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        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.       1803                  OF     2012   (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.4649 of 2010)

Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. …Respondents

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

T.S.     THAKUR,     J.   

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against a judgement and order  

dated 6th May, 2010, passed by the High Court of  

Judicature at Allahabad whereby Criminal Revision No.1241  

of 2010 filed by the appellants has been dismissed and  

order dated 9th March, 2010 passed by the Additional  

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Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar dismissing an application  

for discharge affirmed. The factual backdrop in which the  

matter arises may be summarised as under:  

3. Appellant No.3-Naveen Ahlawat and respondent no.2-

Smt. Renu Ahlawat tied the matrimonial knot on 28th  

September, 1998. Appellant No.3 was, at that time, serving  

in Indian Army as a Captain. The couple were blessed with  

a daughter three years after marriage. According to the  

wife-Smt. Renu Ahlawat, the addition to the family did not  

make much of a difference in terms of cordiality of her  

relations with her husband Captain Naveen Ahlawat and  

appellants No.1 and 2 who happen to be her parents in-law  

as they kept harassing her for dowry ever since the  

marriage was solemnised. These demands, according to  

her, continued even after her father had paid a sum of  

rupees four lakhs to the appellants. Physical and mental  

torture of respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat, it is alleged, also  

did not stop even after the said payment, for the sake of a  

luxury car as an additional item of dowry. Respondent  

No.2-Smt. Renu Ahlawat’s further case is that on 10th  

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December, 2006 she was forced into a car by the  

appellants who then abandoned her at a deserted place on  

a lonely road near Sihi village at around 8 p.m. and  

threatened to kill her if she returned to her matrimonial  

home. When Jitendar Singh and Brijvir Singh two villagers  

saw respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat weeping by the side of  

the road, besides the car they tried to confront the  

appellants whereupon appellant No.3-Naveen is alleged to  

have pulled out a revolver and threatened to shoot them.  

4. A complaint about the incident was lodged on 13th  

December, 2006, by respondent No.2-Renu Ahlawat with  

SSP, Bulandshahar in which she gave details regarding her  

marriage with the appellant No.3-Naveen Ahlawat and the  

mental and physical harassment faced by her at their hands  

as also repeated demands for dowry. She also accused her  

sisters-in-law, Neena and Meghna for indulging in such  

harassment along with the appellants.  

5. The jurisdictional police started investigation into the  

incident, in the course whereof complainant-Smt. Renu  

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Ahlawat came to know about her husband-Naveen Ahlawat  

having obtained an ex parte decree for divorce against her.  

A copy of the said judgment and decree was collected by  

Smt. Renu Ahlawat on 28th November, 2006 and steps  

taken to have the same set aside. The decree was  

eventually set aside by the Court concerned.     

6. The police, in the meantime, filed a closure report to  

which Renu Ahlawat filed a protest petition. It was on the  

basis of the protest petition that Judicial Magistrate,  

Bulandshahar, took cognizance of an offence punishable  

under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. against the appellants as  

also against Neena and Meghna sisters-in-law of the  

complainant.  By an order dated 13th February, 2009 Neena  

and Meghna were discharged by the High Court of  

Allahabad on the ground that no specific allegations were  

made against them. The appellants then filed an application  

for discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Civil  

Procedure, 1973 before learned Additional Chief Judicial  

Magistrate, Bulandshahar in which they alleged that the  

accusations of dowry harassment levelled against them  

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were false and so was the incident alleged to have taken  

place on 10th December, 2006 on which date both  

appellants No.1 and his son appellant No.3 claimed to be  

otherwise engaged which according to them belied Renu  

Ahlawat’s story of their having abandoned her on a  

deserted road as alleged by her. The application for  

discharge was, however, dismissed by the Court by order  

dated 9th March, 2010 holding that the grounds urged for  

discharge could be considered only after evidence was  

adduced in the case and that appellant No.2 could not be  

discharged on the basis of minor contradictions in the  

depositions recorded in the course of the investigation.   

7. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Trial Court the  

appellants preferred Criminal Revision No.1241 of 2010  

which was dismissed by the High Court on the ground that  

the same did not make out a case for quashing of the  

proceedings against the appellants. The present appeal  

assails the correctness of the said order of dismissal.  

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8. On behalf of the appellant it was argued on the  

authority of the decisions of this Court in Preeti Gupta  

and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. (2010) 7 SCC  

667,  Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Anr.  

(1979) 3 SCC 4, Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of  

Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368, State of Orissa v.  

Debendra Nath Pandhi (2005) 1 SCC 568, Onkar Nath  

Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr.  

(2008) 2 SCC 561, Shakson Belthissor v. State of  

Kerala and Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 466, and Rumi Dhar  

(Smt.) v. State of West Bengal and Anr. (2009) 6 SCC  

364, that while considering an application for discharge the  

Court can examine the evidence on record and discharge  

the accused persons if there is no possibility of the accused  

being found guilty on the basis of such evidence specially in  

cases where the accused produces unimpeachable evidence  

in support of his defence. It was also contended that while  

examining whether the Court should or should not  

discharge the accused, it must be remembered, that  

Section 498-A of the IPC is a much abused provision and  

that exaggerated versions of small incidents are often  

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presented to falsely implicate, harass and humiliate the  

husband and his relatives. Applying the principles set out in  

the above decisions the appellants were, according to Ms.  

Geeta Luthra, learned counsel appearing for them, entitled  

to a discharge not only because there was an inordinate  

delay in the filing of the complaint by respondent No.1 but  

also because the statements made under Section 161  

Cr.P.C. by the witnesses who were either planted or merely  

chance witnesses were contradictory in nature.  It was  

argued that two Investigating Officers having investigated  

the matter and found the allegations to be false, there was  

no reason for the Court to believe the story set up by the  

wife who had suffered a decree for divorce in regard to  

which she had written to the Army Authorities a letter  

dated 2nd October, 2006 stating that she was not pursuing  

the matter in any Court. Appellant No.3-Naveen Ahlawat  

having got re-married on 30th October, 2006 the incident  

referred in the complaint was a fabrication which aspect the  

Courts below had failed to consider thus failing to protect  

the appellants against harassment and the ignominy of a  

criminal trial.   

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9. On behalf of respondent No.2, it was per contra  

argued that her husband had filed a divorce petition against  

her in the Family Court, Meerut showing respondent No.2  

to be residing with her parents at 327, Prabhat Nagar,  

Meerut, whereas she was actually residing with the  

appellants along with her daughter at No. 9, Tigris Road,  

Delhi Cantt, Delhi. It was further argued that appellant  

No.3 had obtained an ex parte decree order of divorce by  

fraudulent means and by forging signatures of respondent  

No.2, acknowledging receipt of the notice which she had  

never received from the concerned Court.  This was  

conclusively established by the fact that the ex parte  

decree dated 31st May, 2006 had been eventually set aside  

by the Court in terms of order dated 28th July, 2007.  

Allegations regarding physical torture of respondent No.2  

and her being abandoned on the road on the date of  

incident in question as also the allegation about dowry  

harassment were factually correct and made out a clear  

case for prosecuting the appellants. Appellant No.3 had,  

according to the counsel for the respondent, married one  

Aditi on 30th October, 2006.  It was also argued that letter  

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referred to by appellant No.3 as also letter dated 2nd  

November, 2006 allegedly written by respondent No.2 were  

forgeries committed by the appellants. The trial Court was,  

in the light of the available material, justified in refusing to  

discharge the accused persons and that the grounds for  

discharge set up by the appellants could be examined only  

after the case had gone through full-fledged trial. Reliance  

was placed upon a decision of this Court in Union of India  

v. Prafulla Kumar Samala and Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 5.  

10. The case at hand being a warrant case is governed by  

Section 239 of the Cr.P.C. for purposes of determining  

whether the accused or any one of them deserved to be  

discharged.  Section 239 is as under:

“239. When accused shall be discharged.

If, upon considering the police report and the  documents sent with it under section     173   and making  such examination, if any, of the accused as the  Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the  prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being  heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the  accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the  accused, and record his reasons for so doing.”

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11. A plain reading of the above would show that the  

Court trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons  

to be recorded by it and only if it considers the charge  

against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the  

Code provides for framing of a charge if, upon  

consideration of the police report and the documents sent  

therewith and making such examination, if any, of the  

accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, the Magistrate  

is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the  

accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter  

XIX, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which  

can be adequately punished by him. The ambit of Section  

239 Cr.P.C. and the approach to be adopted by the Court  

while exercising the powers vested in it under the said  

provision fell for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath  

Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr.  

(2008) 2 SCC 561. That too was a case in which a  

complaint under Sections 498-A and 406 read with Section  

34 of the I.P.C. was filed against the husband and parents-

in-law of the complainant-wife. The Magistrate had in that  

case discharged the accused under Section 239 of the  

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Cr.P.C, holding that the charge was groundless. The  

complainant questioned that order before the Revisional  

Court which directed the trial Court to frame charges  

against the accused persons. The High Court having  

affirmed that order, the matter was brought up to this  

Court. This Court partly allowed the appeal qua the  

parents-in-law while dismissing the same qua the husband.  

This Court explained the legal position and the approach to  

be adopted by the Court at the stage of framing of charges  

or directing discharge in the following words:

“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the  court is required to evaluate the material and  documents on record with a view to finding out if the  facts emerging therefrom, taken     at     their     face     value  ,  disclosed the existence of all the ingredients  constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the  court is not expected to go deep into the probative  value of the material on record. What     needs     to     be    considered     is     whether     there     is     a     ground     for     presuming    that     the     offence     has     been     committed     and     not     a     ground    for     convicting     the     accused     has     been     made     out.     At     that    stage,     even     strong     suspicion     founded     on     material    which     leads     the     court     to     form     a     presumptive     opinion     as    to     the     existence     of     the     factual     ingredients     constituting    the     offence     alleged     would     justify     the     framing     of     charge    against     the     accused     in     respect     of     the     commission     of    that     offence  .”

(emphasis supplied)

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12. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court  

from earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v.  

L. Muniswamy 1977 Cri.LJ 1125, State of  

Maharashtra & Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors.  

1996 Cri.LJ 2448 and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni  

2000 Cri.LJ 3504.  In Som Nath’s case (supra) the legal  

position was summed up as under:

“if on the basis of materials on record, a court could  come to the conclusion that commission of the offence  is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge  exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think  that the accused might have committed the offence it  can frame the charge, though for conviction the  conclusion is required to be that the accused has  committed the offence. It     is     apparent     that     at     the     stage    of     framing     of     a     charge,     probative     value     of     the     materials    on     record     cannot     be     gone     into;     the     materials     brought    on     record     by     the     prosecution     has     to     be     accepted     as     true    at     that     stage.  ”

(emphasis supplied)

13. So also in Mohanlal’s case (supra) this Court referred  

to several previous decisions and held that the judicial  

opinion regarding the approach to be adopted for framing  

of charge is that such charges should be framed if the  

Court prima facie finds that there is sufficient ground for  

proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required  

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to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the  

material produced was sufficient to convict the accused.  

The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal’s  

case (supra) is in this regard apposite:

“8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of  framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider  whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding  against the accused. The court is not required to  appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials  produced are sufficient or not for convicting the  accused.”

14. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi  

(2005) 1 SCC 568, this Court was considering whether  

the trial Court can at the time of framing of charges  

consider material filed by the accused.  The question was  

answered in the negative by this Court in the following  

words:

“18. We     are     unable     to     accept     the     aforesaid     contention  .  The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is  misplaced...Further, at the stage of framing of charge  roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the  contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a  mini trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would  defeat the object of the Code. It     is     well-settled     that     at    the     stage     of     framing     of     charge     the     defence     of     the    accused     cannot     be     put     forth.     The     acceptance     of     the    contention     of     the     learned     counsel     for     the     accused     would    mean     permitting     the     accused     to     adduce     his     defence     at    the     stage     of     framing     of     charge     and     for     examination    

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thereof     at     that     stage     which     is     against     the     criminal    jurisprudence. By     way     of     illustration,     it     may     be     noted    that     the     plea     of     alibi     taken     by     the     accused     may     have     to    be     examined     at     the     stage     of     framing     of     charge     if     the    contention     of     the     accused     is     accepted     despite     the     well    settled     proposition     that     it     is     for     the     accused     to     lead    evidence     at     the     trial     to     sustain     such     a     plea.     The    accused     would     be     entitled     to     produce     materials     and    documents     in     proof     of     such     a     plea     at     the     stage     of    framing     of     the     charge,     in     case     we     accept     the     contention    put     forth     on     behalf     of     the     accused.     That     has     never     been    the     intention     of     the     law     well     settled     for     over     one    hundred     years     now.   It is in this light that the provision  about hearing the submissions of the accused as  postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only  means hearing the submissions of the accused on the  record of the case as filed by the prosecution and  documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The  expression 'hearing the submissions of the accused'  cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted  to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At  the     state     of     framing     of     charge     hearing     the     submissions    of     the     accused     has     to     be     confined     to     the     material    produced     by     the     police  ...

xx xx xx xx  

23. As     a     result     of     aforesaid     discussion,     in     our     view,    clearly     the     law     is     that     at     the     time     of     framing     charge     or    taking     cognizance     the     accused     has     no     right     to     produce    any     material  ...”  

(emphasis supplied)

15. Even in Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal &  

Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364, reliance whereupon was placed  

by counsel for the appellants the tests to be applied at the  

stage of discharge of the accused person under Section 239  

of the Cr.P.C., were found to be no different. Far from  

readily encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a  

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conceding that legal process at times is abused by  

unscrupulous litigants especially in matrimonial cases  

where the tendency has been to involve as many members  

of the family of the opposite party as possible.  While such  

tendency needs to be curbed, the Court will not be able to  

speculate whether the allegations made against the  

accused are true or false at the preliminary stage to be able  

to direct a discharge. Two of the appellants in this case  

happen to be parents-in-law of the complainant who are  

senior citizens. Appellant No.1 who happens to be the  

father-in-law of the complainant-wife has been a Major  

General, by all means, a respectable position in the Army.  

But the nature of the allegations made against the couple  

and those against the husband, appear to be much too  

specific to be ignored at least at the stage of framing of  

charges. The Courts below, therefore, did not commit any  

mistake in refusing a discharge.   

18. In the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.  

Keeping, however, in view the facts and circumstances of  

the case, we direct that appellant Nos. 1 and 2 shall stand  

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exempted from personal appearance before the trial Court  

except when the trial Court considers it necessary to direct  

their presence.  The said appellants shall, however, make  

sure that they are duly represented by a counsel on all  

dates of hearing and that they cooperate with the progress  

of the case failing which the trial Court shall be free to  

direct their personal appearance. No costs.  

……………………….……………………..…….…J. (T.S. THAKUR)

……………………….………………….…..……….J. (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)

New Delhi November 9, 2012

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