31 January 2012
Supreme Court
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SHARAD Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

Bench: AFTAB ALAM,ANIL R. DAVE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000011-000011 / 2006
Diary number: 882 / 2005
Advocates: K. RAJEEV Vs


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NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.11 OF 2006

Sharad    … Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Aftab Alam,J.

1. For causing “the dowry death” of  his  wife  Savita,  the appellant  is  

convicted under section 304-B and is given the minimum statutory sentence  

of 7 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with the default  

sentence  of  rigorous  imprisonment  for  three  months.  He  is  additionally  

convicted under sections 306 and 498-A. Under these two sections he was  

sentenced  to  imprisonment  for  lesser  periods  and  all  the  sentences  were  

directed to run concurrently. He served out the sentences for the other two  

offences before he was released on bail  by order dated January 3,  2006,  

passed in this appeal.    

2. According to the prosecution case, in the marriage negotiation Savita's  

father had agreed to pay Rs.9,000/- as dowry to the appellant. At the time of  

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marriage,  however,  he  was  able  to  pay  only  Rs.4,000/-  and  the  balance  

amount of Rs.5,000/- remained unpaid.  It is the case of the prosecution that  

after marriage Savita had to face harassment and cruelty at the hands of her  

husband, the appellant, and his parents in connection with the demand for  

the unpaid amount of the dowry that was promised by her father.  When  

Savita was unable to bear the harassment and cruelty meted out to her, she  

committed  suicide by setting alight  after  dousing herself  in kerosene oil.  

She suffered 100% burn injuries and died.  

3. It is an admitted position that Savita died within two and a half years  

of her marriage with the appellant.  It is also undeniable that her death was a  

case of suicide and it was caused by 100% burn injuries suffered by her.  

This takes us to the third ingredient of section 304-B and we find that too is  

fully satisfied by the evidences of her brother Dhanraj,  (the complainant)  

PW.1,  Pundalik  (her  uncle),  PW.2  and  Sau.  Sheela,  PW.3,  one  of  the  

neighbours  of  Savita’s  father.  All  the  three  witnesses  have  consistently  

stated that out of the promised amount of dowry, the sum of Rs.5,000/- had  

remained unpaid at the time of marriage and during her visits to her father's  

place  Savita  used  to  tell  them  that  the  accused  ill-treated  her  for  non-

payment of Rs.5,000/- as part of the agreed dowry. The appellant used to say  

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that he would beat her if she failed to bring the unpaid amount from her  

father.   

4. Mr.  Renjith B.,  counsel  appearing for  the appellant,  submitted  that  

though  there  may  be  some  evidence  of  ill-treatment  of  the  deceased  in  

connection with the demand of dowry that alone would not be sufficient to  

bring home the charge of “dowry death” against the appellant unless it was  

shown that any harassment or cruelty was meted out to her in connection  

with that demand "soon before her death".  Learned counsel submitted that  

any  harassment  or  cruelty  at  a  distant  point  of  time,  even  though,  in  

connection with the demand for dowry would not make out a case under  

section 304-B of the Penal Code and in order to bring the case under section  

304-B of the Penal Code, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish  

that not only the harassment or cruelty was in connection with the demand  

for dowry but it was also soon before the death took place.  In support of the  

submission learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court in Durga  

Prasad and another v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 9 SCC 73, Suresh  

Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. , 2009 (7) SCALE 629 and Tarsem Singh v.  

State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 155.

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5. We find no merit in the submission and, in our view, the decisions  

relied upon by the counsel have no application to the facts of this case and  

do not advance the case of the present appellant in any way.  PW.1 in his  

deposition before the court  said that  Savita last  came to them to see her  

ailing father just two days before committing suicide. In that visit also she  

told her father that unless he paid Rs.5,000/-, she would not remain alive and  

it would be the end of her life. The following day, she left her father's place  

and went to her matrimonial home and in the evening of the same day she  

committed  suicide.  PW.3,  who  was  one  of  the  neighbours  of  Savita's  

parents, said that Savita came to see her ailing father on a Sunday and she  

went back on Monday. She had then told her that her father was ill and the  

accused were demanding dowry and ill-treating her. She also told her that  

she would not remain alive thereafter. On the next day, they got the message  

that Savita died due to burn injuries. We find it difficult to imagine a more  

proximate  link  between  harassment  and  cruelty  in  connection  with  the  

demand of dowry and the death of the victim resulting from it.

6. Counsel for the appellant next tried to advance the plea that it was in  

fact a case of accidental burn and Savita caught fire by falling down on the  

chulha.  It is seen above that Savita died from burn injuries within two and a  

half year of her marriage with the appellant. It is also established that soon  

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before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant  

in connection with the demand for the unpaid amount of the dowry. All the  

three facts and circumstances put together clearly attracts the provision of  

section 113-B of the Evidence Act and the burden lay upon the appellant to  

prove  the  defence  plea  that  it  was  a  case  of  accidental  burn.  There  is,  

however,  no  evidence  on  record  even  to  remotely  support  the  plea  of  

accidental burn.

7. Counsel  for the appellant  submitted that the doctor  who conducted  

post-mortem on the body of Savita was not examined as a witness and the  

appellant  was  thus  denied  the  opportunity  to  put  any  question  to  him  

regarding the possibility of Savita catching fire by accident. Learned counsel  

also  submitted  that  though the post-mortem report  was  not  in  the  list  of  

admitted documents and even though the doctor who conducted the post-

mortem was not examined, yet it was marked as an exhibit and was referred  

to by the trial court and the High Court. This, according to him, vitiated the  

trial and rendered the appellant's conviction unsustainable. We find no merit  

in  this  submission  either.  The  post-mortem  report  indeed  indicates  that  

Savita died as a result of shock due to 100% burns but it does not say, as, in  

fact, it can not say, whether it was a case of suicide or the catching of fire  

was  accidental.  But apart  from the post-mortem report  there  is sufficient  

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evidence on record to show that Savita set herself on fire committing suicide  

and she did not catch fire accidently. More importantly, in the charge against  

the appellant  it  was clearly spelled out  that  Savita committed  suicide by  

setting herself on fire. Further, in course of his examination under section  

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was repeatedly put to the appellant  

that  Savita  committed  suicide  by  setting  herself  on  fire  in  face  of  his  

persistent  demand  for  dowry  (see  question  Nos.  15,  16,  and  24).  The  

appellant of course denied the accusation saying “it is false” but he never  

said before the trial court that Savita caught fire accidentally by falling down  

on the chulha. It is, thus, clear that the plea of accidental fire is being raised  

for the first time before this Court and hence, it can not be entertained.

8. In  the  result,  we  find  no  merit  in  the  appeal,  it  is  accordingly  

dismissed.

……………………………J. (Aftab Alam)

……………………………J. (Anil R. Dave)

New Delhi; January 31, 2012.  

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