04 September 2015
Supreme Court
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SMITA SUBHASH SAWANT Vs JAGDEESHWARI JAGDISH AMIN .

Bench: J. CHELAMESWAR,ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-006848-006848 / 2015
Diary number: 5663 / 2015
Advocates: ABHA R. SHARMA Vs


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REPORTABLE

        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA          

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

          CIVIL APPEAL No.  6848  OF 2015        (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 6244/2015)

Smita Subhash Sawant …….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin & Ors. ……Respondent(s)

                 J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  final

judgment  and  order  dated  09.02.2015  passed  by

the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Writ

Petition  No.  9388  of  2014  which  arises  out  of

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judgment  and  order  dated  24.09.2014  passed  by

the Court of Small Causes at Bombay in Municipal

Election Petition No. 129 of 2012 holding that the

election  petition  filed  by  respondent  No.1  herein

questioning the appellant’s election as a Councilor

of the Bruhan Mumbai Municipal Corporation from

Ward  No.76  is  within  the  period  of  limitation

prescribed  under  Section  33  of  the  Mumbai

Municipal  Corporation  Act,  1888  (hereinafter

referred to as “the Act”).

3. In order to appreciate the issue involved in this

appeal, it is necessary to state a few relevant facts:

(a) The  election  schedule  for  General  Election

2012 of Councilors under the Act was published by

Notification dated 02.02.2012 declaring the date of

poll  as  16.02.2012  and  counting  of  votes  on

17.02.2012.  The said Notification also declared that

the  list  of  elected  candidates  along  with  total

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number  of  valid  votes  polled  by  them  will  be

published in the Government Gazette on or before

21.02.2012  as  required  under  the  provisions  of

Sections 10, 28(k) and 32 of the Act.

(b) The  appellant  and  respondent  No.1  herein

contested  the  election  from  Ward  No.76  for

Municipal  Corporator.   The  election  was  held  on

16.02.2012 and after counting, which took place on

17.02.2012,  the  Election  Officer  declared  the

appellant herein to have been elected as a Municipal

Corporator from Ward No.76.  A certificate to that

effect  was  also  issued  by  the  Election  Officer  in

favour of the appellant herein in Form No. 21-C as

per Rule 103 of  Municipal  Corporation of  Greater

Mumbai conduct of Election Rules 2006 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Rules’) on 17.02.2012. Thereafter

on  21.02.2012,  the  Municipal  Commissioner

published the Official Gazette declaring the names

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of the candidates elected from all the 227 wards of

the Municipal Corporation with the names of their

political parties and the votes polled by them as per

Section 10 and Section 32 (i) of the Act and Rule

104 of the Rules.    

(c) Challenging  the  election  of  the  appellant

herein,  on  28.02.2012,  respondent  No.1  filed

Election Petition No.  129 of  2012 in the Court  of

Chief  Judge, Small  Causes Court,  Mumbai.   After

service  of  notice,  the  appellant  herein  appeared

before the Chief Judge and filed written statement

contesting  inter  alia  on  the  ground  that  the  said

election petition filed by respondent No.1 herein was

barred by limitation as provided in Section 33 (1) of

the  Act.   According  to  the  appellant,  the  election

petition was required to be filed within 10 days from

the date on which the list prescribed under clause

(k) of Section 28 was available for sale or inspection

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as  provided in  Section 33 (1)  of  the  Act.   It  was

contended  that  since  in  this  case,  the  list  was

published and was available for sale or inspection

on 17.02.2012, hence, the limitation to file election

petition was up to 27.02.2012 as prescribed under

Section  33  (1)  of  the  Act  whereas  the  election

petition  was  filed  on  28.02.2012  by  the  election

petitioner.  It  was,  therefore,  barred  by  limitation

and hence liable to be dismissed as being barred by

time.  She also filed an application before the Chief

Judge praying for framing the issue of limitation as

a preliminary issue.  Initially, the Chief Judge had

rejected the said application but thereafter by order

dated 30.07.2013 issued direction to  try  the  said

issue  as  a  preliminary  issue.   After  hearing  the

parties, by judgment and order dated 24.09.2014,

the Chief Judge held that the election petition was

within  limitation.  He  accordingly  entertained  the

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election petition filed by respondent No.1 herein for

being tried on merits.   

(d) Aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant

herein  approached  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  by

way of W.P. No. 9388 of 2014.  By judgment and

order dated 09.02.2015, the learned Single Judge of

the High Court dismissed the petition and upheld

the judgment of the Chief Judge.  The High Court

also  held  that  the  election  petition  filed  by

respondent  No.1  herein  is  within  limitation  as

prescribed under Section 33 (1) of the Act.

(e) Against the said judgment, the present appeal

has been filed by way of special leave.

4. Heard Mr.  Vinay Navare,  learned counsel  for

the  appellant  and  Mr.  Sudhanshu  S.  Choudhari,

learned counsel for respondent No.1, Ms. Jayashree

Wad, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr.

Vijay Kumar, learned counsel for respondent No.3.  

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5. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  while

assailing  the  legality  and  correctness  of  the

impugned order reiterated the submissions, which

were  urged  by  him  before  the  Courts  below.

According to the learned counsel, both the Courts

below erred in holding that the election petition filed

by respondent No.  1 herein (election petitioner)  is

within limitation as prescribed under Section 33 (1)

of  the Act.  In other words,  it  was his  submission

that both the Courts below should have held that

the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 herein

was  beyond  the  period  of  limitation  and  in

consequence  was  liable  to  be  dismissed  as  being

barred by limitation.

6. Elaborating  the  aforementioned  submissions,

learned counsel contended that in order to decide

the question of limitation and how it will apply to

the  facts  of  the  case  in  hand,  two  Sections  are

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relevant, namely, Section 33 (1) and Section 28 (k)

of the Act. Learned counsel contended that Section

33 (1) prescribes limitation of 10 days for filing the

election petition and the period of 10 days has to be

counted from the date on which the list prescribed

under Section 28 (k) of the Act is available for sale

or inspection.  

7. Learned counsel pointed out that the election

in question was held on 16.02.2012 and counting of

votes  was  done  on  17.02.2012  followed  by

declaration of election result declaring the appellant

to  have  won  the  election  and  finally  issuance  of

certificates of the election result as required under

Rule  103  of  the  Rules  in  the  prescribed  format

(Form No. 21-C) were given to the appellant herein

and the election petitioner (respondent No. 1 herein)

on  the same day, i.e., 17.02.2012 by the Returning

Officer.  Similarly, it was pointed out that the list of

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the ward was also made available for sale or/and

inspection  on  17.02.2012  to  all   including  the

candidates  immediately  after  declaration  of  result

and handing over the certificates in Form No. 21-C

to  both  the  candidates  by  the  Returning  Officer.

Learned counsel thus contended that in the light of

these admitted facts, the limitation to file Election

Petition began from 17.02.2012 as prescribed under

Section 33 (1) and ended on 27.02.2012. Since the

election  petition  was  filed  by  respondent  No.1  on

28.2.2012,  it  was liable  to  be dismissed as being

barred by limitation.

8. In reply, learned counsel for respondent No. 1

while supporting the reasoning and the conclusion

of the High Court, contended that the view taken by

the High Court is just and proper and hence it does

not call for any interference by this Court. It was his

submission  that  the  limitation  to  file  election

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petition began from 21.02.2012, this being the date

on which the gazette publication of election results

in the official Gazette was published by the Election

Commissioner  as  required  under  Section  10  read

with  Section  32  of  the  Act  and  Rule  104  of  the

Rules. According to learned counsel, 10 days’ period

prescribed  for  limitation  therefore  began  from

21.02.2012  and  ended  on  02.03.2012.   Learned

counsel,  therefore, urged that the election petition

filed by the election Petitioner (respondent no. 1) on

28.02.2012  was  within  limitation  and  hence  was

rightly  held  to  be  within  time  for  being  tried  on

merits.

9. Having  heard  the  learned  Counsel  for  the

parties  and  on  perusal  of  the  record  of  the  case

including their written submissions, we find force in

the  submissions  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant.

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10. The question which arises for consideration in

this appeal is whether the election petition filed by

respondent  No.1  against  the  appellant  under

Section 33 (1) of the Act before the Chief Judge is

within limitation as prescribed under Section 33 (1)

of the Act?

11. Section 28 (k) and Section 33 (1) of  the Act,

which  are  relevant  for  deciding  the  aforesaid

question, read as under:  

“   Section 28 (k)

(k)  the  State  Election  Commissioner shall, as soon as may be, declare the result of the poll, specifying the total number of valid votes  given  for  each  candidate,  and  shall cause  lists  to  be  prepared  for  each  ward, specifying  the  name  of  all  candidates,  and the  number  of  valid  votes  given  to  each candidate.  In accordance with such rules as the State Election Commissioner may frame for the purpose and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed by him a copy of such list shall be supplied to any candidate of the ward and shall be available for inspection to any voter of the ward.

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Section 33 (1)

Election petitions to be heard and disposed of by Chief Judge of the Small Cause Court.

(1) If the qualification of any person declared to  be  elected  for  being  a  councilor  is disputed, or if the validity of any election is questioned,  whether  by  reason  of  the improper  rejection  by  the  State  Elections Commissioner  of  a  nomination  or  of  the improper reception of refusal of a vote, or for any  other  cause  or  if  the  validity  of  the election  of  a  person  is  questioned  on  the ground  that  he  has  committed  a  corrupt practice within the meaning of section 28F, any person enrolled in the municipal election roll may, at any time, within ten days from the date on which the list prescribed under clause (k) of section 28 was available for sale or inspection apply to the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court.  If the application is for a  declaration  that  any  particular  candidate shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  elected,  the applicant  shall  make  parties  to  his application all  candidates who although not declared  elected,  have,  according  to  the results  declared  by  the  State  Election Commissioner  under  section  32,  a  greater number of votes than the said candidate, and proceed against them in the same manner as against the said candidate.  

 (emphasis supplied) ’’

12. The question is – what is the true meaning of

the words "any person enrolled in the municipal

election roll may, at any time, within ten days

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from the date on which the list prescribed under

clause (k) of section 28 was available for sale or

inspection apply to the Chief Judge of the Small

Causes Court” occurring  in  Section 33 (1)  of  the

Act.

13. A plain reading  of  the  aforementioned  words

shows  that  the  period  of  10  days  prescribed  for

filing the election petition begins from "the date" on

which the list prescribed under clause (k) of Section

28 of the Act was available for sale or inspection. In

other words, the starting point of limitation for filing

the  election petition  for  counting  10 days  is  “the

date" on which the list prescribed under clause (k)

of  Section 28 of  the Act was available for  sale or

inspection.  Therefore,  in order to see as to when

the list was prepared and made available for sale or

inspection, it is necessary to read Section 28 (k) of

the Act.

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14. Section 28 (k) of the Act provides that the State

Election Commissioner  shall,  as  soon as  may be,

declare  the  result  of  the  poll,  specifying  the  total

number of the valid votes given for each candidate

and shall cause lists to be prepared for each ward,

specifying  the  names  of  all  candidates  and  the

number of  valid  votes given to  each candidate.  It

also  confers  power  on  the  State  Election

Commissioner to frame Rules for payment of such

fee as may be prescribed by him for supply of a copy

of such list to any candidate of the ward and for its

inspection by any voter of the ward.

15. It is pertinent to mention here that till date the

State  Election  Commissioner  has  not  framed  any

Rules as required under Section 28 (k) of the Act.

16. Section 29 empowers the State Government to

frame  rules  for  the  conduct  of  election  on  the

subjects specified in clause (a) to (i).   In addition,

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the State is also empowered to make rules on other

subjects  regarding  conduct  of  election  as  it  may

think  proper.   The  State  has  accordingly  framed

rules  called  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater

Mumbai Conduct of Election Rules 2006.  

17. Rule  2  (q)  of  the  Rules  defines  “Returning

Officer” as an Officer appointed as such under Rule

3.  Rule  3  enables  the  Municipal  Commissioner

designate  to  nominate  any  officer  of  the  State

Government not below the rank of Deputy Collector

or  of  the  Corporation  not  below  the  rank  of

Assistant Municipal Commissioner as the Returning

Officer for the purpose of conducting the election.

Rule 103 provides that the Returning Officer shall

complete and certify the return of election in Form-

21  C and  send  the  signed  copies  thereof  to  the

Municipal  Commissioner  and  State  Election

Commissioner.   Rule  104  inter  alia provides  for

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grant of certificate of election to returned candidate

as  required under  Section 32 and also  empowers

the State Election Commission to publish the result

in the Official Gazette.

18. At the outset, we consider it apposite to state

that if the State Election Commissioner has failed to

frame the Rules for  proper  implementation of  the

functions set out in Section 28 (k) of the Act and

due to that reason, there appears to be some kind of

ambiguity noticed in its interpretation, then in our

considered  opinion,  such  provision  should  be

interpreted as  far  as  possible  in  a manner  which

may benefit  the elected candidate rather than the

election petitioner.  

19. This Court in Anandilal and another vs. Ram

Narain  and  others [AIR  1984  SC  1383]  had  the

occasion to  construe Section 15 of  the  Limitation

Act.  While construing the said section, the learned

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Judge A.P. Sen J. speaking for the Bench observed

in para 10 “It is also true that in construing statutes

of limitation considerations of hardship and anomaly

are  out  of  place.   Nevertheless,  it  is,  we  think,

permissible  to  adopt  a beneficent  construction of  a

rule  of  limitation  if  alternative  constructions  are

possible.’’  Our observations made above are also in

line keeping in view this principle.   

20. This  we  have  said  because  we  find  that  the

High Court in Para 30 has held that since no rules

have  been  framed and  there  appears  to  be  some

ambiguity in applying Section 28 (k),  therefore,  in

such  circumstances  while  interpreting  such

provision,  its  benefit  must  go  to  the  election

petitioner  (defeated  candidate)  rather  than  to  the

elected candidate.  We do not agree with the High

Court on this issue as in our opinion it should be

the other way round as held by us supra.

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21. On perusal of the impugned judgment, we find

that the High Court in Para 23 has held that the list

was prepared by the Returning Officer immediately

after the declaration of the result of the election on

17.02.2012 and it satisfied  all the requirements of

Section 28 (k) of the Act. The High Court therefore

held that the list was issued under Section 28 (k) of

the Act.  

22. We are in agreement with this finding of the

High Court as in our opinion also, the list prepared

by  the  Returning  Officer  on  17.02.2012  was  in

conformity  with  all  the  requirements  specified  in

Section 28 (k) of the Act.

23. The next question that needs to be examined is

on which date  such list  was available  for  sale  or

inspection to the voter of the ward.  To decide this

question,  we  consider  it  apposite  to  read  the

evidence adduced by the parties on this issue in the

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affidavits.

24. This is what the appellant (respondent No. 3 in

the election petition) said on affidavit on this issue:

“5. I say that the Election Result of Ward No. 76 of Mumbai Municipal Corporation was declared by the Returning Election Officer on 17th Feb. 2012 at about 12.30 p.m. I say that after  the  counting  was  over  the  Election officer prepared list of votes polled by each contesting  candidate  as  prescribed  under clause (k) of section 28 of Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act which is a same list annexed hereto  as  Exhibit  A  and  also  annexed  as Exhibit E of the Election Petition. I say that the  said  Election  result  as  contemplated under section 28 (k) of MMC Act was available for sale and inspection since 17th Feb. 2012. I  say  that  the  Petitioner  and  his  election Agent  and  his  Counting  Agents  who  were present in the counting Hall during Counting of  votes,  took  inspection  of  the  Election Result  declared  by  the  Returning/Election officer I prepared as per Section 28 (k) of the MMC Act.  I  say that thereafter the copy of the  Election  Result  was  taken  by  the Petitioner  on  17.02.2012  itself  which  is annexed as Exhibit E to the Election Petition. 6…………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………… … 7. I say that on the date of counting i.e. on 17.02.2012, I was present in the counting hall  and the Petitioner  was  also  present  in counting  hall  with  her  Election  Agent  and counting  Agents.  I  further  say  that  after counting was completed on the same day, the concerned election officer had published the

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Election Result  as  prescribed under  section 28 (k)  of  the MMC Act and gave inspection and copies of the Result to all the candidates present  on  17.02.2012.  I  say  that  the Petitioner himself took the inspection of the result on the same day i.e. 17.02.2012 and thereafter  collected  the  copy  of  the  Result sheet  as  declared  by  the  Election  officer under section 28 (k) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation  Act.  The  copy  of  the  same  is filed by the Petitioner and marked as exhibit “E” to the election petition.”

25. So far as the election petitioner is concerned,

she  did  not  deny  much  less  categorically  the

statement  of  the  appellant  quoted  above  in  her

affidavit and instead said as under:

“3. I say that in so far as preliminary issue framed by this Hon’ble Court in regard to the limitation is concerned, I say that result of the  Municipal  Elections  in  question  was declared  on  17.02.2012.  My  advocate, thereafter, had taken up the matter with the Respondent  No.  1  Corporation  so  as  to ascertain  as  to  when,  the  list  prescribed under clause (k) of section 28  has been made available for sale and inspection by his letter dated  23.02.2012.  Accordingly,  the  Deputy Election  Officer  of  Respondent  No.  1 Corporation  by  its  letter  dated  28.02.2012 informed  my  advocate  that  Gazette Notification  under  Section  10  to  32  of  the MMC  Act  was  published  in  Government Gazette  on  21.02.2012.  I  hereby  produce original letter dated 28.02.2012 addressed by

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the  Dy.  Election  Officer  attached  to  the respondent  No.  1  as  Document  No.1,  I, therefore, pray that the said letter issued by the respondent No. 1 through its Dy. Election Officer be read into as evidence in relation to the preliminary issue framed by this Hon’ble Court.  4. I  thus,  say  that  the  Respondent  No.  1 notified result of the election in the Official Gazette  by  its  Notification  dated  21st February, 2012 as required under Section 28 (k)  of  the  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater Mumbai.  

5. I,  therefore,  say  that  since  the above-said Gazette Notification was published on 21.02.2012, election petition filed by me is within limitation considering Section 33(1) of the said Act.”  

26. After reading the aforesaid two statements of

the parties, we have no hesitation in holding that

the list prescribed under Section 28 (k) was made

available to all the parties including the voter of the

ward in question on 17.02.2012 by the Returning

Officer. This we say so for the reasons that firstly,

there is no ground much less sufficient ground to

disbelieve  the  sworn  testimony  of  the  appellant

wherein she said that the appellant and respondent

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No.1  herein  (election  petitioner)  including  their

voting  agents  and other  persons  were  throughout

present in-person on 17.02.2012 during counting of

votes.  Indeed, counting of votes is always done in

presence of the candidates and their agents and in

this  case  also  it  was  done  in  presence  of  the

candidates, who contested the election. Secondly, as

soon as the results were announced on 17.02.2012,

the  appellant  and  respondent  No.1  herein  were

given  their  respective  certificates  in  Form-21C as

prescribed  in  Rule  103  of  the  Rules  by  the

Returning Officer. Thirdly, respondent No.1 herself

inspected the list prepared by the Returning Officer,

which she could not do unless the list was made

available  for  inspection  on  17.02.2012  by  the

Returning  Officer.  Fourthly,  the  Returning  Officer

could  not  have  announced  the  results  unless  he

had  first  prepared  the  list  specifying  therein  the

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necessary details which were required for declaring

the result of election and lastly, there was no reason

for  not  making  the  list  available  to  the  voter  on

17.02.2012  and  keep  withholding  when  it  was

prepared on that day itself by the Returning Officer

for declaration of the result of the election.

27. When we read the statement of respondent No.

1(election petitioner)  extracted supra, we find that

she did not deny her presence on the whole day on

17.02.2012  nor  she  denied  what  was  specifically

stated  by  the  appellant  in  her  affidavit.   All  that

respondent  No.1  herein  said  was  that  on

23.02.2012,   her  advocate  wrote  a  letter  to  the

Corporation as to when the list would be available

and  the  Corporation  by  letter  dated  28.02.2012

informed  her  that  the  Gazette  Notification  under

Sections  10  and 32 of  the  Act  was published on

21.02.2012.  On  this  basis,  respondent  no.  1

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claimed that limitation to file election petition would

begin from 21.02.2012 and not from 17.02.2012.

28. Learned counsel for respondent No.1, therefore

relying upon the aforesaid statement, made attempt

to contend that the limitation would begin, as held

by the High Court in her favour from 21.02.2012,

for filing election petition which is the date on which

the  election  results  were  declared  and  then  were

published  in  the  official  gazette  as  provided  in

Section  10  read  with  Section  32  of  the  Act  and

hence  10  days  will  have  to  be  counted  from

21.02.2012.  Learned counsel, thus submitted that

the  election  petition  filed  by  respondent  No.1  on

28.02.2012 was within limitation because 10 days

period  prescribed  under  Section  33  (1)  ended  on

02.03.2012.

29.  We do not agree with this submission. It is, in

our opinion,  wholly  misplaced in the facts of  this

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case.  Firstly, Section 33 (1) only mentions Section

28 (k) and does not refer to any other section much

less Section 10 or/and 32 for deciding the issue of

limitation.  In  other  words,  Section  33  (1)  is

controlled  by  Section 28 (k)  only  and not  by  any

other  section  of  the  Act  for  deciding  the  issue  of

limitation.  Secondly,  if  the  intention  of  the

legislature was to calculate the period of limitation

from  the  date  of  issuance  of  Official  Gazette  as

provided  in  Section  10  and/or  Section  32,  as

contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  respondent

No.1, then instead of mentioning Section 28 (k), the

legislature would have mentioned Section 10 and/or

Section 32 in Section 33(1) of the Act. However, it

was not done.  The legislative intention, therefore,

appears to be clear leaving no ambiguity therein by

including Section 28 (k) only and excluding Section

10 and 32 in Section 33 (1).  

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30. It is a settled principle of rule of interpretation

that the Court cannot read any words which are not

mentioned  in  the  Section  nor  can  substitute  any

words in  place  of  those  mentioned  in  the  section

and  at  the  same  time  cannot  ignore  the  words

mentioned in the section.  Equally well settled rule

of interpretation is that if the language of statute is

plain,  simple,  clear  and  unambiguous  then  the

words  of  statute  have  to  be  interpreted  by  giving

them their natural meaning. [See. Interpretation of

statute by G.P. Singh 9th Edition page 44/45]. Our

interpretation of Section 33 (1) read with Section 28

(k) is in the light of this principle.    

31. We accordingly,  hold  that  the  list  prescribed

under Section 28(k) was available for inspection and

sale  to  the  voters  of  the  ward  in  question  on

17.02.2012.  In view of this finding, the limitation to

file  election petition would begin from 17.02.2012

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and  it  will  be  up  to  27.02.2012.  In  other  words,

period of limitation of 10 days prescribed for filing

the  election  petition  in  Section  33  (1)  of  the  Act

would begin from 17.02.2012 and it would be up to

27.02.2012.

32. It  was,  therefore,  necessary  for  respondent

No.1 (election petitioner)  to have filed the election

petition  on  any  day  between  17.02.2012  to

27.2.2012. Since the election petition was filed on

28.02.2012, a date beyond 27.02.2012, it was liable

to be dismissed as being barred by limitation. In the

absence  of  any  provision  made  in  the  Act  for

condoning the delay in filing the election petition,

the Chief Judge had no power to condone the delay

in filing the election petition beyond the period of

limitation  prescribed  in  law.  Indeed,  no  such

argument was advanced by the learned counsel for

respondent No.1 in this regard.

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33. Before  parting  with  the  case,  we  consider  it

appropriate  to  observe  that  the  State  Election

Commissioner  would  be  at  liberty  to  frame Rules

under Section 28 (k) for its proper implementation.

Indeed,  when the  legislature  has  conferred a  rule

making power on the specified authority for proper

and effective implementation of Section 28 (k) then

in our opinion, such power should be exercised by

the State Election Commissioner within reasonable

time by framing appropriate Rules.  

34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we cannot

agree with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived

at by the two courts below when both proceeded to

hold that  the election petition filed by respondent

No.1  on  28.02.2012  was  within  limitation.  We

accordingly hold that the election petition filed by

respondent No.1 out of which this appeal arises was

barred by limitation and hence it should have been

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dismissed as being barred by limitation.   

35. The appeal is accordingly allowed.  Impugned

judgment is set aside.  As a consequence, Election

Petition No.129 of 2012 filed by respondent No.1 is

dismissed as barred by limitation.  There shall be no

order as to costs.

                  ………...................................J.           [J. CHELAMESWAR]

                             …...……..................................J.

 [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; September 04, 2015.     

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