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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5063-5065 of 2005

Shivdev Kaur (D) By Lrs. & Ors.                       …Appellants

Versus

R.S. Grewal                               … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J:

1.     These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned  

judgment  and  order  dated  2.7.2004  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 257  

of  1982  and  Regular  Second  Appeal  No.  608  of  1982  and  Cross  

Objection No. 14-C of 1982 by which the High Court has affirmed the  

judgment of the first appellate court as well as the trial court so far as  

the  nature  of  the  rights  of  the  appellant  in  the  suit  property  are  

concerned.

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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

A. One Dr. Hira Singh had acquired a huge property in his life  

time. He executed various deeds creating certain rights in favour of  

his sole son Dr. Shivdev Singh Grewal and two daughters, namely,  

Smt. Dayawant Kaur and Dr. Shivdev Kaur including the Will dated  

16.9.1944, creating certain rights in favour of the appellant. Dr. Hira  

Singh died on 11.4.1945.  

B. Shri  Shivdev  Singh  Grewal  and  Smt.  Dayawant  Kaur  died  

leaving behind their children.  Dr. Shivdev Kaur claimed certain rights  

on the basis of the Will dated 16.9.1944, and for the same she filed  

Suit No. 161/399/74 on 4.10.1974 against her nephew for mandatory  

injunction  seeking  his  eviction  from  the  suit  premises  claiming  

absolute right/ownership over the same in view of the provisions of  

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to  

as  the  `Act  1956’).   The  respondent/defendant  contested  the  suit  

denying such a right.   

C. During the pendency of the said suit, the respondent/defendant  

also  filed  Suit  No.  80  of  1976,  against  the  appellant/plaintiff  for  

permanent injunction restraining her from transferring/alienating the  

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suit  property.   The  trial  court  vide  judgment  and  decree  dated  

28.4.1978  decided  the  Suit  No.  161/399/74,  holding  that  

appellant/plaintiff  had  no  absolute  right/ownership  over  the  suit  

property.  The trial  court  vide  judgment  and  decree  dated  4.6.1979  

passed in Suit No. 80/1976, held to the effect that the appellant would  

not interfere in any manner in respect of the agricultural lands etc.,  

however, she would not be dispossessed from the suit premises and it  

would be subject to the final decision of the another suit.   

D. Aggrieved, both parties filed appeals and cross-objections. The  

appellate  court  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by  the  respondent  on  

22.10.1981.  On  the  same  day,  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  was  

allowed  to  certain  extent.  However,  so  far  as  the  issue  relating  to  

conversion of the life interest into absolute title was decided against  

the appellant.   

E. Aggrieved, respondent filed RSA Nos. 257 and 608 of 1982,  

and appellant filed  RSA No. 608/1982 and cross-objection bearing  

No. 14-C/1982.

F. The appellant executed a Will dated 28.2.1991 in respect of the  

suit property creating a trust in the name of her father and appointing  

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Shri Sudarshan Singh Deol and Brig Inderjeet Singh Dhillon as the  

trustees. She further made Codicil dated 25.8.1995. The appellant died  

on 15.2.1998 and thus executors of her Will got impleaded.

G. The High Court allowed both the RSAs filed by the respondent  

and dismissed the claim of the appellant.  

Hence, these appeals.   

3. Shri  Devender  Mohan  Verma,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the appellant, has argued that the appellant had become a  

widow at a very young age. She was maintained by her in laws, thus,  

her father took pity on her and as she was a destitute, brought her back  

and  created  a  “life  interest”  in  her  favour  in  respect  of  the  suit  

property by executing a Will dated 16.9.1944.  She started residing in  

the suit property. Her father died in 1945. After commencement of the  

Act 1956, right of “life interest” stood crystallised into absolute right  

and title.    Therefore,  the courts below erred in deciding the issue  

against her.  Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.  

4. Per contra,  Shri  R.K.  Dhawan,  learned counsel  appearing on  

behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeals contending that the  

appellant  cannot  be  permitted  to  introduce  a  new  case  that  the  

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appellant was a destitute.  She was a well qualified person and MBBS  

doctor. She had acquired large properties from the family of her late  

husband.   More  so,  father  of  the  appellant  had  created  only  “life  

interest”  in  her  favour  in  the  suit  property  by  executing  the  Will.  

Section  14(2)  of  the  Act  1956  does  not  provide  that  such  “life  

interest”  would  stand  converted  into  absolute  ownership  on  

commencement of the said Act.  There are concurrent findings of facts  

on this issue and, thus, the appeals  lack merit and are liable to be  

dismissed.  

5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.  

6.  The document creating a limited right, “life interest” in favour  

of the appellant i.e. Will dated 16.9.1944 so far as the relevant part is  

concerned reads as under:  

“I give this Kothi situated at Iqbal Road to my  daughter Bibi Shivdev Kaur subject to the rights  of Bibi Shiv Charan Kaur, mentioned above, for  life time, who after my death will remain abad in  this Kothi and get benefit thereof.   If she wishes,  she  can  get  the  benefit  of  its  rent  also  as  per  necessity  and can use the income of rent.   But  

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these rights are only for her life time.  She can  not alienate this kothi or the site relating thereto,  in any way, or create any charge thereon, nor she  can  mortgage  gift,  sell  or  transfer  it.   My son  Shibdev  Singh  aforesaid  shall  also  be  the  sole  owner  of  this  Kothi  subject  to  the  above  mentioned rights.”  

7. It is evident from the aforesaid part of the Will that only a life  

interest  had  been  created  in  favour  of  the  appellant  by  that  Will.  

Therefore,  the  sole  question  for  our  consideration  remains  as  to  

whether  such  limited  right  got  converted  into  absolute  right  on  

commencement of the  Act 1956.    

8. Section 14 of the Act 1956 reads as under:  

“14.  Property  of  a  female  Hindu  to  be  her  absolute property.

(1) Any  property  possessed  by  a  female  Hindu,  whether  acquired  before  or  after  the  commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as  full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.  

(2) Nothing  contained  in  sub-  section  (1)  shall  apply to any property acquired by way of gift or  under  a  will  or  any other  instrument  or  under  a  decree or order of a civil court or under an award  where  the  terms  of  the gift,  will or  other  instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe  a restricted estate in such property.”

                  (Emphasis added)

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9. The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for conversion of life  

interest  into  absolute  title  on  commencement  of  the  Act  1956,  

however,  sub-section (2)  carves out an exception to the same as it  

provides that such right would not be conferred where a property is  

acquired by a Hindu female by way of gift or  under a Will or any  

other instrument prescribing a restricted estate in that property.   

10. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 745,  a similar  

issue was considered by this Court and after examining the contents of  

the Will came to the conclusion that where a woman succeeded some  

property on the strength of a Will, she cannot claim any right in those  

properties over and above what was given to her under that Will.  The  

life estate given to her under the Will would not become an absolute  

estate under the provisions of the Act 1956 and, thus, such a Hindu  

female cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the  

Will  executed in her  favour.   (See also:  Navneet  Lal  @ Rangi v.  

Gokul & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 794; and Jagan Singh (Dead) Through  

LRs. v. Dhanwanti & Anr., (2012) 2 SCC 628).  

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11. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors., AIR 2006  

SC 3282, this Court again considered the issue, held as under:

“When  he  thus  validly  disposes  of  his   property by providing for a limited estate to his   heir,  the  wife  or  widow  has  to  take  it  as  the   estate  falls.  This  restriction  on  her  right  so   provided,  is  really  respected  by  the  Act.  It   provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such   a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on   her right and she cannot claim any higher right   by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other   words,  conferment  of  a  limited estate  which is   otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act   by the introduction of  Section 14(2) of  the Act   and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of   the  Act,  even  if  that  provision  is  held  to  be   attracted in the case of a succession under the   Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the   case of a testamentary disposition taking effect   after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2)   redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant,   the expression “property possessed by a female   Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An   interpretation that leads to such a result cannot   certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in   the  Act  compelling  such  an  interpretation.   Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1)   applies in a case where the female had received   the property prior to the Act being entitled to it   as  a  matter  of  right,  even if  the  right  be  to  a   limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the   right to maintenance. (Emphasis added)

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12. Shri  Verma,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  placed a  very  

heavy reliance on the judgment of  this Court in  Balwant Kaur &  

Anr. v. Chanan Singh & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1908, contending that a  

destitute  Hindu  daughter  if  acquires  such  a  right,  it  would  stand  

crystallised  in  absolute  title.   There  is  a  complete  fallacy  in  his  

argument. In the said case, this Court held that all the clauses of the  

Will must be read together to find out the intention of the testator. The  

court held:  

“…This  is  obviously  on  the  principle  that   the last clause represents the latest intention   of the testator. It is true that in the earlier   part of the Will, the testator has stated that   his  daughter  Balwant  Kaur  shall  be  the   heir,  owner  and  title-holder  of  his  entire   remaining  moveable  and  immovable   property  but  in  the later part  of  the same   Will he has clearly stated that on the death  of  Balwant  Kaur,  the  brothers  of  the   testator shall be the heirs of the property.  This  clearly  shows  that  the recitals  in  the   later  part  of  the  Will  would  operate  and   make  Appellant  1  only  a  limited  estate- holder in the property bequeathed to her.”

(Emphasis added)

13. Thus,  in  view  of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  can  be  

summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a  

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“life interest”, through Will  or gift or any other document referred to  

in  Section  14  of  the  Act  1956,  the  said  rights  would  not  stand  

crystallised  into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions  

to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the  

property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956,  

the  provisions  of  Sections  14(2)  and  30  of  the  Act  1956  would  

become otios.  

Section 14(2) carves out an exception to rule provided in sub-

section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property has been  

acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift, giving her only a “life  

interest”, it would remain the same even after commencement of the  

Act 1956, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title.   

14. Whether person is destitute or not, is a question of fact. The  

expression  ‘destitute’  has  not  been  defined under  the  Act  1956 or  

under  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  or  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure, 1908.   The dictionary meaning is “without resources, in  

want of necessaries”. A person can be held destitute when no one is to  

support  him  and  is  found  wandering  without  any  settled  place  of  

abode and without visible means of subsistence.  In the instant case,  

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no factual foundation has ever been laid by the appellant before the  

courts below in this regard. In such a fact-situation, the issue does not  

require consideration.  

15.   All the courts have taken a consistent view rejecting the claim  

of the appellant of having acquired an absolute title.  We do not see  

any cogent reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts.  

Appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.  

….…………..……………………….....................J.      (Dr.  B. S. CHAUHAN)  

……..………….…………….................................. J.    (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)  

New Delhi,                                                                                               March 20, 2013.  

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