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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2070  OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6220 OF 2014)

Shalu Ojha  … Appellant

Versus

Prashant Ojha …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Chelameswar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This is an unfortunate case where the provisions of the  

Protection of  Women from Domestic  Violence  Act,  2005 are  

rendered simply a pious hope of the Parliament and a teasing  

illusion for the appellant.

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3. The appellant is a young woman who got married to the  

respondent on 20.04.2007 in Delhi according to Hindu rites  

and customs, pursuant to certain information placed by the  

respondent  on the website  known as “Sycorian Matrimonial  

Services Ltd.”.   

4. According to the appellant,  she was thrown out of  the  

matrimonial  home  within  four  months  of  the  marriage  on  

14.8.2007.   Thereafter,  the  respondent  started  pressurizing  

the appellant to agree for dissolution of marriage by mutual  

consent.   As  the  appellant  did not  agree for  the  same,  the  

respondent filed a petition for divorce being H.M.A. No.637 of  

2007 under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on  

17.10.2007 before  the  Additional  District  Judge,  Tis  Hazari  

Courts, Delhi.  The said petition was dismissed by an order  

dated 03.10.2008.  Within four months, the respondent filed  

another  petition on 08.04.2009 once again invoking Section  

13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Additional  

District  Judge,  Patiala  House  Courts,  Delhi  being  H.M.A.  

No.215 of 2009 and the same on being transferred is pending  

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before  the  Family  Court,  Saket  and  renumbered  as  H.M.A.  

No.266 of 2009.

5. On  04.06.2009,  the  appellant  filed  a  complaint  case  

No.120/4/09 under  Section  12 of  the  Protection of  Women  

from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as  

“the DV Act”).

6. The said complaint case came to be disposed of by the  

learned Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi by his order dated  

05.07.2012.   By  the  said  order,  the  Magistrate  granted  an  

amount  of  Rs.2.5 lacs towards monthly  maintenance of  the  

appellant  which  included  rental  charges  for  alternative  

accommodation.  The respondent was made liable to pay such  

monthly maintenance from the date of filing of the petition, i.e.  

from  04.06.2009.  The  monthly  maintenance  was  made  

payable  on  or  before  10th of  each  succeeding  month.   The  

learned  Magistrate  further  directed  that  the  arrears  of  the  

maintenance be cleared by 05.12.2012.

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7. Aggrieved by the above order, the respondent carried the  

matter in appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act in Criminal  

Appeal No.23 of 2012 before the learned Additional Sessions  

Judge,  Rohini,  New  Delhi.   On  10.01.2013,  the  learned  

Additional Sessions Judge while granting stay of the execution  

of  the  order  under  appeal  passed  an  order  directing  the  

respondent to pay the entire arrears of the maintenance due to  

the appellant till the presentation of the appeal within a period  

of two months.   

8. Since  the  respondent  did  not  pay  the  arrears,  the  

appellant  moved  an  application  for  execution  of  the  order  

dated 10.01.2013.   

9. By an order dated 07.05.2013, Criminal Appeal No.23 of  

2013  preferred  by  the  respondent  was  dismissed  by  the  

learned  Sessions  Judge  for  non-compliance  of  the  interim  

directions dated 10.01.2013.   

10. Aggrieved by the order dated 07.05.2013, the respondent  

filed  Crl.  Misc.  Case  No.1975  of  2013  and  Crl.  Misc.  

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Application No.78-34 of 2013 for interim directions in the High  

Court  of  Delhi  on  08.05.2013.  The  High  Court  initially  

declined  to  pass  an  interim  order  in  the  said  appeal.  

Aggrieved by the same the respondent approached this Court  

in SLP (Crl.)  No.6509-6510 of 2013 which was dismissed  in  

limine  on 13.08.2013 with a direction to the parties to apply  

for mediation.

11. Pursuant to the said direction, the respondent filed Crl.  

Misc.  Application  No.12547  of  2013  in  Crl.  Misc.  Case  

No.1975 of 2013 for direction to refer the matter to Mediation.  

The matter was referred accordingly.  Eventually the mediation  

failed.  On receipt of such failure report, the appeal was again  

listed before the High Court on 10.09.2013.  The High Court  

directed the respondent to pay an amount of Rs.10 lakhs in  

two instalments and that the execution petition filed by the  

appellant for the recovery of the arrears be kept in abeyance.   

12. Thereafter,  an  application  was  filed  by  the  appellant  

before the High Court seeking direction to the respondent for  

the payment of monthly maintenance (current period) in terms  

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of  order  dated  05.7.2012  of  the  learned  Metropolitan  

Magistrate  (supra).  It  appears  that  the  matter  underwent  

number of adjournments but no orders have been passed by  

the High Court.

13. In the said background, the appellant filed Special Leave  

Petition (Crl.) No.2210 of 2014 in this Court.  The said petition  

came to  be disposed of  on 31.03.2014 by setting aside the  

interim  stay  granted  by  the  High  Court  on  the  execution  

petition  filed  by  the  appellant.   This  Court  categorically  

observed that - it is open to the petitioner to execute the order of maintenance  

passed  by the  learned Metropolitan  Magistrate and requested the High  

Court to dispose of the appeal of the respondent expeditiously.  

 14. Strangely,  when  the  appellant’s  application  for  the  

payment of  current maintenance in C.M. No.18869 of  2013  

was  listed  on  27.5.2014  before  the  High  Court  along  with  

other connected matters in Appeal (Crl. Misc. Case No.1975 of  

2013)  preferred  by  the  respondent,  the  application  of  the  

appellant  was dismissed as  “not  pressed”  on representation  

made  by  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant.  The  

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appellant appeared in person before us and made a statement  

that such instructions not to press the application were never  

given  to  the  counsel  who  appeared  in  the  High  Court  and  

hence the present appeal.

15. We  have  heard  the  appellant-in-person  and  learned  

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

16. The  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent  pleaded  inability  to  make  the  payment  of  the  

arrears and the current maintenance due to the appellant in  

terms  of  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Metropolitan  

Magistrate on 05.07.2012 on the ground that the respondent’s  

annual income as can be seen from his income-tax returns for  

the last two years is only around Rs.2.50 lakhs per annum.  

17. The appellant submitted that the income-tax returns of  

the respondent do not reflect the true picture of the income of  

the respondent.  The appellant pointed out the profile of the  

respondent  placed  on  the  website  of  “Sycorian  Matrimonial  

Services  Ltd.”  wherein  the  respondent’s  personal  income  is  

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shown as Rs.50 lakhs to Rs.1 crore per annum and monthly  

income  of  Rs.5  lakhs.  He  was  shown  to  be  a  Managing  

Director or Director of four companies, the details of which are  

as under:

Sr. No. Organization Designation 1 M/s Utkarsh Art Press Pvt. Ltd. Managing Director/Share Holder 2 M/s Empress Infonet Pvt. Ltd. Director/Share Holder 3 Hotel Urban Pind Director 4 M/s Brahmani Apparel Pvt. Ltd. Director/Share Holder

18. Apart from that, the appellant also placed reliance on a  

article  published  in  weekly  magazine  Business  World (Issue  

dated 10.03.2014) wherein some information regarding a posh  

restaurant known as Zerruco by Zilli at The Ashok, New Delhi  

was published.  The article named the respondent along with  

one  Kashif  Farooq  as  the  restaurateurs.   According  to  the  

article, the restaurant was set up at astounding cost of Rs.7  

crore.  The relevant portion of the article reads as follows:

“If  chef  Back  has  been  feeding  American  entertainment  industry stars.  London-based Aldo Zilli is well-known for his  celeb-patronised Italian bites.  He has just made his Asian  foray with Zerruco by Zilli, set in the partly al fresco-partly  indoors space at The Ashoka New Delhi that used to house  Mashrabiya.  The menu is simple, fresh and Med – salads,  grills,  the occasional  show-offy  “  gelato ravioli”  but  this is  one of those big “lifestyle restaurants” that we seem to be  losing  more  recently  with  the  spurt  in  made-to-look-like- mom-and-pop places.

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Restaurateurs Kashif  Farooq and Prashant Ojha known in  the clubbing/partying circuits have brought in Zilli as part of  their ambitious plans to grow and get taken seriously in the  F&B  realm.   The  restaurant  (that  will  turn  into  a  lounge/club in the evenings) has been set up at astounding  Rs.7 crore cost.  You can look to this one as an alternate to  the “upscale, casual”, Olive-like spaces.”    

 19. Before we proceed to take any decision in the matter, we  

deem it  appropriate  to  make  a  brief  survey  of  the  DV  Act  

insofar as it is relevant for the present purpose.  The preamble  

of  the Act  states that  this  is  “an  Act  to  provide  for  more  effective  

protection  of  the  rights  of  women guaranteed  under  the  Constitution  who  are  

victims  of  violence  of  any  kind  occurring  within  the  family  and  for  matters  

connected or incidental thereto.”

20. “Domestic  violence”  is  defined under  Section 3  as  any  

act, omission or commission or conduct of any adult male who  

is or has been in domestic relationship.

“Section  3.  Definition  of  domestic  violence.—For  the  purposes  of  this  Act,  any act,  omission or  commission or  conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence  in case it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life,  limb or well-being whether mental or physical, of the  aggrieved  person  or  tends  to  do  so  and  includes  causing  physical  abuse,  sexual  abuse,  verbal  and  emotional abuse and economic abuse; or

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(b) harasses,  harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved  person with a view to coerce her or any other person  related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any  dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or  any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in  clause (a) or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or  mental, to the aggrieved person.”

21. The expression “domestic relationship” is defined under  

Section  2(f)1.  The  expressions  “physical  abuse”,  “sexual  

abuse”,  “verbal and emotional  abuse” and “economic abuse”  

are explained in Explanation-1 to Section 3.

22. Section 12 of the Act recognizes the right of an “aggrieved  

person”2 (necessarily  a  woman  by  definition)  to  present  

application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under  

the Act.  The reliefs provided under the Act are contained in  

Sections 17 to 22.  Section 17 creates a right in favour of a  

1 Section 2. (f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any  point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or   through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint   family.

2. Section 2.(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with  the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of  domestic violence by the respondent;  

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woman/aggrieved  person  to  reside  in  a  “shared  household”  

defined under Section 2(s)3.

23. Section 18 deals with various orders that can be passed  

by the Magistrate dealing with the application of an aggrieved  

person  under  Section  12.   Section  19  provides  for  various  

kinds of residence orders which a Magistrate dealing with an  

application under Section 12 can pass in favour of a woman.  

Section  20  authorizes  the  Magistrate  dealing  with  an  

application under Section 12 to direct the respondent to pay  

monetary relief to the aggrieved person.  Section 20 reads as  

follows:

“Section 20.  Monetary reliefs.—(1) While  disposing  of  an  application  under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  12,  the  Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief  to  meet  the expenses  incurred and losses  suffered by the  aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a  result of the domestic violence and such relief may include,  but is not limited to,—

(a) ………………………………… (b) …………………………………. (c) …………………………………..

3. Section 2(s).— "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any  stage  has  lived  in  a  domestic  relationship  either  singly  or  along with  the  respondent  and   includes  such  a  household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person  and the respondent, or owned   or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the  aggrieved person or the respondent or both   jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or  equity and includes such a household which may belong to   the joint  family of  which the  respondent  is  a  member,  irrespective  of  whether  the respondent  or  the   aggrieved person has  any right, title or interest in the shared household.   

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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well  as her children, if any, including an order under or in  addition to an order of maintenance under section 125  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or  any other law for the time being in force.  

(2). The monetary relief granted under this section shall be  adequate,  fair  and  reasonable  and  consistent  with  the  standard  of  living  to  which  the  aggrieved  person  is  accustomed.

(3). The  Magistrate  shall  have  the  power  to  order  an  appropriate  lump  sum  payment  or  monthly  payments  of  maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case  may require.

(4). The  Magistrate  shall  send  a  copy  of  the  order  for  monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties to  the  application  and to  the  in-charge  of  the  police  station  within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent  resides.

(5). The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted  to  the  aggrieved  person  within  the  period specified  in the  order under sub-section (1).

(6). Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make  payment  in  terms of  the  order  under  sub-section  (1),  the  Magistrate  may  direct  the  employer  or  a  debtor  of  the  respondent,  to  directly  pay  to  the  aggrieved  person  or  to  deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or  debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which  amount  may  be  adjusted  towards  the  monetary  relief  payable by the respondent.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. Section 21 deals with the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to  

pass orders relating to custody of  children of  the aggrieved  

person.   Section  22  deals  with  compensation  orders  which  

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authorizes  the  Magistrate  to  pass  an  order  directing  the  

respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries  

including mental torture and emotional distress caused by the  

act of domestic violence committed by the respondent.  The  

Magistrate  receiving  a  complaint  under  Section  12  is  

authorized under the Act to pass anyone of the orders under  

the various provisions discussed above appropriate to the facts  

of the complaint.

25. Section 29 provides for an appeal to the Court of Session  

against  any  order  passed  by  the  Magistrate  under  the  Act  

either  at  the  instance  of  the  aggrieved  person  or  the  

respondent.

26. One important factor to be noticed in the context of the  

present case is that while Section 23 expressly confers power  

on the Magistrate to grant interim orders, there is no express  

provision  conferring  such  power  on  the  Sessions  Court  in  

exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction.   Section  23  reads  as  

follows:

“Section 23. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders. —(1)  In  any  proceeding  before  him  under  this  Act,  the  

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Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just  and proper.  

(2)  If  the Magistrate  is satisfied that  an application prima  facie  discloses  that  the  respondent  is  committing,  or  has  committed  an  act  of  domestic  violence  or  that  there  is  a  likelihood  that  the  respondent  may  commit  an  act  of  domestic  violence,  he may grant an  ex parte order on the  basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of  the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section  20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the  respondent.”  

27. It can be seen from the DV Act that no further appeal or  

revision  is  provided  to  the  High  Court  or  any  other  Court  

against the order of the Sessions Court under Section 29.   

28. It is in the background of the abovementioned Scheme of  

the  DV  Act  this  case  is  required  to  be  considered.   The  

appellant made a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act.  

The  Magistrate  in  exercise  of  his  jurisdiction  granted  

maintenance to the appellant.  The Magistrate’s legal authority  

to pass such an order is traceable to Section 20(1)(d) of the DV  

Act.

29. Questioning the correctness of the Magistrate’s order in  

granting  the  maintenance  of  Rs.2.5  lakhs  per  month  the  

respondent carried the matter in appeal under Section 29 to  

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the Sessions Court and sought stay of  the execution of the  

order  of  the  Magistrate  during  the  pendency of  the  appeal.  

Whether  the  Sessions  Court  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  

under Section 29 of the Act has any power to pass interim  

orders staying the execution of the order appealed before it is a  

matter to be examined in an appropriate case.   We only note  

that  there  is  no  express  grant  of  power  conferred  on  the  

Sessions Court while such power is expressly conferred on the  

Magistrate under Section 23.  Apart from that, the power to  

grant  interim orders  is  not  always inherent  in  every Court.  

Such  powers  are  either  expressly  conferred  or  implied  in  

certain  circumstances.   This  Court  in  Super  Cassettes  

Industres  Limited  v.  Music  Broadcast  Private  Limited,  

(2012) 5 SCC 488, examined this question in detail.  At any  

rate, we do not propose to decide whether the Sessions Court  

has the power to grant interim order such as the one sought  

by the respondent herein during the pendency of his appeal,  

for that issue has not been argued before us.   

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30. We presume (we emphasize that we only presume for the  

purpose  of  this  appeal)  that  the  Sessions  Court  does  have  

such power.  If such a power exists then it can certainly be  

exercised by the Sessions Court on such terms and conditions  

which in the opinion of the Sessions Court are justified in the  

facts and circumstances of a given case.  In the alternative, if  

the Sessions Court does not have the power to grant interim  

orders during the pendency of the appeal, the Sessions Court  

ought  not  to have stayed the execution of  the maintenance  

order passed by the Magistrate.   Since the respondent did not  

comply  with  such  conditional  order,  the  Sessions  Court  

thought  it  fit  to  dismiss  the  appeal.   Challenging  the  

correctness of the said dismissal, the respondent carried the  

matter before the High Court invoking Section 482 of the Code  

of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  and  Article  227  of  the  

Constitution.   

31. The issue before the High Court in Crl. MC. No. 1975 of  

2013  is  limited  i.e.  whether  the  sessions  court  could  have  

dismissed the  respondent’s  appeal  only  on the  ground that  

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respondent did not discharge the obligation arising out of the  

conditional  interim  order  passed  by  the  sessions  court.  

Necessarily the High Court will have to go into the question  

whether the sessions court has the power to grant interim stay  

of the execution of the order under appeal before it.

32. In  a  matter  arising  under  a  legislation  meant  for  

protecting  the  rights  of  the  women,  the  High  Court  should  

have been slow in granting interim orders, interfering with the  

orders by which maintenance is granted to the appellant.  No  

doubt, such interim orders are now vacated.  In the process  

the appellant is still awaiting the fruits of maintenance order  

even after 2 years of the order.

33. We find it difficult to accept that in a highly contested  

matter  like  this  the  appellant  would  have  instructed  her  

counsel not to press her claim for maintenance.   In our view,  

the High Court ought not to have accepted the statement of  

the counsel without verification.  The impugned order is set  

aside.

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34. We are of the opinion that the conduct of the respondent  

is a gross abuse of the judicial process.  We do not see any  

reason  why  the  respondent’s  petition  Crl.  MC  No.  1975  of  

2013 should be kept pending.  Whatever be the decision of the  

High Court, one of the parties will (we are sure) approach this  

Court again thereby delaying the conclusion of the litigation.  

The  interests  of  justice  would  be  better  served  if  the  

respondent’s  appeal before the Sessions Court is heard and  

disposed  of  on  merits  instead  of  going  into  the  residuary  

questions  of  the  authority  of  the  appellate  Court  to  grant  

interim orders or the legality of the decision of the Sessions  

Court to dismiss the appeal only on the ground of the non-

compliance  by  the  respondent  with  the  conditions  of  the  

interim  order.  The  Criminal  Appeal  No.23/2012  stands  

restored to the file of the Sessions Court.

35. We also direct that the maintenance order passed by the  

magistrate be executed forthwith in accordance with law.   The  

executing court should complete the process within 8 weeks  

and report compliance in the High Court.  We make it  clear  

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that such hearing by the Sessions Court should only be after  

the  execution  of  the  order  of  maintenance  passed  by  the  

Magistrate.    

36. In the event of the respondent’s success in the appeal,  

either in full or part, the Sessions Court can make appropriate  

orders  regarding  the  payments  due  to  be  made  by  the  

respondent in the execution proceedings.

The appeal is disposed off accordingly.

………………………….J.                                                           (J. Chelameswar)

……………………..….J.                              (A.K. Sikri)

New Delhi; September 18, 2014

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