SIDHARTHA SARAWGI Vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR PORT OF KOLKATA&OR
Bench: GYAN SUDHA MISRA,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: SLP(C) No.-018347-018347 / 2013
Diary number: 13697 / 2013
Advocates: ABHIJAT P. MEDH Vs
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.18347/2013
SIDHARTHA SARAWGI … PETITIONER (S)
VERSUS BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.19458- 19459/2013
UNIVERSAL AUTOCRAFTS PRIVATE LIMITED AND ANOTHER … PETITIONER (S)
VERSUS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.19600/2013
SIDHARTHA SARAWGI … PETITIONER (S)
VERSUS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.19652/2013
SIDHARTHA SARAWGI … PETITIONER (S)
VERSUS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE PORT OF KOLKATA AND OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)
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REPORTABLE
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J U D G M E N T
KURIAN, J.:
1. Delegatus Non Potest Delegare: A delegate has no
power to delegate, is a well-settled principle. Is there any
exception and is there any distinction between delegation
of legislative and non-legislative powers, are the moot
issues arising for consideration in these cases.
2. Delegation is the act of making or commissioning a
delegate. It generally means parting of powers by the
person who grants the delegation and conferring of an
authority to do things which otherwise that person would
have to do himself. Delegation is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “the act of entrusting another with authority
by empowering another to act as an agent or
representative”. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Law
Lexicon, “delegation is the act of making or
commissioning a delegate. Delegation generally means
parting of powers by the person who grants the
delegation, but it also means conferring of an authority to
do things which otherwise that person would have to do
himself”. Justice Mathew in Gwalior Rayon Silk
Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant
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Commissioner of Sales Tax and Others1, has
succinctly discussed the concept of delegation. Paragraph
37 reads as follows:
“37. … Delegation is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to another person or body of persons, with complete power of revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this, for, much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from assuming that delegation involves or may involve, the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced.”
3. There is a subtle distinction between delegation of
legislative powers and delegation of
non-legislative/administrative powers. As far as delegation
of power to legislate is concerned, the law is well-settled:
the said power cannot be sub-delegated. The Legislature
cannot delegate essential legislative functions which
consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative
policy and formally enacting that policy into a binding rule
1 (1974) 4 SCC 98 3
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of conduct2. Subordinate legislation which is generally in
the realm of Rules and Regulations dealing with the
procedure on implementation of plenary legislation is
generally a task entrusted to a specified authority. Since
the Legislature need not spend its time for working out the
details on implementation of the law, it has thought it fit
to entrust the said task to an agency. That agency cannot
entrust such task to its subordinates; it would be a breach
of the confidence reposed on the delegate.
4. Regarding delegation of non-
legislative/administrative powers on a person or a body to
do certain things, whether the delegate himself is to
perform such functions or whether after taking decision as
per the terms of the delegation, the said agency can
authorize the implementation of the same on somebody
else, is the question to be considered. Once the power is
conferred, after exercising the said power, how to
implement the decision taken in the process, is a matter
of procedure. The Legislature may, after laying down the
legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative
2 Harishanker Bagla v. State of M.P. – (1955) 1 SCR 380 (Page 388) Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works
Limited – (1997) 5 SCC 516 (Paragraph 24)
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agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the
agency to work out the details within the framework of
that policy3. So long as the essential functions of decision
making is performed by the delegate, the burden of
performing the ancillary and clerical task need not be
shouldered by the primary delegate. It is not necessary
that the primary delegate himself should perform the
ministerial acts as well. In furtherance of the
implementation of the decision already taken by the
primary delegate as per the delegation, ministerial or
clerical tasks may be performed by authorized officers.
The complexity of modern day administration and the
expansion of functions of the State to the economic and
social spheres have made it necessary that the Legislature
gives wide powers to various authorities when the
situation requires it. Today’s governmental functions are a
lot more complex and the need for delegation of powers
has become more compelling. It cannot be expected that
the head of the administrative body performs each and
every task himself.
3 Khambalia Municipality v. State of Gujarat – AIR 1967 SC 1048 (P.1051)
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5. The issue was considered by this Court in Jamal
Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and Another4
in the context of the procedure for filing of the election
petitions under Section 81 of the Representation of
Peoples Act, 1951. It was held that the ministerial or
administrative functions of the authority on whom the
powers are conferred by the statute can be exercised by
the authorized officers. It was held that:
“13. The functions discharged by a High Court can be divided broadly into judicial and administrative functions. The judicial functions are to be discharged essentially by the Judges as per the Rules of the Court and cannot be delegated. However, administrative functions need not necessarily be discharged by the Judges by themselves, whether individually or collectively or in a group of two or more, and may be delegated or entrusted by authorization to subordinates unless there be some rule of law restraining such delegation or authorisation. Every High Court consists of some administrative and ministerial staff which is as much a part of the High Court as an institution and is meant to be entrusted with the responsibility of discharging administrative and ministerial functions. There can be “delegation” as also there can be “authorization” in favour of the Registry and the officials therein by empowering or entrusting them with authority or by permitting a few things to be done by them for and on behalf of the Court so as to aid the Judges in discharge of their judicial functioning. Authorization may take the form of formal conferral or sanction or may be by way of approval or countenance. Such delegation or authorization is not a matter of mere convenience but a
4 (2003) 4 SCC 257 6
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necessity at times. The Judges are already overburdened with the task of performing judicial functions and the constraints on their time and energy are so demanding that it is in public interest to allow them to devote time and energy as much as possible in discharging their judicial functions, relieving them of the need for diverting their limited resources of time and energy to such administrative or ministerial functions, which, on any principle of propriety, logic, or necessity are not required necessarily to be performed by the Judges. Receiving a cause or a document and making it presentable to a Judge for the purpose of hearing or trial and many a functions post- decision, which functions are administrative and ministerial in nature, can be and are generally entrusted or made over to be discharged by the staff of the High Court, often by making a provision in the Rules or under the orders of the Chief Justice or by issuing practice directions, and at times, in the absence of rules, by sheer practice. The practice gathers the strength of law and the older the practice the greater is the strength…”
6. Practical necessities or exigencies of administration
require that the decision making authority who has been
conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks
when the situation so requires. Thus, the maxim delegatus
non potest delegare, gives way in the performance of
administrative or ministerial tasks by subordinate
authorities in furtherance of the exercise of the delegated
power by an authority.
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7. It would also be useful in this context to refer to the
decision of this Court in Barium Chemicals Limited and
Another v. The Company Law Board and Another5
wherein it is held at paragraph 36 as follows:
“…the maxim delegatus non potest delegare must not be pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by any contrary indications in the language, scope or object of the statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and object of the statute should be adopted.”
8. The Constitution confers power and imposes duty on
the Legislature to make laws and the said functions
cannot be delegated by the Legislature to the executive.
The Legislature is constitutionally required to keep in its
own hands the essential legislative functions which consist
of the determination of legislative policy and its
formulation as a binding rule of conduct. After the
performance of the essential legislative function by the
Legislature and laying the guiding policy, the Legislature
may delegate to the executive or administrative authority,
any ancillary or subordinate powers that are necessary for
5 AIR 1967 SC 295 8
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giving effect to the policy and purposes of the enactment.
In construing the scope and extent of delegated power,
the difference between the essential and non-essential
functions of the delegate should also be borne in mind.
While there cannot be sub-delegation of any essential
functions, in order to achieve the intended object of the
delegation, the non-essential functions can be sub-
delegated to be performed under the authority and
supervision of the delegate.
9. Sometimes, in the plenary legislation itself, the
lawmakers may provide for such sub-delegation. That is
what we see under Section 21 and 34 of the Major Port
Trusts Act, 1963, which we shall be discussing in more
detail at a later part of this judgment.
10. Having analysed the legal position as above, we shall
now deal with the factual position in these cases. The
challenge is on the judgment dated 28.01.2013 of the
Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The issue
pertains to the determination of leases granted by the
Kolkata Port Trust to the petitioners. In the case of
Universal Autocrafts Private Limited, they were granted
lease of a plot of land for 30 years, on 19.08.1990. The
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lease deed was executed by the Land Manager of the
Kolkata Port Trust. On 05.02.2008, a letter was issued to
the said petitioner to demolish an alleged unauthorized
construction and eject the sub-tenants from the premises.
The petitioner submitted its reply on 02.05.2008. Not
satisfied with the reply, on 30.01.2009, a notice
terminating the lease was issued. The ejectment notice
was signed by the Land Manager. The main contention is
that the ejectment notice issued by the Land Manager is
illegal and without jurisdiction as he is not competent to
issue such ejectment notices. In the case of Siddhartha
Sarawgi, the leases were terminated during the
subsistence of the renewed period of 30 years, on the
ground of sub-letting without consent of the Kolkata Port
Trust. In his case also, the ejectment notices were issued
by the Land Manager and, hence, it is contended that
there can be no eviction on the basis of ejectment notice
issued by a person who is not competent to do so, the
same being without jurisdiction. The said ejectment
notices were challenged by both the petitioners before the
Calcutta High Court. In the case of Universal Autocrafts
Private Limited, the learned Single Judge of Calcutta High
Court allowed the writ petition holding that the Land 10
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Manager was not competent to issue the ejectment notice.
In the writ petition filed by Sidhartha Sarawgi, the learned
Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court found a conflict
between two earlier decisions and referred the matter to a
Division Bench. The Division Bench vide common
judgment dated 28.01.2003 held in favour of the Kolkata
Port Trust in the case of both the petitioners, which is
challenged in these Special Leave Petitions.
11. The Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred
to as, ‘the Act’) is an Act intended “to make provision for
the constitution of port authorities for certain major ports
in India and to vest the administration, control and
management of such ports in such authorities and for
matters connected therewith”. Section 3 of the Act
provides for the constitution of a Board of Trustees
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’). Section 5 provides
that:
“5. Board to be body corporate.-Every Board constituted under this Act shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold or dispose of property and may by the name by which it is constituted, sue or be sued.”
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12. Section 21 of the Act provides for delegation of
powers of the Board with the approval of the Central
Government on the Chairman and specification of exercise
of such powers conferred on the Chairman by the Deputy
Chairman or any other officer of the Board. The provision
reads as follows:
“21. Delegation of powers.-A Board may, with the approval of the Central Government, specify-
(a) the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the Board by or under this Act, which may also be exercised or performed by the Chairman; and
(b) the powers and duties conferred or imposed on the Chairman by or under this Act, which may also be exercised or performed by the Deputy Chairman or any officer of the Board and the conditions and restrictions, if any, subject to which such powers and duties may be exercised and performed:
Provided that any powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the Deputy Chairman or any officer of the Board under clause (b) shall be exercised and performed by him subject to the supervision and control of the Chairman.”
13. Section 34 of the Act provides for the mode of
executing contracts on behalf of Board. It is provided
therein that every contract is to be made by the Chairman
or any other officer of the Board not below the rank of the
Head of a Department as authorized by the Chairman, on
behalf of the Board. The provision reads as follows:
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“34. Mode of executing contracts on behalf of Board.-(1) Every contract shall, on behalf of a Board, be made by the Chairman or by any such officer of the Board not below the rank of the Head of a Department as the Chairman may, by general or special order, authorise in this behalf and shall be sealed with the common seal of the Board:
Provided that no contract whereof the value or amount exceeds such value or amount as the Central Government may from time to time fix in this behalf shall be made unless it has been previously approved by the Board:
Provided further that no contract for the acquisition or sale of immovable property or for the lease of any such property for a term exceeding thirty years, and no other contract whereof the value or amount exceeds such value or amount as the Central Government may from time to time fix in this behalf, shall be made unless it has been previously approved by the Central Government. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub- section (1), the form and manner in which any contract shall be made under this Act shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations made in this behalf. (3) No contract which is not made in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder shall be binding on the Board.”
14. In exercise of the power under Section 21 on
delegation of powers, the Board of the Kolkata Port Trust
passed Resolution No. 82 dated 26.05.1988 delegating the
power to terminate any lease on the Chairman. The
Chairman was also authorized by the said Resolution to
issue ejectment notices. The text of the Resolution reads
as follows:
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“.. Resolution No. 82- Resolved to sanction the proposal for delegation of powers to the Chairman by invocation of section 21(a) of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963, the power to terminate leases sanctioned by the Trustees and to authorizing him to issue ejectment notices, subject to the sanction of the Government.”
15. It is the contention of the petitioners that the power
to terminate the lease having been specifically conferred
on the Chairman, the steps now taken by the Land
Manager by issuing the impugned notices for eviction, are
clearly without jurisdiction and, hence, illegal and
inoperative. On behalf of the Board of Kolkata Port Trust, it
is contended that the decision to terminate the lease has
actually been taken by the Chairman and the issuance of
notice of termination in furtherance of the decision taken
by the Chairman alone, has been delegated to the Land
Manager. Our attention is also invited to Office Order No.
6480/3/0 dated 22.01.1990, which reads as under: -
“CALCUTTA PORT TRUST No. 6480/3/0 January 22, 1990
OFFICE ORDER
Henceforth ejectment (sic) notices in respect of leases determined with my approval may be signed by any one of the undernoted officers:
Calcutta (1) Deputy Chairman (Calcutta)
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(2) Land Manager
Haldia (1) Deputy Chairman (Haldia) (2) General Manager (Mas) (3) Manager (I&C.F)”
16. The power that is delegated to the Chairman as per
Resolution No. 82 is the power to terminate a lease. The
decision to terminate has been taken by the Chairman
only and there is no dispute in that regard. In
implementation of the decision thus taken by the
Chairman to terminate the leases, the Chairman has
authorized the Land Manager to issue the ejectment
notices. The issuance of such notices is a mere ministerial
act for the implementation of a decision already taken by
the Chairman as delegated by the Board. The Chairman
having duly authorized the Land Manager in that regard, it
cannot be said that the ejectment notice issued by the
Land Manager is without jurisdiction. It is not a case of
sub-delegation. It is merely a ministerial exercise of
issuance of a notice in implementation of the decision, as
per the specific authorization in that regard.
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17. The situation can be viewed from another angle as
well. Section 21 of The General Clauses Act, 1897
provides that power to issue would include power to add,
amend, vary or rescind. The provision reads as follows:
“21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.-Where, by any Central Act or Regulations a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.”
18. Admittedly, in the case of the petitioners, the lease
deed has been executed by the Land Manager. The
execution of the lease deed is as per the decision by the
competent authority. If that be so, the lease can be
terminated by the same authority who executed the lease
deed, after a decision has been made in that regard by
the competent authority. In P. Saibaba Rao S/o Amruth
Rao v. Dr. Dugyala Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao and
Dr. N. Sudhakar Rao S/o. Late N. Yethiraja Rao v.
Dr. Dugyala Srinivasa Rao S/o Swami Rao and Ors. 6
High Court of Andhra Pradesh considered the situation of
6 Election Petition Nos. 1 and 3 of 2004, Judgment dated 30.08.2007. 16
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termination of a contract. The contention was that the
Superintendent Engineer was not competent to terminate
the contract in terms of the guidelines. His authority was
only to execute the contract. Negating the same, it was
held as follows:
“It is very interesting to notice that entry 5(b) of the Government order as above speaks of instruments relating to execution of works including Highways. The officer authorized to execute these instruments among others is SE. Chapter II of PWD Code deals with, "Works". It contains paragraphs 88 to 224. Nowhere has it mentioned any authority, who is conferred with power to terminate/cancel the contract entered into by SE as per Paragraph 159 of PWD Code read with executive instructions. Petitioners have failed to bring any evidence in this regard. Furthermore, in G.O.Ms. No. 2209, dated 24.9.1965, it was clarified that SE is competent to execute contracts and piece work agreements upto the limit of tenders accepted by the competent authority regardless of whether they were accepted by SE and irrespective of restrictions imposed on the powers of SE in the matter of acceptance of contract. This means that SE is competent to enter into contract and also for terminating/ closing/cancelling the contract. The power to enter into contracts or the authorisation to execute instruments also includes the power to execute contracts or instruments cancelling a contract. It may also be noticed that under preliminary specification Nos. 7 and 8 of APSS, SE is competent to alter the standard specifications for a particular contract. Thus authorization given to SE under G.O.Ms. No. 1632, dated 24.10.1958, is all pervasive and the same cannot be interpreted in a restrictive manner.”
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We respectfully endorse the legal principle.
19. We do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned
notices issued by the Land Manager of the Kolkata Port
Trust, as noted by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court, in the impugned judgment. The power is exercised
only as duly authorized by the Chairman. The Land
Manager is also otherwise competent to issue notices after
due decision has been taken in that regard by the
competent authority since he is the one who executed the
lease deed. There is no merit in these Petitions.
20. The Special Leave Petitions are hence dismissed.
There is no order as to costs.
…………….…..…………J. (GYAN SUDHA
MISRA)
.……..……………………J. (KURIAN
JOSEPH)
New Delhi; April 16, 2014.
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