05 September 2018
Supreme Court
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SMT. KAVITA Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY

Bench: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR, HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
Judgment by: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Case number: C.A. No.-002623-002623 / 2018
Diary number: 1808 / 2018
Advocates: ADITYA RANJAN Vs


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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2623   OF  2018    Smt. Kavita           …..Appellant(s)          

:Versus:    

The State of Uttar Pradesh through  Secretary  &  Ors.             ....Respondent(s)  

 

 

 

J U D G M E N T  

 

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.  

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated 3rd August, 2017, passed by the High Court of  

Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.27912 of 2017, whereby  

the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ  

petition filed by the appellant for challenging the no confidence  

motion notice issued under Section 15 of The U.P. Kshettra

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Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961 (for short,  

“the Act”).   

  2. A Notice was issued by the Collector/District Magistrate,  

Bulandshahar, U.P., dated 15th June, 2017 on the basis of  

requisition given by 32 members out of 59 members of the  

Kshettra Panchayat, expressing no confidence against the  

appellant who was the Block Pramukh of Kshettra Panchayat,  

Lakhawati at the relevant time. The notice had fixed the  

meeting date as 1st July, 2017 i.e. on the 17th day from the  

date of notice. The appellant challenged the said notice by way  

of a writ petition before the High Court of Allahabad on two  

counts. First, that the Collector had failed to hold an enquiry  

into the validity of signatures of 10 members, who  

subsequently filed affidavits stating that their signatures were  

obtained by fraud. Second, that there was no clear 15 days’  

notice as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 15 of  

the Act. The Division Bench, after considering the factual  

position emanating from the record before it, negatived both

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the contentions and eventually dismissed the writ petition filed  

by the appellant vide the impugned judgment.   

 

3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has approached this  

Court raising the self-same two grounds urged before the High  

Court,  for challenging the validity of the no confidence motion  

notice dated 15th June, 2017. The respondents have supported  

the reasons recorded by the High Court and would contend  

that both the grounds urged by the appellant are devoid of any  

merit.   

 

4. We have heard Mr. Aditya Ranjan, learned counsel for  

the appellant.   

 

5. Reverting to the second contention that there was no  

clear 15 days’ notice, this aspect has been considered by the  

High Court on the basis of record before it, revealing that the  

appellant had refused/avoided to receive the notice personally  

and hence it was sent by post. The High Court also found that  

the appellant had failed to produce any material on record to  

show that the notice was dispatched after the 17th day and

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that on the appellant’s own admission in the writ petition, it  

was evident that the objection to the said notice was taken on  

the 16th day itself relating to signatures of few members who  

had signed the notice. This was a strong circumstance to belie  

the tall claim of the appellant. Taking an overall view of the  

matter, the High Court noted that the issue involved a  

disputed question of fact and could not be decided in writ  

jurisdiction. At the same time, the High Court took note of the  

fact that the meeting was duly conducted as scheduled in  

terms of the stated notice and the no confidence motion was  

passed by a majority, against the appellant. We, therefore, find  

no reason to depart from the conclusion recorded by the High  

Court for rejecting the challenge that no clear 15 days’ notice  

was given as claimed by the appellant. Accordingly, this  

contention must fail and is rejected.  

 6. As aforesaid, since the stated notice has already been  

acted upon and the no confidence motion has been passed  

against the appellant by majority, no further enquiry into the  

grounds urged by the appellant is warranted. Be that as it

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may, even the first ground urged by the appellant has been  

justly negatived by the High Court following the exposition of  

the Full Bench of the same High Court in Smt. Sheela Devi  

Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.,1 which decision adverts to the  

dictum of another Full Bench decision of the same High Court  

in Mathura Prasad Tewari Vs. Assistant District  

Panchayat Officer, Faizabad.2  In the impugned judgment,  

the Division Bench has reproduced paragraph 23 of the Full  

Bench decision in Sheela Devi, (supra) which reads thus:  

 

 

“23. For these reasons, we have come to the  

conclusion that where a notice is delivered to the  

Collector under sub-section (2) of Section 15, the  

Collector has the discretion to determine whether the  

notice fulfills the essential requirements of a valid  

notice under sub-section (2). However, consistent with  

the stipulation of time enunciated in sub-section (3) of  

Section 15 of convening a meeting no later than thirty  

days from the date of delivery of the notice and of  

issuing at least a fifteen days' notice to all the elected  

members of the Kshettra Panchayat, it is not open to  

the Collector to launch a detailed evidentiary  

enquiry into the validity of the signatures which  

are appended to the notice. Where a finding in  

regard to the validity of the signatures can only be  

arrived at in an enquiry on the basis of evidence  

adduced in the course of an evidentiary hearing at  

                                                           1   AIR 2015 All. 65  

2   1966 ALJ 612

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a full-fledged trial, such an enquiry would be  

outside the purview of Section 15. The Collector  

does not exercise the powers of a Court upon  

receipt of a notice and when he transmits the  

notice for consideration at a meeting of the elected  

members of the Kshettra Panchayat. Hence, it  

would not be open to the Collector to resolve or enter  

findings of fact on seriously disputed questions such  

as forgery, fraud and coercion. However, consistent  

with the law which has been laid down by the Full  

Bench in Mathura Prasad Tewari's case, it is open to  

the Collector, having due regard to the nature and  

ambit of his jurisdiction under sub-section (3) to  

determine as to whether the requirements of a valid  

notice under sub-section (2) of Section 15 have been  

fulfilled. The proceeding before the Collector under  

sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act of 1961 is more  

in the nature of a summary proceeding. The Collector  

for the purpose of Section 15, does not have the  

trappings of a Court exercising jurisdiction on the  

basis of evidence adduced at a trial of a judicial  

proceeding. Whether in a given case, the Collector has  

transgressed the limits of his own jurisdiction is a  

matter which can be addressed in a challenge under  

Article 226 of the Constitution. We clarify that we have  

not provided an exhaustive enumeration or list of  

circumstances in which the Collector can determine  

the validity of the notice furnished under sub-section  

(2) in each case and it is for the Collector in the first  

instance and for the Court in the exercise of its power  

of judicial review, if it is moved, to determine as to  

whether the limits on the power of the Collector have  

been duly observed.”  

 

(emphasis supplied)  

  

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7. Notably, this Court in the case of Kiran Pal Singh Vs.  

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (in C.A. No.2622 of 2018  

decided on 17th May, 2018)3  has had an occasion to explicate  

on the purport of Section 15(2) of the Act. In paragraph 15 of  

this decision the Court observed thus:  

“15. To appreciate the controversy, we have to understand  

the scheme engrafted under Section 15 of the Act.  Subsection (2) of Section 15 provides that a written notice of  

intention to make the motion in such form as may be  prescribed, signed by at least half of the total number of  elected members of the Kshettra Panchayat for the time  

being together with a copy of the proposed motion, shall be  delivered in person, by any one of the members signing the  

notice, to the Collector having jurisdiction over the Kshettra  Panchayat. Subsection (3) requires the Collector to convene a  meeting. At this stage, the jurisdiction that the Collector  

has is only to scan the notice to find out whether it  fulfills the essential requirements of a valid notice. The  exercise of the said discretion, as we perceive, has to be  

summary in nature. There cannot be a detailed inquiry  with regard to the validity of the notice. We are obliged to  

think so as subsection (3) mandates that a meeting has to be  convened not later than 30 days from the date of delivery of  the notice and further there should be at least 15 days’  

notice to be given to all the elected members of the Kshettra  Panchayat. The Collector, therefore, should not assume  

power to enter into an arena or record a finding on  seriously disputed questions of facts relating to fraud,  undue influence or coercion. His only duty is to  

determine whether there has been a valid notice as  contemplated under Subsection (2) of Section 15. His  delving deep to conduct a regular inquiry would frustrate  

the provision. He must function within his own limits  and leave the rest to be determined in the meeting.”  

 

           (emphasis supplied)     

                                                           3   2018 (7) SCALE 605

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 8. In view of the above, the ground urged by the appellant  

that the Collector ought to have enquired into the validity of  

the signatures of 10 members, who subsequently filed  

affidavits stating that their signatures were obtained by fraud,  

had been justly negatived by the High Court. Hence, the  

impugned judgment does not warrant any interference. As no  

other contention has been urged, the appeal must fail.   

 9. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to  

costs.    

   

.………………………….CJI.        (Dipak Misra)   

  

 

…………………………..….J.                (A.M. Khanwilkar)  

 

 

…………………………..….J.               (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)  

New Delhi;  

September 05, 2018.