Page 1

        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7212-7213  OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.29306-29307 of 2010)

Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. …Appellant

Versus

Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of a judgment and order dated  

7th September 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature  

of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Appeal No.936 of  

2006  and  an  order  dated  21st August  2009  passed  in  

W.A.M.P. No.2901 of 2008 in W.A. No.936 of 2006 whereby  

the High Court has dismissed the Writ Appeal and the review  

1

Page 2

petition filed by the appellant holding that the LAO/Collector,  

Land Acquisition having made the Award beyond the period  

of  two  years   stipulated  in  Section  11-A  of  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated by the  

authorities have lapsed.  

3. The appellant happens to be a Government company  

engaged in coal mining operations in the State of Andhra  

Pradesh.  In terms of a notification dated 30th August, 1992  

issued  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  a  

large  extent  of  land  measuring  35  acres  and  09  gts.  in  

Survey Nos.285, 287 and 288  situated in village Jallaram,  

Kamanpur Mandal and Karimnagar Districts was notified for  

acquisition for the benefit of the appellant-company. A final  

declaration in terms of Section 6 was made on 2nd March,  

1994,  the  validity  whereof  was  assailed  by  four  owners  

(Pattadars),  respondents  in  this  appeal  in  Writ  Petition  

No.27/483  of  1995  primarily  on  the  ground  that  the  

declaration  under  Section  6  had  been  issued  beyond  the  

period of limitation stipulated for the purpose. An application  

for interim stay was also moved by the writ-petitioners, in  

2

Page 3

which a Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  

granted an interim stay on 6th September, 1995. The writ  

petition  was  finally  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  by  a  

judgment and order dated 20th July, 1999. Aggrieved by the  

said  order  of  dismissal  the  respondent  filed  Writ  Appeal  

No.1228 of 1999 which too failed and was dismissed by the  

Division Bench on 13th August, 1999.   

4. With the dismissal of the writ petition and the appeal  

arising out of the same, the Collector made an Award under  

Section  11  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  on  5th November,  

1999. The appellant-company’s case is that all the owners,  

except the four respondents who had moved the High Court,  

sought a reference of the dispute regarding the quantum of  

compensation payable to them to the Civil  Court in which  

Senior Civil Judge, Manthani, District Karimnagar, A.P. held  

the expropriated owners entitled to receive compensation @  

Rs.60,000/-  per  acre  besides  enhanced  value  of  the  

structure,  wells  and  trees  standing  on  the  same.  The  

appellant-company claims to have deposited one third of the  

enhanced value of compensation in the appeal preferred by  

3

Page 4

it against the Award made by the Civil Court.  The appeal is,  

according to the appellant, pending for disposal by the High  

Court.

5. In the meantime respondents 1 to 4 in this appeal who  

apparently did not seek any reference to the Civil Court for  

enhancement  of  the  compensation  filed  Writ  Petition  

No.22875  of  1999  challenging  the  validity  of  the  Award  

made by the LAO/Collector on the ground that the same was  

beyond the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-

A of the Act. That contention found favour with the learned  

Single Judge of the High Court before whom the matter was  

argued.  The Single Judge held that the Award having been  

passed  beyond  the  period  of  limitation  stipulated  under  

Section 11-A of the Act, the land acquisition proceedings had  

lapsed.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge,  

the appellant filed Writ Appeal Nos.1315 of 2001 and 936 of  

2006  before  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  who  

affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed  

the appeals  by  its  order  dated  7th September,  2006.  The  

4

Page 5

appellant-company  then  appears  to  have  filed  review  

petition No.2901 of 2008 which too failed and was dismissed  

by the Division Bench by its order dated 21st August, 2009  

as already indicated.  The present appeals call in question  

the said two judgments and orders.

7. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  at  

length.  Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act reads as  

follows:              

“11-A. Period within which an Award shall be  made.  –  (1)  The  Collector  shall  make  an  Award   under section 11 within a period of two years from  the date of the publication of the declaration and if   no  Award  is  made  within  that  period,  the  entire   proceedings  for  the  acquisition  of  the  land  shall   lapse:

Provided that in a case where the said declaration   has been published before the commencement of the   Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the Award   shall be made within a period of two years from such   commencement.

Explanation - In computing the period of two years   referred to in this section, the period during which   any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of   the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court   shall be excluded.”

8. It is evident from the above that in order to be valid,  

the Award must be made within a period of two years from  

5

Page 6

the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6  

of the Act. The declaration in the instant case was published  

on  2nd March,  1994  while  the  Award  was  made  on  5th  

November, 1999. The same was, therefore, clearly beyond  

two  years’  period  stipulated  under  the  above  provisions.  

Even so the Award could be held to be valid if the same was  

within two years of the declaration after excluding the period  

during which the High Court had stayed the proceedings in  

the writ petition filed by the respondent-landowners.  That is  

because  Explanation  to  Section  11-A  (supra)  permits  

exclusion of the period during which the Court had stayed  

the acquisition proceedings for the purpose of reckoning the  

period of two years prescribed for making the Award. In the  

case at hand the interim order of stay was issued by the  

High Court on 6th December, 1995 which order was finally  

vacated on 28th July,  1999 with the dismissal  of  the writ  

petition.  This means that the restraint order remained in  

force for a period of 3 years, 7 months and 22 days.  That  

period shall  have to be added to the period of  two years  

prescribed for making the Award in the light of Explanation  

to Section 11-A. The difficulty is that even if the said period  

6

Page 7

is  added  to  the  time  allowed  for  making  an  Award,  the  

Award stands beyond the period prescribed. Confronted with  

this  proposition  Mr.  Altaf  Ahmad  argued  that  the  period  

taken to obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court  

vacated  the  stay  earlier  granted  by  it  ought  also  to  be  

excluded  from  consideration  and  when  so  excluded  the  

Award  would  fall  within  the  outer  limit  of  two  years  

stipulated under Section 11-A.  Reliance in support of that  

submission was placed by Mr. Altaf Ahmad on the decision of  

this  Court  in  N.  Narasimhaiah  and  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3   

SCC 88. It was contended that although the said decision  

was  reversed  by  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N.   

and  Ors.  (2002)  3  SCC  533,  the  law  declared  by  this  

Court  was  made  applicable  prospectively.  This  would,  

according to Mr. Altaf Ahmad, imply that on the date the  

Award in  question was made,  the legal  position  stated in  

Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) would hold the field. It would  

also, according to the learned counsel, mean that the time  

taken for obtaining a copy of the order of the High Court  

7

Page 8

would have to be excluded in the light of the judgment in  

Narasimhaiah’s case (supra).  

9. On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned  

counsel placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in  R.  

Indira Saratchandra v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.   

(2011)  10  SCC  344 to contend  that  this  Court  having  

noticed  the  previous  decisions  on  the  subject  had clearly  

repelled  the  contention  that  a  stay  order  vacated  by  the  

Court should all the same remain operative till  delivery or  

receipt of a copy of such order by the Collector/LAO. It was  

submitted that the view expressed in  N. Narasimhaiah’s  

case (supra) which was followed in State of Karnataka v.   

D.C.  Nanjudaiah (1996)  10  SCC  619 having  been  

overruled by this Court in case of  Padma Sundara Rao’s  

case,  there was no question  of  placing  reliance upon the  

ratio of the said two decisions. The contrary view expressed  

in  A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and   

Others (2010) 2 SCC 801 having been found to be the  

correct view, not only by the Constitution Bench in Padma  

Sundara  Rao’s  case  (supra)  but  also  in  R.  Indira  

8

Page 9

Sartchandra’s case (supra), the ratio of the said decisions  

alone stated the correct legal position, which was squarely  

applicable to the case at hand.  

10. It is, in our opinion, not necessary to delve deep into  

the merits of the contention urged on behalf of the appellant  

which is founded entirely on the ratio of the decision of this  

Court in  N. Narasimhaiah’s  case (supra).  Correctness of  

the  view  taken  in  N.  Narasimhaiah’s  case  (supra)  was  

examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma  

Sundara Rao’s  case (supra) and overruled.  If the matter  

rested there, we may have examined the question whether  

the  prospective  overruling  of  the  decision  in  N.  

Narasimhaiah’s case (supra) was of any assistance to the  

appellant in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.  

That  exercise  is  rendered  unnecessary  by  the  decision  

rendered by this  Court  in  R. Indira  Sartchandra’s  case  

(supra),  which places  the matter  beyond the pale  of  any  

further debate on the subject.  In R. Indira Sartchandra’s  

case (supra)  also  the  Award  made  by  the  Collector  was  

sought to be supported on the ground that the period of two  

9

Page 10

years prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act should be  

counted, not from the date of the Judgment by which the  

interim stay order was vacated but from the date on which a  

copy thereof was supplied to the Collector. The High Court  

had accepted that contention relying upon the decisions of  

this  Court  in  N  Narasimhaiah  and  Ors.  v.  State  of   

Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3   

SCC 88; State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. L. N. Krishnan   

and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 250;  Executive Engineer, Jal   

Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. v. Suresha Nand  

Juyal  alial  Musa  Ram  (Deceased)  by  Lrs.  and  Ors.  

1997 (9) SCC 224;  Municipal Corporation of Greater  

Bombay  v.   Industrial  Development  Investment  Co.   

Pvt.  Ltd.  and Others  1996 (11)  SCC  501;  Municipal  

Council,  Ahmednagar  v.  Shah  Hyder  Beig  and  Ors.   

2000 (2) SCC 48; Tej Kaur and Ors. v. State of Punjab   

2003 (4) SCC 48.

11. This Court, however, reversed the view taken by the  

High Court holding that Section 11-A did not admit of an  

interpretation by which the period of two years would start  

10

Page 11

running from the date a copy of the order vacating the stay  

granted by the  Court  is  served upon the Collector.   This  

Court observed:

“10. There is nothing in Section 11-A from which it   can be inferred that the stay order passed by the   court remains operative till  the delivery of copy of   the order. Ordinarily, the rules framed by the High   Court  do  not  provide  for  supply  of  copy  of  the   judgment or order to the parties free of cost. The   parties to the litigation can apply for certified copy  which is required to be supplied on fulfillment of the   conditions specified in the relevant rules. However,   no  period  has  been  prescribed  for  making  of  an  application  for  certified  copy  of  the  judgment  or   order or preparation and delivery thereof. Of course,   once an application  is  made within  the  prescribed  period  of  limitation,  the  time  spent  in  the   preparation and supply of  the copy is  excluded in   computing  the  period  of  limitation  prescribed  for   filing an appeal or revision.”

12. The above, in our opinion, is a complete answer to the  

contention urged on behalf of the appellant that not only the  

period  during  which  the  interim order  of  stay  remains  in  

force but also the time taken for obtaining the copy of the  

order vacating the stay should be excluded for reckoning the  

period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of the Act.

13. There is yet another dimension to the contention urged  

before us which too in our opinion stands concluded by the  

11

Page 12

decision  of  this  Court  in  Ravi  Khullar  and  Another  v.   

Union of India & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 231.  That was a  

case where a preliminary notification under Section 4 was  

issued  on  23rd January,  1965  and  a  declaration  under  

Section 6 published on 26th December, 1968 i.e. before the  

commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984.  In terms of  

sub-section  (1)  of  Section  11-A  applicable  to  such  a  

declaration,  an  Award  was  required  to  be  made  within  a  

period  of  two  years  from  such  commencement.  So  

calculated, the Award ought to have been made on or before  

28th September, 1986 when the period of two years from the  

commencement  of  the  Amendment  Act  of  1984  expired.  

The land owner however had filed a writ petition before the  

High Court on 12th September, 1986 in which an order for  

maintenance of  status quo was made on 18th September,  

1986  restraining  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  from  

announcing the Award. That order continued to remain in  

force till  13th February, 2003.  The High court, eventually,  

dismissed  the  writ  petition  on  13th February,  2003.  An  

application was made for obtaining a certified copy of the  

judgment which was ready only on 27th February, 2003.  The  

12

Page 13

Award  was  then  pronounced  on  1st March,  2003  after  

excluding the period during which the interim stay order was  

operative.  The Award should have been pronounced on or  

before 18th February, 2003. Having been pronounced on 1st  

March,  2003,  the  Award  was  made  beyond  the  period  

prescribed  under  Section  11-A.  The  contention  urged  on  

behalf  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer  was  that  a  public  

functionary had to look into the contents of the order passed  

by  the  Court  before  taking  any  action,  including  the  

pronouncement of the Award and, therefore, the time taken  

between 14th February, 2003 and 27th February, 2003 must  

also be excluded which meant that the Award could have  

been made up to any date till 4th March, 2003. Support was  

drawn for that proposition from the provisions of Section 12  

of the Limitation Act which according to the Land Acquisition  

Officer ought to have applied for computing the period of  

limitation under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.  

Rejecting that contention, this Court observed:

“54. ……The Land Acquisition Collector in making an   Award does not act as a court within the meaning of   the Limitation Act. It is also clear from the provisions   of the Land Acquisition Act that the provisions of the   Limitation  Act  have  not  been  made  applicable  to   

13

Page 14

proceedings  under  the  Land Acquisition Act  in  the   matter of making an Award under Section 11-A of   the  Act.  However,  Section  11-A  of  the  Act  does   provide  a  period  of  limitation  within  which  the   Collector  shall  make  his  Award.  The  Explanation   thereto  also  provides  for  exclusion  of  the  period   during which any action or proceeding to be taken in   pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of   a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope   for  importing  into  Section  11-A  of  the  Land   Acquisition Act the provisions of Section 12 of the   Limitation Act. The application of Section 12 of the   Limitation  Act  is  also  confined  to  matters   enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a   certified copy of the judgment is excluded because a   certified copy is required to be filed while preferring   an  appeal/revision/review,  etc.  challenging  the   impugned order.  Thus  a  court  is  not  permitted  to   read  into  Section  11-A  of  the  Act  a  provision  for   exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of   the judgment and order. The Court has, therefore,   no option but to compute the period of limitation for   making an Award in accordance with the provisions   of  Section  11-A  of  the  Act  after  excluding  such  period as can be excluded under the Explanation to   Section 11-A of the Act.”

14. This  Court  drew a comparison between Section 11-A  

and Section 28-A of the Act, and based on the difference  

between the two provisions, observed:

 “56. It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  legislature  wherever  it  considered  necessary  incorporated  by   express words the rule incorporated in Section 12 of   the  Limitation  Act.  It  has  done  so  expressly  in   Section 28-A of the Act while it has consciously not   incorporated  this  rule  in  Section  11-A  even  while   providing  for  exclusion  of  time  under  the   Explanation.  The  intendment  of  the  legislature  is   therefore  unambiguous  and  does  not  permit  the  court to read words into Section 11-A of the Act so   

14

Page 15

as to enable it to read Section 12 of the Limitation   Act into Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.”

15. We are in respectful agreement with the above line of  

reasoning.  Section  11-A  in  terms  does  not  provide  for  

exclusion of the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the  

Judgment  or  order  by  which  the  stay  order  was  either  

granted or vacated.  Section 12 of the Limitation Act has no  

application  to  the  making  of  an  Award  under  the  Land  

Acquisition  Act.  In  the  absence  of  any enabling  provision  

either in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act or in the  

Limitation Act, there is no room for borrowing the principles  

underlying Section 12 of the Limitation Act for  computing  

the  period  or  determining  the  validity  of  an  Award  by  

reference to Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act.

16. Mr. Altaf Ahmad made a feeble attempt to argue that  

omission of a specific provision in Section 11-A excluding the  

time taken in obtaining a copy of the order passed by the  

Court  was  casus omissus and that  this  Court  could  while  

interpreting  the  said  provision  supply  the  unintended  

omission of the Parliament. There is, in our view, no merit in  

15

Page 16

that  contention.  We  say  so  for  more  than  one  reasons.  

Firstly, because while applying the doctrine of casus omissus  

the  Court  has  to  look  at  the  entire  enactment  and  the  

scheme underlying the same. In the case at hand, we find  

that  Parliament  has,  wherever  it  intended,  specifically  

provided for exclusion of time requisite for obtaining a copy  

of the order. For instance, under Section 28A which provides  

for re-determination of the amount of compensation on the  

basis  of  the  Award  of  the  Court,  the  aggrieved  party  is  

entitled to move a written application to the Collector within  

three months from the date of the Award of the Court or the  

Collector  requiring  him  to  determine  the  amount  of  

compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount  

Awarded by the Court.  Proviso to Section 28A specifically  

excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award  

while computing the period of three months within which the  

application shall be made to the Collector.  It reads:

“28A.  Re-  determination  of  the  amount  of   compensation on the basis of the Award of the   Court.- (1) Where in an Award under this part, the   court  allows  to  the  applicant  any  amount  of   compensation in excess of the amount Awarded by  the  collector  under  section  11,  the  persons   interested in all the other land covered by the same  

16

Page 17

notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who   are  also  aggrieved  by  the  Award  of  the  Collector   may,  notwithstanding  that  they  had  not  made  an  application  to  the  Collector  under  section  18,  by   written  application  to  the  Collector  within  three   months  from the  date  of  the  Award  of  the  Court   require that the amount of compensation payable to   them may be re-  determined  on  the basis  of  the   amount of compensation Awarded by the Court:  

Provided that in computing the period of three   months within which an application to the Collector   shall be made under this sub- section, the day on  which  the  Award  was  pronounced  and  the  time  requisite for obtaining a copy of the Award shall be   excluded.”

  (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx  

17. Absence of a provision analogous to proviso to Section  

28A (supra) in the scheme of Section 11-A militates against  

the  argument  that  the  omission  of  such  a  provision  in  

Section 11-A is unintended which could be supplied by the  

Court taking resort to the doctrine of casus omissus.    

18. Secondly,  because  the  legal  position  regarding  

applicability of the doctrine of casus omissus is settled by a  

long  line  of  decisions  of  this  Court  as  well  as  Courts  in  

England.  Lord Diplock in Wentworth Securities v. Jones  

(1980) AC 1974,  revived  the  doctrine  which  was  under  

17

Page 18

major  criticism,  by  formulating  three  conditions  for  its  

exercise namely, (1) What is the intended purpose of the  

statute  or  provision  in  question;  (2)  Whether  it  was  by  

inadvertence  that  the  draftsman  and  the  Parliament  had  

failed  to  give  effect  to  that  purpose  in  the  provision  in  

question;  and  (3)  What  would  be  the  substance  of  the  

provision  that  the Parliament  would have made,  although  

not necessarily the precise words that the Parliament would  

have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The House  

of  Lords  while  approving  the  above  conditions  in  Inco  

Europe  v.  First  Choice  Distribution  (2000)  1  All  ER  

109, went further to say that there are certain exceptions to  

the rule inasmuch the power will not be exercised when the  

alteration is far-reaching or when the legislation in question  

requires strict construction as a matter of law.  

19. The legal position prevalent in this country is not much  

different from the law as stated in England. This Court has in  

several decisions held that casus omissus cannot be supplied  

except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it  

is found within the four corners of the statute itself.   The  

18

Page 19

doctrine was first discussed by Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar in  

the  case  of  Commissioner  Of  Income  Tax,  Central   

Calcutta  v.  National  Taj  Tradus  (1980)  1  SCC  370.  

Interpretative  assistance  was  taken  by  this  Court  from  

Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.) pg.  

33 and 47.  The Court said:  

“10.  Two principles  of  construction-one relating  to   casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the   statute  as  a  whole-appear  to  be  well  settled.  In   regard to the former the following statement of law   appears  in  Maxwell  on  Interpretation  of  Statutes   (12th Edn.) at page 33:

Omissions not to be inferred-"It is a corollary to the   general rule of literal construction that nothing is to   be added to or taken from a statute unless there are   adequate grounds to justify  the inference that the   legislature intended something which it  omitted to   express. Lord Mersey said: 'It is a strong thing to   read into an Act of Parliament words which are not   there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a   wrong thing to do.' 'We are not entitled,' said Lords   Loreburn  L.C.,  'to  read  words  into  an  Act  of   Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found  within the four corners of the Act itself.' A case not   provided  for  in  a  statute  is  not  to  be  dealt  with   merely because there seems no good reason why it   should  have  been  omitted,  and  the  omission  in   consequence to have been unintentional.  

In  regard  to  the  latter  principle  the  following   statement of law appears in Maxwell at page 47:

A statute is to be read as a whole-"It was resolved in   the case of Lincoln College (1595) 3 Co. Rep. 58 that   the good expositor  of  an Act of  Parliament should   'make construction on all the parts together, and not   of one part only by itself.' Every clause of a statute   is to 'be construed with reference to the context and  

19

Page 20

other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to   make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.'   (Per Lord Davey in Canada Sugar Refining Co., Ltd.   v. R: 1898 AC 735)  

In  other  words,  under  the  first  principle  a  casus   omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in   the case of clear necessity and when reason for it   found in the four corners of the statute itself but at   the same time a casus omissus should not be readily   inferred  and  for  that  purpose  all  the  parts  of  a   statute or section must be construed together and  every clause of a section should be construed with   reference to the context and other clauses thereof so   that  the  construction  to  be  put  on  a  particular   provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole   statute. This would be more so if literal construction   of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or   anomalous  results  which  could  not  have  been   intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce   an,  unreasonable  result",  said  Danckwerts  L.J.  in   Artemiou v. Procopiou [1966] 1 Q.B. 878 "is not to   be  imputed  to  a  statute  if  there  is  some  other   construction  available."  Where  to  apply  words   literally  would "defeat the obvious intention of the  legislation  and  produce  a  wholly  unreasonable   result" we must "do some violence to the words" and   so  achieve  that  obvious  intention  and  produce  a   rational  construction,  (Per  Lord  Reid  in  Luke  v.   I.R.C.-1968  AC  557  where  at  p.  577  he  also   observed:  "this  is  not a new problem, though our   standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.  In  the  light  of  these  principles  we  will  have  to   construe  Sub-section  (2)(b)  with  reference  to  the   context and other clauses of Section 33B.”

20. Arijit Pasayat, J. has verbatim relied upon the above in  

Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu 2 (2002) 3   

SCC  533, Union  of  India  v.  Dharmendra  Textile  

Processors (2008) 13 SCC 369, Nagar Palika Nigam v.   

Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 364,   

20

Page 21

Sangeeta Singh v. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 484,   

State of Kerala & Anr. v. P.V. Neelakandan Nair & Ors.   

(2005) 5 SCC 561, UOI v. Priyankan Sharan and Anr.   

(2008)  9  SCC  15,  Maulavi  Hussein  Haji  Abraham  

Umarji v. State of Gujarat (2004) CriLJ 3860, Unique  

Butyle  Tube  Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  U.P.  Financial   

Corporation and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 455, UOI v. Rajiv   

Kumar with UOI v. Bani Singh (2003) SCC (LS) 928,   

Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj   

Developers and Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 659, Prakash Nath   

Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and   

Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 686, State of Jharkhand & Anr. v.   

Govind Singh (2005) 10 SCC 437, Trutuf Safety Glass   

Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. (2007)   

7 SCC 242.

21. In Padma Sundara Rao’s (supra) this Court examined  

whether  the  doctrine  of  casus  omissus could  be  invoked  

while  interpreting Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act  

so as to provide for exclusion of time taken for service of  

21

Page 22

copy  of  the  order  upon  the  Collector.  Repelling  the  

contention this Court said:

“12. The  court  cannot  read  anything  into  a  statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous.   A statute is an edict of the legislature.  The language   employed in a statute is the determinative factor of   legislative  intent.  The  first  and  primary  rule  of   construction is  that the intention of  the legislation   must be found in the words used by the legislature   itself.  The question is not what may be supposed  and has been intended but what has been said.   

xxx xxx xxx

14. While  interpreting  a  provision the  court  only   interprets  the  law  and  cannot  legislate  it.  If  a   provision  of  law  is  misused  and  subjected  to  the   abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to   amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.”     

22. There is in the case at hand no ambiguity nor do we  

see  any  apparent  omission  in  Section  11-A  to  justify  

application  of  the  doctrine  of  casus  omissus and  by  that  

route re-write 11-A providing for exclusion of time taken for  

obtaining a copy of the order which exclusion is not currently  

provided by the said provision. The omission of a provision  

under Section 11-A analogous to the proviso under Section  

22

Page 23

28A is obviously not unintended or inadvertent which is the  

very  essence  of  the  doctrine  of  casus  omissus.  We,  

therefore,  have  no  hesitation  in  rejecting  the  contention  

urged by Mr. Altaf Ahmad.

23. The  High  Court  was  in  the  above  circumstances  

perfectly  justified in holding that the Award made by the  

Collector/Land Acquisition Officer was  non est and that the  

acquisition proceedings had elapsed by reason of a breach of  

Section 11-A of the Act.  We, however, make it clear that  

the declaration granted by the High Court and proceedings  

initiated by the Collector shall be deemed to have elapsed  

only qua the writ petitioners-respondents herein.  With those  

observations,  these appeals fail  and are hereby dismissed  

but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.  

……………………………………….……….…..…J.             (T.S. THAKUR)

     …………………………..…………………..…..J.                    (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

New Delhi

23

Page 24

August 29, 2013

24