REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 34 OF 2020 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7678 of 2019)

SHILPA MITTAL                                  …APPELLANT(S)   

Versus

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.        …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Deepak Gupta, J.

Leave granted.

2. “Whether  an  offence  prescribing  a  maximum sentence  of

more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum

sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years,

can be considered to be a ‘heinous offence’ within the meaning of

Section  2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and  Protection  of

Children) Act, 2015?” is the extremely important and interesting

issue which arises in this case.

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3. The factual background is that a juvenile  ‘X’  is alleged to

have committed an offence punishable under Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC for short) which offence is

punishable with a maximum punishment of imprisonment for life

or up to 10 years and fine in the first part and imprisonment up

to 10 years or fine, or both in the second part.   No minimum

sentence is prescribed.

4. The deceased in the motor vehicle accident was the brother

of the appellant herein.   The juvenile at the time of occurrence

was above 16 years but below 18 years.   The Juvenile Justice

Board vide order dated  04.06.2016  held that juvenile ‘X’  has

committed a heinous offence, and, therefore should be tried as an

adult. The appeal filed to the Children’s Court was also dismissed

on 11.02.2019.   Thereafter, the juvenile ‘X’, through his mother

approached the High Court of Delhi, which vide order 01.05.2019

held that since no minimum sentence is prescribed for the

offence in question, the said offence did not fall within the ambit

of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Act, 2015. This order is under challenge in this appeal.

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5. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior

counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior

counsel  and Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, learned counsel appearing

for juvenile ‘X’.   

6. To  appreciate the  contentions of the  parties, it  would  be

relevant to make a brief reference to the history and development

of Juvenile Justice Act in India.  In India there was no pan India

Act to govern children, and some states had their own

enactments, like the Madras Children Act, 1920.  The Union had

also enacted the Children Act of 1960 but this was only

applicable  to Union Territories  and not the States.  Therefore,

this Court in Sheela Barse(II) and others   vs.  Union of India

and others1, observed as follows :­

“4. We have by our order dated August 5, 1986 called upon the State Governments to bring into force and to implement vigorously the provisions of the Childrens’ Acts enacted in the various States. But we would suggest that instead of each State having its own Childrens’ Act different in  procedure  and content from the  Childrens’ Act in other States, it would be desirable if the Central Government initiates Parliamentary Legislation on the subject, so that there is complete uniformity in regard to the various provisions relating to children in the entire territory of the country…”

1 (1986) 3 SCC 632

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It  would be pertinent to mention that  these observations were

made in the context of developments happening internationally in

the field of Child Rights.   The United Nations General Assembly

adopted the  United  Nations  Standard  Minimum Rules for the

Administration of Juvenile Justice on 29th  November, 1985.

These Rules are commonly referred to as the Beijing Rules.

Clause 4.1 of the Rules reads as follows :­

“4.1     In those legal systems recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”

7. As is apparent, the Rules did not fix any specified age and

left it to each country to frame their domestic laws, keeping in

view the various relevant doctrines.

8. After  the adoption of  the Beijing Rules, India enacted the

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.  In this Act, the juvenile was defined

under Section 2(h) to mean a boy who has not attained the age of

16 years or a girl who has not attained the age of 18 years.  Such

a juvenile was entitled to various protections and these

protections were uniform irrespective of the nature of the crime

committed.

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9. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, (CRC

for short) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly

on 20th November, 1989, and this Convention came into force on

2nd  September, 1990.   Under Article 1 of  the CRC a child was

defined as every human being below the age of 18 years.

However, if the  domestic law  provided that the child  attained

majority below the age of 18 years, then that would be treated to

be the age till which the child would remain a juvenile. Discretion

was  left to the individual  countries to fix the  age of juvenility

under the domestic laws.

10. The next development was the enactment of  The Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter

referred to as the Act of 2000) which repealed the Juvenile

Justice Act, 1986.  Under the Act of 2000 a juvenile or child was

defined to mean a person who had not completed 18 years of age.

Even a juvenile in conflict with law was defined to mean a

juvenile who was alleged to have committed an offence.   Since

there was no clarity with regard to the date on which the age was

to be determined, the definition of  juvenile  in conflict with law

was amended and the juvenile in conflict with law has been

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defined to mean a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an

offence and has not completed 18th year of age as on the day of

commission of the offence.

11. An unfortunate incident of rape and murder of a young girl

(given the  identity ‘Nirbhaya’) took place  in Delhi in December

2012.   One of the persons involved in the crime was a juvenile,

aged 17½ years.  This led to a call from society to re­visit the law

and some sections of society felt that the word ‘juvenile’ had been

given a very wide meaning and  juveniles have been dealt  with

leniently. In one such matter Salil Bali  vs.  Union of India and

Another2,  this Court rejected the writ petition which prayed for

reconsideration of Sections 2(k), 2(l), and 15 of the Act of 2000.

Thereafter, a writ petition titled  Subramanian Swamy and

others   vs.  Raju through Member,  Juvenile Justice Board

and Another3 was filed challenging the provisions of the Act of

2000, especially with regard to classification of  juveniles.   This

petition was also dismissed.  This Court held that the decision as

to who should be treated as a juvenile is a decision for the

Legislature to take and the courts cannot enter into this arena.

2 (2013) 7 SCC 705 3 (2014) 8 SCC 390

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12. Thereafter, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to the Act of 2015) was

enacted.   For the first time, the Act of 2015 made a departure

from the  earlier  Acts.  Since this  Act is the  subject  matter  of

discussion  in  this case,  we may refer to the  following relevant

provisions of the Act.

“Section 2(12) “child” means a person who has not completed eighteen years of age;

Section 2(13)   “child in conflict with law” means a child who is alleged or found to have committed an offence and who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission of such offence;

   xxx                                xxx                              xxx

Section 2(33)  “heinous offences” includes the offences for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more;

   xxx                             xxx                            xxx

Section 2(35)   “juvenile” means a child below the age of eighteen years;

   xxx                            xxx                             xxx

Section 2(45)   “petty offences” includes the offences for which the maximum punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment upto three years;

xxx                            xxx                             xxx

Section 2(54)  “serious offences” includes the offences for which the punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force, is imprisonment between three to seven years;”

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13. A  bare reading of  Section  2(12), 2(13) and  2(35) clearly

shows that a child or a juvenile is a person who has not

completed 18 years of age, and a child in conflict with law is a

child/juvenile who commits an offence when that child/juvenile

has not completed 18 years of age.  ‘Petty offences’ have been

defined under Section 2(45) to mean offences for which the

maximum punishment  provided  under any law including the

IPC, is imprisonment up to 3 years.  ‘Serious offences’ means,

offences for which punishment under any law is imprisonment

between 3­7 years.   ‘Heinous offences’ have been defined to

mean offences for which the minimum punishment under any

law is imprisonment for 7 years or more.  This was a departure

from the previous legislation on the subject where the offences

had not been categorised as heinous or serious.

14. Section 14 of the Act of 2015 lays down the procedure to be

followed by the Juvenile Justice Board while conducting an

enquiry regarding a child in conflict with law under these

different categories.   We are mainly concerned with sub­section

(5) (d), (e) and (f), which reads as follows :­

“14. Inquiry by Board regarding child in conflict with law.  

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        xxx                            xxx                              xxx

(5) The Board shall take the following steps to ensure fair and speedy inquiry, namely:—

(a)       …                             …                                     …

(b)       …                             …                                     …

(c)       …                             …                                      …

(d)  cases of  petty offences,  shall  be disposed of  by the Board through summary proceedings, as per the procedure prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);

(e) inquiry of serious offences shall be disposed of by the Board, by following the procedure, for trial in summons cases under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974);

(f) inquiry of heinous offences,—

(i) for child below the age of sixteen years as on the date of commission  of  an offence  shall  be disposed of by the Board under clause (e);

(ii) for child above the age of sixteen years as on the date of commission  of  an offence  shall  be dealt with in the manner prescribed under section 15.”

15. The inquiry for serious offences has to be disposed of by

following the procedure for  trial in summons cases under the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC for short).   As far as

heinous offences are concerned  if the child  is  below 16 years

then the procedure prescribed for serious offences is to be

followed; but if the child is above 16 years then assessment in

terms of Section 15 has to be made.

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16. The  above  categorisation  has  been  done  with  a  purpose

which is reflected in Section 15 of the Act of 2015, which reads

as follows :­

“15.   Preliminary assessment into heinous offences by Board.  ­  (1)  In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary  assessment  with  regard  to  his  mental  and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of sub­section (3) of section 18:

Provided  that for  such an assessment, the  Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho­social workers or other experts.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of the alleged offence.

(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure, as far as may be, for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the matter shall be appealable under sub­section (2) of section 101.

Provided further that the assessment under this section shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.

This Section provides that if the child offender has committed a

heinous offence, the Juvenile Justice Board shall conduct a

preliminary assessment with regard to the mental and physical

capacity of such child to commit such offence, the ability of the

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child to understand the consequence of the offence and the

circumstances in which the said offence was allegedly committed.

The Board is entitled to take the help of experienced

psychologists, psychosocial workers or other experts in the field.

The explanation makes it clear that the preliminary assessment

is not to go into the merits of the trial or the allegations against

the child.  The inquiry is conducted only to assess the capacity of

the child to commit and understand the consequence of the

offence.  If the Board is satisfied that the matter can be disposed

of by the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure

prescribed in summons cases under the Cr.PC.

17. Section 19 of the Act of 2015 empowers the Children’s

Court to re­assess the preliminary assessment of the Board

under Section 15.  It reads as follows :­

“19. Powers of Children’s Court ­ (1) After the receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15, the Children’s Court may decide that—

(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after trial subject to the provisions of this section and section 21, considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child friendly atmosphere;

(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions of section 18.

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(2) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the final order, with regard to a child in conflict with law, shall include an individual care  plan for the rehabilitation of child, including follow up by the probation officer or the District Child Protection Unit or a social worker.

(3) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the child who is found to be in conflict with law is sent to a place of safety till he attains the age of twenty­one years and thereafter, the person shall be transferred to a jail:

Provided that the reformative services including educational services, skill development, alternative therapy such as counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support shall be provided to the child during the period of his stay in the place of safety.

(4) The Children’s Court shall ensure that there is a periodic follow up report every year by the probation officer  or the District  Child Protection Unit  or  a social worker, as required, to evaluate the progress of the child in the place of safety and to ensure that there is no ill­ treatment to the child in any form.

(5) The reports under sub­section (4) shall be forwarded to the Children’s Court for record and follow up, as may be required.”

18. The Children’s Court constituted under the Act of 2015 has

to determine whether there is actually any need for trial of the

child as an adult under the provisions of Cr.PC and pass

appropriate orders in this regard.   The Children’s Court should

also take into consideration the special needs of the child, tenets

of fair trial and maintaining child­friendly atmosphere.   The

Court can also hold that there is no need to try the child as an

adult.  Even if the Children’s Court holds that the child has to be

tried as an adult, it must ensure that the final order includes an

individual care plan for rehabilitation of the child as specified in

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Sub­section (2) of Section 19. Furthermore, under Sub­section(3)

such a child must be kept in a place of safety and cannot be sent

to jail till the child attains the age of 21 years, even if such a

child has to be tried as an adult.  It is also provided that though

the child may be tried as an adult, reformative services,

educational services, skill development, alternative therapy,

counselling, behaviour modification, and psychiatric support  is

provided to the child during the period the child is kept in the

place of safety.

19. It would also be pertinent to refer to Section 21 of the Act of

2015 which clearly lays down that no child in conflict with law

shall be sentenced to  death  or life imprisonment  without the

possibility of release whether tried under the Act or under the

IPC, or any other law.

20. It is contended by Mr. Siddharth Luthra, that if the

definitions of offences, i.e., petty, serious and heinous are read

literally then there is one category of offences which is not

covered by the Act of 2015.   He submits that petty offences are

those offences where the punishment is up to 3 years, serious

offences are those where the maximum punishment is of 7 years,

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and as far as heinous offences are concerned, if the definition is

read literally, then these are only those offences which provide a

minimum sentence of 7 years and above. He submits that this

leaves out a host of offences falling within the 4th category. The 4th

category of offences are those where the minimum sentence is

less than 7 years, or there is no minimum sentence prescribed

but the maximum sentence is more than 7 years.   He has

submitted a chart of such offences.  It is not necessary to set out

the chart in­extenso but we may highlight a few of these offences.

Some of these offences relate to abetment but they also include

offences such as those under Section 121A, 122 of IPC, offences

relating to counterfeiting of currency, homicide not amounting to

murder (as in the present case), abetment to suicide of child or

innocent person and many others.  He submits that it could not

have  been the intention  of the  Legislature to leave out these

offences and they should have been in some category at least.

The submission of  Mr.  Luthra  is that if from the definition of

‘heinous offences’,  the word ‘minimum’ is removed then all

offences other than petty and serious would fall under the

heading of ‘heinous offences’.  He submits that if the 4th category

of offences is left out it would result in an absurdity which could

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not have been the intention of the Legislature.   He further

submits that  applying the  doctrine  of surplusage, if the  word

‘minimum’ is removed then everything will fall into place.   

21. On the other hand, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior

counsel for the juvenile ‘X’ submitted that this  Court cannot

rewrite the  law.   He  further  submits  that  the  intention of the

Legislature cannot be deciphered by this Court only on the

ground that a category of offences have been left out.  If there is a

lacuna in the scheme of the Act it is for the Legislature to correct

the lacuna and this Court cannot step in.   

22. It is true that if we accept the submission of Mr. Luthra,

then things will fall into place.  There would be only 3 categories

of offences and all offences punishable with imprisonment of 7

years and above would be classified as ‘heinous offence’.

However, we are not solving a jigsaw puzzle where we have to put

all the pieces in place. We are interpreting a statute which must

be interpreted as per its language and intent.

23. The  Golden  Rule of Interpretation  was laid  down by the

House of Lords in Grey  vs.  Pearson4, as follows :­

4 (1857) 6 HLC 61

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“...I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now, I believe, universally adopted, at least in the Courts of Law in Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and indeed statutes, and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest  of the  instrument, in which case  the  grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther. ...”

24. The Privy Council in Salmon  vs.   Duncombe and Others5

stated the principle in the following terms :­

“It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of law.  It may be necessary for a Court of Justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing  can justify it except  necessity or the  absolute intractability of the language used. ...”

25. In Justice G.P. Singh’s treatise, “Principles of Statutory

Interpretation’6  the doctrine of surplusage as a limit on the

traditional rule of strict construction has been referred to.   The

main judgment on this point is the decision of the House of Lords

in McMonagle  vs.  Westminster City Council7.  In that case the

defendant’s premises contained a machine which on insertion of

a coin revealed two naked women in a manifestly immoral

manner.  The defendant was charged with using this premises as

5 (1886) 11 AC 627 6 14th Edn., Lexis Nexis, pp.89­90, 983 (2016) 7 [1990] 2 A.C. 716

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a sex establishment without any licence.  His contention was that

the Act (Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1982)

used the words ‘which is not unlawful’ and since he was

conducting an unlawful activity he did not require a licence.   It

was in this context that the House of Lords held that the words

‘which are not unlawful’ should be treated as surplusage and as

having been introduced by incompetent draftsmanship.   In that

case the intention of the Legislature was clear that no sex

establishment could  be set  up  without a licence.  The  words

‘which is not unlawful’ would render the entire provision

nugatory.   That does not happen in this case.   What has

happened in this case is that there is a 4th  category of offences

which is not dealt with under the Act.   It cannot be said with

certainty that the Legislature intended to include this 4th category

of offences in the category of ‘heinous offences’. Merely because

removing the word ‘minimum’ would make the Act workable is

not a sufficient ground to hold that the word ‘minimum’ is

surplusage.   

26. This Court in  Vasant Ganpat Padave  vs.  Anant

Mahadev Sawant8 was dealing with the provisions of Section 32­

8  2019 SCC Online SC 1226 ( Judgment dated 18.09.2018 Civil Appeal No. 11774 of 2018)

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F(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,

1948.  It was an admitted case of the parties that this was a law

for agrarian reforms.  The provision in issue deals with the rights

of the tenant to purchase the property where the landlord is a

widow, minor or person with mental or physical disability.  This

Section essentially gave a right to the tenant to exercise his right

of purchase within one year from the expiry of the period during

which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy.   The

Section literally provided that the landlord shall send an

intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority

before the expiry of the period during which the landlord is

entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31.   Though a

widow or a disabled person were not required to give notice for

the tenant to  exercise  his right  of  purchase, in the  case  of  a

minor unless the minor on attaining majority issued such a

notice, the tenant  would  not be able to exercise  his right of

purchase.  Effectively the minor on attaining majority cold defeat

the right of the tenant by not issuing the notice.   It  is in this

context that this  Court held that this would create such an

anomaly that it would turn the entire scheme of agrarian reform

on its head.  Therefore, it held as follows :­

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“25. … This anomaly indeed turns the entire scheme of agrarian reform on its head.   We have thus to see whether the language of Section 32­F can be added to or subtracted from, in order that the absurdity aforementioned and the discrimination between persons who are similarly situate be obviated.”

After  discussing  various rules  of interpretation the Court  held

that instead of striking out the classification as a whole it would

delete the words ‘of the fact that he has attained majority’.   We

may refer to para 43 which is relevant :­

“43.   Given the fact that the object of the 1956 Amendment, which is an agrarian reform legislation, and is to give the tiller of the soil statutory title to land which such tiller cultivates; and, given the fact that the literal interpretation of Section 32­F(1)(a) would be contrary to justice and reason and would lead to great hardship qua persons who are similarly circumstanced; as also to the absurdity of land going  back to an  absentee landlord when he has lost the right of personal cultivation, in the teeth of the object of the 1956 Amendment as mentioned hereinabove, we delete the words “..of the fact that he has attained majority..”.  Without these words, therefore, the landlord belonging to all three categories has to send an intimation to the tenant, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31.”

27. Mr. Luthra, drew our attention to the speech of the Minister

while introducing the Bill in relation to the Act of 2015. We need

not repeat the speech in detail but reading of the same clearly

indicates that the Minister while dealing with the issue of

‘heinous offences’ wherein the children could be tried as adults

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mainly made reference to the offences of murder, rape and

terrorism.   There are some other speeches that have been

referred to by Mr. Luthra, but we are not referring to the same

because the  intention of the Legislature as a whole cannot be

gauged from the speeches of individual members, some of whom

supported the Bill and some of whom did not support the Bill.

The main reliance could only be made on the objects and reasons

and introduction of the Bill by the Minister which basically

makes reference to offences like murder, rape, terrorism, where

the minimum punishment is more than 7 years.   

28. There can be no quarrel with the submission made by Mr.

Siddharth Luthra that in a given circumstance, this Court can

even add or subtract words from a statute.  However, this can be

done only when the intention of the Legislature is clear.  We not

only have to look at the principles of statutory interpretation but

in the present case, the conundrum we face is that how do we

decipher the intention of the Legislature.  It is not necessary that

the intention of the Legislature is the one what the judge feels it

should be.   If the intention of the Legislature is clear then the

Court can get over the inartistic or clumsy wording of the statute.

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However, when the wording of the statute is clear but the

intention of the Legislature is unclear, the Court cannot add or

subtract words from the statute to give it a meaning which the

Court feels would fit into the scheme of things.

29. There can be no manner of doubt that if the intention of the

Legislature is absolutely clear from the objects and reasons of the

Act then the Court can correct errors made by the person who

drafted the legislation and may write down or omit/delete/add

words to serve the purpose of the legislation and ensure that the

legislation is given a meaning  which  was intended to by the

Legislature.  The  issue is  whether  in the present case we can

clearly hold what was the intention of the Legislature.   

30. We  must also  while interpreting  an  Act see  what is the

purpose of the Act.  The purpose of the Act of 2015 is to ensure

that children who come in conflict with law are dealt with

separately and not like adults.  After the unfortunate incident of

rape on December 16,  2012  in Delhi,  where one  juvenile  was

involved, there was a call from certain sections of the society that

juveniles indulging in such heinous crimes should not be dealt

with like children.  This incident has also been referred to by the

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Minister in her introduction.  In these circumstances, to say that

the intention of the Legislature was to include all offences having

a punishment of more than 7 years in the category of ‘heinous

offences’ would not, in our opinion be justified.   When the

language  of the  section  is  clear  and  it  prescribes  a  minimum

sentence of  7 years  imprisonment while dealing with heinous

offences then we cannot  wish away the word ‘minimum’ .

31. No doubt, as submitted by Mr. Luthra there appears to be a

gross mistake committed by the framers of the legislation.   The

legislation does not take  into  consideration the 4th  category of

offences.  How and in what manner a juvenile who commits such

offences should be dealt with was something that the Legislature

should have clearly spelt out in the Act.  There is an unfortunate

gap.  We cannot fill the gap by saying that these offences should

be treated as heinous offences.  Whereas on the one hand there

are some offences in this category which may in general parlance

be termed as heinous, there are many other offences which

cannot be called as heinous offences.   It is not for this Court to

legislate.   We may fill in the gaps but we cannot enact a

legislation, especially when the Legislature itself has enacted one.

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We also have to keep in mind the fact that the scheme of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is

that children should be protected.  Treating children as adults is

an exception to the rule.   It is  also a well  settled principle of

statutory interpretation that  normally an exception  has to be

given a restricted meaning.  

32. We may add that the High Courts of Bombay9, Patna10, and

Punjab and Haryana11,  have taken a view that the category of

‘heinous offences’ cannot include offences falling within the 4th

category.  No contrary view has been brought to our notice.  We

see no reason to take a different view.

33. It  was  urged  by  Mr. Luthra that  while  defining ‘heinous

offences’ the word ‘includes’ has been used which would mean

that the definition is an inclusive definition and includes things

not mentioned in the definition.  We are not impressed with this

argument since the  definitions of ‘petty offences’ and ‘serious

offences’ also use the word ‘includes’.  In fact the word ‘includes’

is a surplusage.   The word ‘includes’ in the three definition

9 Saurabh Jalinder Nangre & Ors.  vs. State of Maharashtra, 2019 (1) Crimes 253 (Bom). 10 Criminal (SJ)No.1716 of 2018 titled Rajiv Kumar  vs.  State of Bihar. Judgment dated 18.09.2018 11 CRR 1615 of 2018 titled Bijender  vs.  State of Haryana and another, judgment dated 21st May,  2018.

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clauses does not make any sense.   There is nothing else to be

included.  The definition is complete in itself.

34. From the scheme of Section 14, 15 and 19 referred to above

it is clear that the Legislature felt that before the juvenile is tried

as an adult a very detailed study must be done and the

procedure laid down has to be followed.  Even if a child commits

a heinous crime, he is not automatically to be tried as an adult.

This also clearly indicates that the meaning of the words ‘heinous

offence’   cannot be expanded by removing the word ‘minimum’

from the definition.

35. Though we are of the view that the word ‘minimum’ cannot

be treated as surplusage, yet we are duty bound to decide as to

how the children who have committed an offence falling within

the 4th  category should be dealt with.   We are conscious of the

views expressed  by  us  above that this  Court  cannot legislate.

However, if  we do not  deal  with  this issue there would be no

guidance  to the  Juvenile  Justice  Boards  to  deal  with children

who have committed such offences which definitely are serious,

or may be more than serious offences, even if they are not

heinous offences.   Since two views are possible we would prefer

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to take a view which is in favour of children and, in our opinion,

the Legislature should take the call in this matter, but till it does

so, in exercise of powers conferred under Article142 of the

Constitution, we direct that from the date when the Act of 2015

came into force, all children who have committed offences falling

in the 4th  category shall  be dealt with in the same manner as

children who have committed ‘serious offences’.   

36. In view of the above discussion we dispose of the appeal

by answering the question set out in the first part of the

judgment in the negative and hold that an offence which does

not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to

be an heinous offence.  However, in view of what we have held

above, the Act does not deal with the 4th  category of offences

viz., offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years

imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum

sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as

‘serious offences’ within the meaning of the Act and dealt with

accordingly till the Parliament takes the call on the matter.

37. In passing we may note that in the impugned judgment

the name of the Child in Conflict with Law, has been disclosed.

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This is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 74 of

the  Act of  2015,  and  various judgments  of the  courts.  We

direct the High Court to correct the judgment and remove the

name of the Child in Conflict with Law.

38. We further direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the

Secretary Law, Ministry of   Law and Justice, Government of

India, Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Development,

Government of India and the Secretary, Home, Ministry of Home

Affairs, and Registrar General, Delhi High Court, who shall

ensure that the issue raised in this judgment is addressed by the

Parliament as early as possible or by the Executive by issuing an

Ordinance.  Our directions shall continue to remain in force only

till such action is taken.

39. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

…..…………………………………….J. (DEEPAK GUPTA)

..……………………………………….J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

New Delhi January 09, 2020

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