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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2008

Smt. P. Leelavathi (D) by LRs .. Appellant

Versus

V. Shankarnarayana Rao (D) by LRs .. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling  aggrieved  and  dissatisfied  with the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka

at Bangalore dated 06.09.2007 in RFA No. 220 of 1991, by

which the High Court  has dismissed the said First  appeal

preferred by the original plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi (now

deceased and represented through her legal heirs) and has

confirmed the  judgment and decree passed by the  learned

trial Court dismissing the suit, the legal heirs of the original

plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi have preferred the present appeal.

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2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are

as under:

That Smt. P. Leelavathi instituted Original Suit No. 1248 of

1980 in the Court of the XIV Additional City Civil Judge at

Bangalore against the original defendants – V.

Shankaranarayan Rao (now deceased and represented

through his legal heirs) and two others for partition and for

recovery of 1/4th share of the plaintiff in the plaint scheduled

properties.  That the original plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi and

the original defendants are the sister and brothers and the

daughter and sons  of Late  G.  Venkata  Rao,  who  died  on

08.10.1974.   

2.1 It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that her

father Late G. Venkata Rao was an Estate Agent and he was

doing money lending business in his name and also in the

names of his sons and he was purchasing properties in the

names of his sons, though his father  was funding those

properties.    According to the  plaintiff, at the time  of  his

death, G. Venkata Rao was in possession of a  large estate

comprising of immoveable properties, bank deposits etc.

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shown in the plaint schedule.   It was the case on behalf of

the original plaintiff that the suit schedule properties were as

such joint family properties and/or they were purchased in

fact by their late father G. Venkata Rao and the same was

funded by their father.  That, it was the case on behalf of the

original plaintiff that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th share

in all the said properties belonging to her father.  It was the

case on behalf of the original plaintiff that as the defendants

refused to give  her 1/4th  share and gave an evasive reply,

which prompted the plaintiff to demand in writing her share

and for early settlement.   That, thereafter she got a notice

dated 18.07.1975 issued demanding partition and amicable

settlement.   But the defendants have failed to settle the

matter.   Therefore, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit

for partition and for recovery of her 1/4th share in the plaint

schedule properties.

3. That the original defendants resisted the suit by filing

the  written statement.   It  was the case on  behalf of the

original  defendants  that the plaint  schedule  properties  are

exclusively owned by the defendants in their individual

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rights.   Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule i.e., premises No.

32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road is the personal property of

defendant No. 3.  Item (b) of schedule 1 belongs to defendant

No. 2 and Item (c) belongs to defendant  No. 1.   These

properties never belonged to their deceased father G. Venkata

Rao and they do not form part of his estate.  Coming to Item

No. II, the three fixed deposits were the personal properties of

each of the defendants.   There was a joint saving bank

account in the Syndicate Bank, Cantonment Branch in the

joint names of the deceased and defendant No. 2.  There is a

small amount still lying in the said account.   At any rate,

there is no outstanding of Rs.10,000/­ in the said account.

Regarding Item No. III, there were no debts due and payable

to the deceased.   939 shares were in the joint names of the

deceased and the plaintiff.  840 shares were in the names of

the deceased and defendant No. 1.  Another 840 shares were

in the names of  the deceased and defendant No.  2.   949

shares were in the names of the deceased and defendant No.

3.   The plaintiff had major share which were purchased by

the deceased in the names of himself and the plaintiff.  Late

G. Venkata Rao was a head clerk attached to an advocate’s

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office in Civil Station, Bangalore.   On retirement, the

deceased indulged in and acted as an estate agent in a most

casual  manner.   At any rate, he  was  not doing  money­

lending business nor did he purchase properties as is sought

to be made out in the plaint.  The deceased was at no point of

time in affluent circumstances.  The solvency of the deceased

was at a very low ebb at the time of his death and he left no

jewellery.   Even the furniture available at Premises No. 138,

Aga Abbas Ali  Road,  Bangalore  was not  worth  mentioning

inasmuch as the pieces left could be counted on finger tips.

The value of the entire hold effects would not exceed

Rs.400.00.   Only Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22 out of the

said premises were valuable articles of the deceased.   The

other items never existed at any point of time.   The plaintiff

had the best of  things  from her  father while he was alive.

She was the recipient of favours shown by her father from

time to time.   The deceased stretched his generosity even to

his son­in­law, the husband of the plaintiff.  The deceased in

fact emptied his resources at the calls of her daughter and

her husband.   The son­in­law also collected cash from the

deceased.   The plaintiff and her husband are also due in a

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sum of Rs.3000/­ borrowed by them under a pro­note dated

11.06.1966 from the deceased and defendant No. 3.   They

are  also  due  a sum of  Rs.1500/­  under  another  pro­note

dated 29.11.1966 payable to the deceased.   The above

amounts also carry interest at stipulated rates.   The

defendants serve their right to recover the said amounts

through proper legal remedies.   The plaintiff constructed a

house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street with the said and

financial assistance of her father.   The plaintiff in active

connivance with her husband ransacked the house No. 138,

Aga Abbas Ali Road during the absence of the deceased and

defendant  No. 2  who  had gone to  Tirupathi and  Madras.

The plaintiff had made wrongful gains about this time

somewhere in 1963.  The plaintiff stayed with her husband at

Chicmagalur only for about three months after her marriage.

Thereafter she came  with her husband to Bangalore and

stayed with her father for nearly six years.   The plaintiff is

enjoying the special privilege and she has benefits bestowed

on her, her husband and her children almost regularly.   In

addition to her father, defendant No. 2 was also looking after

the needs of the plaintiff’s family at considerable expenses.

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All the defendants are residing in rented houses.   The claim

of the plaintiff in respect of Item A to C in the plaint schedule

is not tenable, in view of provisions of Section 2 of Benami

Transactions (Prohibition of Right to Recover Property)

Ordinance, 1988, the plaintiff has no cause of action and no

relief can be given to her.    The suit is therefore liable to be

dismissed with costs.

3.1 That the trial Court framed the following issues:

1) Whether the plaintiff  proves that the suit schedule

immovable  and movable  properties  as described  in

Schedule I to V are the self­acquire properties?

2) Whether the suit schedule I(a) vacant  site  bearing

No. 32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road, Civil Station,

Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant

No. 3?

3) Whether the  suit schedule I(b)  vacant  site  bearing

No. 32/1, Aga Abbas Ali Road, Civil Station.

Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant

No. 2?

4) Whether the  suit schedule I(c)  property is the  self

acquired property of defendant No. 1?

5) Whether the defendants prove that the suit schedule

II Bank deposits are the personal properties of each

of the defendants?

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6) Whether the defendants prove that there were

furniture mentioned as Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and

22 of suit Schedule V in page­5 of the plaint, hardly

worth Rs.400/­ in premises No. 138/A (New No. 6)

Armstrong Road, Civil Station, Bangalore?

7) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to partition and

possession of  her  1/4th  share  in  the suit  schedule

properties?

8)  Whether there is cause of action for the suit?

9) To what reliefs is the plaintiff entitled?

Additional Issue:   Is the claim of the plaintiff barred by

Section 2  of the  Benami  Transaction

(Prohibition of Right to Recover

Property) Ordinance, 1988 as alleged?

3.2 That the learned trial Court dismissed the suit by

holding that the  suit  schedule  properties  are  not the  self­

acquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao; suit Item Nos.

I(a), I(b) and I(c) are the properties of original defendant Nos.

1 to 3; the bank deposits mentioned in Scheduled II of the

plaint are the personal properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.

The learned trial  Court further  observed  and held that in

respect of moveable properties mentioned in Schedule V as

suit Item Nos.  10,  12,  19,  20,  21  and 22, the  plaintiff is

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entitled for 1/4th share and therefore the learned trial Court

granted the decree for recovery of 1/4th share to the plaintiff

which was hardly worth Rs.400/­ (sic) available in the

premises  bearing  No.  138/A  (New No.  6)  Armstrong Road,

Civil Station, Bangalore.   

4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied  with the judgment

and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the

suit and holding that the suit schedule properties were not

the self­acquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao and they

were the  properties  of  defendant  Nos.  1 to  3, the  original

plaintiff preferred an appeal before the High Court.   The High

Court vide judgment and order dated 26.02.1999 set aside

the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court

holding that all though the properties were in the names of

the original defendants, the transactions, in question, were

benami in nature and in that view of the matter, the plaintiff

had inherited 1/4th share therein.    

4.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied  with the judgment

and order passed by the High Court dated 26.02.1999

allowing the appeal and quashing and setting aside the

judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and,

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consequently decreeing the suit and holding that the plaintiff

had inherited 1/4th share in the said schedule properties, the

legal representatives of the original  defendants approached

this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 7117 of 2000.

4.2 That by judgment and order dated 11.05.2007, this

Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the

High Court observing that the High Court has not properly

appreciated and/or considered  whether the transaction in

question is benami or not.

4.3 That thereafter, on remand, the High Court has by the

impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal

confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned

trial Court dismissing the suit, by specifically observing that

the purchase/transaction in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3

with respect to the suit schedule  properties  were  not the

benami transactions and that they  were the self­acquired

properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and, therefore, the

plaintiff is  not entitled to any share in the suit schedule

properties.   The High Court has further observed and held

that the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)

Act, 1988 are retroactive in application.   

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5. Feeling  aggrieved  and  dissatisfied  with the impugned

judgment and order passed by the High Court in dismissing

the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed

by the trial  Court dismissing the suit, the original plaintiff

(now the deceased and represented through the legal heirs)

has preferred the present appeal.   

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants

has vehemently submitted that, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a

grave error in dismissing the appeal and confirming the

judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the

suit.

6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Courts below

have materially erred in not accepting the case of the plaintiff

that the suit properties acquired in the names of defendant

Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature.

6.2 It is submitted  by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant that the findings recorded by the

learned trial Court and confirmed by the High Court that the

suit properties acquired in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to

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3  were not benami in  nature, but  were the self­acquired

properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are contrary to the

evidence on record.

6.3 It is submitted  by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellants that it has come in evidence that the

sale consideration was paid by the father of the plaintiff and

defendant Nos. 1 to 3.   It is submitted that DW1 admitted

that he had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,030/­ from his father

Late G. Venkata Rao and that Late G. Venkata Rao sent a

demand draft for a sum of Rs.1,030/­ directly to the Tamil

Nadu Housing  Board. It is submitted  that  even  the  entire

consideration  for  acquisition of  suit  properties ­ Item Nos.

1(a) to 1(c) were paid by Late G. Venkata Rao.

6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant that the High Court having

concluded that the purchase money of suit properties ­Item

Nos. 1(a) to 1(c) came from Late G.Venkata Rao, thereafter,

the High Court is not justified in concluding that the plaintiff

was required to give  further evidence  to establish that the

suit properties were acquired for the benefit of defendants or

Late G. Venkata Rao had other reasons to acquire the suit

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properties in the names of his sons – original defendant Nos.

1 to 3.   Relying upon the decision of this Court in  Thakur

Bhim Singh v. Thakur Kan Singh  (1980) 3 SCC 72, it is

vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf  of the  appellant that,  as  held  by this  Court in the

aforesaid decision,  if it is proved that the purchase money

came from a person other than the person in whose favour

the  property  was transferred, the  purchase is  prima facie

assumed to  be  for the benefit  of  person who supplied  the

purchase money, unless there is an evidence to the contrary.

6.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant that both the Courts below have

materially erred in observing and consequently holding that

the plaintiff was not a member of the joint family.

6.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the

present appeal and quash and set aside the judgment and

decree passed by both the Courts below and consequently to

decree the suit.   

7. Shri G. V. Chandrashekar, learned advocate appearing

on behalf of the original defendants, while opposing the

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present appeal,  has vehemently submitted that the finding

recording by the learned trial Court, confirmed by the High

Court that the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) were not

benami transactions, are on appreciation of evidence.   It is

submitted that, as rightly observed by the High Court, merely

because some financial assistance might have been given by

the father to the defendants while purchasing the suit

properties, the same would not become a benami transaction,

unless the contrary intention is established and proved.

7.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel

appearing on behalf  of the defendants that, in the present

case, all the three suit properties were purchased by

defendant  Nos.  1 to  3  by registered  sale  deeds  and  some

financial assistance was given by the father Late G. Venkata

Rao, which was given to the plaintiff also.   It  is submitted

that, in the  present  case, it  has  come on record  that the

plaintiff married with PW­1 in the year 1954; the marriage of

the plaintiff was performed by Late G. Venkata Rao; and that

after the marriage of the plaintiff, Late G. Venkata Rao and

defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were living together.   It is submitted

that  it  has also come on record that Late G. Venkata Rao

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provided the  financial  assistance to the plaintiff to acquire

the house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street, Civil Station,

Bangalore.   It is submitted that even the evidence on record

would disclose that after the marriage, the plaintiff and her

husband were maintained by her father  for a period of 10

years.   It is submitted that, considering the aforesaid

circumstances,  as  rightly  observed by  the  High Court, the

intention of Late G. Venkata Rao in providing financial

assistance  to  his  sons  for  acquisition of  properties  was  to

provide shelter to his sons and, therefore, the acquisition of

the suit properties – Items I(a) to I(c) by defendants, out of the

financial assistance provided by their father Late G. Venkata

Rao, did not involve any benami transaction.   

7.2 It is further submitted on behalf of the defendants that,

as such, the provisions of the Benami Transactions

(Prohibition) Act would not be applicable retrospectively.   It

is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the original defendants that, as observed and held

by this  Court in the case of  Binapani  Paul v. Pratima

Ghosh  (2007) 6 SCC 100, the burden of proving of benami

nature of transaction lies on the person  who alleges the

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transaction to be a benami.   It is submitted that in the

aforesaid  decision, it is further  observed  and held  by this

Court that the source of money can never be the sole

consideration and it is merely one of the relevant

considerations, but not determinative  in character.     It is

submitted that, in the present case, the plaintiff has failed to

establish and prove that the purchase of the properties – Item

Nos. I(a) to 1(c) were benami in nature and/or that the

intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to purchase the suit

properties for and on behalf of the family, but were

purchased  in  the  names of  defendant  Nos.  1  to  3.   It is

submitted that, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of

the case, the High Court  has rightly dismissed the appeal

and has rightly confirmed the judgment and decree passed by

the learned trial  Court  dismissing the  suit,  by  specifically

observing and holding that the suit properties – Items I(a) to

I(c)  were not  benami  in nature.  Therefore, it is  prayed to

dismiss the present appeal.

8. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respective parties at length.   In the present case, the original

plaintiff instituted the suit claiming 1/4th   share in the suit

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properties,  including the suit properties – Item Nos.  I(a)  to

I(c).   Admittedly, the suit properties were purchased by

defendant Nos. 1 to 3 respectively.  However, it was the case

on behalf of the plaintiff that the purchase of the suit

properties was benami transaction as the sale consideration

was paid by their father Late G. Venkata Rao.  The aforesaid

is not accepted by the High Court and the High Court has

observed and held that the plaintiff  has  failed to establish

and prove by leading cogent evidence that the  intention of

Late G. Venkata Rao to purchase the suit properties in the

names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was to purchase for and on

behalf of the family and, therefore, the transaction cannot be

said to be benami in nature.    

8.1 Therefore, the short question that is posed for

consideration of this Court is, whether in the facts and

circumstances of the case and merely because some financial

assistance has been given by the father to the sons to

purchase the properties, can the transactions be said to

benami in nature?

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9. While considering the aforesaid question, few decisions

of this Court on the benami transactions/transactions of

benami nature, are required to be referred to:

9.1 In the case of  Thakur Bhim Singh  (supra), it is

observed  and  held  by this  Court that  while considering  a

particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person

who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the

nature of transaction.  It is further observed by this Court as

to  what the intention of the person  who contributed the

purchase  money, has to be decided on the basis of the

surrounding circumstance; the relationship of the parties;

the  motives governing their action in bringing about the

transaction and their subsequent conduct etc.   In the

aforesaid decision, this Court considered the earlier decision

of this Court in  Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst.)

(1974)  1  SCC  3,  more  particularly  para  6, and thereafter

summed up in para 17 and para 18.  Paras 17 and 18 of that

judgment are as under:

“17. The principle enunciated by Lord Macmillan in the case of Manmohan  Das  [AIR 1931 PC 175 : 134 IC 66 9 : 1931 ALJ 550] has been followed by this Court in Jaydayal

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Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (Mst) [(1974) 1 SCC 3 : (1974)  2 SCR 90]  where Sarkaria,  J.,  observed thus: (SCC p. 6, para 6)

“It is well­settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil  which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for  proof.  The reason is that  a deed  is  a  solemn document  prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts with  the initial  presumption  in  his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely  one of fact,  and  for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid tests, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the courts are usually guided by these circumstances:(1) the source from which the purchase  money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive,  if  any,  for giving

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the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale.”

18. The principle governing the determination of the question whether a transfer is a benami transaction or not may be summed up thus: (1) the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction lies on the person who asserts that it is such a transaction; (2) it is  proved that  the purchase money came from a person other than the person  in whose favour the property is transferred, the purchase is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the person who supplied the purchase money, unless there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true character of the transaction is governed by the intention of the person who has contributed the purchase money and (4) the question as to what his intention was has to be decided on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, the relationship of the parties, the motives governing their action in bringing about the transaction and their subsequent conduct, etc.”

9.2 In Binapani Paul case (supra), this Court again had an

occasion to consider the nature of benami transactions.  After

considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point,

this Court in that judgment observed and held that the

source of money had never been the sole consideration. It is

merely one of the relevant considerations but not

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determinative in character.  This Court ultimately concluded

after considering its earlier judgment in the case of

Valliammal v. Subramaniam  (2004) 7 SCC 233 that while

considering  whether a  particular transaction is  benami in

nature, the  following six circumstances can be taken as a

guide:

“(1) the source from which the purchase money came;

(2) the  nature  and  possession  of the  property, after the purchase;

(3)  motive, if any, for giving the transaction  a benami colour;

(4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar;

(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale; and  

(6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale. (Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (supra), SCC p. 7, para6)”

10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the

aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of

the opinion that the  High  Court has rightly come to the

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conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the

purchase of the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the

names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature.   It is

true that, at the time of purchase of the suit properties – Item

Nos. I(a) to I(c), some financial assistance was given by Late

G. Venkata Rao.  However, as observed by this Court in the

aforesaid decisions, that cannot  be the sole  determinative

factor/circumstance to  hold the transaction  as  benami in

nature.   The plaintiff has miserably failed to establish and

prove the intention of the father to purchase the suit

properties for and on behalf of the family, which were

purchased in the  names  of  defendant  Nos. 1 to  3.   It is

required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff – daughter

has not stepped into the witness box and that the evidence

on behalf of the plaintiff has been given by her husband who,

as such, can be said to be an outsider, so far as the joint

family is concerned.   Apart from that, it has come on record

that the plaintiff and her husband were maintained by Late

G. Venkata Rao.   The financial assistance was also given to

the  plaintiff and  her  husband to  purchase the residential

house at Bangalore.   Late G. Venkata Rao, therefore,

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provided a shelter to his daughter and, as observed herein

above, also gave the financial assistance to purchase the

residential house at Bangalore.   It has also come on record

that Late G. Venkata Rao even purchased the share

certificates and his daughter­original plaintiff was also given

certain number of shares.   Therefore, considering the

aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, Late G.

Venkata Rao also must have given the financial assistance to

defendant Nos. 1 to 3 – sons and helped them in purchase of

the properties.   Therefore, the intention of Late G. Venkata

Rao to give the financial assistance to purchase the

properties in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be

said to be to purchase the properties for himself and/or his

family  members  and, therefore,  as rightly  observed by the

High Court, the transactions of purchase of the suit

properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of the

defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be benami in nature.

The intention  of  Late  G.  Venkata  Rao  was to  provide the

financial assistance for the welfare of his sons and not

beyond that.   None of the other ingredients to establish the

transactions as benami transactions, as held by this Court in

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the aforesaid decisions, are satisfied, except that some

financial assistance was provided by Late G. Venkata Rao.  In

the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the

evidence on record, the purchase of the suit properties – Item

Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot

be said to be benami transactions and, therefore, as rightly

observed and held by the learned trial Court and confirmed

by the High Court, the plaintiff has no right to claim 1/4th

share in the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) which were

purchased by the sons in their names by separate sale deeds.

We are  in complete  agreement with the view taken by  the

High Court.

11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,

the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is

accordingly dismissed.   No costs.

........................................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

........................................J. [M. R. SHAH]

New Delhi, April 9, 2019.