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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 55 OF 2013

Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr.              .... Petitioner (s)

Versus

Union of India & Ors.   ....  Respondent(s)

WITH  

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 34 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 56 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 136 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 139 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 141 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 132 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 187 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 188 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 190 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 191 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 192 OF 2013 WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 193 OF 2013

J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam, CJI.

1) Our Constitution is highly valued for its articulation.  

One such astute drafting is Article 21 of the Constitution  

which  postulates  that  every  human  being  has  inherent  

right to life and mandates that no person shall be deprived  

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of  his  life  or  personal  liberty  except  according  to  the  

procedure established by law. Over the span of years, this  

Court  has  expanded  the  horizon  of  ‘right  to  life’  

guaranteed  under  the  Constitution  to  balance  with  the  

progress  of  human life.  This  case  provides  yet  another  

momentous occasion, where this Court is called upon to  

decide whether it will be in violation of Article 21, amongst  

other provisions, to execute the levied death sentence on  

the accused notwithstanding the existence of supervening  

circumstances.  Let  us  examine  the  supervening  

circumstances  of  each  individual  case  to  arrive  at  a  

coherent decision.  

2) All the above writ petitions, under Article 32 of the  

Constitution  of  India,  have  been  filed  either  by  the  

convicts,  who were awarded death sentence or by their  

family members or by public-spirited bodies like People’s  

Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) based on the rejection  

of mercy petitions by the Governor and the President of  

India.

3) In all the writ petitions, the main prayer consistently  

relates to the issuance of a writ of declaration declaring  

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that  execution  of  sentence  of  death  pursuant  to  the  

rejection of the mercy petitions by the President of India is  

unconstitutional  and  to  set  aside  the  death  sentence  

imposed  upon  them  by  commuting  the  same  to  

imprisonment  for  life.   Further,  it  is  also  prayed  for  

declaring the order passed by the Governor/President of  

India rejecting their respective mercy petitions as illegal  

and unenforceable.  In view of the similarity of the reliefs  

sought for in all the writ petitions, we are not reproducing  

every  prayer  hereunder,  however,  while  dealing  with  

individual  claims,  we  shall  discuss  factual  details,  the  

reliefs sought for and the grounds urged in support of their  

claim at the appropriate place. Besides, in the writ petition  

filed  by  PUDR,  PUDR  prayed  for  various  directions  in  

respect of procedure to be followed while considering the  

mercy petitions, and in general for protection of rights of  

the death row convicts.   We shall  discuss discretely the  

aforesaid prayers in the ensuing paragraphs.  

4) Heard Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Mr. Anand Grover, Mr. R.  

Basant,  Mr.  Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel and  

Dr.  Yug  Mohit  Chaudhary,  learned  counsel  for  the  

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petitioners  and  Mr.  Mohan  Parasaran,  learned  Solicitor  

General,  Mr.  L.N.  Rao,  Mr.  Siddharth  Luthra,  learned  

Additional  Solicitor  Generals,  Mr.  V.C.  Mishra,  learned  

Advocate  General,  Mr.  V.N.  Raghupathy,  Ms.  Anitha  

Shenoy, Mr. Rajiv Nanda, Mr. C.D. Singh, learned counsel  

and Mr. Manjit Singh, Additional Advocate General for the  

respondents.   We  also  heard  Mr.  T.R.  Andhyarujina,  

learned senior counsel as amicus curiae.   

5) Before  considering  the  merits  of  the  claim  of  

individual case, it is essential to deliberate on certain vital  

points  of  law  that  will  be  incidental  and  decisive  for  

determining the case at hand.  

Maintainability of the Petitions  

6) Before we advert  to  the issue of  maintainability  of  

the petitions, it  is  pertinent to grasp the significance of  

Article  32  as  foreseen  by  Dr.  Ambedkar,  the  principal  

architect  of  the  Indian  Constitution.   His  words  were  

appositely reiterated in Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. vs.  

Union of India and Ors. (1980) 2 SCC 625 as follows:-

“87. ….If I was asked to name any particular Article in this  Constitution as the most important – an Article without which  

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this Constitution would be a nullity – I could not refer to any  other  Article  except  this  one.  It  is  the  very  soul  of  the  Constitution and the very heart of it.” (emphasis supplied)

The fundamental right to move this Court can, therefore,  

be  appropriately  described  as  the  corner-stone  of  the  

democratic edifice raised by the Constitution. At the same  

time,  this  Court,  in  A.R  Antulay vs.  Union  of  India  

(1988) 2 SCC 602, clarified and pronounced that any writ  

petition under Article 32 of  the Constitution challenging  

the validity of the order or judgment passed by this Court  

as nullity or otherwise incorrect cannot be entertained. In  

this  light,  let  us  examine  the  maintainability  of  these  

petitions.

7) The  aforesaid  petitions,  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution,  seek  relief  against  alleged  infringement  of  

certain  fundamental  rights  on account  of  failure  on  the  

part  of  the executive to  dispose of  the mercy petitions  

filed  under  Article  72/161  of  the  Constitution  within  a  

reasonable time.  

8) At the outset, the petitioners herein justly elucidated  

that they are not challenging the final verdict of this Court  

wherein  death  sentence  was  imposed.  In  fact,  they  

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asserted in their respective petitions that if the sentence  

had been executed then and there, there would have been  

no grievance or cause of action. However, it wasn’t and  

the  supervening  events  that  occurred  after  the  final  

confirmation of the death sentence are the basis of filing  

these petitions.  

9) It  is  a  time-honored principle,  as stipulated in  R.D  

Shetty vs.  International  Airport  Authority (1979)  3  

SCC  489,  that  no  matter,  whether  the  violation  of  

fundamental  right  arises  out  of  an  executive  

action/inaction or action of the legislature, Article 32 can  

be  utilized  to  enforce  the  fundamental  rights  in  either  

event.  In  the  given  case,  the  stand  of  the  petitioners  

herein is that exercise of the constitutional power vested  

in  the  executive  specified  under  Article  72/161  has  

violated the fundamental rights of the petitioners herein.  

This  Court,  as  in  past,  entertained  the  petitions  of  the  

given  kind  and  issued  appropriate  orders  as  in  T.V.  

Vatheeswaran vs.  State of Tamil Nadu (1983) 2 SCC  

68, Sher Singh and Ors. vs.  State of Punjab (1983) 2  

SCC 344 Triveniben vs.  State of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC  

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574  etc.  Accordingly,  we  accede  to  the  stand  of  the  

petitioners and hold that the petitions are maintainable.

Nature of power guaranteed under Article 72/161 of  

the Constitution

10) It is apposite to refer the relevant Articles which give  

power to the President of India and the Governor to grant  

pardons and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in  

certain cases.  They are as follows:

“Article 72. Power of President to grant pardons,  etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences  in  certain  cases  –  (1)  The  President  shall  have  the  power  to  grant  pardons,  reprieves,  respites  or  remissions  of  punishment  or  to  suspend,  remit  or  commute the sentence of any person convicted of any  offence –

(a) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is by  a Court Martial;

(b) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is for  an offence against any law relating to a matter to  which the executive power of the Union extends;

(c) in  all  cases  where  the  sentence  is  a  sentence  of  death.

(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect  the power conferred by law on any officer of the  Armed Forces of  the Union to suspend, remit or  commute a sentence passed by a Court martial.

(3) Nothing in sub-clause of clause (1) shall affect the  power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence  of death exercisable by the Governor of a State,  under any law for the time being in force.”

Article 161. Power of Governor to grant pardons,  

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etc. and to suspend, remit or commute sentences  in certain cases – The Governor of a State shall have  the  power  to  grant  pardons,  reprieves,  respites  or  remissions  of  punishment  or  to  suspend,  remit  or  commute the sentence of any person convicted of any  offence against any law relating to a matter to which the  executive power of the State extends.”

11) The  memoir  and  scope  of  Article  72/161  of  the  

Constitution was extensively considered  in  Kehar Singh  

vs.  Union  of  India & Anr., (1989)  1  SCC  204  in  the  

following words:

“7.  The  Constitution  of  India,  in  keeping  with  modern  constitutional  practice,  is  a  constitutive  document,  fundamental to the governance of the country, whereby,  according to accepted political theory, the people of India  have provided a constitutional polity consisting of certain  primary organs, institutions and functionaries to exercise  the powers provided in the Constitution. All power belongs  to  the  people,  and  it  is  entrusted  by  them to  specified  institutions and functionaries with the intention of working  out, maintaining and operating a constitutional order. The  Preambular statement of the Constitution begins with the  significant recital:

We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to  constitute  India  into  a  Sovereign  Socialist  Secular  Democratic  Republic...  do  hereby  adopt,  enact  and  give to ourselves this Constitution.

To any civilized society, there can be no attributes more  important  than  the  life  and  personal  liberty  of  its  members.  That  is  evident  from  the  paramount  position  given by the courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These  twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy over all  other  attributes  of  the  political  and  social  order,  and  consequently,  the  Legislature,  the  Executive  and  the  Judiciary  are  more  sensitive  to  them than  to  the  other  attributes of daily existence. The deprivation of personal  liberty  and  the  threat  of  the  deprivation  of  life  by  the  action of the State is in most civilised societies regarded  seriously  and,  recourse,  either  under  express  constitutional provision or through legislative enactment is  

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The President  or  the Governor,  as  the case may be,  in  

exercise of power under Article 72/161 respectively, may  

examine the evidence afresh and this exercise of power is  

clearly  independent  of  the  judiciary.  This  Court,  in  

numerous  instances,  clarified  that  the  executive  is  not  

sitting  as  a  court  of  appeal  rather  the  power  of  

President/Governor to grant remission of sentence is  an  

act  of  grace  and  humanity  in  appropriate  cases,  i.e.,  

distinct, absolute and unfettered in its nature.  

13) In this context, the deliberations in Epuru Sudhakar  

& Anr. vs. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 161 are  

relevant which are as under:

“16.  The  philosophy  underlying  the  pardon  power  is  that  "every  civilized  country  recognizes,  and  has  therefore  provided for, the pardoning power to be exercised as an act  of grace and humanity in proper cases. Without such a power  of  clemency,  to  be  exercised  by  some  department  or  functionary  of  a  government,  a  country  would  be  most  imperfect and deficient in its political morality, and in that  attribute  of  Deity  whose  judgments  are  always  tempered  with mercy. [See 59 American Jurisprudence 2d, page 5]

17. The rationale of the pardon power has been felicitously  enunciated by the celebrated Justice Holmes of the United  States Supreme Court in the case of  Biddle v.  Perovich in  these words 71 L. Ed. 1161 at 1163: A pardon in our days is  not a private act of grace from an individual happening to  possess  power.  It  is  a  part  of  the  constitutional  scheme.  When  granted,  it  is  the  determination  of  the  ultimate  authority  that  the  public  welfare  will  be  better  served  by  inflicting  less  than  what  the  judgment  fixed.” (emphasis  added)

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“1.  The question as regards the scope of the power of  the  President  under  Article  72  of  the  Constitution  to  commute  a  sentence of  death  into  a  lesser  sentence  may  have  to  await  examination  on  an  appropriate  occasion.  This  clearly  is  not  that  occasion  because  insofar  as  this  case  is  concerned,  whatever  be  the  guide-lines  observed  for  the  exercise  of  the  power  conferred  by  Article  72,  the  only  sentence which  can  possibly be imposed upon the petitioner is that of death  and  no  circumstances  exist  for  interference  with  that  sentence. Therefore  we see no justification  for  saying  that  in  refusing  to  commute  the  sentence  of  death  imposed upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence, the  President  has  in  any  manner  transgressed  his  discretionary power under Article 72. Undoubtedly, the  President  has  the  power  in  an  appropriate  case  to  commute any sentence imposed by a court into a lesser  sentence  and  as  said  by  Chief  Justice  Taft  in  James  Shewan  and  Sons v.  U.S.,  the  “executive  clemency  exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident  mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal  law” and that the administration of justice by the courts  is  not  necessarily  or  certainly  considerate  of  circumstances  which  may properly  mitigate  guilt.  But  the question as to whether the case is appropriate for  the  exercise  of  the  power  conferred  by  Article  72  depends  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  particular  case.  The  necessity  or  the  justification  for  exercising that power has therefore to be judged from  case to case. In fact, we do not see what useful purpose  will  be  achieved  by  the  petitioner  by  ensuring  the  imposition of any severe, judicially evolved constraints  on the wholesome power of the President to use it as  the justice of a case may require. After all, the power  conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the purpose  of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing it. We need  not, however, go into that question elaborately because  insofar as this case is concerned, we are quite clear that  not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction  could have persuaded the President to interfere with the  sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner, in view  particularly of the considerations mentioned by us in our  judgment  in  Kuljeet  Singh v.  Union  of  India.  We may  recall what we said in that judgment that “the death of  the Chopra children was caused by the petitioner and  his companion Billa after a savage planning which bears  a professional stamp”, that the “survival of an orderly  society demands the extinction of the life of persons like  Ranga and Billa who are a menace to social order and  

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as has been reiterated in Bikas Chatterjee vs. Union of  

India (2004) 7 SCC 634.  Secondly,  this  Court,  over the  

span of years, unanimously took the view that considering  

the  nature  of  power  enshrined  in  Article  72/161,  it  is  

unnecessary  to  spell  out  specific  guidelines.  In  this  

context,  in  Epuru  Sudhakar  (supra),  this  Court  held  

thus:

“36. So  far  as  desirability  to  indicate  guidelines  is  concerned in  Ashok Kumar case it was held as follows:  (SCC pp. 518-19, para 17)

“17. In  Kehar Singh case on the question of laying  down  guidelines  for  the  exercise  of  power  under  Article 72 of the Constitution this Court observed in  para 16 as under: (SCC pp. 217-18, para 16) ‘It seems to us that there is sufficient indication in  the  terms of  Article  72 and in  the  history  of  the  power  enshrined  in  that  provision  as  well  as  existing case-law, and specific guidelines need not  be spelled out. Indeed, it may not be possible to lay  down any precise,  clearly  defined and sufficiently  channelised guidelines, for we must remember that  the  power  under  Article  72  is  of  the  widest  amplitude,  can  contemplate  a  myriad  kinds  and  categories  of  cases  with  facts  and  situations  varying from case to case, in which the merits and  reasons  of  State  may  be  profoundly  assisted  by  prevailing occasion and passing time. And it  is  of  great  significance  that  the  function  itself  enjoys  high status in the constitutional scheme.’

These  observations  do  indicate  that  the  Constitution  Bench which decided Kehar Singh case was of the view  that the language of Article 72 itself provided sufficient  guidelines for the exercise of power and having regard  to its wide amplitude and the status of the function to be  discharged thereunder, it  was perhaps unnecessary to  spell out specific guidelines since such guidelines may  not  be  able  to  conceive  of  all  myriad  kinds  and  

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categories of cases which may come up for the exercise  of  such  power.  No  doubt  in  Maru  Ram  case the  Constitution  Bench  did  recommend  the  framing  of  guidelines  for  the  exercise  of  power  under  Articles  72/161  of  the  Constitution.  But  that  was  a  mere  recommendation  and  not  a  ratio  decidendi  having  a  binding effect on the Constitution Bench which decided  Kehar Singh case.  Therefore, the observation made by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Kehar  Singh  case does  not  upturn any ratio laid down in  Maru Ram case. Nor has  the Bench in Kehar Singh case said anything with regard  to  using  the  provisions  of  extant  Remission  Rules  as  guidelines for the exercise of the clemency powers.”

19)  Nevertheless, this Court has been of the consistent  

view that the executive orders under Article 72/161 should  

be subject to limited judicial review based on the rationale  

that  the  power  under  Article  72/161  is  per  se above  

judicial  review  but  the  manner  of  exercise  of  power  is  

certainly subject to judicial review. Accordingly, there is no  

dispute as to the settled legal proposition that the power  

exercised under Article 72/161 could be the subject matter  

of  limited judicial  review.   [vide  Kehar Singh (supra);  

Ashok Kumar (supra); Swaran Singh vs. State of U.P  

AIR  1998  SC  2026;  Satpal  and  Anr.  vs. State  of  

Haryana  and  Ors. AIR  2000  SC  1702;  and  Bikas  

Chatterjee (supra)]  

20) Though the contours of power under Article 72/161  

have not been defined, this Court, in  Narayan Dutt vs.  

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State of Punjab (2011) 4 SCC 353, para 24, has held that  

the  exercise  of  power  is  subject  to  challenge  on  the  

following grounds:

a) If  the  Governor  had  been  found  to  have  

exercised  the  power  himself  without  being  

advised by the government;

b) If  the Governor transgressed his jurisdiction in  

exercising the said power;

c) If  the  Governor  had passed the order  without  

applying his mind;

d) The order of the Governor was mala fide; or  

e) The order of the Governor was passed on some  

extraneous considerations.

These propositions are culmination of views settled by this  

Court that:

(i) Power should not be exercised malafidely. (Vide  

Maru Ram vs. Union of India, paras 62, 63 &  

65).

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(ii) No  political  considerations  behind  exercise  of  

power.  In  this  context,  in  Epuru  Sudhakar  

(supra),   this Court held thus:

“34. The  position,  therefore,  is  undeniable  that  judicial review of the order of the President or the  Governor under Article 72 or Article 161, as the  case may be, is available and their orders can be  impugned on the following grounds: a)  that  the  order  has  been  passed  without  application of mind; (b) that the order is mala fide; (c) that the order has been passed on extraneous  or wholly irrelevant considerations; (d) that relevant materials have been kept out of  consideration;

(e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness.

35. Two important aspects were also highlighted  by  learned  amicus  curiae;  one  relating  to  the  desirability  of  indicating  reasons  in  the  order  granting pardon/remission while the other was an  equally more important question relating to power  to  withdraw  the  order  of  granting  pardon/remission,  if  subsequently,  materials  are  placed  to  show  that  certain  relevant  materials  were  not  considered  or  certain  materials  of  extensive  value  were  kept  out  of  consideration.  According to learned amicus curiae, reasons are to  be indicated, in the absence of which the exercise  of judicial review will be affected.

37. In Kehar Singh case this Court held that: (SCC  p. 216, para 13)

“There  is  also  no  question  involved  in  this  case  of  asking  for  the  reasons  for  the  President’s order.”

38. The same obviously means that the affected  party need not be given the reasons. The question  whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the  Court when the same is challenged was not the  subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the  absence of any obligation to convey the reasons  does not mean that there should not be legitimate  

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or relevant reasons for passing the order.”

21) A perusal of the above case-laws makes it clear that  

the President/Governor is not bound to hear a petition for  

mercy  before  taking  a  decision  on  the  petition.   The  

manner of exercise of the power under the said articles is  

primarily a matter of discretion and ordinarily the courts  

would not interfere with the decision on merits.   However,  

the courts retain the limited power of judicial  review to  

ensure that the constitutional authorities consider all the  

relevant materials before arriving at a conclusion.  

22) It  is  the  claim  of  the  petitioners  herein  that  the  

impugned executive orders of rejection of mercy petitions  

against  15  accused  persons  were  passed  without  

considering the supervening events which are crucial for  

deciding the same. The legal basis for taking supervening  

circumstances  into  account  is  that  Article  21  inheres  a  

right in every prisoner till his last breath and this Court will  

protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the  

condemned prisoner’s neck.  [vide Sher Singh (supra),  

Triveniben (supra), Vatheeswaran (supra), Jagdish  

vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2009) 9 SCC 495].

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23) Certainly, delay is one of the permitted grounds for  

limited judicial  review as stipulated in the  stare decisis.  

Henceforth, we shall scrutinize the claim of the petitioners  

herein  and  find  out  the  effect  of  supervening  

circumstances in the case on hand.  

Supervening Circumstances

24) The  petitioners  herein  have  asserted  the  following  

events  as  the  supervening  circumstances,  for  

commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment.

(i) Delay

(ii)  Insanity

(iii) Solitary Confinement  

(iv) Judgments declared per incuriam

(v)  Procedural Lapses

25) All the petitioners have more or less asserted on the  

aforesaid grounds which,  in  their  opinion,  the executive  

had  failed  to  take  note  of  while  rejecting  the  mercy  

petitions filed by them. Let us discuss them distinctively  

and  come  to  a  conclusion  whether  each  of  the  

circumstances  exclusively  or  together  warrants  the  

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commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment.

(i) Delay

26) It  is  pre-requisite  to  comprehend  the  procedure  

adopted  under  Article  72/161  for  processing  the  mercy  

petition so that we may be in a position to appreciate the  

aspect of delay as one of the supervening circumstances.  

27) The  death  row  convicts  invariably  approached  the  

Governor  under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution  of  India  

with a mercy petition after this Court finally decided the  

matter.  During the pendency of  the mercy petition,  the  

execution  of  death  sentence  was  stayed.   As  per  the  

procedure,  once  the  mercy  petition  is  rejected  by  the  

Governor,  the  convict  prefers  mercy  petition  to  the  

President.   Thereafter,  the  mercy  petition  received  in  

President’s  office  is  forwarded  to  the  Ministry  of  Home  

Affairs.   Normally,  the mercy petition consists of one or  

two  pages  giving  grounds  for  mercy.   To  examine  the  

mercy petition so received and to arrive at a conclusion,  

the  documents  like  copy  of  the  judgments  of  the  trial  

Court, High Court and the Supreme Court are requested  

from  the  State  Government.   The  other  documents  

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required  include  details  of  the  decision  taken  by  the  

Governor  under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution,  

recommendations of the State Government in regard to  

grant of mercy petition, copy of the records of the case,  

nominal role of the convict, health status of the prisoner  

and  other  related  documents.   All  these  details  are  

gathered  from  the  State/Prison  authorities  after  the  

receipt of the mercy petition and, according to the Union  

of  India,  it  takes  a  lot  of  time  and  involve  protracted  

correspondence  with  prison  authorities  and  State  

Government.  It is also the claim of the Union of India that  

these documents are then extensively examined and in  

some sensitive cases, various pros and cons are weighed  

to  arrive  at  a  decision.   Sometimes,  person  or  at  their  

instance  some  of  their  relatives,  file  mercy  petitions  

repeatedly  which  cause  undue  delay.   In  other  words,  

according  to  the  Union  of  India,  the  time  taken  in  

examination  of  mercy  petitions  may  depend  upon  the  

nature of the case and the scope of inquiry to be made.  It  

may  also  depend  upon  the  number  of  mercy  petitions  

submitted by or on behalf of the accused.  It is the claim of  

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the respondents that there cannot be a specific time limit  

for examination of mercy petitions.   

28) It is also the claim of the respondents that Article 72  

envisages  no  limit  as  to  time  within  which  the  mercy  

petition  is  to  be  disposed  of  by  the  President  of  India.  

Accordingly,  it  is  contended  that  since  no  time  limit  is  

prescribed for the President under Article 72, the courts  

may  not  go  into  it  or  fix  any  outer  limit.   It  is  also  

contended that the power of the President under Article  

72 is  discretionary which cannot be taken away by any  

statutory  provision  and  cannot  be  altered,  modified  or  

interfered  with,  in  any  manner,  whatsoever,  by  any  

statutory provision or authority.  The powers conferred on  

the President are special powers overriding all other laws,  

rules and regulations in force.  Delay by itself does not  

entail the person under sentence of death to request for  

commutation of sentence into life imprisonment.   

29) It is also pointed out that the decision taken by the  

President under Article 72 is communicated to the State  

Government/Union Territory concerned and to the prisoner  

through  State  Government/Union  Territory.   It  is  also  

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brought  to  our  notice that  as  per  List  II  Entry  4  of  the  

Seventh  Schedule  to  the  Constitution  of  India,  “Prisons  

and  persons  detained  therein”  is  a  State  subject.  

Therefore,  all  steps for  execution of  capital  punishment  

including informing the convict and his/her family, etc. are  

required  to  be  taken  care  of  by  the  concerned  State  

Governments/Union Territories in accordance with their jail  

manual/rules etc.   

30) On the contrary, it is the plea of the petitioners that  

after exhausting of the proceedings in the courts of law,  

the aggrieved convict gets right to make a mercy petition  

before  the  Governor  and  the  President  of  India  

highlighting  his  grievance.   If  there  is  any  undue,  

unreasonable and prolonged delay in disposal of his mercy  

petition, the convict is entitled to approach this Court by  

way of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.  

It  is  vehemently  asserted  that  the  execution  of  death  

penalty  in  the  face  of  such  an  inordinate  delay  would  

infringe fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the  

Constitution,  which  would  invite  the  exercise  of  the  

jurisdiction by this Court.  

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31) The right to life is the most fundamental of all rights.  

The right  to  life,  as guaranteed under Article 21 of  the  

Constitution  of  India,  provides  that  no  person  shall  be  

deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with  

the procedure established by law.  According to learned  

counsel for the Union of India, death sentence is imposed  

on a person found guilty of an offence of heinous nature  

after  adhering to the due procedure established by law  

which is subject to appeal and review. Therefore, delay in  

execution  must  not  be  a  ground  for  commutation  of  

sentence of such a heinous crime. On the other hand, the  

argument  of   learned  counsel  for  the  petitioners/death  

convicts is  that human life is  sacred and inviolable and  

every  effort  should  be  made  to  protect  it.  Therefore,  

inasmuch  as  Article  21  is  available  to  all  the  persons  

including  convicts  and  continues  till  last  breath  if  they  

establish and prove the supervening circumstances, viz.,  

undue delay in disposal of mercy petitions, undoubtedly,  

this  Court,  by  virtue  of  power  under  Article  32,  can  

commute the death sentence into imprisonment for life.  

As a matter of fact, it is the stand of the petitioners that in  

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a  petition  filed  under  Article  32,  even  without  a  

presidential  order,  if  there  is  unexplained,  long  and  

inordinate  delay  in  execution  of  death  sentence,  the  

grievance of the convict can be considered by this Court.  

32) This  Court  is  conscious  of  the  fact,  namely,  while  

Article 21 is the paramount principle on which rights of the  

convicts are based, it must be considered along with the  

rights  of  the  victims  or  the  deceased’s  family  as  also  

societal consideration since these elements form part of  

the sentencing process as well.  The right of a victim to a  

fair investigation under Article 21 has been recognized in  

State of West Bengal vs. Committee for Democratic  

Rights,  West  Bengal, (2010)  3  SCC 571,  which  is  as  

under:

“68. Thus, having examined the rival contentions in the  context  of  the constitutional  scheme,  we conclude as  follows:

(i) The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the  Constitution,  are inherent and cannot be extinguished  by  any  constitutional  or  statutory  provision.  Any  law  that  abrogates  or  abridges  such  rights  would  be  violative  of  the  basic  structure  doctrine.  The  actual  effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed  under  Part  III  has  to  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  whether  or  not  it  destroys  the  basic  structure.

(ii)  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  in  its  broad  perspective seeks to protect the persons of their lives  

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and  personal  liberties  except  according  to  the  procedure  established  by  law.  The  said  article  in  its  broad  application  not  only  takes  within  its  fold  enforcement of  the rights  of  an accused but also the  rights of the victim. The State has a duty to enforce the  human rights of a citizen providing for fair and impartial  investigation against any person accused of commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,  which  may  include  its  own  officers. In certain situations even a witness to the crime  may seek  for  and shall  be  granted protection  by  the  State…”

We  do  comprehend  the  critical  facet  involved  in  the  

arguments by both the sides and we will strive to strike a  

balance between the rights of the accused as well as of  

the victim while deciding the given case.  

33) This is not the first time when the question of such a  

nature is raised before this Court. In Ediga Anamma vs.  

State of A.P., 1974(4) SCC 443 Krishna Iyer, J. spoke of  

the  “brooding  horror  of  haunting  the  prisoner  in  the   

condemned  cell  for  years”.  Chinnappa  Reddy,  J.  in  

Vatheeswaran (supra) said  that  prolonged  delay  in  

execution  of  a  sentence  of  death  had  a  dehumanizing  

effect  and  this  had  the  constitutional  implication  of  

depriving  a  person  of  his  life  in  an  unjust,  unfair  and  

unreasonable way so as to offend the fundamental right  

under Article 21 of the Constitution.  Chinnappa Reddy, J.  

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quoted the Privy Council’s observation in a case of such an  

inordinate  delay  in  execution,  viz.,  “The  anguish  of  

alternating hope and despair the agony of uncertainty and   

the  consequences  of  such  suffering  on  the  mental,   

emotional  and  physical  integrity  and  health  of  the   

individual has to be seen.” Thereby, a Bench of two Judges  

of this Court held that the delay of two years in execution  

of the sentence after the judgment of the trial court will  

entitle the condemned prisoner to plead for commutation  

of  sentence  of  death  to  imprisonment  for  life.  

Subsequently,  in  Sher  Singh  (supra),  which  was  a  

decision of  a  Bench of three Judges,  it  was held that a  

condemned prisoner has a right of  fair  procedure at  all  

stages, trial, sentence and incarceration but delay alone is  

not  good  enough  for  commutation  and  two  years’  rule  

could not be laid down in cases of delay.

34) Owing to the conflict in the two decisions, the matter  

was  referred  to  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  for  

deciding  the  two  questions  of  law  viz.,  (i)  whether  the  

delay in execution itself will be a ground for commutation  

of sentence and (ii) whether two years’ delay in execution  

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will  automatically  entitle  the  condemned  prisoner  for  

commutation of sentence.  In Smt. Triveniben vs. State  

of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC 574, this Court held thus:  

“2.  …..Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of  death  will  entitle  the  condemned person  to  approach  this  Court  under  Article  32  but  this  Court  will  only  examine the nature of delay caused and circumstances  that ensued after sentence was finally confirmed by the  judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to re-open  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  court  while  finally  maintaining  the  sentence  of  death.   This  Court,  however, may consider the question of inordinate delay  in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide  whether the execution of sentence should be carried out  or should be altered into imprisonment for life.  No fixed  period of delay could be held to make the sentence of  death inexecutable  and to  this  extent  the  decision  in  Vatheeswaran  case  cannot  be  said  to  lay  down  the  correct  law  and  therefore  to  that  extent  stands  overruled.”

35) While giving full  reasons which is reported in  Smt.  

Triveniben vs. State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 678 this  

Court,  in  para  22,  appreciated  the  aspect  of  delay  in  

execution in the following words:-  

“22. It was contended that the delay in execution of the  sentence will entitle a prisoner to approach this Court as  his  right  under Article  21 is  being infringed.  It  is  well  settled  now  that  a  judgment  of  court  can  never  be  challenged  under  Article  14  or  21  and  therefore  the  judgment of the court awarding the sentence of death is  not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21  as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar  Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra and also in A.R. Antulay  v. R.S. Nayak the only jurisdiction which could be sought  to  be  exercised by  a  prisoner  for  infringement  of  his  rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after  the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because  of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a  

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condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that  is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it  will not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction  under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final  verdict  reached by  a  competent  court  convicting  and  sentencing  the  condemned  prisoner  and  even  while  considering  the  circumstances  in  order  to  reach  a  conclusion as to whether the inordinate delay coupled  with  subsequent  circumstances  could  be  held  to  be  sufficient for coming to a conclusion that execution of  the sentence of death will not be just and proper. The  nature  of  the  offence,  circumstances  in  which  the  offence was committed will have to be taken as found  by the competent court while finally passing the verdict.  It may also be open to the court to examine or consider  any  circumstances  after  the  final  verdict  was  pronounced if it is considered relevant. The question of  improvement  in  the conduct  of  the prisoner  after  the  final verdict also cannot be considered for coming to the  conclusion  whether  the  sentence  could  be  altered  on  that ground also.”

36) Though learned counsel appearing for the Union of  

India  relied  on  certain  observations  of  Shetty,  J.  who  

delivered  concurring  judgment,  particularly,  para  76,  

holding that “the inordinate delay,  may be a significant  

factor,  but  that  by  itself  cannot  render  the  execution   

unconstitutional”,  after  careful  reading  of  the  majority  

judgment authored by Oza, J., particularly, para 2 of the  

order  dated 11.10.1988 and para 22 of  the subsequent  

order dated 07.02.1989, we reject the said stand taken by  

learned counsel for the Union of India.   

37) In Vatheeswaran (supra), the dissenting opinion of  

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the two judges in the Privy Council case, relied upon by  

this Court, was subsequently accepted as the correct law  

by the Privy Council  in  Earl Pratt vs.  AG for Jamaica  

[1994] 2 AC 1 – Privy Council, after 22 years.  There is no  

doubt that judgments of the Privy Council have certainly  

received  the  same  respectful  consideration  as  the  

judgments  of  this  Court.   For  clarity,  we  reiterate  that  

except the ratio relating to delay exceeding two years in  

execution of sentence of death, all other propositions are  

acceptable, in fact, followed in subsequent decisions and  

should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under  

sentence  of  death  to  invoke  Article  21  and  plead  for  

commutation of the sentence.  

38) In view of the above, we hold that undue long delay  

in  execution  of  sentence  of  death  will  entitle  the  

condemned prisoner to approach this Court under Article  

32.   However,  this  Court  will  only  examine  the  

circumstances  surrounding  the  delay  that  has  occurred  

and  those  that  have  ensued  after  sentence  was  finally  

confirmed  by  the  judicial  process.   This  Court  cannot  

reopen the conclusion already reached but may consider  

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the  question  of  inordinate  delay  to  decide  whether  the  

execution of sentence should be carried out or should be  

altered into imprisonment for life.

39) Keeping a convict in suspense while consideration of  

his  mercy  petition  by  the  President  for  many  years  is  

certainly an agony for him/her.  It creates adverse physical  

conditions and psychological stresses on the convict under  

sentence  of  death.  Indisputably,  this  Court,  while  

considering the rejection of the clemency petition by the  

President,  under  Article  32  read  with  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution, cannot excuse the agonizing delay caused to  

the convict only on the basis of the gravity of the crime.    

40) India  has  been  a  signatory  to  the  Universal  

Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  1948  as  well  as  to  the  

United  Nations  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  

1966.   Both  these  conventions  contain  provisions  

outlawing  cruel  and  degrading  treatment  and/or  

punishment.   Pursuant to  the judgment of  this  Court  in  

Vishaka vs.  State  of  Rajasthan, (1997)  6  SCC  241,  

international covenants to which India is a party are a part  

of domestic law unless they are contrary to a specific law  

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in  force.   It  is  this  expression  (“cruel  and  degrading  

treatment  and/or  punishment”)  which  has  ignited  the  

philosophy  of  Vatheeswaran  (supra) and  the  cases  

which  follow  it.   It  is  in  this  light,  the  Indian  cases,  

particularly, the leading case of  Triveniben (supra) has  

been followed in the Commonwealth countries.  It is useful  

to  refer  the  following foreign  judgments  which  followed  

the proposition :  

i) Earl Pratt vs. AG for Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1 – Privy  

Council

ii) Catholic  Commission  for  Justice  &  Peace  in  

Zimbabwe vs.  Attorney General,  1993 (4) S.A.  239 –  

Supreme Court of Zimbabwe

iii) Soering vs.  United Kingdom [App. No. 14038/88,  

11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989)] – European Court of Human  

Rights

iv) Attorney General vs. Susan Kigula, Constitutional  

Appeal No. 3 of 2006 – Supreme Court of Uganda

v) Herman  Mejia  and  Nicholas  Guevara vs.  

Attorney General, A.D. 2000 Action No. 296 – Supreme  

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Court of Belize.                            

41) It  is  clear  that  after  the  completion  of  the  judicial  

process,  if  the  convict  files  a  mercy  petition  to  the  

Governor/President, it is incumbent on the authorities to  

dispose of the same expeditiously.  Though no time limit  

can be fixed for the Governor and the President, it is the  

duty  of  the  executive  to  expedite  the  matter  at  every  

stage, viz., calling for the records, orders and documents  

filed in the court, preparation of the note for approval of  

the Minister concerned, and the ultimate decision of the  

constitutional  authorities.   This  court,  in  Triveniben  

(supra), further held that in doing so, if it is established  

that there was prolonged delay in the execution of death  

sentence, it is an important and relevant consideration for  

determining whether the sentence should be allowed to be  

executed or not.

42) Accordingly,  if  there  is  undue,  unexplained  amd  

inordinate delay in execution due to pendency of mercy  

petitions  or  the  executive  as  well  as  the  constitutional  

authorities  have  failed  to  take  note  of/consider  the  

relevant aspects, this Court is well within its powers under  

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Article  32  to  hear  the  grievance  of  the  convict  and  

commute  the  death  sentence into  life  imprisonment  on  

this ground alone however, only after satisfying that the  

delay  was  not  caused  at  the  instance  of  the  accused  

himself.  To this extent, the jurisprudence has developed  

in the light of the mandate given in our Constitution as  

well  as  various  Universal  Declarations  and  directions  

issued by the United Nations.

43) The procedure prescribed by law, which deprives a  

person  of  his  life  and  liberty  must  be  just,  fair  and  

reasonable  and  such  procedure  mandates  humane  

conditions of detention preventive or punitive.  In this line,  

although the petitioners were sentenced to death based  

on  the  procedure  established  by  law,  the  inexplicable  

delay on account of executive is unexcusable. Since it is  

well  established that Article 21 of the Constitution does  

not end with the pronouncement of sentence but extends  

to  the  stage  of  execution  of  that  sentence,  as  already  

asserted,  prolonged  delay  in  execution  of  sentence  of  

death has a dehumanizing effect on the accused.  Delay  

caused  by  circumstances  beyond  the  prisoners’  control  

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mandates  commutation  of  death  sentence.   In  fact,  in  

Vatheeswaran (supra),  particularly,  in para 10, it  was  

elaborated where amongst other authorities, the minority  

view of Lords Scarman and Brightman in the 1972 Privy  

Council case of  Noel Noel Riley vs.  Attorney General,  

(1982) Crl.Law Review 679 by quoting “sentence of death  

is  one  thing,  sentence  of  death  followed  by  lengthy   

imprisonment  prior  to  execution  is  another”.  The  

appropriate relief in cases where the execution of death  

sentence  is  delayed,  the  Court  held,  is  to  vacate  the  

sentence of death.  In para 13, the Court made it clear  

that Articles 14, 19 and 21 supplement one another and  

the right which was spelled out from the Constitution was  

a substantive right of the convict and not merely a matter  

of  procedure  established  by  law.   This  was  the  

consequence  of  the  judgment  in  Maneka  Gandhi  vs.  

Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 which made the content  

of  Article  21  substantive  as  distinguished  from  merely  

procedural.   

44) Another argument advanced by learned ASG is that  

even if the delay caused seems to be undue, the matter  

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must  be  referred  back  to  the  executive  and a  decision  

must  not  be  taken  in  the  judicial  side.   Though  we  

appreciate the contention argued by the learned ASG, we  

are not inclined to accept the argument.  The concept of  

supervening events emerged from the jurisprudence set  

out in Vatheeswaran (supra) and Triveniben (supra).  

The word ‘judicial review’ is not even mentioned in these  

judgments and the death sentences have been commuted  

purely on the basis of supervening events such as delay.  

Under the ground of supervening events, when Article 21  

is held to be violated, it is not a question of judicial review  

but of  protection of  fundamental  rights  and courts  give  

substantial  relief  not merely procedural  protection.  The  

question  of  violation  of  Article  21,  its  effects  and  the  

appropriate relief is the domain of this Court.  There is no  

question  of  remanding  the  matter  for  consideration  

because  this  Court  is  the  custodian  and  enforcer  of  

fundamental  rights  and  the  final  interpreter  of  the  

Constitution.   Further,  this  Court  is  best  equipped  to  

adjudicate  the  content  of  those  rights  and  their  

requirements in a particular fact situation.  This Court has  

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always granted relief  for  violation of  fundamental  rights  

and  has  never  remanded  the  matter.   For  example,  in  

cases  of  preventive  detention,  violation  of  free  speech,  

externment, refusal of passport etc., the impugned action  

is quashed, declared illegal and violative of Article 21, but  

never remanded.  It would not be appropriate to say at  

this  point  that  this  Court  should  not  give  relief  for  the  

violation of Article 21.

45) At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer the records of  

the disposal  of  mercy petitions compiled by Mr.  Bikram  

Jeet Batra and others, which are attached as annexures in  

almost  all  the  petitions  herein.  At  the  outset,  this  

document reveals that the mercy petitions were disposed  

of more expeditiously in former days than in the present  

times.  Mostly,  until  1980,  the  mercy  petitions  were  

decided in minimum of 15 days and in maximum of 10-11  

months. Thereafter, from 1980 to 1988, the time taken in  

disposal of mercy petitions was gradually increased to an  

average of 4 years. It is exactly at this point of time, the  

cases  like  Vatheeswaran  (supra) and  Triveniben  

(supra) were decided which gave way for developing the  

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jurisprudence of commuting the death sentence based on  

undue delay. It is also pertinent to mention that this Court  

has  observed  in  these  cases  that  when  such  petitions  

under  Article  72 or  161 are received by the authorities  

concerned,  it  is  expected  that  these  petitions  shall  be  

disposed of  expeditiously.  In  Sher Singh (supra)  their  

Lordships have also impressed the Government of India  

and  all  the  State  Governments  for  speedy  disposal  of  

petitions  filed  under  Articles  72  and  161  and  issued  

directions in the following manner:

“23. We must take this opportunity to impress upon the  Government of  India  and the State Governments  that  petitions  filed  under  Articles  72  and  161  of  the  Constitution  or  under  Sections  432  and  433  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  must  be  disposed  of  expeditiously.  A  self-imposed  rule  should  be  followed by the executive authorities rigorously,   that  every  such  petition  shall  be  disposed  of  within a period of three months from the date on   which it is received. Long and interminable delays in  the disposal of these petitions are a serious hurdle in  the dispensation of justice and indeed, such delays tend  to  shake  the  confidence  of  the  people  in  the  very  system of justice.  

46) Obviously, the mercy petitions disposed of from 1989  

to 1997 witnessed the impact of the observations in the  

disposal of mercy petitions. Since the average time taken  

for  deciding  the mercy petitions  during this  period  was  

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brought down to an average of  5 months from 4 years  

thereby paying due regard to the observations made in  

the  decisions  of  this  Court,  but  unfortunately,  now  the  

history seems to be repeating itself as now the delay of  

maximum  12  years  is  seen  in  disposing  of  the  mercy  

petitions under Article 72/161 of the Constitution.  

47) We  sincerely  hope  and  believe  that  the  mercy  

petitions  under  Article  72/161  can  be  disposed  of  at  a  

much faster pace than what is adopted now, if  the due  

procedure  prescribed  by  law  is  followed  in  verbatim.  

Although, no time frame can be set for the President for  

disposal of the mercy petition but we can certainly request  

the concerned Ministry to follow its own rules rigorously  

which can reduce, to a large extent, the delay caused.

48) Though  guidelines  to  define  the  contours  of  the  

power under Article 72/161 cannot be laid down, however,  

the  Union  Government,  considering  the  nature  of  the  

power, set out certain criteria in the form of circular as  

under for deciding the mercy petitions.

• Personality  of  the  accused  (such  as  age,  sex  or  

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mental  deficiency)  or  circumstances  of  the  case  

(such as provocation or similar justification);

• Cases in which the appellate Court expressed doubt  

as to the reliability of evidence but has nevertheless  

decided on conviction;

• Cases  where  it  is  alleged  that  fresh  evidence  is  

obtainable mainly with a view to see whether fresh  

enquiry is justified;

• Where the High Court on appeal reversed acquittal or  

on an appeal enhanced the sentence;

• Is  there  any  difference  of  opinion  in  the  Bench  of  

High Court Judges necessitating reference to a larger  

Bench;

• Consideration of evidence in fixation of responsibility  

in gang murder case;

• Long delays in investigation and trial etc.

49) These guidelines and the scope of the power set out  

above make it clear that it is an extraordinary power not  

limited by judicial determination of the case and is not to  

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be exercised  lightly  or  as  a  matter  of  course.  We  also  

suggest, in view of the jurisprudential development with  

regard  to  delay  in  execution,  another  criteria  may  be  

added so as to require consideration of the delay that may  

have occurred in disposal of a mercy petition.  In this way,  

the constitutional authorities are made aware of the delay  

caused at  their  end which aspect  has to be considered  

while  arriving at  a  decision in  the mercy petition.   The  

obligation to do so can also be read from the fact that, as  

observed  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Triveniben  

(supra), delays in the judicial process are accounted for in  

the  final  verdict  of  the  Court  terminating  the  judicial  

exercise.    

50) Another vital  aspect,  without mention of which the  

present  discussion  will  not  be  complete,  is  that,  as  

aforesaid, Article 21 is the paramount principle on which  

rights of the convict are based, this must be considered  

along  with  the  rights  of  the  victims  or  the  deceased’s  

family as also societal consideration since these elements  

form part of the sentencing process as well. It is the stand  

of the respondents that the commutation of sentence of  

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death based on delay alone will  be against the victim’s  

interest.

51) It is true that the question of sentence always poses  

a complex problem, which requires a working compromise  

between  the  competing  views  based  on  reformative,  

deterrent  and retributive  theories  of  punishments.  As  a  

consequence,  a  large  number  of  factors  fall  for  

consideration  in  determining  the  appropriate  sentence.  

The  object  of  punishment  is  lucidly  elaborated  in  Ram  

Narain vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 86 in  

the following words:-

“8.  …the  broad  object  of  punishment  of  an  accused  found  guilty  in  progressive civilized societies  is  to impress on the  guilty party that commission of crimes does not pay and that  it is both against his individual interest and also against the  larger  interest  of  the  society  to  which  he  belongs.  The  sentence to be appropriate should, therefore, be neither too  harsh nor too lenient....”

52) The  object of punishment has been succinctly stated  

in Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th Edition: Vol. II: para  

482) thus:

“The  aims  of  punishment  are  now  considered  to  be  retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation and protection  and  modern  sentencing  policy  reflects  a  combination  of  several  or  all  of  these  aims.  The  retributive  element  is  

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intended  to  show public  revulsion  to  the  offence  and  to  punish the offender for his wrong conduct. The concept of  justice  as  an  aim  of  punishment  means  both  that  the  punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences  should  receive  similar  punishments.  An  increasingly  important  aspect  of  punishment  is  deterrence  and  sentences  are  aimed  at  deterring  not  only  the  actual  offender from further offences but also potential offenders  from breaking the law. The importance of reformation of the  offender is shown by the growing emphasis laid upon it by  much modern legislation, but judicial opinion towards this  particular aim is varied and rehabilitation will not usually be  accorded  precedence  over  deterrence.  The  main  aim  of  punishment  in  judicial  thought,  however,  is  still  the  protection  of  society  and  the  other  objects  frequently  receive only secondary consideration when sentences are  being decided.”

53) All  these  aspects  were  emphatically  considered  by  

this Court while pronouncing the final verdict against the  

petitioners  herein  thereby  upholding  the  sentence  of  

death imposed by the High Court. Nevertheless, the same  

accused  (petitioners  herein)  are  before  us  now  under  

Article  32 petition seeking commutation of  sentence on  

the  basis  of  undue  delay  caused  in  execution  of  their  

levied  death  sentence,  which  amounts  to  torture  and  

henceforth violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. We  

must clearly see the distinction under both circumstances.  

Under the former scenario, the petitioners herein were the  

persons  who  were  accused  of  the  offence  wherein  the  

sentence of death was imposed but in later scenario, the  

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petitioners  herein  approached this  Court  as  a  victim of  

violation  of  guaranteed  fundamental  rights  under  the  

Constitution  seeking  commutation  of  sentence.   This  

distinction must be considered and appreciated.  

54) As  already  asserted,  this  Court  has  no  jurisdiction  

under Article 32 to reopen the case on merits. Therefore,  

in the light of the aforesaid elaborate discussion, we are of  

the cogent view that undue, inordinate and unreasonable  

delay  in  execution  of  death  sentence  does  certainly  

attribute to torture which indeed is in violation of Article  

21 and thereby entails as the ground for commutation of  

sentence. However, the nature of delay i.e. whether it is  

undue or unreasonable must be appreciated based on the  

facts of individual cases and no exhaustive guidelines can  

be framed in this regard.   

Rationality of Distinguishing between Indian Penal  Code, 1860 And Terrorist and Disruptive Activities  (Prevention) Act Offences for Sentencing Purpose  

55) In Writ Petition No. 34 of 2013 – the accused were  

mulcted  with  TADA  charges  which  ultimately  ended  in  

death  sentence.   Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani,  learned  senior  

counsel  for  the  petitioners  in  that  writ  petition  argued  

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against  the  ratio  laid  down  in  Devender  Pal  Singh  

Bhullar  vs. State  (NCT)  of  Delhi  (2013)  6  SCC  195  

which holds that when the accused are convicted under  

TADA, there is no question of showing any sympathy or  

considering  supervening  circumstances  for  commutation  

of sentence, and emphasized the need for reconsideration  

of  the  verdict.   According  to  Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani,  

Devender  Pal  Singh Bhullar  (supra) is  per  incuriam  

and is  not  a binding decision for  other  cases.   He also  

prayed that inasmuch as the ratio laid down in Devender  

Pal Singh Bhullar (supra) is erroneous, this Court, being  

a larger Bench, must overrule the same.   

56) He pointed out that delay in execution of sentence of  

death after it has become final at the end of the judicial  

process is wholly unconstitutional inasmuch it constitutes  

torture, deprivation of liberty and detention in custody not  

authorized by law within the meaning of Article 21 of the  

Constitution.  He further pointed out that this involuntary  

detention of the convict is an action not authorized by any  

penal provision including Section 302 IPC or any other law  

including TADA.  On the other hand, Mr. Luthra, learned  

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ASG heavily relying on the reasonings in  Devender Pal  

Singh Bhullar (supra) submitted that inasmuch as the  

crime involved is a serious and heinous and the accused  

were charged under TADA, there cannot be any sympathy  

or  leniency  even on  the  ground of  delay  in  disposal  of  

mercy petition.  According to him, considering the gravity  

of the crime, death sentence is warranted and Devender  

Pal  Singh  Bhullar  (supra) has  correctly  arrived  at  a  

conclusion and rejected the claim for commutation on the  

ground of delay.  

57) From  the  analysis  of  the  arguments  of  both  the  

counsel, we are of the view that only delay which could  

not have been avoided even if the matter was proceeded  

with  a  sense  of  urgency  or  was  caused  in  essential  

preparations  for  execution  of  sentence  may  be  the  

relevant  factors  under  such  petitions  in  Article  32.  

Considerations  such  as  the  gravity  of  the  crime,  

extraordinary  cruelty  involved  therein  or  some  horrible  

consequences for society caused by the offence are not  

relevant  after  the  Constitution  Bench  ruled  in  Bachan  

Singh vs.  State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 that the  

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sentence of death can only be imposed in the rarest of  

rare  cases.   Meaning,  of  course,  all  death  sentences  

imposed are impliedly the most heinous and barbaric and  

rarest  of  its  kind.  The  legal  effect  of  the  extraordinary  

depravity  of  the  offence  exhausts  itself  when  court  

sentences the person to death for that offence.  Law does  

not  prescribe  an  additional  period  of  imprisonment  in  

addition to the sentence of death for any such exceptional  

depravity involved in the offence.  

58) As rightly pointed out  by Mr.  Ram Jethmalani,  it  is  

open to the legislature in its wisdom to decide by enacting  

an  appropriate  law  that  a  certain  fixed  period  of  

imprisonment in addition to the sentence of death can be  

imposed in some well defined cases but the result cannot  

be  accomplished  by  a  judicial  decision  alone.   The  

unconstitutionality of this additional incarceration is itself  

inexorable  and  must  not  be  treated  as  dispensable  

through a judicial decision.  

59) Now, in this background, let us consider the ratio laid  

down in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar (supra).  

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60) The brief facts of that case were: Devender Pal Singh  

Bhullar,  who was convicted by the Designated Court  at  

Delhi for various offences under TADA, IPC and was found  

guilty and sentenced to death.  The appeal as well as the  

review  filed  by  him was  dismissed  by  this  Court.  Soon  

after  the  dismissal  of  the  review  petition,  Bhullar  

submitted  a  mercy  petition  dated  14.01.2003  to  the  

President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution and  

prayed for  commutation of his sentence.   Various other  

associations including Delhi  Sikh Gurdwara Management  

Committee sent letters in connection with commutation of  

the death sentence awarded to him.  During the pendency  

of the petition filed under Article 72, he also filed Curative  

Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2013 which was also dismissed  

by  this  Court  on  12.03.2013.   After  prolonged  

correspondence  and  based  on  the  advice  of  the  Home  

Minister, the President rejected his mercy petition which  

was  informed vide  letter  dated 13.06.2011 sent  by  the  

Deputy  Secretary  (Home)  to  the  Jail  Authorities.   After  

rejection of his petition by the President,  Bhullar filed a  

writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, in this  

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regard  praying  for  quashing  the  communication  dated  

13.06.2011.   While  issuing  notice  in  Writ  Petition  

(Criminal) Diary No. 16039/2011, this Court directed the  

respondents to clarify as to why the petitions made by the  

petitioner had not been disposed of for the last 8 years.  In  

compliance  with  the  courts  direction,  the  Deputy  

Secretary (Home) filed an affidavit giving reasons for the  

delay.   This  Court,  after  adverting  to  all  the  earlier  

decisions, instructions regarding procedure to be observed  

for  dealing  with  the  petitions  for  mercy,  accepted  that  

there was a delay of 8 years.  Even after accepting that  

long delay may be one of the grounds for commutation of  

sentence  of  death  into  life  imprisonment,  this  Court  

dismissed his writ petition on the ground that the same  

cannot be invoked in cases where a person is convicted  

for an offence under TADA or similar statutes.  This Court  

also held that such cases stand on an altogether different  

footing and cannot be compared with murders committed  

due to personal animosity or over property and personal  

disputes.  It is also relevant to point out that while arriving  

at  such conclusion,  the Bench heavily  relied on opinion  

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expressed  by  Shetty,  J.  in  Smt.  Triveniben  (supra).  

Though the Bench adverted to paras 73, 74, 75 and 76 of  

Triveniben (supra),  the  Court  very  much  emphasized  

para 76 which reads as under:-           

“76. … The court while examining the matter, for the  reasons  already  stated,  cannot  take  into  account  the  time utilised in the judicial proceedings up to the final  verdict.  The court  also cannot  take into  consideration  the time taken for disposal of any petition filed by or on  behalf of the accused either under Article 226 or under  Article  32 of  the Constitution  after the final  judgment  affirming the conviction  and sentence. The court  may  only  consider  whether  there was undue long delay in  disposing  of  mercy  petition;  whether  the  State  was  guilty of dilatory conduct and whether the delay was for  no  reason  at  all.  The inordinate  delay,  may be a  significant factor, but that by itself cannot render  the  execution  unconstitutional.  Nor  it  can  be  divorced  from  the  dastardly  and  diabolical   circumstances  of  the  crime  itself…”  (emphasis  supplied)

61) On  going  through  the  judgment  of  Oza,  J.  on  his  

behalf and for M.M. Dutt, K.N. Singh and L.M. Sharma, JJ.,  

we are of the view that the above quoted statement of  

Shetty, J. is not a majority view and at the most this is a  

view expressed by him alone.  In this regard, at the cost of  

repetition it is relevant to refer once again the operative  

portion  of  the  order  dated  11.10.1988  in  Triveniben  

(supra)  which is as under:-     

“2.  We are of the opinion that:  

Undue long delay in execution of the sentence of death  

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will  entitle  the  condemned  person  to  approach  this  Court under Article 32 but this Court will only examine  the  nature  of  delay  caused  and  circumstances  that  ensued  after  sentence  was  finally  confirmed  by  the  judicial process and will have no jurisdiction to re-open  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  court  while  finally  maintaining  the  sentence  of  death.   This  Court,  however, may consider the question of inordinate delay  in the light of all circumstances of the case to decide  whether the execution of sentence should be carried out  or should be altered into imprisonment for life.  No fixed  period of delay could be held to make the sentence of  death inexecutable  and to  this  extent  the  decision  in  Vatheeswaran  case  cannot  be  said  to  lay  down  the  correct  law  and  therefore  to  that  extent  stands  overruled.”

62) The same view was once again reiterated by all the  

Judges  and  the  very  same  reasonings  have  been  

reiterated in Para 23 of the order dated 07.02.1989.  In  

such  circumstances  and  also  in  view of  the  categorical  

opinion  of  Oza,  J.  in  para  22  of  the  judgment  in  

Triveniben (supra) that “it will not be open to this Court   

in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or   

to examine the final  verdict…the nature of the offence,   

circumstances  in  which  the offence was  committed  will   

have to be taken as found by the competent court…”, it  

cannot be held, as urged, on behalf of the Union of India  

that the majority opinion in Triveniben (supra) is to the  

effect that delay is only one of the circumstances that may  

be  considered  along  with  “other  circumstances  of  the  

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case”  to  determine  as  to  whether  the  death  sentence  

should be commuted to one of life imprisonment.  We are,  

therefore, of the view that the opinion rendered by Shetty,  

J.  as quoted in para 76 of the judgment in  Triveniben  

(supra) is a minority view and not a view consistent with  

what has been contended to be the majority opinion. We  

reiterate that as per the majority view, if there is undue  

long  delay  in  execution  of  sentence  of  death,  the  

condemned  prisoner  is  entitled  to  approach  this  Court  

under Article 32 and the court is bound to examine the  

nature  of  delay  caused  and  circumstances  that  ensued  

after  sentence  was  finally  confirmed  by  the  judicial  

process  and  to  take  a  decision  whether  execution  of  

sentence should be carried out or should be altered into  

imprisonment for life.  It is, however, true that the majority  

of the Judges have not approved the fixed period of two  

years enunciated in  Vatheeswaran (supra) and only to  

that extent overruled the same.  

63) Incidentally,  it  is  relevant  to  point  out  Mahendra  

Nath Das vs.  Union of India and Ors. (2013) 6 SCC  

253, wherein the very same bench, taking note of the fact  

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that there was a delay of 12 years in the disposal of the  

mercy  petition  and  also  considering  the  fact  that  the  

appellants therein were prosecuted and convicted under  

Section 302 IPC held the rejection of the appellants’ mercy  

petition as illegal and consequently, the sentence of death  

awarded to them by the trial Court which was confirmed  

by the High Court, commuted into life imprisonment.   

64) In the light of the same, we are of the view that the  

ratio laid down in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar (supra)  

is  per  incuriam.   There  is  no  dispute  that  in  the  same  

decision this Court has accepted the ratio enunciated in  

Triveniben (supra) (Constitution Bench) and also noted  

some  other  judgments  following  the  ratio  laid  down  in  

those cases that unexplained long delay may be one of  

the grounds for commutation of sentence of death into life  

imprisonment.  There is no good reason to disqualify all  

TADA cases as a class from relief on account of delay in  

execution  of  death  sentence.   Each  case  requires  

consideration on its own facts.  

65) It is useful to refer a Constitution Bench decision of  

this Court in  Mithu  vs.  State of Punjab  (1983) 2 SCC  

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277,  wherein this  Court  held Section 303 of  the IPC as  

unconstitutional and declared it void.  The question before  

the Constitution Bench was whether  Section 303 of  IPC  

infringes  the  guarantee  contained  in  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution,  which  provides  that  “no  person  shall  be  

deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to  

the procedure established by law”.  Chandrachud, J. the  

then Hon’ble the Chief Justice, speaking for himself, Fazal  

Ali, Tulzapurkar and Varadarajan, JJ., struck down Section  

303  IPC  as  unconstitutional  and  declared  it  void.   The  

Bench also held that all the cases of murder will now fall  

under Section 302 IPC and there shall  be no mandatory  

sentence of death for the offence of murder. The reasons  

given by this Court for striking down this aforesaid section  

will  come in  aid  for  this  case.  Section  303  IPC  was  as  

under:

“303.  Punishment  for  murder  by  life  convict.— Whoever, being under sentence of imprisonment for life,  commits murder, shall be punished with death.”

66)  Before  striking  down  Section  303  IPC,  this  Court  

made the following conclusion:

“3…The reason, or at least one of the reasons, why the  

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discretion of the court to impose a lesser sentence was  taken  away  and  the  sentence  of  death  was  made  mandatory in cases which are covered by Section 303  seems to have been that if,  even the sentence of life  imprisonment was not sufficient  to act as a deterrent  and  the  convict  was  hardened  enough  to  commit  a  murder  while  serving  that  sentence,  the  only  punishment which he deserved was death. The severity  of this legislative judgment accorded with the deterrent  and retributive theories of punishment which then held  sway. The reformative theory of  punishment attracted  the attention of criminologists later in the day…

5…The sum and substance of the argument is that the  provision  contained  in  Section  303  is  wholly  unreasonable  and  arbitrary  and  thereby,  it  violates  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  which  affords  the  guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or  personal  liberty  except  in  accordance  with  the  procedure established by law. Since the procedure by  which Section 303 authorises the deprivation of life is  unfair and unjust, the Section is unconstitutional. Having  examined this argument with care and concern, we are  of the opinion that it must be accepted and Section 303  of the Penal Code struck down.”

67) After quoting Maneka Gandhi (supra), Sunil Batra  

vs. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494 and Bachan  

Singh (supra), this Court opined:

“19…To prescribe a mandatory sentence of  death for  the  second  of  such  offences  for  the  reason  that  the  offender was under the sentence of  life imprisonment  for  the  first  of  such  offences  is  arbitrary  beyond  the  bounds of all reason. Assuming that Section 235(2) of  the Criminal Procedure Code were applicable to the case  and  the  court  was  under  an  obligation  to  hear  the  accused on the question of sentence, it would have to  put some such question to the accused: “You  were  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment  for  the  offence of forgery. You have committed a murder while  you were under that sentence of life imprisonment. Why  should you not be sentenced to death”

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The question carries its own refutation. It highlights how  arbitrary and irrational it is to provide for a mandatory  sentence of death in such circumstances…”

23.  On  a  consideration  of  the  various  circumstances  which we have mentioned in this judgment, we are of  the opinion that Section 303 of the Penal Code violates  the guarantee of equality contained in Article 14 as also  the right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution that  no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty  except according to procedure established by law. The  section was originally conceived to discourage assaults  by life convicts on the prison staff, but the legislature  chose language which  far  exceeded its  intention.  The  Section also assumes that life convicts are a dangerous  breed of humanity as a class.  That assumption is not  supported  by  any scientific  data.  As  observed  by  the  Royal Commission in its Report on “Capital Punishment” “There is a popular belief that prisoners serving a life  sentence  after  conviction  of  murder  form  a  specially  troublesome and dangerous class. That is not so. Most  find themselves in prison because they have yielded to  temptation  under  the  pressure  of  a  combination  of  circumstances unlikely to recur.” In Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P. this Court was  not concerned with the question of the vires of Section  303,  but  Sarkaria,  J.,  in  his  concurring  judgment,  described the vast sweep of that Section by saying that  “the  section  is  Draconian  in  severity,  relentless  and  inexorable in operation” [SCC para 22, p. 567: SCC (Cri)  p. 92]. We strike down Section 303 of the Penal Code as  unconstitutional and declare it void. It is needless to add  that all cases of murder will now fall under Section 302  of  the  Penal  Code  and  there  shall  be  no  mandatory  sentence of death for the offence of murder.”

68) Chinnappa Reddy, J., concurring with the above view,  

held thus:

“25.  Judged in  the  light  shed by  Maneka Gandhi  and  Bachan Singh, it is impossible to uphold Section 303 as  valid. Section 303 excludes judicial discretion. The  scales of justice are removed from the hands of  the Judge so soon as he pronounces the accused  guilty of the offence. So final, so irrevocable and  

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so  irrestitutable  [sic  irresuscitable]  is  the  sentence of death that no law which provides for  it without involvement of the judicial mind can be  said to be fair,  just and reasonable.  Such a law  must necessarily be stigmatised as arbitrary and  oppressive. Section 303 is such a law and it must  go the way of all bad laws. I agree with my Lord  Chief Justice that Section 303, Indian Penal Code,  must be struck down as unconstitutional.”

69) It is clear that since Section 303 IPC excludes judicial  

discretion, the Constitution Bench has concluded that such  

a  law must  necessarily  be  stigmatized  as  arbitrary  and  

oppressive.   It  is  further  clear  that  no  one  should  be  

deprived of  equality  contained in  Article 14 as also the  

right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution regarding  

his  life  or  personal  liberty  except  according  to  the  

procedure established by law.   

70) Taking guidance from the above principles and in the  

light of the ratio enunciated in  Triveniben (supra),  we  

are  of  the  view  that  unexplained  delay  is  one  of  the  

grounds for  commutation  of  sentence of  death into  life  

imprisonment  and the said supervening circumstance is  

applicable  to  all  types  of  cases  including  the  offences  

under TADA.  The only aspect the courts have to satisfy is  

that the delay must be unreasonable and unexplained or  

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inordinate at the hands of the executive.  The argument of  

Mr. Luthra, learned ASG that a distinction can be drawn  

between IPC and non-IPC offences since the nature of the  

offence is a relevant factor is liable to be rejected at the  

outset.  In view of our conclusion, we are unable to share  

the  views  expressed  in  Devender  Pal  Singh  Bhullar  

(supra).

(ii) Insanity/Mental Illness/Schizophrenia

71) In this batch of cases, two convict prisoners prayed  

for commutation of death sentence into sentence of life  

imprisonment on the ground that the unconscionably long  

delay in deciding the mercy petition has caused the onset  

of  chronic  psychotic  illness,  and  in  view  of  this  the  

execution of death sentence will be inhuman and against  

the well-established canons of human rights.   

72) The  principal  question  raised  in  those  petitions  is  

whether  because  of  the  aforementioned  supervening  

events after the verdict of this Court confirming the death  

sentence, the infliction of the most extreme penalty in the  

circumstances of the case, violates the fundamental rights  

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under Article 21.  The petitioners have made it clear that  

they are not challenging the death sentence imposed by  

this Court.  However, as on date, they are suffering from  

insanity/mental illness.  In this background, let us consider  

whether  the  petitioners  have  made  out  a  case  for  

commutation to life sentence on the ground of insanity.

73) India  is  a  member  of  the  United  Nations  and  has  

ratified  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and Political  

Rights  (ICCPR).   A  large  number  of  United  Nations  

international  documents  prohibit  the execution of  death  

sentence  on  an  insane  person.   Clause  3(e)  of  the  

Resolution  2000/65 dated  27.04.2000  of  the U.N.  

Commission on Human Rights titled “The Question  

of Death Penalty” urges  “all  States that still  maintain  

the death penalty…not to impose the death penalty on a   

person suffering from any form of mental disorder or to   

execute any such person”.  It further elaborates:     

“3. Urges all States that still maintain the death penalty: (a)  To  comply  fully  with  their  obligations  under  the  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and  the Convention on the Rights of the Child, notably not to  impose the death penalty for any but the most serious  crimes and only pursuant to a final judgement rendered  by an independent and impartial competent court,  not  to impose it for crimes committed by persons below 18  years of age, to exclude pregnant women from capital  

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punishment and to ensure the right to a fair trial and the  right to seek pardon or commutation of sentence; (b) To ensure that the notion of "most serious crimes"  does  not  go  beyond  intentional  crimes  with  lethal  or  extremely  grave  consequences  and  that  the  death  penalty is not imposed for non-violent financial crimes  or  for  non-violent  religious  practice  or  expression  of  conscience; (c) Not to enter any new reservations under article 6 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  which may be contrary to the object and the purpose of  the  Covenant  and  to  withdraw  any  such  existing  reservations,  given  that  article  6  of  the  Covenant  enshrines the minimum rules for the protection of the  right to life and the generally accepted standards in this  area; (d) To observe the Safeguards guaranteeing protection  of the rights of those facing the death penalty and to  comply  fully  with  their  international  obligations,  in  particular  with those under the Vienna Convention  on  Consular Relations; (e)  Not  to  impose  the  death  penalty  on  a  person  suffering from any form of mental disorder or to execute  any such person; (f)  Not  to  execute  any  person  as  long  as  any  related legal procedure,  at  the  international  or  at  the  national level, is pending; 4. Calls  upon all  States  that  still  maintain  the  death  penalty: (a) Progressively to restrict the number of offences for  which the death penalty may be imposed; (b) To establish a moratorium on executions, with a view  to completely abolishing the death penalty; (c)  To  make  available  to  the  public  information  with  regard to the imposition of the death penalty; 5. Requests States  that  have  received  a  request  for  extradition on a capital charge to reserve explicitly the  right  to refuse extradition  in  the absence of  effective  assurances from relevant authorities of the requesting  State that capital punishment will not be carried out; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to submit  to the Commission on Human Rights, at its fifty-seventh  session,  in consultation with Governments,  specialized  agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental  organizations,  a yearly  supplement on changes in law  and practice concerning the death penalty worldwide to  his  quinquennial  report  on  capital  punishment  and  implementation  of  the  Safeguards  guaranteeing  

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protection  of  the  rights  of  those  facing  the  death  penalty; 7. Decides to continue consideration of the matter at its  fifty-seventh session under the same agenda item.

66th meeting

26 April 2000”

74) Similarly, Clause 89 of  the Report of the Special   

Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Summary or Arbitrary   

Executions published  on  24.12.1996  by  the  UN  

Commission  on  Human  Rights  under  the  caption  

“Restrictions  on  the  use  of  death  penalty” states  

that  “the  imposition  of  capital  punishment  on  mentally   

retarded or insane persons, pregnant women and recent   

mothers is prohibited”.  Further, Clause 116 thereof under  

the  caption  “Capital  punishment”  urges  that  

“Governments that enforce such legislation with respect   

to minors and the mentally ill are particularly called upon   

to bring their domestic criminal laws into conformity with   

international legal standards”.

75) United Nations General Assembly in its Sixty-second  

session,  adopted  a  Resolution  on  18.12.2007,  which  

speaks about moratorium on the use of the death penalty.  

The following decisions are relevant:

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“1. Expresses its  deep concern about the continued  application of the death penalty; 2. Calls upon all States that still maintain the death  penalty: (a) To  respect  international  standards  that  provide  safeguards  guaranteeing  protection  of  the  rights  of  those  facing  the  death  penalty,  in  particular  the  minimum  standards,  as  set  out  in  the  annex  to  Economic and Social  Council  resolution  1984/50 of  25  May 1984;

*** *** *** 76th plenary meeting

18 December 2007”

76) The following passage from the Commentary on the  

Laws of England by William Blackstone is relevant for our  

consideration:

“…In criminal cases therefore idiots and lunatics are not  chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under  these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself.  Also,  if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense,  and  before  arraignment  for  it,  he  becomes  mad,  he  ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able  to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought.  And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad,  he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense?  If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses  before  judgment,  judgment  shall  not  be  pronounced;  and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory,  execution  shall  be stayed:  for  peradventure,  says  the  humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of  sound  memory,  he  might  have  alleged  something  in  stay of judgment or execution.”

77) India  too  has  similar  line  of  law  and  rules  in  the  

respective State Jail  Manuals.  Paras 386 and 387 of the  

U.P. Jail Manual applicable to the State of Uttarakhand are  

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relevant for our purpose and are quoted hereinbelow:

“386. Condemned convicts developing insanity – When  a  convict  under  sentence  of  death  develops  insanity after conviction, the Superintendent shall  stay the execution of the sentence of death  and  inform  the  District  Magistrate,  who  shall  submit  immediately  a report,  through the Sessions Judge,  for  the orders of the State Government. 387. Postponement of execution in certain cases – The  execution of a convict under sentence of death shall not  be carried out on the date fixed if he is physically unfit  to receive the punishment, but shall not be postponed  unless  the  illness  is  both  serious  and  acute  (i.e.  not  chronic).   A report  giving full  particulars of  the illness  necessitating postponement of execution should at once  be  made  to  the  Secretary  to  the  State  Government,  Judicial  (A)  Department  for  the  orders  of  the  Government.”

Similar provisions are available in Prison Manuals of other  

States in India.

78) The  above  materials,  particularly,  the  directions  of  

the  United  Nations  International  Conventions,  of  which  

India  is  a  party,  clearly  show  that  insanity/mental  

illness/schizophrenia  is  a  crucial  supervening  

circumstance, which should be considered by this Court in  

deciding whether  in  the facts  and circumstances of  the  

case  death  sentence  could  be  commuted  to  life  

imprisonment.   To  put  it  clear,  “insanity”  is  a  relevant  

supervening factor for consideration by this Court.

79) In  addition,  after  it  is  established  that  the  death  

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convict is insane and it is duly certified by the competent  

doctor,  undoubtedly,  Article  21  protects  him  and  such  

person  cannot  be  executed  without  further  clarification  

from the competent authority about his mental problems.  

It  is  also  highlighted  by  relying  on  commentaries  from  

various  countries  that  civilized  countries  have  not  

executed  death  penalty  on  an  insane  person.  Learned  

counsel also relied on United Nations Resolution against  

execution  of  death  sentence,  debate  of  the  General  

Assembly, the decisions of International Court of Justice,  

Treaties,  European  Conventions,  8th amendment  in  the  

United States which prohibits execution of death sentence  

on an insane person.  In view of the well established laws  

both at national as well  as international sphere,  we are  

inclined to  consider  insanity  as  one of  the  supervening  

circumstances  that  warrants  for  commutation  of  death  

sentence to life imprisonment.

(iii) Solitary Confinement  

80) Another  supervening  circumstance,  which  most  of  

the petitioners appealed in their petitions is the ground of  

solitary  confinement.  The  grievance  of  some  of  the  

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of death' means 'to be under a finally executable death  

sentence'.

83) Even  in  Triveniben  (supra),  this  Court  observed  

that keeping a prisoner in solitary confinement is contrary  

to the ruling in Sunil Batra (supra) and would amount to  

inflicting  “additional  and  separate”  punishment  not  

authorized  by  law.  It  is  completely  unfortunate  that  

despite  enduring  pronouncement  on  judicial  side,  the  

actual implementation of the provisions is far from reality.  

We take this  occasion  to  urge  to  the  jail  authorities  to  

comprehend  and  implement  the  actual  intent  of  the  

verdict in Sunil Batra (supra).

84) As far as this batch of cases is concerned, we are not  

inclined to interfere on this ground.     

(iv) Judgments Declared Per Incuriam

85) Many counsels, while adverting to the cause of the  

petitioners,  complained that either the trial  court or the  

High Court relied on/adverted to certain earlier decisions  

which were either doubted or held  per incuriam such as  

Machhi Singh vs.  State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470,  

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Ravji alias Ramchandra vs. State of Rajasthan (1996)  

2  SCC  175,  Sushil  Murmu  vs.  State  of  Jharkhand  

(2004) 2 SCC 338,  Dhananjoy Chatterjee vs.  State of  

W.B. (1994) 2 SCC 220, State of U.P. vs. Dharmendra  

Singh (1999) 8 SCC 325 and  Surja Ram vs.  State of  

Rajasthan (1996) 6 SCC 271.  Therefore, it is the claim of  

the  petitioners  herein  that  this  aspect  constitutes  a  

supervening circumstance that warrants for commutation  

of sentence of death to life imprisonment.  

86) It is the stand of few of the petitioners herein that the  

guidelines issued in  Machhi Singh (supra) are contrary  

to  the  law  laid  down  in  Bachan  Singh  (supra).  

Therefore,  in  three  decisions,  viz.,  Swamy  

Shraddananda (2)   vs.  State of Karnataka (2008) 13  

SCC 767,  Sangeet and Another vs.  State of Haryana  

(2013)  2  SCC  452  and  Gurvail  Singh vs.  State  of  

Punjab (2013)  2  SCC  713  the  verdict  pronounced  by  

Machhi Singh (supra) is held to be per incuriam.

87) In  the  light  of  the  above  stand,  we  carefully  

scrutinized  those  decisions.   Even  in  Machhi  Singh  

(supra),  paragraphs 33 to  37 included certain  aspects,  

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viz.,  I.  manner  of  commission  of  murder;  II.  motive  for  

commission of murder; III. anti-social or socially abhorrent  

nature  of  the  crime;  IV.  magnitude  of  crime  and  V.  

personality of victim of murder.  Ultimately, in paragraph  

38,  this  Court  referred  to  the  guidelines  prescribed  in  

Bachan Singh (supra).  In other words,  Machhi Singh  

(supra), after  noting  the  propositions  emerged  from  

Bachan  Singh  (supra), considered  the  individual  

appeals and disposed of the same.  In this regard, it  is  

useful to refer a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court  

in  Swamy  Shraddananda  (2)  (supra).  The  Bench  

considered  the  principles  enunciated  in  Machhi  Singh  

(supra),  Bachan Singh (supra) and after analyzing the  

subsequent  decisions,  came  to  the  conclusion  in  

paragraph 48:

“48…It is noted above that Bachan Singh laid down the  principle of the rarest of rare cases. Machhi Singh, for  practical  application  crystallised the principle  into  five  definite categories of cases of murder and in doing so  also considerably enlarged the scope for imposing death  penalty.  But  the  unfortunate  reality  is  that  in  later  decisions neither the rarest of rare cases principle nor  the  Machhi  Singh  categories  were  followed  uniformly  and consistently.”

88) Except  the  above  observations,  the  three-Judge  

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Bench has nowhere discarded Machhi Singh (supra).  In  

other  words,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  three-Judge  

Bench considered and clarified the principles/guidelines in  

Machhi Singh (supra).  It is also relied by the majority in  

Triveniben (supra).  As regards other cases, in view of  

the factual position, they must be read in consonance with  

the three-Judge Bench and the Constitution Bench.

89) As pointed out by learned ASG for the Union of India,  

no decision mentioned above was found to be erroneous  

or  wrongly  decided.   However,  due  to  various  factual  

situations, certain decisions were clarified and not applied  

to the facts of the peculiar case.  In these circumstances,  

we  are  of  the  view  that  there  is  no  need  to  give  

importance to the arguments relating to per incuriam.  

(v) Procedural Lapses

90) The  last  supervening  circumstance  averred  by  the  

petitioners herein is the ground of procedural lapses. It is  

the  claim  of  the  petitioners  herein  that  the  prescribed  

procedure  for  disposal  of  mercy  petitions  was  not  duly  

followed  in  these  cases  and  the  lapse  in  following  the  

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prescribed rules have caused serious injustice to both the  

accused  (the  petitioners  herein)  and  their  family  

members.  

91) Ministry  of  Home Affairs,  Government  of  India  has  

detailed  procedure  regarding  handling  of  petitions  for  

mercy  in  death  sentence  cases.   As  per  the  said  

procedure,  Rule  I  enables  a  convict  under  sentence  of  

death to submit  a petition for  mercy within seven days  

after  and  exclusive  of  the  day  on  which  the  

Superintendent of Jail informs him of the dismissal by the  

Supreme  Court  of  his  appeal  or  of  his  application  for  

special  leave to  appeal  to  the  Supreme Court.   Rule  II  

prescribes procedure for submission of petitions.  As per  

this Rule, such petitions shall be addressed to, in the case  

of States, to the Governor of the State at the first instance  

and thereafter to the President of India and in the case of  

Union Territories directly to the President of India.  As soon  

as mercy petition is received, the execution of sentence  

shall in all cases be postponed pending receipt of orders  

on the same.  Rule III states that the petition shall in the  

first instance, in the case of States, be sent to the State  

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concerned for consideration and orders of the Governor.  If  

after consideration it is rejected, it shall be forwarded to  

the  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  Ministry  of  

Home Affairs.  If it is decided to commute the sentence of  

death,  the  petition  addressed  to  the  President  of  India  

shall be withheld and intimation to that effect shall be sent  

to the petitioner. Rule V states that in all cases in which a  

petition for mercy from a convict under sentence of death  

is to be forwarded to the Secretary to the Government of  

India,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  the  Lt.  Governor/Chief  

Commissioner/Administrator  or  the  Government  of  the  

State concerned, as the case may be, shall forward such  

petition,  as  expeditiously  as  possible,  along  with  the  

records of the case and his or its observations in respect  

of  any  of  the  grounds  urged  in  the  petition.  Rule  VI  

mandates that upon receipt of the orders of the President,  

an acknowledgement shall be sent to the Secretary to the  

Government  of  India,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  

immediately  in  the  manner  prescribed.  In  the  case  of  

Assam and Andaman and Nicobar Islands, all orders will be  

communicated by telegraph and the receipt thereof shall  

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be  acknowledged  by  telegraph.   In  the  case  of  other  

States and Union Territories, if the petition is rejected, the  

orders will be communicated by express letter and receipt  

thereof shall be acknowledged by express letter.  Orders  

commuting the death sentence will be communicated by  

express letters, in the case of Delhi and by telegraph in all  

other cases and receipt thereof shall be acknowledged by  

express  letter  or  telegraph,  as  the  case  may be.   Rule  

VIII(a)  enables  the  convict  that  if  there  is  a  change  of  

circumstance or if any new material is available in respect  

of rejection of his earlier mercy petition, he is free to make  

fresh application  to  the President  for  reconsideration of  

the earlier order.

92) Specific  instructions  relating  to  the  duties  of  

Superintendents of Jail in connection with the petitions for  

mercy for or on behalf of the convicts under sentence of  

death  have  been  issued.   Rule  I  mandates  that  

immediately  on  receipt  of  warrant  of  execution,  

consequent on the confirmation by the High Court of the  

sentence of death, the Jail Superintendent shall inform the  

convict  concerned  that  if  he  wishes  to  appeal  to  the  

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Supreme Court or to make an application for special leave  

to appeal to the Supreme Court under any of the relevant  

provisions of the Constitution of India, he/she should do so  

within the period prescribed in the Supreme Court Rules.  

Rule II makes it clear that, on receipt of the intimation of  

the dismissal by the Supreme Court of the appeal or the  

application for special leave to appeal filed by or on behalf  

of the convict, in case the convict concerned has made no  

previous petition for mercy, the Jail Superintendent shall  

forthwith inform him that if he desires to submit a petition  

for mercy, it should be submitted in writing within seven  

days of the date of such intimation. Rule III says that if the  

convict submits a petition within the period of seven days  

prescribed by Rule  II, it should be addressed, in the case  

of States, to the Governor of the State at the first instance  

and, thereafter, to the President of India and in the case of  

Union  Territories,  to  the  President  of  India.   The  

Superintendent  of  Jail  shall  forthwith  dispatch  it  to  the  

Secretary  to  the  State  Government  in  the  Department  

concerned  or  the  Lt.  Governor/Chief  

Commissioner/Administrator, as the case may be, together  

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with  a  covering  letter  reporting  the  date  fixed  for  

execution and shall  certify  that  the execution has been  

stayed pending receipt  of  orders of  the Government on  

the petition. Rule IV mandates that if the convict submits  

petition  after  the  period  prescribed  by  Rule  II,  the  

Superintendent of Jail shall, at once, forward it to the State  

Government  and  at  the  same  time  telegraphed  the  

substance  of  it  requesting  orders  whether  execution  

should be postponed stating that pending reply sentence  

will not be carried out.

93) The above Rules make it clear that at every stage the  

matter has to be expedited and there cannot be any delay  

at  the  instance  of  the  officers,  particularly,  the  

Superintendent  of  Jail,  in  view  of  the  language  used  

therein as “at once”.

94) Apart from the above Rules regarding presentation of  

mercy  petitions  and  disposal  thereof,  necessary  

instructions have been issued for preparation of note to be  

approved  by  the  Home  Minister  and  for  passing  

appropriate orders by the President of India.   

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95) Extracts  from  Prison  Manuals  of  various  States  

applicable for the disposal of mercy petitions have been  

placed before us.  Every State has separate Prison Manual  

which  speaks  about  detailed  procedure,  receipt  placing  

required materials for approval of the Home Minister and  

the President for taking decision expeditiously.  Rules also  

provide steps to be taken by the Superintendent of  Jail  

after the receipt of mercy petition and subsequent action  

after  disposal  of  the  same  by  the  President  of  India.  

Almost all the Rules prescribe how the death convicts are  

to be treated till final decision is taken by the President of  

India.

96) The  elaborate  procedure  clearly  shows  that  even  

death  convicts  have  to  be  treated  fairly  in  the  light  of  

Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Nevertheless, it is  

the claim of all the petitioners herein that all these rules  

were not adhered to strictly and that is the primary reason  

for the inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions. For  

illustration, on receipt of mercy petition, the Department  

concerned  has  to  call  for  all  the  records/materials  

connected  with  the  conviction.   Calling  for  piece-meal  

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records  instead of  all  the  materials  connected  with  the  

conviction  should  be  deprecated.   When  the  matter  is  

placed before the President, it is incumbent upon the part  

of the Home Ministry to place all  the materials such as  

judgment of the Trial Court, High Court and the final Court,  

viz., Supreme Court as well as any other relevant material  

connected with the conviction at once and not call for the  

documents in piece meal.   

97) At the time of considering individual cases, we will  

test whether those Rules have been strictly complied with  

or not on individual basis.

Analysis on Case-to-Case Basis

Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 55 and 132 of 2013

98) Mr. Shatrughan Chauhan and Mr. Mahinder Chauhan,  

family  members  of  death  convicts  –  Suresh  and  Ramji  

have filed Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 55 of 2013.  Subsequent  

to the filing of the Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 55 of 2013 by the  

family  members,  the  death  convicts  themselves,  viz.,  

Suresh  and  Ramji,  aged  60  years  and  45  years  

respectively, belonging to the State of Uttar Pradesh, filed  

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Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 132 of the 2013.  

99) On 19.12.1997, the petitioners were convicted under  

Section 302 IPC for the murder of five family members of  

the first petitioner’s brother for which they were awarded  

death sentence. On 23.02.2000, the Allahabad High Court  

confirmed  their  conviction  and  death  sentence  and,  

subsequently  this  Court  dismissed their  Criminal  Appeal  

being No. 821 of 2000, vide judgment dated 02.03.2001.

100) On  09.03.2001  and  29.04.2001,  the  first  and  the  

second  petitioners  herein  filed  mercy  petitions  

respectively addressed to the Governor/President of India.  

On 28.03.2001, Respondent No. 2–State of Uttar Pradesh  

wrote to the prison authorities seeking information  inter  

alia on the conduct of the first petitioner in prison.  On  

05.04.2001,  the  prison  authorities  informed Respondent  

No. 2 about his good conduct.  

101) On  18.04.2001,  this  Court  dismissed  the  Review  

Petition (Crl.) being No. 416 of 2001 which was filed on  

30.03.2001.   

102) On  22.04.2001,  Respondent  No.  1–Union  of  India  

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wrote to Respondent No.  2 asking for the record of the  

case and for information on whether mercy petition has  

been rejected by the Governor.  Meanwhile, other mercy  

petitions were received by Respondent No. 1.  There is no  

reference in  the  affidavit  of  Respondent  No.  1  that  the  

same  were  forwarded  to  Respondent  No.  2  for  

consideration.   

103) On  04.05.2001,  Respondent  No.  2  wrote  to  the  

Government Advocate, District Varanasi asking for a copy  

of the trial court judgment, which information is available  

from the counter affidavit filed by Respondent No. 2.  On  

23.05.2001,  Respondent  No.  2  sent  a  reminder  to  the  

Government Advocate, District Varanasi to send a copy of  

the  trial  court  judgment.   On  04.09.2001,  the  District  

Magistrate, Varanasi informed Respondent No. 2 that it is  

not possible to get a copy of the trial court judgment as all  

the papers are lying in the Supreme Court.

104) On 13.12.2001, without obtaining a copy of the trial  

court judgment, Respondent No. 2 advised the Governor  

to reject the mercy petition.  On 18.12.2001, the Governor  

rejected the mercy petition after taking nine months’ time.  

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On 22.01.2002,  Respondent No.  2 informed Respondent  

No.  1  that  the  Governor  has  rejected  the  petitioners’  

mercy petition.  It is the grievance of the petitioners that  

neither  the  petitioners  nor  their  family  members  were  

informed about the rejection.   

105) On  28.03.2002,  Respondent  No.  1  wrote  to  

Respondent  No.  2  seeking  copy  of  the  trial  court  

judgment.  On 12.06.2002, the judgment of the trial court  

was furnished by Respondent No. 2 to Respondent No. 1.   

106) Rule V of the Mercy Petition Rules which exclusively  

provides that the mercy petition should be sent along with  

the judgments and related documents immediately, states  

as follows:

“In all cases in which a petition for mercy from a convict  under  sentence  of  death  is  to  be  forwarded  to  the  Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home  Affairs,  the  Lieut  Governor/Chief  Commissioner/Administrator  or  the Government of  the  State concerned as the case may be shall forward such  petition  as  expeditiously  as  possible  along  with  the  records of the case and his or its observations in respect  of any of the grounds urged in the petition”.

107) There is no explanation for the delay of about five  

months in sending the papers to Respondent No. 1.  On  

07.12.2002, Respondent No. 2 wrote to Respondent No. 1  

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seeking  information  about  the  status  of  the  petitioners’  

mercy  petition.   Twelve  reminders  were  sent  between  

17.01.2003 and 14.12.2005.

108) On 27.07.2003, Respondent No. 4-Superintendent of  

Jail,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  U.P.  Jail  

Manual,  wrote to Respondent No.  2 seeking information  

about  the  petitioners’  pending  mercy  petitions.  

Thereafter,  twenty-seven  reminders  were  sent  by  the  

prison authorities between 29.09.2003 and 29.05.2006.

109) On  08.04.2004,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the mercy petition.  On 21.07.2004, the  

President returned the petitioners’ file (along with the files  

of ten other death-row convicts) to Respondent No. 1 for  

the  advice  of  the  new Home Minister.   On 20.06.2005,  

Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  reject  the  

mercy  petitions.   On  24.12.2010,  Respondent  No.  1  

recalled the files from the President.  On 13.01.2011, the  

said  files  were  received  from  the  President.   On  

19.02.2011,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  

reject the mercy petition.  

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110) On  14.11.2011,  Respondent  No.  2  wrote  to  

Respondent No. 1 seeking information about the status of  

the petitioners’ mercy petitions.   

111) On 29.10.2012, the President returned the file for the  

advice  of  the  new  Home  Minister.   On  16.01.2013,  

Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  reject  the  

mercy petition.  On 08.02.2013, the President rejected the  

mercy petitions.

112) On  05.04.2013,  the  petitioners  heard  the  news  

reports that their mercy petitions have been rejected by  

the President of India.  It is asserted that they have not  

received any written confirmation till this date.  

113) On  06.04.2013,  the  petitioners  authorized  their  

family  members,  viz.  Mr.  Shatrughan  Chauhan  and  Mr.  

Mahinder Chauhan, to file an urgent writ petition in this  

Court,  which  was  ultimately  numbered  as  Writ  Petition  

(Crl.)  No.  55 of  2013.   By order  dated 06.04.2013,  this  

Court  stayed the execution of  the petitioners.   Only  on  

20.06.2013,  the  prison  authorities  informed  vide  letter  

dated  18.06.2013  that  the  petitioners’  mercy  petitions  

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have been rejected by the President.   

114) All the above details have been culled out from the  

writ  petitions  filed  by  the  petitioners  and  the  counter  

affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India as well as the  

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh.   The  following  are  the  details  

relating  to  disposal  of  mercy  petitions  by  the  Governor  

and the President:

Custody suffered till date 6.10.1996  –  17.12.2013

17  years  2  months

Custody  suffered  under  sentence of death

19.12.1997  –  17.12.2013

16 years

Total delay since filing of mercy  petition till prisoner informed of  rejection by the President

27.04.2001  –  20.06.2013

12  years  2  months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition by Governor First petitioner

Second petitioner

9.3.2001  –  28.01.2002

27.04.2001  –  28.01.2002

10 months

9 months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition by the President

28.01.2002  –  08.02.2013

11 years

Delay  in  communicating  rejection by the President

8.02.2013  –  20.06.2013

4 months

115) There is no dispute that these petitioners killed five  

members of their family – two adults and three children  

over property dispute.  It is a heinous crime and they were  

awarded death sentence which was also confirmed by this  

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Court.   However,  the  details  furnished  in  the  form  of  

affidavits  by  the  petitioners,  counter  affidavit  filed  by  

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as well as the records produced  

by Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, clearly  

show that there was a delay of twelve years in disposal of  

their  mercy  petitions.   To  put  it  clear,  the  Governor  of  

Uttar Pradesh took around ten months to reject the mercy  

petitions  (09.03.2001  to  28.01.2002)  and  the  President  

rejected  the  petitions  with  a  delay  of  eleven  years  

(28.01.2002  to  08.02.2013).   We  also  verified  the  

summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the  

President  and  the  connected  papers  placed  by  learned  

ASG wherein no discussion with regard to the same was  

attributed to.  

116) On  going  through  various  details,  stages  and  

considerations  and  in  the  light  of  various  principles  

discussed above and also of the fact that this Court has  

accepted  in  a  series  of  decisions  that  undue  and  

unexplained delay in execution is one of the supervening  

circumstances,  we  hold  that  in  the  absence  of  proper,  

plausible and acceptable reasons for the delay, the delay  

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of  twelve  years  in  considering  the  mercy  petitions  is  a  

relevant ground for  the commutation of death sentence  

into  life  imprisonment.   We  are  also  satisfied  that  the  

summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the  

President makes no mention of twelve years’ delay much  

less  any plausible  reason.   Accordingly,  both the death  

convicts  –  Suresh and Ramji  have made out a case for  

commutation  of  their  death  sentence  into  life  

imprisonment.   

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 34 of 2013

117) This  writ  petition  is  filed  by  Shamik  Narain  which  

relates  to  four  death convicts,  viz.,  Bilavendran,  Simon,  

Gnanprakasam and Madiah aged 55 years, 50 years, 60  

years and 64 years respectively.   

118) The  case  emanates  from  the  State  of  Karnataka.  

According to the petitioners, the accused persons are in  

custody for nearly 19 years and 7 months.  All the persons  

were charged under IPC as well as under the provisions of  

the TADA.  By judgment dated 29.09.2001, the Designated  

TADA Court, Mysore convicted the accused persons for the  

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offence  punishable  under  TADA as  well  as  IPC  and the  

Arms  Act  and  sentenced  them  inter  alia to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for life.  

119) All  the  accused  persons  preferred  Criminal  Appeal  

being Nos. 149-150 of 2002 before this Court which were  

admitted by this Court.  The State of Karnataka also filed a  

Criminal  Appeal  being  No.  34  of  2003  against  the  

judgment dated 29.09.2001 praying for enhancement of  

sentence from life imprisonment to death sentence.  On  

09.01.2003, this Court refused to accept the claim of the  

State of Karnataka and dismissed its appeal on the ground  

of limitation.  However, this Court, by judgment and order  

dated 29.01.2004, suo motu enhanced the sentence of the  

accused persons from life imprisonment to death.  In the  

same  order,  this  Court  confirmed  the  conviction  and  

sentence imposed by the TADA Court and dismissed the  

appeals preferred by the accused.

120) On 12.02.2004, separate mercy petitions were filed  

by  the  petitioners  and  the  Superintendent,  Central  Jail,  

Belgaum forwarded the same to Respondent No. 1.

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121) On  29.04.2004,  the  review  petitions  filed  by  the  

petitioners were also dismissed by this Court.   

122) On  29.07.2004,  the  Governor  rejected  the  mercy  

petitions  and,  according  to  the  petitioners,  they  were  

never informed about the same.

123) On  07.08.2004,  Respondent  No.  2  forwarded  the  

mercy petitions to Respondent No. 1 which were received  

on 16.08.2004.  Here again, there is no explanation for the  

delay  of  six  months  from 12.02.2004,  when  the  mercy  

petitions were first forwarded to Respondent No. 1.

124) On  19.08.2004,  Respondent  No.  1  requested  

Respondent No. 2  for a copy of the trial court judgment.  

Here again,  the trial  court  judgment and other  relevant  

documents should have been sent to  Respondent No. 1  

along  with  the  mercy  petitions.   We  have  already  

extracted Rule V of the Mercy Petition Rules relating to  

forwarding of the required materials as expeditiously as  

possible.  On 30.08.2004, Respondent No. 2 sent a copy of  

the trial court judgment to  Respondent No. 1 which was  

received on 09.09.2004.   

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125) On  18.10.2004,  the  petitioners’  gang  leader  

Veerappan was killed in an encounter by a Special Task  

Force and his gang disbanded.

126) On  29.04.2005,  the  Home  Minister  advised  the  

President  to  reject  the  mercy  petitions.   There  was  no  

further progress in the petitions till the files were recalled  

from the President and received back in the Ministry of  

Home Affairs, i.e., six years later on 16.05.2011.  Though  

separate counter affidavit has been filed by Respondent  

No. 1, there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay of  

six years.  Learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out  

that  it  is  pertinent  to  take  note  of  the  fact  that  two  

consecutive Presidents had deemed it fit not to act on the  

advice  suggested.   In  any  event,  this  procrastination  

violated  the  petitioners’  right  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution  by  inflicting  six  additional  years  of  

imprisonment under the constant fear of imminent death  

not authorized by judgment of any court.   

127) On 28.02.2006, Curative Petition being No. 6 of 2006  

was dismissed by this Court.

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128) In the meanwhile, letters were sent by the petitioners  

to the President of India highlighting their grievance about  

their  procrastination  for  about  last  twelve  years.   The  

information  furnished  by  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  

under  the  Right  to  Information  Act  shows  that  mercy  

petitions submitted after the petitions of the petitioners  

were given priority and decided earlier  while the mercy  

petitions of the petitioners were kept pending.

129) On 16.05.2011, the mercy petitions were recalled by  

Respondent No. 1 from the President.  Here again, there is  

no explanation for the delay of six years.  On 25.05.2011,  

the Home Minister advised the President for the second  

time  to  reject  the  mercy  petition.   On  19.11.2012,  the  

President returned the file stating that the views of the  

new Home Minister may be ascertained.  Here again, there  

is no explanation for the delay of 1 ½ years while the file  

was  pending  with  the  President.   On  16.01.2013,  the  

Home Minister advised the President for the third time to  

reject the mercy petitions.  On 08.02.2013, the President  

rejected the mercy petitions and  Respondent No. 2 was  

informed vide letter dated 09.02.2013.

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130) It is the grievance of the petitioners that though they  

were informed orally  and signatures were obtained,  the  

prison authorities refused to hand over the copy of  the  

rejection letter to them or to their advocate.  The details  

regarding delay in this matter are as follows:

Custody suffered till date 14.07.1993  –  17.12.2013

20  years  5  months

Custody  suffered  under  sentence of death

29.01.2004  –  17.12.2013

9  years  11  months

Total  delay  in  disposal  of  the  mercy petitions

12.02.2004  –  08.02.2013

9 years

131) The delay of six months (12.02.2004 – 07.08.2004)  

when the mercy petitions were being considered by the  

Governor is attributed to Respondent No. 1 because the  

mercy  petition  had  been  sent  to  Respondent  No.  1  on  

12.02.2004 and also because Respondent No. 2/Governor  

did not have jurisdiction to entertain the mercy petitions  

and even if  clemency had been granted,  it  would  have  

been null and void.

132) From the particulars furnished by the petitioners as  

well as the details mentioned in the counter affidavit of  

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we are satisfied that the delay  

of  nine  years  in  disposal  of  their  mercy  petitions  is  

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unreasonable and no proper explanation has been offered  

for the same.  Apart from the delay in question, according  

to  us,  it  is  important  to  note  that  delay  is  undue  and  

unexplained.  Certain other aspects also support the case  

of the petitioners for commutation.

133) We have already mentioned that on 29.01.2004, this  

Court, by its judgment and order, suo motu enhanced the  

sentence from life imprisonment to death.  It is relevant to  

point  out  that  when  the  State  preferred  an  appeal  for  

enhancement of the sentence from life to death, this Court  

rejected the claim of the State, however, this Court  suo  

motu enhanced the same and the fact remains that the  

appeal filed by the State for enhancement was rejected by  

this Court.

134) In the earlier part of our discussion, we have already  

held that the decision in  Devender Pal Singh Bhullar  

(supra),  holding  that  the  cases  pertaining  to  offences  

under  TADA  have  to  be  treated  differently  and  on  the  

ground of delay in disposal  of  mercy petition the death  

sentence cannot be commuted, is  per incuriam.  Further,  

this Court in  Yakub Memon vs.  State of Maharashtra  

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(Criminal  Appeal  No.  1728  of  2007)  delivered  on  

21.03.2013 and in subsequent cases commuted the death  

sentence passed in TADA case to imprisonment for life.

135) Taking  note  of  these  aspects,  viz.,  their  age,  in  

custody for nearly twenty years, unexplained delay of nine  

years  in  disposal  of  mercy  petitions  coupled  with  other  

reasons and also of the fact that the summary prepared  

by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President makes no  

mention of the delay of 9 ½ years and also in the light of  

the  principles  enunciated  in  the  earlier  paragraphs,  we  

hold  that  the  petitioners  have  made  out  a  case  for  

commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life.

Writ Petition (Crl.)No. 187 of 2013

136) Praveen Kumar,  aged about  55 years,  hailing from  

Karnataka,  has  filed  this  petition.   He  was  charged  for  

murdering  four  members  of  a  family  and  ultimately  by  

judgment  dated  05.02.2002,  he  was  convicted  under  

Sections 302, 392 and 397 IPC and sentenced to death.  

The petitioner was defended on legal aid.   

137) By judgment dated 28.10.2002, death sentence was  

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confirmed  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  

Karnataka  and  by  order  dated  15.10.2003,  this  Court  

dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.   

138) On 25.10.2003, the petitioner sent the mercy petition  

addressed to the President of India wherein he highlighted  

that he has been kept in solitary confinement since the  

judgment of the trial Court, i.e., 05.02.2002.  

139)  On  12.12.2003,  Respondent  No.  1  requested  

Respondent  No.  2  to  consider  the  petitioner’s  mercy  

petition under Article 161 of the Constitution and intimate  

the decision along with the copies of the judgment of the  

trial Court, High Court, police diary and court proceedings.  

Respondent No. 1 also received mercy petition signed by  

260 persons.  By order dated 15.09.2004, the Governor  

rejected the mercy petition. On 30.09.2004, Respondent  

No.  2  informed  Respondent  No.  1  that  the  petitioner’s  

mercy petition has been rejected by the Governor.  

140)  On  18.10.2004,  Respondent  No.  1  requested  

Respondent  No.  2  for  the  second  time  to  send  the  

judgment of the trial Court along with the police diary and  

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court  proceedings.   On  20.12.2004,  according  to  

Respondent No. 1, Respondent No. 2 sent the requested  

documents  to  Respondent  No.  1  but  Respondent  No.  1  

claimed that the same were in Kannada. On 07.01.2005,  

Respondent  No.  1  returned  the  documents  sent  by  

Respondent  No.  2  with  a  request  to  provide  English  

translation.  The State Government was again reminded in  

this  regard  on  05.04.2005,  20.04.2005,  04.06.2005  and  

21.07.2005.  Even after these reminders,  the translated  

documents were not sent.   

141) On 06.09.2005, the mercy petition of the petitioner-

Praveen  Kumar  was  processed  and  examined  without  

waiting for the copy of the judgment of the trial Court and  

submitted for  consideration  of  the  Home Minister.   The  

Home  Minister  approved  the  rejection  of  the  mercy  

petition.  On 07.09.2005, Respondent No. 1 advised the  

President  to  reject  the  petitioner’s  mercy  petition.   On  

14.03.2006,  Respondent  No.  2  sent  the  translated  

documents to Respondent No. 1.   

142) On 20.08.2006, the petitioner wrote to the President  

referring to  his  earlier  mercy petition dated 25.10.2003  

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stating that for the last four years and seven months he  

has  been  languishing  in  solitary  confinement  under  

constant fear of death.   

143) On  29.09.2006,  the  petitioner  wrote  to  the  Chief  

Minister of Karnataka referring to his earlier mercy petition  

dated 25.10.2003 highlighting the same grievance.  

144) The information received under RTI Act shows that  

mercy  petitions  submitted  after  the  petition  of  the  

petitioner were given priority and decided earlier while the  

mercy petition of the petitioner was kept pending.  

145)  On 01.07.2011, the petitioner’s mercy petition was  

recalled from the President and received by Respondent  

No. 1 and thereafter it remained pending consideration of  

the President of India for five years and 10 months.  There  

is no explanation for this inordinate delay.

146) On  14.07.2011,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the petitioner’s mercy petition.  The file  

remained with the President till 29.10.2012, i.e. for 1 year  

3 months and no explanation was offered for this delay.

147) On  29.10.2012,  the  President  returned  the  

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petitioner’s mercy petition to Respondent No. 1 ostensibly  

on the ground of an appeal made by 14 former Judges.  

However,  this  appeal,  as  is  admitted  in  the  counter  

affidavit  filed  by  Respondent  No.  1  itself,  “had  not  

indicated  any  plea  in  respect  of  Praveen  Kumar”.   On  

16.01.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  

reject the petitioner’s mercy petition.   

148) On  26.03.2013,  the  President  rejected  the  

petitioner’s mercy petition.  On 05.04.2013, the petitioner  

heard  news  reports  that  his  mercy  petition  has  been  

rejected by the President of India.  He has not received  

any written confirmation of the same till date.   

149) On 06.04.2013,  this  Court  stayed the  execution  of  

the sentence in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 56 of 2013 filed by  

PUDR.  The following details show the delay in disposal of  

petitioner’s  mercy  petition  by  the  Governor  and  the  

President:

Custody  suffered  till  date

2.3.94- 19.2.95+1.2.99- 17.12.13

15 years 9 months

Custody  suffered  under  sentence  of  death

04.02.02-17.12.13 11 years 10 months

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Total  delay  since  filing  of  mercy  petition  till  prisoner  coming  to  know  of  rejection  by  President

25.10.2003-5.4.2013 9 years 5 months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition  by  Governor

25.10.03-30.09.04 11 months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition  by  President

30.09.04-26.03.2013 8 ½ years

150) Though learned counsel for the petitioner highlighted  

that the trial Court relied on certain decisions which were  

later held to be per incuriam, in view of the fact that there  

is a delay of 9½ years in disposal of the mercy petition,  

there  is  no  need  to  go  into  the  aspect  relating  to  the  

merits of the judicial decision.  On the other hand, we are  

satisfied  that  even  though  the  Union  of  India  has  filed  

counter  affidavit,  there  is  no  explanation  for  the  huge  

delay.  Accordingly, we hold that the delay in disposal of  

the mercy petition is one of the relevant circumstances for  

commutation of death sentence.  Further, we perused the  

notes prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as  

the  decision  taken  by  the  President.  The  summary  

prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President  

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makes no mention of the unexplained and undue delay of  

9  ½  years  in  considering  the  mercy  petition.   The  

petitioner has rightly made out a case for commutation of  

death sentence into life imprisonment.  

Writ Petition (Crl.)No. 193 of 2013

151) Gurmeet  Singh,  aged about  56 years,  hailing from  

U.P.  has  filed  this  petition.   According  to  him,  he  is  in  

custody for 26 years.   

152) The  allegation  against  the  petitioner  is  that  he  

murdered 13 members of his family on 17.08.1986.  By  

order  dated  20.07.1992,  the  trial  Court  convicted  the  

petitioner under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34  

IPC and awarded death sentence.    

153) On 28.04.1994, the Division Bench of the Allahabad  

High Court  pronounced the judgment in  the petitioner’s  

Criminal  Appeal  No.  1333  of  1992.   The  two  Hon’ble  

Judges disagreed with each other on the question of guilt,  

Malviya,  J.  upheld  the  petitioner’s  conviction  and  death  

sentence  and  dismissed  his  appeal,  while  Prasad,  J.  

acquitted the petitioner herein and allowed his appeal.   

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154) On 29.02.1996, in terms of Section 392 of the Code,  

the papers were placed before a third Judge (Singh,  J.),  

who agreed with Malviya,  J.  and upheld the petitioner’s  

conviction and sentence.

155) On  08.03.1996,  the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the  

appeal of the petitioner herein and confirmed his death  

sentence.

156) On 28.09.2005, this Court dismissed the petitioner’s  

appeal  and  upheld  the  death  sentence  passed  on  him.  

The petitioner was represented on legal aid.

157) On 06.10.2005,  the petitioner  sent  separate mercy  

petitions through jail addressed to the President of India  

and the Governor of Uttar Pradesh.

158) On  24.12.2005,  the  Prison  Superintendent  sent  a  

radiogram  to  Respondent  No.  2  reminding  about  the  

pendency  of  the  mercy  petition.  Thereafter,  10  

radiograms/letters  were  sent  till  16.05.2006.   These  11  

reminders are itself testimony of the unreasonable delay  

by  the  State  Government  in  deciding  the  petitioner’s  

mercy petition.

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159) On  04.04.2006,  the  Governor  rejected  the  

petitioner’s mercy petition.   

160)   On  26.05.2006,  the  fact  of  the  rejection  by  the  

Governor was communicated to Respondent No. 1 and to  

the  Prison  authorities  after  a  delay  of  more  than  1½  

months.

161) On  16.06.2006,  the  President  forwarded  to  

Respondent  No.  1  letter  dated  02.06.2006  of  the  

Additional  District  &  Sessions  Judge,  Shahjahanpur,  

addressed to Respondent No. 2 requesting to intimate the  

status of  the petitioner’s  mercy petition pending before  

the President.   

162) On  07.07.2006,  Respondent  No.  1  forwarded  the  

letter  of  the  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge  to  

Respondent  No.  2  with  a  request  to  forward  the  

petitioner’s  mercy  petition  as  the  same  has  not  been  

received  along  with  the  judgment  of  the  courts,  police  

diary etc.   

163) On  09.02.2007,  Respondent  No.  2  sent  the  mercy  

petition and other related documents to Respondent No.  

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1, i.e., 10 months after the mercy petition was rejected by  

the Governor.  The Mercy Petition Rules, which we have  

already extracted in the earlier part, explicitly provide that  

the mercy petition and the related documents should be  

sent immediately.  There is no explanation for the delay of  

10 months in sending the papers to Respondent No. 1.

164) On  18.05.2007,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the petitioner’s mercy petition.   

165) On  04.11.2009,  the  petitioner’s  mercy  petition  file  

was received from the President’s  office by Respondent  

No. 1.

166) Again on 09.12.2009, Respondent No. 1 advised the  

President to reject the petitioner’s mercy petition.  There  

was no progress in  the petitioner’s  case for  the next  2  

years and 11 months, i.e., till 29.10.2012.   

167) On  29.10.2012,  the  President  returned  the  

petitioner’s mercy petition to Respondent No. 1, ostensibly  

on the pretext of an appeal made by 14 former judges,  

even though, as is admitted in the counter affidavit filed  

by Respondent  No.  1,  this  appeal  does not  in  any way  

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relate to the case of the petitioner.

168) On  16.01.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the petitioner’s mercy petition.

169) On 01.03.2013,  the  President  of  India  rejected  the  

petitioner’s mercy petition.

170) On 05.04.2013, the petitioner heard the news reports  

that his mercy petition has been rejected by the President  

of India.  However, till date the petitioner has not received  

any official written communication that his mercy petition  

has  been  rejected  either  by  the  Governor  or  by  the  

President.

171) On 06.04.2013,  this  Court  stayed the  execution  of  

the death sentence of the petitioner in W.P. (Crl.) No. 56 of  

2013  filed  by  the  Peoples’  Union  for  Democratic  Rights  

(PUDR).

172) On 20.06.2013, 3 ½ months after the actual rejection  

of  the  petitioner’s  mercy  petition,  the  news  was  

communicated to the prison authorities.  The following are  

the  details  regarding  the  delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  

petition by the Governor and the President:

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Custody  suffered  till  date

16.10.1986- 17.12.2013  less  1  year  of  under-trial  bail

26 years 2 months

Custody  suffered  under  sentence  of  death

20.07.1992- 17.12.2013

21 years 5 months

Total  delay  since  filing  of  mercy  petition  till  prisoner  coming  to  know  of  rejection by President

6.10.2005- 20.06.2013

7 years 8 months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition  by  Governor

6.10.2005-4.4.2006 6 months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition  by  President

4.4.2006-1.3.2013 6 years 11 months

Delay  in  communicating  rejection to petitioner

1.3.2013-20.06.2013 3 ½ years

The above details clearly show that there is a delay of 7  

years  8  months  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition  by  the  

Governor and the President.   

173) Though  Respondent  No.  1  has  filed  a  separate  

counter  affidavit,  there  is  no  acceptable  reason for  the  

delay of 7 years 8 months.  In the absence of adequate  

materials for such a huge delay, we hold that the delay is  

undue and unexplained.   

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174) In the file of the Home Ministry placed before us, at  

pages 31 & 32, the following recommendations have been  

made  for  commutation  of  death  sentence  to  life  

imprisonment which are as under:

“I think that in this case too, we can recommend  commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment for  two reasons:

1) There  was  a  disagreement  amongst  the  Hon.  Judges  of  the  High  Court  implying  thereby that  there  was some doubt in the mind of at least one Hon. Judge  that this might not be the ‘rarest of the rare cases’.

2) Unusual  long  delay  in  investigation  and  trial  is  another reason.  This kind of submission was also made  by the learned amicus curiae but was disregarded by  the  Court.   I  think  the  submission  should  have  been  accepted.

Accordingly,  I  suggest  that  we may recommend  that  the  death  sentence  of  Sh.  Gurmeet  Singh  be  commuted to that of life imprisonment but he would not  be allowed to come out of prison till he lives.

        Sd/-“

However, this was not agreed to by the Home Minister.

175) In view of the reasons and discussion in the earlier  

part  of  our  order,  the  petitioner-convict  is  entitled  to  

commutation  of  death  sentence  into  life  imprisonment.  

Even in the summary prepared by the Ministry of Home  

Affairs for the President makes no mention of the delay of  

7 years 8 months.  We are satisfied that the petitioner has  

made out a case for commutation of death sentence into  

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life imprisonment.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 188 of 2013

176) Sonia  and  Sanjeev  Kumar,  aged  about  30  and  38  

years respectively,  hailing from Haryana, have filed this  

petition.  According to them, they are in custody for about  

12 years.   

177) On 27.05.2004, both of them were convicted for the  

offence punishable under Section 302 and sentenced to  

death by the trial Court. By order dated 12.04.2005, the  

High Court confirmed their conviction but modified their  

sentence of death into life imprisonment. The order of the  

High Court was challenged before this Court in Criminal  

Appeal No. 142 of 2005 and Criminal Appeal No. 894 of  

2005  and  Criminal  Appeal  No.  895  of  2006.   By  order  

dated 15.02.2007, this Court upheld their conviction and  

enhanced the imprisonment for life to death sentence.

178) In  February,  2007,  the  petitioners  filed  a  mercy  

petition before the Governor of Haryana.  Similar mercy  

petitions were sent to the President.

179) On 23.08.2007, the Review Petitions being Nos. 260-

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262 of 2007 filed by the petitioners were dismissed.

180) On  31.10.2007,  Respondent  No.  2  informed  

Respondent No.  1  that  the mercy petitions filed by the  

petitioners  have  been  rejected  by  the  Governor  of  

Haryana and forwarded the relevant documents.

181) On  08.02.2008,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the petitioner’s mercy petitions.  The  

mercy petitions remained pending with the President till  

16.04.2009.   

182) On 16.04.2009, the President sent the petitioners’ file  

along with the first petitioner’s letter dated 17.02.2009 to  

reject  their  petitions conveying their  difficult  position to  

continue with their life to Respondent No. 1.   

183) On  20.05.2009,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President  for  the  second  time  to  reject  the  petitioners’  

mercy petitions.

184) On  04.02.2010,  the  President  returned  the  

petitioners’ file to Respondent No. 1 seeking clarification  

whether the first petitioner’s request to reject the mercy  

petition amounts to withdrawal of original mercy petition  

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and if so, is there further need to reject the petition? On  

17.02.2010,  Respondent  No.  1  referred  the  President’s  

query to the Law Department. On 05.03.2010, Respondent  

No. 1 advised the President for the 3rd time to reject the  

petitioners’  mercy  petitions.  On  03.01.2012,  upon  the  

request of Respondent No. 1, the President returned the  

petitioners’  file  to  Respondent  No.  1.  On  18.01.2012,  

Respondent No. 1 advised the President for the 4th time to  

reject the petitioners’ mercy petitions.

185) On  29.10.2012,  the  President  returned  the  

petitioners’ file back to Respondent No. 1 in the light of  

the appeal made by 14 former judges.  It is pointed out by  

learned counsel that admittedly the appeal was made for  

other prisoners and not for the petitioners and so there  

was no need to return the files.   

186) On 29.01.2013, since it was found that the judges’  

appeal did not pertain to the petitioners, Respondent No. 1  

advised  the  President  for  the  5th time  to  reject  the  

petitioners’  mercy  petitions.  On  21.02.2013,  the  

petitioners, anxious for a decision on their mercy petitions,  

wrote  to  the  President  again  reiterating  their  plea  for  

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mercy.

187) On  28.03.2013,  the  President  returned  the  

petitioners’  file  to  Respondent  No.  1,  supposedly  on  

account  of  the  petitioners’  letter  dated  21.02.2013.  On  

06.06.2013, Respondent No. 1 advised the President for  

the 6th time to reject the petitioners’ mercy petitions “as  

no  mitigating  circumstance  was  found”.  Finally,  on  

29.06.2013, the  President rejected the petitioners’ mercy  

petitions.

188) On  13.07.2013,  the  petitioners’  family  members  

received  a  letter  dated  11.07.2013  from  the  prison  

authorities informing that the petitioners’ mercy petitions  

have  been  rejected  by  the  President  of  India.   The  

following are the details regarding the delay in disposal of  

the mercy petition by the Governor and the President:

Custody suffered till  date

26.08.2001/19.09.2001- 17.12.2013

12 years 3 months

Total  delay  since  filing  of  mercy  petition  till  prisoner  coming  to  know  of  rejection  by  President

Feb.2007-13.07.2013 6 years 5 months

Delay in disposal of  mercy  petition  by  

Feb. 2007-31.10.2007 8 months  

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Governor

Delay in disposal of  mercy  petition  by  President

31.10.2007-29.06.2013 5 years 8 months

189) In  view  of  the  above  details  as  well  as  the  

explanation  offered  in  the  counter  affidavit  filed  by  

Respondent No. 1, we hold that the delay in disposal of  

mercy petitions is undue and unexplained and in the light  

of  our  conclusion  in  the  earlier  part  of  our  order,  the  

unexplained and undue delay is one of the circumstances  

for commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment.

190) In  addition,  due  to  unbearable  mental  agony  after  

confirmation of death sentence, petitioner No.1 attempted  

suicide.   In  view  of  our  conclusion  that  the  delay  in  

disposal of mercy petitions is undue and unexplained, we  

hold  that  the  petitioners  have  made  out  a  case  for  

commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment.   

Writ Petition(Crl.)No. 192 of 2013

191) PUDR has filed this petition for Sundar Singh, who is  

hailing  from Uttarkhand.   On 30.06.2004,  Sundar  Singh  

was convicted by the Sessions Court under Sections 302,  

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307 and 436 IPC and sentenced to death. On 20.07.2005,  

the High Court confirmed the death sentence passed by  

the trial  Court.  On 16.09.2010, this Court dismissed the  

appeal filed by Sundar Singh through legal aid.   

192) On 29.09.2010, Sundar Singh sent a mercy petition  

through jail authorities addressed to the President of India  

stating therein that he had committed the offence due to  

insanity and that he repented for the same each day and  

shall continue to do for the rest of his life.   

193) On  29.09.2010,  the  prison  authorities  filled  in  a  

nominal  roll  for  Sundar Singh in  which they stated that  

Sundar Singh’s  mental  condition is  abnormal.   The said  

form was sent to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.  The prison  

authorities  noticed  that  Sundar  Singh’s  behaviour  had  

become extremely abnormal.  He was initially treated for  

mental illness by the prison doctor and, thereafter, he was  

examined  by  doctors  from  the  HMM  District  Hospital,  

Haridwar.   Thereafter, when he continued to show signs  

of  insanity,  the  prison  authorities  called  a  team  of  

psychiatrists from the State Mental Institute, Dehradun to  

examine him.  The psychiatrists found him to be suffering  

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from schizophrenia and recommended that he be sent to  

Benaras Mental  Hospital.   On 15.10.2010,  Sundar Singh  

was admitted to Benaras Mental Hospital and he remained  

there for 1 ½ years till his discharge on 28.07.2012 with  

further prescriptions and advice for follow up treatment.   

194)   On  19.10.2010,  Respondent  No.  1  informed  

Respondent  No.  2  in  writing that  Sundar  Singh’s  mercy  

petition should be first sent to the Governor.

195) Based  on  the  direction  of  Respondent  No.  1,  on  

20.10.2010,  the  prison  authorities  forwarded  the  mercy  

petition of Sundar Singh to the Governor. On 21.01.2011,  

the Governor rejected the mercy petition of Sundar Singh  

and  Respondent  No.  2  forwarded  the  same  to  the  

President.

196) On  24.05.2011,  Respondent  No.  1  wrote  to  

Respondent  No.  2  asking  for  a  copy  of  Sundar  Singh’s  

nominal  roll,  medical  record  and  crime  record.   On  

01.06.2011,  Respondent  No.  2  sent  Sundar  Singh’s  

nominal roll and medical report to Respondent No. 1.  In  

the  covering  letter,  Respondent  No.  2  informed  

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Respondent No. 1 that Sundar Singh had been declared to  

be a mental patient by medical experts and was admitted  

to Varanasi Mental Hospital for treatment on 11.12.2010.   

197) On  03.02.2012,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President  to  reject  the  mercy  petition  filed  by  Sundar  

Singh. On 30.10.2012, the President returned the mercy  

petition of Sundar Singh ostensibly because of the petition  

sent  by 14 former  judges wherein  there  was a  specific  

reference to the case of Sundar Singh.

198) On  28.12.2012,  Sundar  Singh  was  examined  by  a  

doctor  in  prison  who  noted  that  he  was  “suicidally  

inclined”  and prescribed him very strong anti  psychotic  

medicines. Despite that, on 01.02.2013, Respondent No. 1  

advised  the  President  to  reject  the  mercy  petition  of  

Sundar Singh.

199) On 16.02.2013, the prison authorities again called a  

team of three psychiatrists from the State Mental Hospital,  

Dehradun, who examined Sundar Singh.  In their report,  

they  mentioned  that  Sundar  Singh  had  already  been  

diagnosed  as  suffering  from  undifferentiated  

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schizophrenia.   They  noted  that  he  was  “unkempt  and  

untidy,  cooperative  but  not  very  much  communicative”  

and his “speech is decreased in flow and content” and “at  

times is inappropriate and illogical to the question asked.”  

They concluded as follows:

“he is suffering from chronic psychotic illness and he needs  long term management”.   

The prison authorities sent this report to Respondent No.  

1.

200) On  31.03.2013,  the  President  rejected  the  mercy  

petition of Sundar Singh. On 02.04.2013, Respondent No.  

1  informed  Respondent  No.  2  that  the  President  has  

rejected  the  mercy  petition  of  Sundar  Singh.   On  

05.04.2013,  Sundar  Singh  was  orally  informed  by  the  

prison  authorities  that  his  mercy  petition  had  been  

rejected  by  the  President  but  he  did  not  appear  to  

understand and did not react.

201) On 06.04.2013,  this  Court  stayed the  execution  of  

death  sentence of  Sundar  Singh in  W.P.(Crl.)  No.  56  of  

2013 filed by PUDR.

202) On  31.10.2013,  at  the  instance  of  the  prison  

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authorities,  Dr.  Arun Kumar, Neuro Psychiatrist from the  

State Mental Institute, Dehradun was brought to the prison  

to examine Sundar Singh.  He opined as follows:

“Sundar  Singh  is  suffering  from  schizophrenia  (undifferentiated) and requires long term bed rest.  He is not  mentally fit to be awarded for death penalty.”

203) We have carefully perused all  the details.   Though  

there is a delay of only 2 ½ years in considering the mercy  

petition of Sundar Singh, the counter affidavit as well as  

various communications sent by the jail authorities clearly  

show that Sundar Singh was suffering from mental illness,  

i.e., Schizophrenia.

204) In  the  earlier  part  of  our  order,  while  considering  

“mental illness”, we have noted Rules 386 and 387 of the  

U.P.  Jail  Manual  which  are  applicable  to  the  State  of  

Uttarakhand  also,  which  clearly  show  that  when  

condemned convict develops insanity, it is incumbent on  

the part  of the Superintendent to stay the execution of  

sentence  of  death  and  inform the  same to  the  District  

Magistrate.   In  the  reply  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  

Respondent  Nos.  2-4  insofar  as  mental  illness  of  the  

convict – Sundar Singh is concerned, it is stated as under:

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“16. As  far  as  illness  of  the  convict  Sunder  Singh  is  concerned,  he has been regularly medically examined  as  per  the  provisions  of  the  jail  manual,  he  was  examined by Medical Officers of HMM District Hospital,  Haridwar and thereafter on the recommendation of the  Doctors of State Mental Health Institute, Dehradun, the  Prisoner  was  sent  to  Mental  Hospital,  Varanasi  on  15.10.2010 for examination and treatment.

17. Convict Sunder Singh was admitted in the Mental  Hospital, Varansai for treatment and after his treatment,  Board of Visitors under Chairpersonship of District Judge,  Varansai,  convict  Sunder  Singh  was  found  fit  and,  therefore,  they  discharged  the  convict  Sunder  Singh  along with certain prescription and advice on 28.7.2012  from Mental Hospital, Varanasi…

18. In  pursuance of  above advice  of  the  Doctors  of  Mental  Hospital,  Varansai,  on  the  request  of  the  Jail  Administration  to  State  Mental  Hospital,  Selaqui,  Dehradun, a panel of three Doctors visited on 16.2.2013  and examined the Convict Sunder Singh and opined that  on the basis of information and present assessment, he  is suffering from chronic psychiatric illness and he need  long term treatment…

19. Convict  has  thereafter  been  regularly  provided  due  medical  assistance  in  the  form  of  medicine  and  examination.   On  31.10.2013,  Dr.  Arun  Kumar,  neuro  psychiatric from State Mental Health Institute, Selaqui,  Dehradun visited to the District Jail  for examination of  the  Convict  Sunder  Singh  and  opined:  Impression:  Sunder  Singh  is  suffering  from  Schizophrenia  (undifferentiated) and require long term bed rest.  He is  not mentally fit to be awarded for death penalty…

20. On  5.11.2013,  on  the  aforesaid  report  dated  31.10.2013, Chief Medical Superintendent, State Medical  Health Institute Selaqui Dehradun, has been requested  to send a panel of Doctors for thorough examination of  the  mental  state  of  the  said  Prisoner  Sunder  Singh.  Upon medical  examination by a board of  Doctors  and  receipt  of  the  examination  report  the  State  and  Jail  Authorities shall act in accordance with law.

In  view  of  the  above  submission,  this  Hon’ble  Court may kindly pass appropriate orders disposing of  the present petition.  The answering respondent is duty  bound  to  comply  the  orders  passed  by  the  Hon’ble  Court.”

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Along with the reply affidavit, the State has fairly enclosed  

the  medical  reports,  various  correspondence/intimation  

about the Schizophrenia of lunatic nature/mental illness of  

the petitioner suffering from Schizophrenia.  Further, even  

on 24.05.2011, the Government of India, Ministry of Home  

Affairs, after receipt of mercy petition of the condemned  

prisoner – Sundar Singh requested the Principal Secretary,  

Government  of  Uttarakhand,  Secretariat,  Dehradun  to  

furnish  the  following  documents/information  at  the  

earliest:

(i) Present age of the prisoner along with nominal roll.

(ii) Medical report of the prisoner

(iii) Previous crime record, if any, of the prisoner.

205) Pursuant  to  the  same,  Shri  Rajeev  Gupta,  

Principal Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand furnished  

all the details to the Joint Secretary (Judicial), Ministry of  

Home Affairs, Government of India, Jaisalmer House, New  

Delhi enclosing various medical reports.  Learned counsel  

for  the  State  has  also  placed  mental  status  of  Sundar  

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Singh duly certified by the State Mental Health Institute,  

Dehradun which is as under:

“MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION REPORT

Prisoner  Name:  Mr.  Sunder  Singh,  age  about  40  yrs/male, S/o Mr. Har Singh with mark of identification –  Black mole over left side lower part of neck, has been  assessed by following experts on 16/2/2013 at District  Jail, Haridwar.

Dr. J.S. Bisht, Psychiatrist

Dr. Arun Kumar, Psychiatrist

Dr. Pratibha Sharma, Psychiatrist

As per information by jail staff and fellow prisoners  above mentioned prisoner is not interacting with others,  not concerned about personal hygiene and would like to  stay alone.

Previous  record  show  that  he  was  referred  to  Banaras Mental Hospital on 11/12/2010 for Management  after being diagnosed as Undifferentiated Schizophrenia  by previous psychiatrist.

Current mental status examination shows that he  is unkempt and untidy, cooperative but not very much  communicative.   Speech  is  decreased  in  flow  and  content.  At time it was inappropriate and illogical to the  question  asked.   Affect  is  blunted.   Thought  flow  is  decreased and there is poor awareness…

OPINION

On  the  basis  of  information  and  present  assessments  he  is  suffering  from  chronic  Psychotic  illness and he needs long term treatment.

(Signature of Dr. illegible) (Signature of Dr. illegible)

(Signature of Dr. illegible)

Date 16/2/2013 Dr. J.S. Bisht Dr. Arun Kumar Dr.  B.  Pratibha  Sharma Psychiatrist

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Thumb Date  16/2/13  Distt.  Jail  Haridwar”

MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION REPORT

Prisoner  Name:  Mr.  Sunder  Singh,  age  about  41  years/male, S/o Mr. Har Singh

Identification Mark: Black mole over left side lower part  of neck.

Index  prisoner  is  examined  by  me  at  District  Jail,  Haridwar.

As  per  information  by  jail  staff,  prisoner  records  and  current mental status examination, the sufferings from  undifferentiated Schizophrenia which is chronic illness.  The  patient/prisoner  require  long  term  treatment  to  remain  in  remission  period.   Person  with  mentioned  diagnose  remain  in  remission  and  cannot  be  said  as  cured.

Impression:  Sunder  Singh  is  suffering  from  Schizophrenia (Undifferentiated) and required long term  treatment.

He is not mentally fit to be awarded for death penalty.

(Signature of Dr. Arun Kumar) Date 31/10/13

Dr. Arun Kumar (MBBS, DPM, DNB) Neuropsychiatries

State Mental Health Institute Salequi Dehradun

Thumb Attested LTI of Sunder Singh

(Signature of Dr. Arun Kumar) Date 31/10/13 Dr. Arun Kumar (MBBS, DPM, DNB) Neuropsychiatries State Mental Health Institute Salequi Dehradun”

206) Even  if  we  agree  that  there  is  no  undue  delay  in  

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disposal  of  the mercy petition by the President,  we are  

satisfied  that  Sundar  Singh  is  suffering  from  mental  

illness, i.e., Schizophrenia as noted by 3 doctors, viz., Dr.  

J.S.  Bisht,  Dr.  Arun  Kumar,  and  Dr.  Pratibha  Sharma,  

Psychiatrists attached to the State Mental Health Institute,  

Salequi, Dehradun.   

207) In  the  earlier  part  of  our  discussion,  we have  

highlighted various Rules from the U.P. Jail Manual which  

are applicable to the State of Uttarakhand also,  various  

international conventions to which India is a party and the  

decisions by the U.N.O. regarding award of death sentence  

and execution  of  persons  suffering  from mental  illness.  

Though  all  the  details  were  furnished  by  the  persons  

concerned to Respondent No. 1, Ministry of Home Affairs,  

unfortunately, those aspects were neither adverted to by  

the  Home  Minister  nor  the  summary  prepared  by  the  

Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  for  the  President  makes  any  

reference  to  the  mental  condition  as  certified  by  the  

competent doctors.   

208) We  are  satisfied  that  in  view  of  the  mental  

illness, he cannot be executed.  On this ground, the death  

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sentence has to be commuted to life imprisonment.  If the  

condition of  Sundar  Sigh requires  further  treatment,  we  

direct  the  jail  authorities  to  provide  all  such  medical  

facilities to him.

Writ Petition (Crl.)No. 190 of 2013

209) The  death  convict  Jafar  Ali,  aged  about  48  years,  

hailing  from  U.P.,  has  filed  the  above  writ  petition.  

According to him, he is in custody for more than 11 years  

(single cell confinement).

210) On 14.07.2003,  the petitioner  was convicted under  

Section  302  IPC  for  the  murder  of  his  wife  and  five  

daughters and was sentenced to death.  On 27.01.2004,  

the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court confirmed  

the  death  sentence  passed  on  the  petitioner.   On  

05.04.2004, the petitioner through legal aid filed SLP (Crl.)  

No. 1129 of 2004.  This Court did not grant special leave  

and dismissed the SLP in limine.   

211) On 19.04.2004, the petitioner sent a mercy petition  

through jail superintendent to the President of India and  

the  Governor  of  Uttar  Pradesh.  On  22.04.2004,  

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Respondent No. 4 sent a radiogram to Respondent No. 2  

to  enquire  about  the  status  of  the  petitioner’s  mercy  

petition.  Thereafter, between 24.04.2004 and 16.05.2005,  

14 more such radiograms/letters were sent by Respondent  

No. 4 to Respondent No. 2 enquiring about the status of  

the  petitioner’s  mercy  petition.   These  15  reminders  

testify  to  the  unreasonable  delay  caused  by  the  State  

Government in deciding the petitioner’s mercy petition.   

212) On  20.05.2005,  one  year  after  the  receipt  of  the  

mercy  petition,  Respondent  No.  2  wrote  to  the  District  

Magistrate and the Government Advocate, Allahabad High  

Court  for  the  trial  court  as  well  as  the  High  Court  

judgments relating to the petitioner’s case.  Here again,  

there is no explanation for the delay of 11 months.

213) On 30.09.2005, the Government Advocate, Allahabad  

High  Court  sent  the  High  Court  judgment  in  the  

petitioner’s case to Respondent No. 2.  Here again, there  

is no explanation for the delay of four months in sending  

the judgment.

214) On  28.11.2005,  the  Governor  rejected  petitioner’s  

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mercy  petition.   It  took  one year  and seven months  in  

rejecting  the  petitioner’s  mercy  petition  in  spite  of  15  

reminders.   On  30.12.2005,  the  Special  Secretary,  UP  

Government informed the Home Ministry, Government of  

India  about  the  rejection  of  mercy  petition  by  the  

Governor.

215) On 22.12.2005, information about the rejection of the  

mercy petition by the Governor was communicated to the  

prison  authorities  one  month  after  its  rejection.  On  

18.01.2006, Respondent No. 1 requested Respondent No.  

2 to furnish the petitioner’s mercy petition along with the  

recommendation of the Governor, judgments of the courts  

and other records of the case.

216) On  17.07.2006,  Respondent  No.  2  sent  the  

documents  to  Respondent  No.  1  which  were  requested  

vide letter dated 18.01.2006 along with a request for an  

early  intimation  of  the  decision  on  the  mercy  petition.  

Here again, there is no explanation for the delay of seven  

months in sending those documents.

217) As pointed out earlier, Rule V of the Mercy Petition  

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Rules explicitly provides that the mercy petition should be  

sent  along  with  the  judgments  and  related  documents  

immediately.  There is no explanation for this inordinate  

delay  of  seven  months  in  sending  the  papers  to  

Respondent No. 1.

218) On  17.08.2006,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President  to  reject  the  mercy  petition.   On 16.01.2007,  

Respondent No. 2 sent another reminder to Respondent  

No.  1 regarding the pendency of  the petitioner’s  mercy  

petition.  Thereafter,  further 15 reminders were sent on  

various dates i.e., on 06.09.2007, 10.07.2008, 19.02.2009,  

17.03.2009,  29.05.2009,  27.07.2009,  10.09.2009,  

29.09.2009,  10.11.2009,  14.01.2010,  20.04.2010,  

26.07.2010,  30.08.2010,  15.07.2011  and  22.11.2011.  

These 16 reminders testify the unreasonable delay caused  

in deciding the petitioner’s mercy petition.

219) On 30.09.2011, Respondent No. 1 recalled the files  

from  the  President.   There  is  no  explanation  for  this  

inordinate delay of 5 years and 1 month.  On 01.11.2011,  

Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  reject  the  

mercy petition.   

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220) On  30.10.2012,  the  President  returned  the  mercy  

petition to Respondent No. 1 ostensibly on the ground of a  

petition sent by 14 retired judges to the President.  There  

was  no  reference  of  the  plea  of  Jafar  Ali  in  the  

representation  made  by  14  retired  judges.   On  

24.01.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  President  to  

reject  the mercy petition.  On 14.03.2013,  the President  

rejected the mercy petition,  viz.,  7 years and 4 months  

after  rejection  by  the  Governor  and after  16  reminders  

sent by the State Government.

221) On  19.03.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  informed  

Respondent No. 2 of the rejection of the mercy petition.  

On 05.04.2013, the petitioner heard the news reports that  

his mercy petition has been rejected by the President of  

India.

222) On 06.04.2013,  this  Court  stayed the  execution  of  

the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 56 of 2013 filed by  

PUDR.

223) On 22.06.2013, the prison authorities were informed  

vide letter dated 18.06.2013 that the President rejected  

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the petitioner’s mercy petition.  There is no explanation  

for  this  delay  of  three  months  in  informing  the  prison  

authorities and the petitioner about the rejection of the  

mercy petition.

224) On  08.07.2013,  Respondent  No.  4  informed  the  

petitioner that his mercy petition had been rejected by the  

President.  

225) The  details  regarding  delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  

petitions by the Governor and the President are as follows:

Custody suffered till date 27.07.2002  –  17.12.2013

11  years,  5  months

Custody  suffered  under  sentence of death

14.07.2003  –  17.12.2013

10  years,  5  months

Total delay in disposal of mercy  petition  

19.04.2004  –  22.06.2013

9  years,  2  months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition by Governor

19.04.2004  –  29.09.2005

1  year,  5  months

Delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  petition by the President

29.09.2005  –  14.03.2013

7  years,  5  months

Delay in intimating prisoner of  rejection  of  mercy  petition  by  President

14.03.2013  –  22.06.2013

3 months

226) A perusal of the details furnished by the petitioner,  

counter affidavit filed by the Union of India as well as the  

State clearly shows that the delay was to the extent of 9  

years.  Though in the counter affidavit Respondent No. 1  

has discussed various aspects including the decision taken  

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by the Home Ministry and the note which was prepared for  

the approval of the President, the fact remains that there  

is  no explanation at all  for  taking seven years and five  

months for disposal of a mercy petition by the President.  

It is for the executive, viz., the Home Ministry, to explain  

the reason for keeping the mercy petition for such a long  

time.  To that extent, everyday, after the confirmation of  

death  sentence  by  this  Court  is  painful  for  the  convict  

awaiting the date of execution.

227) Accordingly,  in view of the unexplained and undue  

delay of nine years in disposal of mercy petition by the  

Governor and the President, we hold that the petitioner is  

entitled to commutation of death sentence to life.

228) Apart from undue and unexplained delay in disposal  

of mercy petition, another relevant aspect has not been  

noted by the Ministry while preparing the notes for  the  

President, viz., when the petitioner preferred special leave  

to  appeal  against  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  

confirming the death sentence,  this Court did not grant  

special  leave and dismissed the SLP  in  limine.   Though  

such recourse is permissible inasmuch as since it is a case  

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of death sentence, it is desirable to examine the materials  

on record first hand in view of time-honoured practice of  

this Court and to arrive at an independent conclusion on  

all issues of facts and law, unbound by the findings of the  

trial  court  and the High Court.   This principle has been  

highlighted in various decisions including the recent one in  

Mohd. Ajmal Kasab vs. State of Maharashtra (2012) 9  

SCC 1.

229) In addition, we also perused the notes prepared by  

the Ministry of  Home Affairs,  the decision taken by the  

Home Ministry and the notes placed for the approval of  

the  President.   It  is  not  in  dispute  that  the  summary  

prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the President  

failed  to  consider  the  undue  delay  and  there  is  no  

explanation for the same at all.

230) We are satisfied that all  these grounds enable this  

court to commute death sentence into life.

Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 191 and 136 of 2013

231) Writ  Petition  (Crl.)  No.  191 of  2013  has  been  

filed  by  Maganlal  Barela,  death  convict,  aged about  40  

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years,  hailing from the State of M.P.  and on his behalf,  

PUDR  has  filed  Writ  Petition  (Crl.)  No.  136  of  2013  for  

similar relief.

232) The petitioner claims that he is in custody for more  

than three years (single cell confinement). On 03.02.2011,  

the  petitioner,  who  is  a  tribal,  was  convicted  by  the  

Sessions Court under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his  

five  daughters  and  under  Section  309  IPC  and  was  

imposed a sentence of death.  On 12.09.2011, the Division  

Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court confirmed the  

death  sentence  passed  on  the  petitioner  who  was  

represented on legal aid.  On 09.01.2012, the petitioner,  

through legal aid,  filed SLP (Crl.)  Nos. 329-330 of 2012.  

This Court did not grant special leave and dismissed the  

SLP in limine.

233) On 02.02.2012, the petitioner sent a mercy petition  

through jail  addressed to the President of India and the  

Governor of Madhya Pradesh.  The mercy petition, which  

was verified by the prison authorities, stated inter alia that  

the petitioner was suffering from mental illness and was  

continuously  undergoing  treatment  through  Central  Jail,  

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Bhopal.

234) On  20.02.2012,  the  Prison  Superintendent,  in  

accordance with Rule 377 of the Madhya Pradesh Prison  

Manual,  submitted a form to the State Government.   In  

column 18, it was stated that his conduct in prison was  

good.   Against  column  19,  which  was  for  the  Prison  

Superintendent to opine on alteration of the petitioner’s  

sentence, the Superintendent opined as follows:              

“Commutation of sentence is recommended”.

235) On  20.02.2012,  the  Prison  Superintendent,  in  

accordance  with  the  Government  Law  and  Judiciary  

Department  Circular  No.  4837/21  dated  13.12.1982  

submitted  to  the  State  Government  a  form  entitled  

“Required  Information”.   The  entries  made  by  the  

Superintendent in the said form stated inter alia that the  

petitioner  is  not  a  habitual  criminal,  he  belongs  to  the  

weaker section of the society and he is of mental disorder  

and at present under treatment of Psychiatry Department  

Hamidia Hospital, Bhopal.  Against Column No. 11 which  

seeks  the  Superintendent’s  recommendations,  it  was  

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stated that, “Commutation of Sentence is recommended”.

236) On  07.08.2012,  Respondent  No.  1  received  the  

petitioner’s mercy petition forwarded by Respondent No.  

2.   There  was  a  delay of  six  months in  forwarding  the  

mercy petition to Respondent No.  1 and no explanation  

was given by Respondent No. 2 in the counter affidavit.

237) On  31.08.2012,  Respondent  No.  1  wrote  to  

Respondent  No.  2  requesting  the  petitioner’s  medical  

report since in the mercy petition, it was stated that the  

petitioner is suffering from mental illness.  Respondent No.  

1 also requested Respondent No. 2 to confirm whether the  

petitioner had filed a review petition in this Court against  

the dismissal of his SLP.   

238) On 19.10.2012, Respondent No. 1 sent a reminder to  

Respondent  No.  2  about  the  queries  vide  letter  dated  

31.08.2012.  On 29.11.2012, Respondent No. 1 sent the  

second reminder to Respondent No. 2 about the queries.  

On 26.02.2013, Respondent No. 1 sent a third reminder to  

Respondent No. 2 about the same.

239) On 25.03.2013, the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail,  

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Indore forwarded the medical report to Respondent No. 1  

and it was also informed that the petitioner has not filed a  

review petition in this Court against the dismissal of his  

SLP.   

240) On  06.06.2013,  the  Home  Minister  advised  the  

President to reject the mercy petition.  On 16.07.2013, the  

President rejected the petitioner’s mercy petition.  There  

was no reference to the petitioner’s mental health report  

in  the  note  prepared  for  approval  of  the  President.  

Likewise, there was no reference to the fact that this Court  

had rejected the petitioner’s SLP in limine in a death case.  

241) On 27.07.2013, the petitioner was orally informed by  

the  prison  authorities  that  his  mercy  petition  has  been  

rejected  by  the  President  of  India.   The  petitioner  was  

neither furnished with any official written communication  

regarding  the  rejection  of  his  mercy  petition  by  the  

President of India nor the petitioner was informed that his  

mercy petition has been rejected by the Governor.

242)  On  27.07.2013,  the  Superintendent  of  the  Central  

Prison, Jabalpur sent a letter to the Icchawar Police Station  

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asking them to inform the petitioner’s family to meet the  

petitioner urgently.

243) On 07.08.2013,  this  Court  stayed the  execution  of  

the petitioner in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 136 of 2013 filed  

by PUDR.  The details regarding delay in disposal of mercy  

petition are as follows:     

Delay by State to send mercy  petition to MHA

2.02.2012  –  07.08.2012

6 months

Total  delay  since  mercy  petition was filed

2.02.2012  –  27.07.2013

1  year  6  months

Delay by State to send medical  report to MHA

31.08.2012  –  25.03.2012

7 months

Delay by President 7.08.2012  –  27.07.2013

1 year

Insofar  as  the  delay  is  concerned,  it  cannot  be  

claimed that the same is excessive though there is a delay  

of one year in disposal of mercy petition by the President.  

However,  during  the  period  of  trial  before  the  Sessions  

court  and  even  after  conviction,  the  petitioner  was  

suffering from mental illness.  This is clear from the note  

made  by  the  Prison  Superintendent  who  opined  for  

alteration of petitioner’s sentence from death to life.  This  

important aspect was not noted by the Home Ministry.

244) Another relevant event which was not noticed by the  

Home Ministry while considering the notes for approval of  

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the  President  was  that  the  petitioner  filed  SLP  through  

legal aid and this Court did not grant special leave and  

dismissed the SLP in limine.  As highlighted in the previous  

case,  we reiterate  that  in  case  of  death sentence,  it  is  

desirable to examine all the materials on record first hand  

in accordance with the time-bound practice of this Court  

and arrive at an independent conclusion on all the issues  

of fact and law irrespective of the findings of the trial court  

and the High Court.   Such recourse was not adopted in  

this case.  This was not highlighted in the notes prepared  

for the approval of the President.  As stated earlier, the  

summary prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs for the  

President fails to consider the mental illness as well as the  

opinion offered by the Prison Superintendent in terms of  

the M.P.  Prison Manual as a ground for  commutation of  

sentence.  For all  these reasons, more particularly, with  

regard to his mental illness, we feel that ends of justice  

would be met by commuting the sentence of death into  

life imprisonment.

Writ Petition (Crl.) Nos. 139 and 141 of 2013

245) Shivu  –  death  convict,  aged  about  31  years,  

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hailing from Karnataka,  has  filed Writ  Petition (Crl.)  No.  

139  of  2013.   Jadeswamy,  aged  about  25  years,  also  

hailing from Karnataka,  has  filed Writ  Petition (Crl.)  No.  

141 of 2013.  Both are challenging the rejection of their  

mercy petitions on various grounds.  According to them,  

they are in custody for 11 years and 10 months.  

246) Both the  petitioners  were  convicted for  an offence  

under  Sections  302,  376  read  with  Section  34  IPC  and  

were sentenced to death.  On 07.11.2005, the Karnataka  

High Court confirmed the petitioners’ death sentence.  On  

13.02.2007, this Court dismissed their appeal and upheld  

the death sentence awarded to them.

247) On  27.02.2007,  both  the  petitioners  filed  separate  

mercy petitions addressed to the Governor of Karnataka  

and  the  President  of  India  through  the  Prison  

Superintendent.   

248) On  21.03.2007,  Respondent  No.  1  wrote  to  

Respondent  No.  2  requesting  to  consider  petitioners’  

mercy petitions under Article 161 of the Constitution and,  

in the event of rejection, to send the mercy petition along  

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with  the  recommendations,  copies  of  the  judgments,  

copies of the records of the case, etc. to Respondent No. 1  

for consideration under Article 72 of the Constitution.

249) On 05.04.2007 and 09.05.2007, review petitions filed  

by the petitioners were dismissed.   

250) On  10.08.2007,  Respondent  No.  2  informed  

Respondent  No.  1  that  the  Governor  has  rejected  the  

mercy petitions and forwarded the copy of the trial court  

judgment,  the  Supreme  Court  judgment  and  mercy  

petitions.

251) On  09.10.2007,  Respondent  No.  1  wrote  to  

Respondent No. 2 requesting him to provide the judgment  

of the High Court, the police diary, the court proceedings  

and  the  English  translation  of  the  trial  court  judgment.  

Respondent  No.  2  sent  some  of  these  documents  on  

26.07.2012, i.e.,  after 4 years and 9 ½ months and the  

rest of the documents were sent on 03.12.2012, i.e., after  

5 years and 2 months.  There was also no explanation as  

to why Respondent No. 1 did not take steps to expedite  

the matter for such a long period.   

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252) On  03.04.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the mercy petitions.  There was a delay  

of 5 years and 8 months after the Governor rejected the  

mercy petitions.   

253) On 27.05.2013, the President returned the file along  

with the mercy petitions sent by Shivu’s mother and the  

members of the Badrayyanhalli Gram Panchayat.

254) On  24.06.2013,  Respondent  No.  1  advised  the  

President to reject the mercy petitions.  On 27.07.2013,  

the President rejected the petitioners’ mercy petitions.

255) On 13.08.2013, the petitioners were informed by the  

prison  authorities  that  their  mercy  petitions  have  been  

rejected by the President.  On 16.08.2013, the local police  

visited the petitioners’ family members and informed that  

they  would  be  executed  at  6  a.m.  on  22.08.2013  at  

Belgaum Central Prison.  The said procedure was contrary  

to  the  Prison  Manual.   As  per  the  present  Rules,  the  

execution  can  only  be  scheduled  after  14  days  of  

informing the prisoner of rejection of mercy petition and in  

this case the same was not being followed.  The following  

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are  the  details  regarding  delay  in  disposal  of  mercy  

petitions by the Governor and the President:

Total custody period till date 15.10.2001  –  17.12.2013

12  years  2  months

Period under sentence of death 29.07.2005  –  17.12.2013

8  years  5  months

Total  delay  in  deciding  mercy  petitions

27.02.2007  –  13.08.2013

6 ½ years

Delay by the Governor 27.02.2007  –  10.08.2007

6 months

Delay by the President 10.08.2007  –  13.08.2013

6 years

256) It  is  true  that  there  is  some  explanation  in  the  

affidavit filed on behalf of the State in respect of the time  

taken  by  the  Governor  for  rejection  of  their  mercy  

petitions,  however,  there  is  no  acceptable/adequate  

reason for delay of six years at the hands of the Ministry of  

Home  Affairs  followed  by  the  rejection  order  by  the  

President.

257) Though learned counsel has referred to the fact that  

the  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  followed  certain  

decisions which were later held as per incuriam, in view of  

the fact that there is undue delay of six years which is one  

of  the circumstances for  commutation of  sentence from  

death to life, we are not adverting to all other aspects.

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258) We also perused the records of the Ministry of Home  

Affairs  produced  by  learned  ASG  and  the  summary  

prepared  for  approval  of  the  President.   There  is  no  

specific  explanation  in  the  summary  prepared  by  the  

Ministry of Home Affairs for the President for the delay of  

six  years.   In  view of  the same and in  the light  of  the  

principles enunciated in various decisions which we have  

adverted to in the earlier part of our judgment, we hold  

that  the  petitioners  have  made  out  a  case  for  

commutation of sentence.

Guidelines:

259) In  W.P  (Crl)  No  56  of  2013,  Peoples’  Union  for  

Democratic  Rights  have  pleaded  for  guidelines  for  

effective  governing  of  the  procedure  of  filing  mercy  

petitions and for the cause of the death convicts. It is well  

settled law that executive action and the legal procedure  

adopted to deprive a person of his life or liberty must be  

fair, just and reasonable and the protection of Article 21 of  

the  Constitution  of  India  inheres  in  every  person,  even  

death-row prisoners, till the very last breath of their lives.  

We  have  already  seen  the  provisions  of  various  State  

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Prison Manuals and the actual procedure to be followed in  

dealing with mercy petitions and execution of convicts.  In  

view  of  the  disparities  in  implementing  the  already  

existing laws, we intend to frame the following guidelines  

for safeguarding the interest of the death row convicts.

1. Solitary Confinement:  This Court, in  Sunil Batra  

(supra), held that solitary or single cell confinement  

prior  to  rejection  of  the  mercy  petition  by  the  

President is  unconstitutional.   Almost all  the prison  

Manuals  of  the  States  provide  necessary  rules  

governing the confinement of  death convicts.   The  

rules should not be interpreted to run counter to the  

above  ruling  and  violate  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution.   

2. Legal Aid: There is no provision in any of the Prison  

Manuals for providing legal aid, for preparing appeals  

or mercy petitions or for accessing judicial remedies  

after the mercy petition has been rejected.  Various  

judgments of this Court have held that legal aid is a  

fundamental right under Article 21.  Since this Court  

has also held that Article 21 rights inhere in a convict  

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till his last breath, even after rejection of the mercy  

petition by the President, the convict can approach a  

writ court for commutation of the death sentence on  

the ground of supervening events,  if available, and  

challenge  the  rejection  of  the  mercy  petition  and  

legal  aid  should  be  provided  to  the  convict  at  all  

stages.   Accordingly,  Superintendent  of  Jails  are  

directed to intimate the rejection of mercy petitions  

to the nearest Legal Aid Centre apart from intimating  

the convicts.  

3. Procedure in placing the mercy petition before  

the President: The Government of India has framed  

certain guidelines for disposal of mercy petitions filed  

by the death convicts after disposal of their appeal  

by  the  Supreme  Court.   As  and  when  any  such  

petition  is  received or  communicated by  the  State  

Government  after  the  rejection  by  the  Governor,  

necessary materials such as police records, judgment  

of the trial  court,  the High Court and the Supreme  

Court and all other connected documents should be  

called at once fixing a time limit for the authorities  

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for  forwarding  the  same  to  the  Ministry  of  Home  

Affairs.  Even here, though there are instructions, we  

have  come  across  that  in  certain  cases  the  

Department calls for those records in piece-meal or  

one  by  one  and  in  the  same way,  the  forwarding  

Departments  are  also  not  adhering  to  the  

procedure/instructions  by  sending  all  the  required  

materials  at  one  stroke.   This  should  be  strictly  

followed to minimize the delay.  After getting all the  

details, it is for the Ministry of Home Affairs to send  

the  recommendation/their  views  to  the  President  

within  a  reasonable  and rational  time.   Even after  

sending  the  necessary  particulars,  if  there  is  no  

response from the office of  the President,  it  is  the  

responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs to send  

periodical  reminders  and  to  provide  required  

materials for early decision.

4. Communication of Rejection of Mercy Petition  

by  the  Governor: No  prison  manual  has  any  

provision for informing the prisoner or his family of  

the rejection of the mercy petition by the Governor.  

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Since  the  convict  has  a  constitutional  right  under  

Article 161 to make a mercy petition to the Governor,  

he is entitled to be informed in writing of the decision  

on that mercy petition.  The rejection of the mercy  

petition  by  the  Governor  should  forthwith  be  

communicated to the convict and his family in writing  

or  through  some  other  mode  of   communication  

available.

5. Communication  of  Rejection  of  the  Mercy  

Petition by the President: Many, but not all, prison  

manuals have provision for informing the convict and  

his family members of the rejection of mercy petition  

by  the  President.  All  States  should  inform  the  

prisoner and their family members of the rejection of  

the mercy petition by the President.   Furthermore,  

even where prison manuals provide for informing the  

prisoner  of  the rejection of  the mercy petition,  we  

have  seen  that  this  information  is  always  

communicated orally, and never in writing.  Since the  

convict has a constitutional right under Article 72 to  

make a mercy petition to the President, he is entitled  

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to  be  informed  in  writing  of  the  decision  on  that  

mercy petition.  The rejection of the mercy petition  

by the President should forthwith be communicated  

to the convict and his family in writing.  

6. Death convicts are entitled as a right to receive  

a copy of the rejection of the mercy petition by  

the President and the Governor.   

7. Minimum 14 days notice for execution:   Some  

prison  manuals  do  not  provide  for  any  minimum  

period between the rejection of  the mercy petition  

being communicated to the prisoner and his family  

and the scheduled date of execution.  Some prison  

manuals  have  a  minimum period  of  1  day,  others  

have a minimum period of 14 days.  It is necessary  

that  a  minimum  period  of  14  days  be  stipulated  

between  the  receipt  of  communication  of  the  

rejection  of  the  mercy  petition  and  the  scheduled  

date of execution for the following reasons:-

(a) It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally  

for execution, to make his peace with god, prepare  

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his will and settle other earthly affairs.

(b) It  allows  the  prisoner  to  have  a  last  and  final  

meeting with his family members.  It also allows  

the  prisoners’  family  members  to  make  

arrangements to travel to the prison which may be  

located at a distant place and meet the prisoner  

for the last time. Without sufficient notice of the  

scheduled date of execution, the prisoners’ right to  

avail of judicial remedies will be thwarted and they  

will  be  prevented  from  having  a  last  and  final  

meeting with their families.

It is the obligation of the Superintendent of Jail  to  

see that the family members of the convict receive  

the message of communication of rejection of mercy  

petition in time.   

8. Mental Health Evaluation: We have seen that in  

some  cases,  death-row  prisoners  lost  their  mental  

balance  on  account  of  prolonged  anxiety  and  

suffering experienced on death row.  There should,  

therefore, be regular mental health evaluation of all  

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death  row  convicts  and  appropriate  medical  care  

should be given to those in need.

9. Physical  and Mental  Health Reports: All  prison  

manuals  give  the  Prison  Superintendent  the  

discretion  to  stop  an  execution  on  account  of  the  

convict’s physical or mental ill health.  It is, therefore,  

necessary  that  after  the mercy  petition  is  rejected  

and  the  execution  warrant  is  issued,  the  Prison  

Superintendent should satisfy himself on the basis of  

medical  reports  by  Government  doctors  and  

psychiatrists that the prisoner is in a fit physical and  

mental  condition  to  be  executed.   If  the  

Superintendent is of the opinion that the prisoner is  

not fit, he should forthwith stop the execution, and  

produce the prisoner  before  a  Medical  Board for  a  

comprehensive  evaluation  and  shall  forward  the  

report  of  the  same  to  the  State  Government  for  

further action.   

10. Furnishing documents to the convict: Most  

of the death row prisoners are extremely poor and do  

not have copies of their court papers, judgments, etc.  

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These  documents  are  must  for  preparation  of  

appeals,  mercy petitions  and accessing post-mercy  

judicial remedies which are available to the prisoner  

under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution.   Since  the  

availability of these documents is  a necessary pre-

requisite  to  the  accessing  of  these  rights,  it  is  

necessary that copies of relevant documents should  

be furnished to  the  prisoner  within  a  week by the  

prison authorities to assist in making mercy petition  

and petitioning the courts.  

11. Final  Meeting  between  Prisoner  and  his  

Family:  While  some  prison  manuals  provide  for  a  

final meeting between a condemned prisoner and his  

family immediately prior to execution, many manuals  

do not.  Such a procedure is intrinsic to humanity and  

justice,  and  should  be  followed  by  all  prison  

authorities.   It  is  therefore,  necessary  for  prison  

authorities  to  facilitate  and  allow  a  final  meeting  

between the prisoner and his family and friends prior  

to his execution.   

12. Post Mortem Reports: Although, none of the  

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Jail Manuals provide for compulsory  post mortem to  

be conducted on death convicts after the execution,  

we think in the light of the repeated arguments by  

the petitioners herein asserting that there is dearth  

of  experienced hangman in  the  country,  the  same  

must be made obligatory.  

In Deena alias Deen Dayal and Ors. vs. Union of  

India (1983)  4  SCC  645,  the  petitioners  therein  

challenged  the  constitutional  validity  of  Section  

354(5) on the ground that hanging a convict by rope  

is a cruel and barbarous method of executing death  

sentence,  which  is  violative  of  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution. This court held as follows:-

“7. …After making this observation Bhagwati, J.,  proceeds thus :

The  physical  pain  and suffering  which  the  execution of the sentence of death involves is  also  no  less  cruel  and  inhuman.  In  India,  the  method of execution followed is hanging by the  rope. Electrocution or application of lethal gas  has not yet taken its place as in some of the  western countries. It is therefore with reference  to  execution  by  hanging  that  I  must  consider  whether the sentence of death is barbaric and  inhuman as entailing physical pain and agony. It  is no doubt true that the Royal Commission on  Capital Punishment 1949-53 found that hanging  

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It is obvious from a reading of the aforesaid decision that  

the method of hanging prescribed by Section 354(5) of the  

Code was held not violative of the guaranteed right under  

Article  21  of  the  Constitution  on  the  basis  of  scientific  

evidence and opinions of eminent medical persons which  

assured that hanging is the least painful way of ending the  

life.   However, it is the contention of learned counsel for  

the  respondents  that  owing  to  dearth  of  experienced  

hangman,  the accused are being hanged in violation of  

the due procedure.

260) By  making  the  performance  of  post  mortem  

obligatory, the cause of the death of the convict can be  

found out, which will reveal whether the person died as a  

result of the dislocation of the cervical vertebrate or by  

strangulation which results on account of too long a drop.  

Our Constitution permits the execution of death sentence  

only  through  procedure  established  by  law  and  this  

procedure  must  be  just,  fair  and  reasonable.  In  our  

considered  view,  making  post  mortem obligatory  will  

ensure just, fair and reasonable procedure of execution of  

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death sentence.

Conclusion:

261) In the aforesaid batch of cases, we are called upon to  

decide on an evolving jurisprudence, which India has to its  

credit for being at the forefront of the global legal arena.  

Mercy  jurisprudence  is  a  part  of  evolving  standard  of  

decency, which is the hallmark of the society.

262) Certainly,  a  series  of  Constitution  Benches  of  this  

Court have upheld the Constitutional validity of the death  

sentence  in  India  over  the  span  of  decades  but  these  

judgments in no way take away the duty to follow the due  

procedure  established  by  law  in  the  execution  of  

sentence. Like the death sentence is passed lawfully, the  

execution  of  the  sentence  must  also  be  in  consonance  

with the Constitutional mandate and not in violation of the  

constitutional principles.   

263) It is well established that exercising of power under  

Article  72/161  by  the  President  or  the  Governor  is  a  

constitutional  obligation  and  not  a  mere  prerogative.  

Considering  the  high  status  of  office,  the  Constitutional  

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framers did not stipulate any outer time limit for disposing  

the mercy petitions under the said Articles, which means it  

should be decided within reasonable time. However, when  

the delay caused in disposing the mercy petitions is seen  

to be unreasonable, unexplained and exorbitant, it is the  

duty of this Court to step in and consider this aspect. Right  

to seek for mercy under Article 72/161 of the Constitution  

is a constitutional right and not at the discretion or whims  

of  the  executive.  Every  Constitutional  duty  must  be  

fulfilled  with  due  care  and  diligence;  otherwise  judicial  

interference  is  the  command  of  the  Constitution  for  

upholding its values.

264) Remember, retribution has no Constitutional value in  

our largest democratic country. In India, even an accused  

has a de facto protection under the Constitution and it is  

the  Court’s  duty  to  shield  and  protect  the  same.  

Therefore,  we  make  it  clear  that  when  the  judiciary  

interferes in such matters, it does not really interfere with  

the  power  exercised  under  Article  72/161  but  only  to  

uphold  the  de  facto protection  provided  by  the  

Constitution to every convict including death convicts.  

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265) In the light of the above discussion and observations,  

we dispose of the writ petitions.  In the cases of Suresh,  

Ramji,  Bilavendran,  Simon,  Gnanprakasam,  Madiah,  

Praveen Kumar,  Gurmeet  Singh,  Sonia,  Sanjeev,  Sundar  

Singh, Jafar Ali, Magan Lal Berala, Shivu and Jadeswamy,  

we commute  the  death  sentence into  imprisonment  for  

life.  All the writ petitions are, accordingly, allowed on the  

above terms.

       ……….…………………………CJI.              (P. SATHASIVAM)   

                                   ……….……………………………J.   

           (RANJAN GOGOI)                      

   ..….….……………………………J.                (SHIVA KIRTI SINGH)   

NEW DELHI; JANUARY 21, 2014.

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