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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 10529   OF 2014 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.11696 OF 2007)

SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS & ANR.          …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

RAVI NATH MISRA & ORS.               …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  and  

Order  dated  7th May,  2007  of  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad, Civil Side in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.47201 of  

2002.

3. The question for consideration is whether Section 12(3) of the  

Uttar  Pradesh  Urban  Buildings  (Regulation  of  Letting,  Rent  and  

Eviction)  Act,  1972  (for  short  “the  Act”)  providing  for  ‘deemed  

vacancy’ is applicable to a situation where the tenant or a member  

of his family builds, acquires or otherwise gets a vacant building in

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the area concerned after commencement of the tenancy but prior to  

application of the Act to the tenancy in question.

4. Brief reference to facts giving rise to the question is necessary.  

The accommodation in question was let out for residential purpose  

w.e.f. 1st June, 1981 and was assessed for house tax for the first time  

on 1st October, 1983.  Under Section 2(2) of the Act, the Act which  

otherwise came into force on 15th July, 1972, was not applicable to  

the building during ten years from the date on which its construction  

was completed.  The construction is deemed to be completed, inter  

alia, on the date on which the first assessment of letting value is  

made by the local authority concerned, which in the present case  

was 1st October,  1983.   Thus, the Act became applicable to the  

accommodation in question in the year 1983.  On 7th June, 1987, the  

tenant purchased another residential house bearing number 198 at  

Safipur-II, Kanpur Nagar.

5. The City Magistrate, Kanpur, in his capacity as Rent Controller,  

vide  Order  dated  5th September,  2002,  declared  the  premises  in  

question to be vacant under Section 12(3) of the Act on account of  

purchase of residential house by the wife of the tenant in the year  

1987.  The tenant filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.47201 of  

2002 against the Order of the Rent Controller declaring the premises  

in question to be vacant and also the subsequent order dated 30th

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September,  2002  releasing  the  accommodation  in  favour  of  the  

landlord under Section 16 of the Act.  The High Court accepted the  

petition holding that no vacancy can be declared if the tenant or his  

family  member  purchased  the  house  before  the  Act  became  

applicable.    Reliance was placed on a Five-Judge Full Bench of the  

High  Court  in  Mangi  Lal vs. Additional  District  Judge  &  

others.  1  .  It is against the said Order that the present appeal has  

been preferred.   

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

7. The Act provides for the regulation of letting and rent and the  

eviction  of  tenants  from  certain  classes  of  buildings  situated  in  

urban areas and for matters connected therewith.   Reference to all  

the provisions of the Act may not be necessary for adjudication of  

the issue involved, except to Section 12 which provides for deemed  

vacancy  of  a  building  in  certain  cases.   Section  12(3)  reads  as  

follows :

“12(1)     ………….      (2)      …………..     (3)   In the case of a residential building,   if  the tenant or any member of  his family   builds  or  otherwise  acquires  in  a  vacant   state or gets vacated a residential building  in the same city, municipality, notified area  or  town  area  in  which  the  building  under  tenancy is  situate,  he shall  be deemed to   

1 (1980) Allahabad Rent Cases, 55

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have ceased to occupy the building under   his tenancy:

Provided that if the tenant or any member   of his family had built any such residential   building before the date of commencement   of  this  Act,  then  such  tenant  shall  be  deemed  to  have  ceased  to  occupy  the   building  under  his  tenancy  upon  the  expiration of a period of one year from the   said date.

Explanation.--For the purposes of  this sub- section-- (a)  a  person  shall  be  deemed  to  have  otherwise  acquired  a  building,  if  he  is   occupying  a  public  building  for  residential   purposes as a tenant, allottee or licensee; (b) the expression "any member of family",   in relation to a tenant, shall  not include a  person  who  has  neither  been  normally   residing  with  nor  is  wholly  dependent  on  such tenant.”

8. Learned counsel for the appellant-landlord submits that under  

the scheme of the Act, the above provision should be interpreted to  

mean that a tenant who has already acquired another residential  

building  in  the  same  city,  is  not  entitled  to  protection  against  

eviction  even  if  such  acquisition  is  before  commencement  or  

applicability of the Act, as the object of the Act is to protect a needy  

person and not a person who has already acquired another building.  

No  doubt  the  expression  “builds  or  otherwise  acquires  in  a  

vacant state or gets vacated” may give an impression that the  

provision  is  applicable  in  respect  of  acquisition  after  the  Act

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becomes applicable, the context and the scheme of the Act clearly  

indicate that any acquisition of alternative accommodation by the  

tenant  after  commencement  of  the  tenancy  is  covered  by  the  

provision  This becomes clear when reference is made to the proviso  

which purports to be more beneficial to the tenant in giving extra  

protection  to  the  tenancy  for  one  year  from  the  date  of  

commencement of the Act.  The proviso clearly refers to a situation  

where the tenant had built  the alternative accommodation before  

the  commencement  of  the  Act.  The  scope  of  proviso  is  always  

narrower than the main provision.   He submitted that the Full Bench  

judgment has been wrongly relied upon by the High Court for the  

contrary view and if so read, the same does not lay down correct  

law.  Reference has also been made to Judgments of this Court in  

Goppumal vs.  Thakurji  Shriji  Shriji  Dwarakadheeshji  &  

another  2   and Gajanan Dattatraya vs.  Sherbanu Hasang Patel  

& others  3   which have been referred to in the Full Bench Judgment.   

9. Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant opposed the above  

submission.  According to him, on a plain reading, Section 12(3) can  

apply  only  if  acquisition  of  alternative  premises  by the  tenant  is  

after  the  Act  becomes  applicable.   In  the  present  case,  the  Act  

became applicable only in the year 1993 and prior thereto, by virtue  2 (1969) 1 SCC 792 3 (1975) 2 SCC 668

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of Section 2(2), the building was exempted from the operation of the  

Act.  He, thus, supports the view taken by the High Court.

10. We have given due consideration to the rival submissions.

11. The object of rent law is to balance the competing claims of  

the landlord on the one hand to recover possession of building let  

out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary  

increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when there is acute shortage  

of accommodation.  Though, it is for the legislature to resolve such  

competing claims in terms of statutory provisions, while interpreting  

the provisions the object of the Act has to be kept in view by the  

Court.     Unless  otherwise  provided,  a  tenant  who  has  already  

acquired alternative accommodation is not intended to be protected  

by the Rent Act.   

12. In  Joginder  Pal vs.  Naval  Kishore  Behal  4  ,  this  Court  

observed :

“5.  It  will  be useful to state the principles   relevant  for  interpretation  of  a  provision  contained in a rent control law like the one  with  which  we  are  dealing.  The  spurt  of   provincial  rent  control  legislations  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  population  explosion.  In  Prabhakaran Nair  v.  State  of   T.N. [(1987) 4 SCC 238] the Court noticed  craving  for  a  home  —  a  natural  human  instinct, intensified by post-war migration of   human beings en bloc place to place,  the   partition of the country and uprooting of the   people from their hearth and home as vital   

4 (2002) 5 SCC 397

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factors  leading  to  acute  housing  shortage  persuading the legislatures to act and enact   rent control laws. The Court emphasized the   need  of  making  the  landlord  and  tenant  laws rational, humane, certain and capable  of  being  quickly  implemented.  Benefit  of   society at large needs an equalistic balance  being  maintained  between  apparently  conflicting  interests  of  the  owners  of  the  property  and  the  tenant  by  inducing  and  encouraging  the  landlords  to  part  with   available  accommodation  for  reasonable  length  of  time  to  accommodate  tenants  without unreasonably restricting their right   to  have  the  property  being  restored  to  them, more so, when they genuinely require  it.  Such  limited  safeguarding  of  landlords’   interest  ensures  a  boost  to  construction   activity which in turn results in availability   of  more  houses  to  accommodate  more  human  souls  with  a  roof  on  their  heads.   Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as His Lordship then  was,  articulated the empty truism in such  words  as  have  become  an  oft-quoted  quotation (SCC p. 262, para 36)— “Tenants  are  in  all  cases  not  the  weaker   sections.  There  are  those  who  are  weak  both  among  the  landlords  as  well  as  the  tenants.” 6. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of   Maharashtra  [  (1998)  2  SCC 1]  this  Court   emphasized the need of social  legislations   like the Rent Control Act striking a balance   between rival interests so as to be just to   law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one  and  give  a  disproportionate  benefit  or   protection  to  another  section  of  the  society.”  (SCC  p.  22,  para  29)  While  the  shortage  of  accommodation  makes  it   necessary  to  protect  the  tenants  to  save  them from exploitation but at the same time  the need to protect tenants is coupled with  an obligation to ensure that the tenants are   not  conferred  with  a  benefit   disproportionately  larger  than  the  one  needed.  Socially  progressive  legislation

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must have a holistic perception and not a  short-sighted parochial approach. Power to  legislate socially progressive legislations is   coupled  with  a  responsibility  to  avoid   arbitrariness  and  unreasonability.  A  legislation  impregnated  with  tendency  to  give undue preference to one section, at the  cost  of  constraints  by placing shackles  on   the  other  section,  not  only  entails   miscarriage of justice but may also result in   constitutional invalidity. 7. In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C.   Tuliani   [(1989)  4  SCC  612]  this  Court   dealing  with  rent  control  legislation  observed that provisions contained in such  legislations  are  capable  of  being  categorized into two: those beneficial to the  tenants and those beneficial to the landlord.   As to a legislative provision beneficial to the  landlord, an assertion that even with regard  to such provision an effort should be made   to interpret it in favour of the tenant, is a   negation  of  the  very  principle  of   interpretation of a beneficial legislation. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of   rent control legislations was emphasized by   this  Court  in  Bega  Begum  v.  Abdul  Ahad   Khan. [(1979) 1 SCC 273] Speaking in the   context  of  reasonable  requirement  of   landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court  guarded  against  any  artificial  extension   entailing stretching or straining of language  so  as  to  make  it  impossible  or  extremely   difficult for the landlord to get a decree for   eviction.  The  Court  warned  that  such  a  course would defeat the very purpose of the   Act which affords the facility of eviction of   the  tenant  to  the  landlord  on  certain   specified  grounds.  In  Kewal  Singh  v.   Lajwanti [(1980) 1 SCC 290] this Court has  observed, while the rent control legislation  has  given  a  number  of  facilities  to  the  tenants, it should not be construed so as to   destroy the limited relief which it seeks to   give to the landlord also. For instance, one  of  the  grounds  for  eviction  which  is  

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contained  in  almost  all  the  Rent  Control   Acts  in  the  country  is  the  question  of   landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The  concept  of  bona  fide  necessity  should  be  meaningfully construed so as to make the  relief  granted  to  the  landlord  real  and  practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr   Mahesh  Chand Gupta  [(1999)  6  SCC 222]   the Court has held that the concept of bona  fide need or genuine requirement needs a   practical  approach  instructed  by  the  realities  of  life.  An  approach  either  too  liberal or too conservative or pedantic must   be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily   loaded  in  favour  of  the  tenants  treating   them  as  weaker  sections  of  the  society   requiring  legislative  protection  against   exploitation  and  unscrupulous  devices  of   greedy landlords. The legislative intent has  to  be  respected  by  the  courts  while   interpreting  the  laws.  But  it  is  being  uncharitable  to  legislatures  if  they  are  attributed with an intention that they lean  only  in  favour  of  the  tenants  and  while   being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of   being unfair to the landlords. The legislature   is fair to the tenants and to the landlords —  both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable   and  balanced  approach  while  interpreting   rent  control  legislations  starting  with  an  assumption  that  an  equal  treatment  has  been meted out to both the sections of the  society. In spite of the overall balance tilting  in favour of the tenants, while interpreting   such of the provisions as take care of the  interest of the landlord the court should not   hesitate  in  leaning  in  favour  of  the  landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in   rent  control  legislations  to  take  care  of   those situations where the landlords too are   weak and feeble and feel humble.”

13. In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance &

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Investment Co. Ltd. & others  5  , it was observed :

“33. Interpretation must depend on the text   and  the  context.  They  are  the  bases  of   interpretation. One may well say if the text   is  the  texture,  context  is  what  gives  the   colour.  Neither  can  be  ignored.  Both  are   important. That interpretation is best which  makes the textual interpretation match the   contextual.  A  statute  is  best  interpreted   when  we  know why  it  was  enacted.  With  this  knowledge, the statute must be read,   first as a whole and then section by section,   clause  by  clause,  phrase  by  phrase  and  word by word. If a statute is looked at, in   the  context  of  its  enactment,  with  the  glasses  of  the  statute-maker,  provided  by  such  context,  its  scheme,  the  sections,   clauses, phrases and words may take colour   and appear different than when the statute   is looked at without the glasses provided by  the  context.  With  these  glasses  we  must  look  at  the  Act  as  a  whole  and  discover   what  each  section,  each  clause,  each  phrase  and  each  word  is  meant  and  designed to say as to fit into the scheme of   the entire Act. No part of a statute and no   word  of  a  statute  can  be  construed  in   isolation. Statutes have to be construed so  that every word has a place and everything  is  in  its  place.  It  is  by  looking  at  the  definition as a whole in the setting of  the   entire  Act  and  by  reference  to  what   preceded the enactment and the reasonsfor  it  that the Court construed the expression  “Prize  Chit”  in  Srinivasa  and  we  find  no  reason  to  depart  from  the  Court’s   construction.”

14. The Full Bench of the High Court in Mangi Lal (supra), rightly  

held  that  the  grammar  cannot  control  the  interpretation  of  the  

provision which has to be read in the context.  It will be appropriate  

5 (1987) 1 SCC 424

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to reproduce relevant part of the said Judgment which is as follows :

“43. The interpretation canvassed on behalf   of the landlord is only grammatical and so  ultra-legalistic. It is what is called the literal   approach. In Kammins v. Zenith Investments   Ltd. (1971)  AC  850 Lord  Diplock  drew  a  clear  distinction  between  the  'literal   approach'  and  the  'purposive  approach',   and used the purposive approach to solve  the question. 44. Recently, the House of Lords considered  the  rules  of  interpretation  of  statutes  in   Stock  v.  Frank  Jones  Tiption  Ltd. (1978)  1  WLR  231.  In  that  case  Viscount  Dilhorne  said: “It is now fashionable to talk of a purposive   construction  of  a  statute,  but  it  has  been   recognised since the 17th century that it is   the task of the judiciary in interpreting an  Act to seek to interpret it 'according to the   intent  of  them that  made it'  (Coke 4  Inst   33).” The  better  approach  is  the  purposive  approach,  namely,  to  seek  the  legislative  intent and not be led away by a strict literal   construction of the words. 45. Lord Denning put it very pithily in   Seaford Count Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2  KB 281 as under: “We do not sit here to pull the language of   Parliament  and of  Ministers  to  pieces  and  make nonsense of it.  That is an easy thing  to do, and it is a thing to which Lawyers are   too often prone.  We sit here to find out the  intention of Parliament and of Ministers and  carry out, and we do this better by filling in   the  gaps  and  making  sense  of  the  enactment  than  by  opening  it  up  to  destructive analysis.” The  Court’s  function  is  to  clarify  the  language  so  as  to  satisfy  the  legislative  intent. 46. The  word  ‘has’  has  been used in  the  Act  in  many  other  provision,  e.g.,  

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section  20  permits  a  suit  for  ejectment  where  the tenant  ‘has  sublet’.   There  the  word  ‘has’  may  have  a  different   significance,  because  of,  inter-alia,  its   legislative history.”

15. Thus, in our view, mere use of present tense in Section 12(3) is  

not intended to limit the applicability of the provision to acquisition  

of  accommodation  by  the  tenant  after  the  Rent  Act  becomes  

applicable.  In the context, the provision also covers the situation  

where the tenant has acquired alternative accommodation before  

the applicability of the Rent Act.  This view is further supported by  

the  language  of  the  proviso.  The  proviso  clearly  shows  that  the  

provision in  question is  not  intended to  be limited to  a situation  

where  alternative  accommodation  is  acquired  after  the  Act  

commences  or  becomes  operative.   The  provision  also  covers  a  

situation where the alternative accommodation is acquired prior to  

that.  The scope of proviso is narrower than the main provision.

16. In  S.  Sundaram  Pillai  &  others vs.  V.R.  

Pattabiraman & others  6  , it was observed:

“27.  The  next  question  that  arises  for   consideration is as to what is the scope of a  proviso  and  what  is  the  ambit  of  an  Explanation  either  to  a  proviso  or  to  any   other statutory provision. We shall first take  up  the  question  of  the  nature,  scope  and  extent  of  a  proviso.  The  well  established  rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a   proviso may have three separate functions.   

6 (1985) 1 SCC 591

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Normally,  a  proviso  is  meant  to  be  an  exception  to  something  within  the  main  enactment or to qualify something enacted   therein which but for the proviso would be  within  the  purview  of  the  enactment.  In   other words, a proviso cannot be torn apart   from the main enactment nor can it be used  to nullify or set at naught the real object of   the main enactment. 28. Craies in his book Statute Law (7th Edn.)   while explaining the purpose and import of   a proviso states at p. 218 thus: “The  effect  of  an  exception  or  qualifying   proviso,  according to the ordinary rules of   construction,  is  to  except  out  of  the  preceding portion  of  the enactment,  or  to   qualify  something  enacted  therein,  which   but for the proviso would be within it.... The   natural  presumption  is  that,  but  for  the  proviso,  the  enacting  part  of  the  section   would have included the subject-matter of   the proviso.” 29.  Odgers  in  Construction  of  Deeds  and  Statutes  (5th  Edn.)  while  referring  to  the  scope of a proviso mentioned the following  ingredients: “p.  317.  Provisos  —These  are  clauses  of   exception  or  qualification  in  an  Act,   excepting  something  out  of,  or  qualifying   something in, the enactment which, but for   the proviso, would be within it. p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a   clause may exceptionally have the effect of   a substantive enactment.” 30. Sarathi  in Interpretation of Statutes at  pages 294-295 has collected the following  principles in regard to a proviso:

(a) When one finds a proviso to a section   the natural  presumption is  that,  but for   the  proviso,  the  enacting  part  of  the  section would have included the subject- matter of the proviso. (b)  A  proviso  must  be  construed  with   reference to the preceding parts  of  the  clause to which it is appended. (c)  Where  the  proviso  is  directly  

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repugnant to a section, the proviso shall   stand and be held a repeal of the section   as the proviso speaks the latter intention   of the makers. (d)  Where  the  section  is  doubtful,  a  proviso  may be  used  as  a  guide  to  its   interpretation:  but  when  it  is  clear,  a   proviso  cannot  imply  the  existence  of   words of  which there is no trace in the  section. (e)  The  proviso  is  subordinate  to  the  main section. (f)  A  proviso  does  not  enlarge  an  enactment  except  for  compelling  reasons. (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is   inserted by way of abundant caution. (h) A construction placed upon a proviso  which brings it into general harmony with   the terms of section should prevail. (i)  When a  proviso  is  repugnant  to  the  enacting part, the proviso will not prevail   over  the  absolute  terms  of  a  later  Act   directed to be read as supplemental  to  the earlier one. (j)  A  proviso  may sometimes  contain  a   substantive provision.”

17. We,  thus,  hold  that  the  view taken by  the  High  Court  that  

acquisition  of  alternative  accommodation  by  the  tenant,  prior  to  

enforcement of the Act, is not covered by Section 12(3) of the Act is  

not  correct  in  law.   The  Full  Bench  Judgment,  to  the  extent  it  

supports the said view, also does not lay down correct law and will  

stand overruled.

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18. Accordingly,  we  allow  this  appeal,  set  aside  the  impugned  

order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the  

Rent Controller.  No costs.

………………………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

………………………………………J. (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

………………………………………J. (R. BANUMATHI)

NEW DELHI NOVEMBER 25, 2014