  confirmed.   Under  Section  55  maximum  punishment is ten years.  We are of the opinion that the  sentence imposed on him should be enhanced.  He is  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  five  years (instead of two years as imposed by the Sessions  Judge) and to pay a fine of Rs. one Lakh in default to  undergo simple imprisonment for six months on each  count under Sections 55(a) and (i). His conviction and  sentence  for  other  offence  are  also  confirmed.  Sentences shall run concurrently.”                  

4. Against the judgment and order passed by the High Court,  

the  accused  came  to  this  Court  in  different  batches.  In  some  

Special  Leave  Petitions  filed  by  different  accused  leave  was  

granted but the Special Leave Petition Nos.237-238 filed by one  

Sudhakaran  @  Sudha  and  the  present  appellant  was  initially  

dismissed  by  order  dated  January  24,  2005.   Later  on,  the  

appellant filed Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.613-614 of 2005, which  

were allowed by order dated November 14, 2005 and leave was  

granted. By the same order, the appellant was also enlarged on  

bail.

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5. Learned counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  did  not  at  all  

question  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  under  the  different  

provisions of the Act.   He has,  however,  vehemently contended  

that  the  High  Court  was  completely  wrong  in  enhancing  the  

appellant’s  sentence  and  imprisonment  from  two  years  to  five  

years.  Learned counsel submitted that the only ground on which  

the High Court has enhanced the appellant’s sentence was that the  

spirit  sold  by  the  appellant  led  to  the  death  of  one  person.  

According to  the learned counsel,  this  could not  have been the  

valid ground for giving a heavier punishment.      

6. Before  considering  this  submission  made  by  the  learned  

counsel, it will be apposite to take a look at the relevant provisions  

of the Act, including those under which the appellant has been held  

guilty.  Section 8 of the Act prohibits manufacture, import, export,  

transport, transit, possession, storage, sales, etc., of arrack and it  

is in the following terms:-

“8.(1)  Prohibition  of  manufacture,  import,  export,  transport,  transit,  possession,  storage,  sales  etc.,  of  arrack.-  No person shall manufacture, import, export,  transport,  [without  permit  transit],  possess,  store,  distribute, bottle or sell arrack in any form.

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(2)  If  any  person contravenes any  provisions  of  sub- section (1),  he shall  be punishable with imprisonment  for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine  which shall not be less than rupees one lakh.”

7. Section 55 of the Act insofar as relevant for the present, is as  

under:-

“55. For illegal import, etc.-Whoever in contravention of  this Act or of any rule or order made under this Act:

(a)imports, exports,  [transports, transits or possesses]  liquor or any intoxicating drug; or

(b) xxxx

(c) xxxx

(d) xxxx

(e) xxxx; or  

(f) xxxx; or

(g) xxxx; or

(h) bottles any liquor for purposes of sale; or

(i)  [sells  or  stores  for  sale  liquor]  or  any  intoxicating  drug;][shall be punishable]

(1) for any offence, other than an offence falling under  clause (d) or clause (e), with imprisonment for a term  which  may  extend  to  [ten  years  and  with  fine  which  shall not be less than rupees one lakh and]

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(2) for an offence falling under clause (d) or clause (e),  with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one  year,  or  with  fine which may extend to  ten thousand  rupees, or with both.”

8. Section 57A reads as under:-

“57A. For adulteration of liquor or intoxicating drug with  noxious substances, etc.-(1) Whoever mixes or permits  to be mixed any  noxious substance or any substance  which  is  likely  to  endanger  human  life  or  to  cause  grievous  hurt  to  human  beings,  with  any  liquor  or  intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable-

(i)  if,  as  a  result  of  such  act,  grievous  hurt  is  caused  to  any  person,  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which shall not be less than two years but which may  extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may  extend to fifty thousand rupees;

(ii) if, as a result of such act, death is caused to  any  person,  with  death  or  imprisonment  for  a  term  which shall not be less than three years but which may  extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine which may  extend to fifty thousand rupees;

(iii)in any other case, with imprisonment for a term  which shall  not be less than one year, but which may  extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to  twenty-five thousand rupees.   

Explanation.- For the purpose of this Section and  Section 57B, the expression “grievous hurt” shall have  the same meaning as in Section 320 of the Indian Penal  Code, 1860 (Central Act 45 of 1860).    

  (2) Whoever omits to take reasonable precautions to  prevent  the  mixing  of  any  noxious  substance  or  any  

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substance which is likely to endanger human life or to  cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or  intoxicating drug shall, on conviction, be punishable,-

(i)if  as  a  result  of  such  omission,  grievous  hurt  is  caused  to  any  person,  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which shall not be less than two years but which may  extend to imprisonment for lie, and with fine which may  extend to fifty thousand rupees;

(ii)if as a result of such omission, death is caused to any  person, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be  less  than  three  years  but  which  may  extend  to  imprisonment for life, and with fine which may extend to  fifty thousand rupees;

(iii)  in  any  other  case,  with  imprisonment  for  a  term  which shall  not be less than one year but which may  extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to  twenty-five thousand rupees.

(3) Whoever possesses any liquor or intoxicating drug  in which any substance referred to in sub-section (1) is  mixed, knowing that such substance is mixed with such  liquor  or  intoxicating  drug  shall,  on  conviction,  be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not  be  less  than  one  year  but  which  may extend  to  ten  years,  and with  fine which may extend to  twenty-five  thousand rupees.   

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973 (Central  Act  2 of  1974) no  person accused or convicted of an offence under sub- section  (1)  or  sub-section  (3)  shall,  if  in  custody,  be  released on bail or on his own bond, unless-

(a) the prosecution has been given an opportunity  to  oppose the application for such release, and

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(b) where the prosecution opposes the application, the  court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for  believing that he is not guilty of such offence.

(5)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Indian  Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)-

(a) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under  sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the burden of proving  that he has not mixed or permitted to be mixed or, as  the  case  may  be,  omitted  to  take  reasonable  precautions  to  prevent  the  mixing  of,  any  substance  referred  to  in  that  sub-section  with  any  liquor  or  intoxicating drug shall be on him;

(b) where a person is prosecuted for an offence under  sub-section (3) for being in possession of any liquor or  intoxicating drug in which any substance referred to in  sub-section (1) is mixed, the burden of proving that he  did not know that such substance was mixed with such  liquor or intoxicating drug shall be on him”

9. Section 58 reads as under:-

“58.  For possession of illicit  liquor.-  Whoever,  without  lawful authority, has in his possession any quantity of  liquor or of any intoxicating drug, knowing the same to  have  been  unlawfully  imported,  transported  or  manufactured,  or  knowing  [the  duty,  tax  or  rental  payable under this Act] not to have been paid therefor,  [shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which  may extend to ten years and with fine which shall not be  less than rupees one lakh].”          

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10. It  may  be  seen  that  all  the  three  provisions  as  contained  

under  Sections  55,  57A  and  58  provide  for  long  periods  of  

imprisonment,  leaving  it  to  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  fix  the  

exact sentence having regard to the facts and circumstances of a  

particular case. Section 57A which is one of the Sections under  

which the appellant is convicted provides for a minimum sentence  

of  three  years’  imprisonment.  When  it  was  pointed  out  to  the  

learned counsel that under the relevant provisions the sentence of  

imprisonment could vary from one day to ten years (under Section  

55) and from three years to a life term (under Section 57A(2)(ii))  

and from one day to ten years under Section 58, he replied that the  

appellant’s conviction was not maintainable under Section 57A(2)

(ii) and so far as Sections 55 and 58 are concerned, the relevant  

considerations for giving a life sentence of imprisonment would be  

the amount of spirit stored for sale.  According to him, the death of  

a person as a result of sale of the spurious liquor could not have  

been a ground for imposition of a heavier sentence.

11. We  find  no  substance  in  the  submissions.  First,  no  good  

reason  is  given  to  hold  that  the  appellant’s  conviction  under  

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Section 57 (2)  (ii)  is  not  sustainable;  secondly,  in  regard to  the  

main  issue  in  the  case,  i.e.,  whether  the  consequences  of  an  

offence  can  be  taken  into  consideration  for  determining  the  

appropriate  punishment,  a  complete  answer  is  to  be  found  in  

Section 57A itself. Under Section 57A, the adulteration of liquor or  

the omission to take reasonable precaution to prevent the mixing of  

any  noxious  substance with  any liquor  are made offences.  And  

then different sentences are provided in clauses (i),  (ii)  and (iii),  

depending  upon  the  different  consequences  resulting  from  the  

offence. In case of  grievous hurt,  the minimum sentence is  two  

years’ imprisonment, in case of death, three years and in any other  

case, one year’s imprisonment. There is no reason why the same  

basis  may  not  be  adopted  for  sentencing  under  the  other  

provisions of the Act, e.g., Sections 8, 55 (a) & (i) and 58.   

12. Giving punishment to the wrongdoer is  at  the heart  of  the  

criminal justice delivery, but in our country, it is the weakest part of  

the administration of  criminal  justice.  There are no legislative or  

judicially laid down guidelines to assist the trial court in meting out  

the just punishment to the accused facing trial before it after he is  

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held guilty of the charges. In  State of Punjab v. Prem Sagar1 this  

Court acknowledged as much and observed as under –

“2.  In  our  judicial  system,  we have not  been able  to  develop  legal  principles  as  regards  sentencing.  The  superior courts except making observations with regard  to  the  purport  and  object  for  which  punishment  is  imposed  upon  an  offender,  have  not  issued  any  guidelines. Other developed countries have done so. At  some quarters, serious concerns have been expressed  in  this  behalf.  Some  committees  as  for  example  Madhava Menon Committee and Malimath Committee  have advocated introduction of sentencing guidelines.”

13. Nonetheless, if one goes through the decisions of this Court  

carefully,  it  would  appear  that  this  Court  takes  into  account  a  

combination  of  different  factors  while  exercising  discretion  in  

sentencing, that is proportionality,  deterrence, rehabilitation etc.  

(See:  Ramashraya  Chakravarti v. State  of  Madhya  Pradesh2,  

Dhananjoy  Chatterjee  alias  Dhana  v.  State  of  W.B.3,  State  of  

Madhya Pradesh v.  Ghanshyam Singh4,  State of  Karnataka v.  

Puttaraja5,  Union  of  India   v. Kuldeep  Singh6,  Shailesh  

1 (2008) 7 SCC 550 2 (1976) 1 SCC 281 3 (1994) 2 SCC 220 4 (2003) 8 SCC 13 5 (2004) 1 SCC 475 6 (2004) 2 SCC 590

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Jasvantbhai  and  another v. State  of  Gujarat  and  others7,  

Siddarama and others  v. State of Karnataka8,  State of Madhya  

Pradesh v. Babulal9,  Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v.  

State of Maharashtra10)

14. In  a  proportionality  analysis,  it  is  necessary  to  assess the  

seriousness of an offence in order to determine the commensurate  

punishment  for  the  offender.  The  seriousness  of  an  offence  

depends, apart from other things, also upon its harmfulness. The  

question is whether the consequences of the offence can be taken  

as the measure for determining its harmfulness? In addition, quite  

apart from the seriousness of the offence, can the consequences  

of  an  offence  be  a  legitimate  aggravating  (as  opposed  to  

mitigating) factor while awarding a sentence. Thus, to understand  

the  relevance  of  consequences  of  criminal  conduct  from  a  

Sentencing  standpoint,  one  must  examine:  (1)  whether  such  

consequences enhanced the harmfulness of the offence; and (2)  

7 (2006) 2 SCC 359 8 (2006) 10 SCC 673 9 (2008) 1 SCC 234 10 (2009) 6 SCC 498

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whether they are an aggravating factor that need to be taken into  

account by the courts while deciding on the sentence.

15. In  Sentencing and Criminal  Justice,  5th Edition,  Cambridge  

University  Press,  2010,  Andrew  Ashworth  cites  the  four  main  

stages in the process of assessing the seriousness of an offence,  

as identified in a previous work by Andrew Von Hirsch and Nils  

Jareborg. (See Pages 108 – 112)

1. Determining the interest that is violated (i.e. physical integrity,  

material support, freedom from humiliation or privacy/autonomy)

2. Quantification of the effect on the victim’s living standard.

3. Culpability of the offender.

4. Remoteness of the actual harm.

16. Ashworth  then  examines  various  specific  offences  to  

ascertain how seriousness is typically gauged. The most relevant  

example  is  that  of  drug  trafficking,  where  the  author  notes  the  

problem that the offence lies fairly remote from causing people’s  

deaths.  Ashworth  further  notes  that  harsh  sentences  for  drug  

trafficking offences is  justified more by deterrent  rationales than  

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proportionality concerns, although even the deterrent rationales are  

beset with problems. (See Pages 128 – 130)

17. Here, it needs to be noted that one major difference between  

production/sale of spurious liquor and drug trafficking is that in the  

case of spurious liquor, the consumer does not know what he is  

consuming, whereas in the case of drugs, the consumer, at least in  

the initial  stages, knowingly and voluntarily chooses to consume  

the drugs.       

18. Ashworth  also  examines  the  impact  of  unintended  

consequences on sentencing. He notes that there is a tendency to  

take those into account in manslaughter and for causing death by  

bad driving. The extent to which unintended consequences may be  

taken into account would depend, for  instance, on the extent to  

which the offender was put on notice of the risk of death. Thus,  

where it is known that driving dangerously or under the influence of  

alcohol  creates  risk  for  the  safety  of  others,  there  would  be  a  

greater  emphasis  on  resulting  death  while  determining  the  

sentence. (See Pages 153 – 154).

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19. Arguably, one might surmise that manufacturers of spurious  

liquor  must  be  able  to  reasonably  foresee  that  consumption  of  

spurious liquor would affect the health (and possibly life) of others.  

Thus,  there  may  be  some  basis  for  taking  into  account  the  

unintended  consequences  while  determining  sentence.  The  

remoteness  of  harm  would  be  a  factor  when  a  person,  by  

consuming drugs, dies after a period of sustained use. Where a  

person  consuming  spurious  liquor  dies  as  a  result  of  such  

consumption, the harm is much more direct and immediate, and  

remoteness of harm may not be as much of an issue.    

20. Germane to the issue under consideration is a decision of the  

Supreme Court  of  Appeal  of  South  Africa in  S Nyathi  and The  

State11 and we may usefully refer to it.   The case relates to the  

death of  six  people  resulting from the road accident  in  which a  

sedan driven by the appellant in that case collided with a minibus  

taxi. The impact caused the minibus to overturn, killing six of its  

occupants.  Some other passengers were injured.  

The appellant was convicted of culpable homicide.   

11 [2005] ZASCA 134 (23 May 2005)

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The court found that the collision between the two vehicles  

had  taken  place  on  a  blind  rise  where  a  double  barrier  line  

prohibited overtaking by vehicles coming from either direction.  It  

was  the  admitted  position  at  the  trial  that  forward  visibility  was  

restricted.  The court observed that overtaking on a barrier line,  

and specially  on a double  barrier  line,  where  a motorist  should  

realise  that  his  inability  to  observe  approaching  traffic  is  

compounded by the inability of the traffic in the opposite direction  

to  see him is  probably the most  inexcusably  dangerous thing a  

road user can do. Coming to the question of sentence, the Court  

observed:

“[13] Road  accidents  with  calamitous  consequences  are  frequently  caused  by  inadvertence,  often  momentary. [Dube v S [2002] JOL (Judgments on Line) 9645  (T), a case mentioned by the regional magistrate, is an example.  The appellant was the driver of a bus involved in an accident on  a  mountain  pass  which  killed  twenty  eight  passengers.   On  appeal a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment was  substituted for one of six years’  imprisonment imposed by the  trial court on the footing that the appellant’s negligence had been  slight.] Overtaking  on  a  double  barrier  line  is  not  inadvertence.  It is a conscious decision to execute a  manoeuvre that involves taking a fearfully high risk.  

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Referring  then  to  some  earlier  decisions  of  the  Court  in  

paragraph 14 of the judgment it observed as under:-

“[14] In S v Nxumalo 1982 (3) SA 856 (SCA) the court  approved a passage from  R v Barnardo 1960 (3) SA  552 (A) (at 557D-E) where the court held that although  no greater moral blameworthiness arises from the  fact  that  a  negligent  act  caused  death,  the  punishment  should  acknowledge  the  sanctity  of  human life.  It affirmed the dicta of Miller J who twenty  years  earlier  in  S v Ngcobo 1962 (2)  SA 333 (N) at  336H-337B  had  set  out  the  approach  to  road  death  cases. At 861H Corbett JA said:

‘It seems to me that in determining an appropriate sentence in  such cases the  basic  criterion  to  which  the  Court  must  have  regard is the degree of culpability or blameworthiness exhibited  by the accused in committing the negligent act.  Relevant to such  culpability  or  blameworthiness  would  be  the  extent  of  the  accused’s deviation from the norm of reasonable conduct in the  circumstances and the foreseeability of the consequences of the  accused’s  negligence.  At  the  same  time  the  actual  consequences  of  the  accused’s  negligence  cannot  be  disregarded.  If they have been serious and particularly if the  accused’s  negligence  has  resulted  in  serious  injury  to  others  or  loss  of  life,  such  consequences  will  almost  inevitably  constitute  an  aggravating  factor,  warranting  a  more  severe  sentence  than  might  otherwise  have  been  imposed.’

(Emphasis Added)

21. Punishment should acknowledge the sanctity of human life.  

We fully agree.  

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22. From the above, one may conclude that:

1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various  

different  rationales  –  most  prominent  amongst  which  

would be proportionality and deterrence.

2. The question of consequences of criminal action can be  

relevant  from  both  a  proportionality  and  deterrence  

standpoint.

3. Insofar  as  proportionality  is  concerned,  the  sentence  

must be commensurate with the seriousness or gravity  

of the offence.

4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of  

the offence is the consequences resulting from it.

5. Unintended  consequences/harm may  still  be  properly  

attributed  to  the  offender  if  they  were  reasonably  

foreseeable.  In  case  of  illicit  and  underground  

manufacture  of  liquor,  the  chances  of  toxicity  are  so  

high that  not  only  its  manufacturer  but  the distributor  

and the retail vendor would know its likely risks to the  

consumer.  Hence,  even  though  any  harm  to  the  

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consumer  might  not  be  directly  intended,  some  

aggravated  culpability  must  attach  if  the  consumer  

suffers  some  grievous  hurt  or  dies  as  result  of  

consuming the spurious liquor.  

23. In light of the discussion made above, we are clearly of the  

view, that the High Court was fully justified in taking into account  

the death of a person, as a result of consuming the illicit  liquor,  

sold by the appellant as a ground for enhancing his sentence from  

two  years  to  five  years  rigorous  imprisonment.   There  was  

absolutely no illegality or lack of jurisdiction in the order of the High  

Court and we would have unhesitatingly upheld the order of the  

High Court but for another reason.  It is noted above that a number  

of appeals against the judgment and order by the High Court came  

before this Court at the instance of a number of accused. One of  

them happened to be accused No.25 who was the supplier of the  

illicit  liquor  to  the  appellant  and  from  him  the  appellant  had  

received the fatal  supply that led to the death of Yohannan and  

sickness  of  a  number  of  others.   The  trial  court  had  convicted  

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accused no.25 under Section 57A(2)(ii) of the Act and sentenced  

him to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. fifty thousand with the  

default sentence of simple imprisonment for six months.  He was  

convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five  

years and a fine of rupees fifty thousand with the default sentence  

of imprisonment for six months under Section 57A(2)(i) of the Act.  

He was also convicted under Sections 57A(2)(iii), 55(a)(i) and 58 of  

the  Act.   The  High  Court  had  maintained  the  conviction  and  

sentence passed by the trial  court.   This Court,  however,  by its  

judgment and order dated April 4, 2011 in  Chandran v.  State of  

Kerala12, maintained  the  conviction  of  accused  no.25  under  the  

various provisions as recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the  

High  Court.  However,  it  accepted  the  plea  made  on  behalf  of  

accused no.25 to reduce his sentence from a life term to ten years  

imprisonment.  Since  this  Court  has  deemed  fit  to  reduce  the  

sentence given  to  accused no.25 from a  life  term to  ten  years  

rigorous imprisonment, we feel that it will not be fair not to give the  

same concession to the appellant (accused no.41) who was the  

last and weakest link in the chain.  We, accordingly, reduce his  

12  (2011) 5 SCC 161

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sentence  from  five  years  rigorous  imprisonment  to  three  years  

rigorous imprisonment, being the minimum under Section 57A (2)  

(ii)  of  the  Act.   The fines  imposed by  the  courts  below for  the  

different offences remain unaltered.  

24. In  the  result,  the  appeals  are  dismissed,  subject  to  

modification and reduction in sentence, as noted above.

25. The bail  bonds of  the appellant  are cancelled.   He will  be  

taken into custody to serve his remainder sentence.  

    ……….……………………J. (Aftab Alam)

…….………………………J.          (Ranjana Prakash Desai)

New Delhi; December 14, 2012.

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