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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2070  OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6220 OF 2014)

Shalu Ojha  … Appellant

Versus

Prashant Ojha …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Chelameswar, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This is an unfortunate case where the provisions of the  

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are  

rendered  simply  a  pious  hope  of  the  Parliament  and  a  

teasing illusion for the appellant.

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3. The appellant is a young woman who got married to the  

respondent on 20.04.2007 in Delhi according to Hindu rites  

and customs, pursuant to certain information placed by the  

respondent on the website known as “Sycorian Matrimonial  

Services Ltd.”.   

4. According to the appellant, she was thrown out of the  

matrimonial  home within  four  months  of  the  marriage on  

14.8.2007.  Thereafter, the respondent started pressurizing  

the appellant to agree for dissolution of marriage by mutual  

consent.  As the appellant did not agree for the same, the  

respondent filed a petition for divorce being H.M.A. No.637 of  

2007 under Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on  

17.10.2007 before the Additional  District  Judge,  Tis  Hazari  

Courts, Delhi.  The said petition was dismissed by an order  

dated 03.10.2008.  Within four months, the respondent filed  

another petition on 08.04.2009 once again invoking Section  

13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Additional  

District  Judge,  Patiala  House  Courts,  Delhi  being  H.M.A.  

No.215  of  2009  and  the  same  on  being  transferred  is  

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pending before the Family Court, Saket and renumbered as  

H.M.A. No.266 of 2009.

5. On  04.06.2009,  the  appellant  filed  a  complaint  case  

No.120/4/09 under Section 12 of the Protection of Women  

from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as  

“the DV Act”).

6. The said complaint case came to be disposed of by the  

learned  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  New  Delhi  by  his  order  

dated 05.07.2012.  By the said order, the Magistrate granted  

an amount of Rs.2.5 lacs towards monthly maintenance of  

the appellant which included rental charges for alternative  

accommodation.   The respondent  was made liable  to  pay  

such  monthly  maintenance  from the  date  of  filing  of  the  

petition, i.e. from 04.06.2009. The monthly maintenance was  

made payable on or before 10th of each succeeding month.  

The learned Magistrate further directed that the arrears of  

the maintenance be cleared by 05.12.2012.

7. Aggrieved by the above order, the respondent carried  

the  matter  in  appeal  under  Section  29  of  the  DV  Act  in  

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Criminal Appeal No.23 of 2012 before the learned Additional  

Sessions  Judge,  Rohini,  New  Delhi.   On  10.01.2013,  the  

learned Additional Sessions Judge while granting stay of the  

execution  of  the  order  under  appeal  passed  an  order  

directing  the  respondent  to  pay  the  entire  arrears  of  the  

maintenance due to the appellant till the presentation of the  

appeal within a period of two months.   

8. Since  the  respondent  did  not  pay  the  arrears,  the  

appellant moved an application for  execution of the order  

dated 10.01.2013.   

9. By an order dated 07.05.2013, Criminal Appeal No.23 of  

2013  preferred  by  the  respondent  was  dismissed  by  the  

learned  Sessions  Judge  for  non-compliance  of  the  interim  

directions dated 10.01.2013.   

10. Aggrieved  by  the  order  dated  07.05.2013,  the  

respondent filed Crl.  Misc.  Case No.1975 of 2013 and Crl.  

Misc. Application No.78-34 of 2013 for interim directions in  

the  High  Court  of  Delhi  on  08.05.2013.  The  High  Court  

initially declined to pass an interim order in the said appeal.  

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Aggrieved  by  the  same  the  respondent  approached  this  

Court  in  SLP  (Crl.)  No.6509-6510  of  2013  which  was  

dismissed  in  limine  on 13.08.2013 with  a  direction to the  

parties to apply for mediation.

11. Pursuant to the said direction, the respondent filed Crl.  

Misc.  Application  No.12547  of  2013  in  Crl.  Misc.  Case  

No.1975  of  2013  for  direction  to  refer  the  matter  to  

Mediation.  The matter was referred accordingly.  Eventually  

the mediation failed.  On receipt of such failure report, the  

appeal  was  again  listed  before  the  High  Court  on  

10.09.2013.  The High Court directed the respondent to pay  

an amount of Rs.10 lakhs in two instalments and that the  

execution petition filed by the appellant for the recovery of  

the arrears be kept in abeyance.   

12. Thereafter,  an  application  was  filed  by  the  appellant  

before the High Court seeking direction to the respondent for  

the  payment  of  monthly  maintenance  (current  period)  in  

terms of order dated 05.7.2012 of the learned Metropolitan  

Magistrate  (supra).  It  appears  that  the  matter  underwent  

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number of adjournments but no orders have been passed by  

the High Court.

13. In  the  said  background,  the  appellant  filed  Special  

Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2210 of 2014 in this Court.  The said  

petition came to be disposed of on 31.03.2014 by setting  

aside  the  interim stay  granted  by  the  High  Court  on  the  

execution  petition  filed  by  the  appellant.   This  Court  

categorically observed that - it is open to the petitioner to execute the  

order  of  maintenance  passed  by  the  learned  Metropolitan  Magistrate and  

requested the High Court  to  dispose of  the appeal  of  the  

respondent expeditiously.   

 14. Strangely,  when  the  appellant’s  application  for  the  

payment of current maintenance in C.M. No.18869 of 2013  

was listed on 27.5.2014 before the High Court  along with  

other connected matters in Appeal (Crl. Misc. Case No.1975  

of 2013) preferred by the respondent, the application of the  

appellant was dismissed as “not pressed” on representation  

made  by  the  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant.  The  

appellant  appeared  in  person  before  us  and  made  a  

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statement that such instructions not to press the application  

were never given to the counsel who appeared in the High  

Court and hence the present appeal.

15. We  have  heard  the  appellant-in-person  and  learned  

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.

16. The  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent  pleaded inability  to  make the payment  of  the  

arrears and the current maintenance due to the appellant in  

terms  of  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Metropolitan  

Magistrate  on  05.07.2012  on  the  ground  that  the  

respondent’s annual income as can be seen from his income-

tax  returns  for  the  last  two  years  is  only  around  Rs.2.50  

lakhs per annum.  

17. The appellant submitted that the income-tax returns of  

the respondent do not reflect the true picture of the income  

of the respondent.  The appellant pointed out the profile of  

the  respondent  placed  on  the  website  of  “Sycorian  

Matrimonial  Services  Ltd.”  wherein  the  respondent’s  

personal income is shown as Rs.50 lakhs to Rs.1 crore per  

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annum and monthly income of Rs.5 lakhs. He was shown to  

be a Managing Director or Director of four companies, the  

details of which are as under:

Sr. No. Organization Designation 1 M/s Utkarsh Art Press Pvt. Ltd. Managing Director/Share Holder 2 M/s Empress Infonet Pvt. Ltd. Director/Share Holder 3 Hotel Urban Pind Director 4 M/s Brahmani Apparel Pvt. Ltd. Director/Share Holder

18. Apart from that, the appellant also placed reliance on a  

article published in weekly magazine  Business World (Issue  

dated  10.03.2014)  wherein  some  information  regarding  a  

posh restaurant known as Zerruco by Zilli at The Ashok, New  

Delhi  was  published.   The  article  named  the  respondent  

along  with  one  Kashif  Farooq  as  the  restaurateurs.  

According  to  the  article,  the  restaurant  was  set  up  at  

astounding cost of Rs.7 crore.  The relevant portion of the  

article reads as follows:

“If  chef  Back  has  been  feeding  American  entertainment  industry stars.  London-based Aldo Zilli  is well-known for  his  celeb-patronised Italian bites.   He has just  made his  Asian foray with Zerruco by Zilli, set in the partly al fresco- partly indoors space at The Ashoka New Delhi that used to  house Mashrabiya.  The menu is simple, fresh and Med –  salads, grills, the occasional show-offy “ gelato ravioli” but  this is one of those big “lifestyle restaurants” that we seem  to be losing more recently with the spurt in made-to-look- like-mom-and-pop places.

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Restaurateurs Kashif Farooq and Prashant Ojha known in  the clubbing/partying circuits have brought in Zilli as part  of their ambitious plans to grow and get taken seriously in  the  F&B  realm.   The  restaurant  (that  will  turn  into  a  lounge/club in the evenings) has been set up at astounding  Rs.7 crore cost.  You can look to this one as an alternate to  the “upscale, casual”, Olive-like spaces.”    

 19. Before we proceed to take any decision in the matter,  

we deem it appropriate to make a brief survey of the DV Act  

insofar  as  it  is  relevant  for  the  present  purpose.   The  

preamble of the Act states that this is “an Act to provide for more  

effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who  

are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters  

connected or incidental thereto.”

20. “Domestic violence” is defined under Section 3 as any  

act, omission or commission or conduct of any adult male  

who is or has been in domestic relationship.

“Section  3.  Definition  of  domestic  violence.—For  the  purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or  conduct  of  the  respondent  shall  constitute  domestic  violence in case it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life,  limb or well-being whether mental or physical, of the  aggrieved  person  or  tends  to  do  so  and  includes  causing  physical  abuse,  sexual  abuse,  verbal  and  emotional abuse and economic abuse; or

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(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved  person with a view to coerce her or any other person  related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any  dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or  any person related to her by any conduct mentioned  in clause (a) or clause (b); or

(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical  or mental, to the aggrieved person.”

21. The expression “domestic relationship” is defined under  

Section  2(f)1.  The  expressions  “physical  abuse”,  “sexual  

abuse”,  “verbal  and  emotional  abuse”  and  “economic  

abuse” are explained in Explanation-1 to Section 3.

22. Section  12  of  the  Act  recognizes  the  right  of  an  

“aggrieved person”2 (necessarily a woman by definition) to  

present application to the Magistrate seeking one or more  

reliefs under the Act.  The reliefs provided under the Act are  

contained in Sections 17 to 22.  Section 17 creates a right in  

1 Section 2. (f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any  point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or   through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint   family.

2. Section 2.(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with  the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of  domestic violence by the respondent;  

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favour of a woman/aggrieved person to reside in a “shared  

household” defined under Section 2(s)3.

23. Section 18 deals with various orders that can be passed  

by  the  Magistrate  dealing  with  the  application  of  an  

aggrieved person under Section 12.  Section 19 provides for  

various kinds of residence orders which a Magistrate dealing  

with an application under Section 12 can pass in favour of a  

woman.  Section 20 authorizes the Magistrate dealing with  

an application under Section 12 to direct the respondent to  

pay monetary  relief  to  the aggrieved person.   Section 20  

reads as follows:

“Section 20.  Monetary reliefs.—(1) While  disposing  of  an  application  under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  12,  the  Magistrate  may  direct  the  respondent  to  pay  monetary  relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by  the  aggrieved  person  and  any  child  of  the  aggrieved  person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief  may include, but is not limited to,—

(a) ………………………………… (b) …………………………………. (c) …………………………………..

3. Section 2(s).— "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any  stage  has  lived  in  a  domestic  relationship  either  singly  or  along with  the  respondent  and   includes  such  a  household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person  and the respondent, or owned   or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the  aggrieved person or the respondent or both   jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or  equity and includes such a household which may belong to   the joint  family of  which the  respondent  is  a  member,  irrespective  of  whether  the respondent  or  the   aggrieved person has  any right, title or interest in the shared household.   

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(d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as  well  as  her  children,  if  any,  including  an  order  under  or  in  addition  to  an  order  of  maintenance  under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973 (2 of 1974)  or any other law for the time  being in force.  

(2). The monetary relief granted under this section shall  be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the  standard  of  living  to  which  the  aggrieved  person  is  accustomed.

(3). The  Magistrate  shall  have  the  power  to  order  an  appropriate  lump sum payment or  monthly  payments  of  maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case  may require.

(4). The  Magistrate  shall  send  a  copy  of  the  order  for  monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties  to the application and to the in-charge of the police station  within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent  resides.

(5). The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted  to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the  order under sub-section (1).

(6). Upon  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  respondent  to  make payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1),  the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the  respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to  deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or  debt  due to or  accrued to the credit  of  the respondent,  which  amount  may  be  adjusted  towards  the  monetary  relief payable by the respondent.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. Section 21 deals with the jurisdiction of the Magistrate  

to  pass  orders  relating  to  custody  of  children  of  the  

aggrieved  person.   Section  22  deals  with  compensation  

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orders  which  authorizes  the  Magistrate  to  pass  an  order  

directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages  

for  the  injuries  including  mental  torture  and  emotional  

distress caused by the act of domestic violence committed  

by the respondent.   The Magistrate receiving a  complaint  

under Section 12 is authorized under the Act to pass anyone  

of the orders under the various provisions discussed above  

appropriate to the facts of the complaint.

25. Section  29  provides  for  an  appeal  to  the  Court  of  

Session against any order passed by the Magistrate under  

the Act either at the instance of the aggrieved person or the  

respondent.

26. One important factor to be noticed in the context of the  

present  case  is  that  while  Section  23  expressly  confers  

power on the Magistrate to grant interim orders, there is no  

express  provision  conferring  such  power  on  the  Sessions  

Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction.   Section  23  

reads as follows:

“Section  23.  Power  to  grant  interim  and  ex  parte  orders.—(1) In any proceeding before him under this Act,  

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the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems  just and proper.  

(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima  facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has  committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a  likelihood  that  the  respondent  may  commit  an  act  of  domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the  basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of  the aggrieved person under section 18, section 19, section  20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against  the respondent.”  

27. It can be seen from the DV Act that no further appeal or  

revision is  provided to  the High Court  or  any other  Court  

against the order of the Sessions Court under Section 29.   

28. It is in the background of the abovementioned Scheme  

of the DV Act this case is required to be considered.  The  

appellant made a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act.  

The  Magistrate  in  exercise  of  his  jurisdiction  granted  

maintenance  to  the  appellant.   The  Magistrate’s  legal  

authority to pass such an order is traceable to Section 20(1)

(d) of the DV Act.

29. Questioning the correctness of the Magistrate’s order in  

granting  the  maintenance  of  Rs.2.5  lakhs  per  month  the  

respondent carried the matter in appeal under Section 29 to  

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the Sessions Court and sought stay of the execution of the  

order of the Magistrate during the pendency of the appeal.  

Whether  the  Sessions  Court  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  

under Section 29 of the Act has any power to pass interim  

orders staying the execution of the order appealed before it  

is a matter to be examined in an appropriate case.   We only  

note that there is no express grant of power conferred on  

the Sessions Court while such power is expressly conferred  

on the Magistrate under Section 23.  Apart from that,  the  

power to grant interim orders is not always inherent in every  

Court.   Such  powers  are  either  expressly  conferred  or  

implied  in  certain  circumstances.   This  Court  in  Super  

Cassettes  Industres  Limited  v.  Music  Broadcast  

Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 488, examined this question  

in detail.  At any rate, we do not propose to decide whether  

the Sessions Court has the power to grant interim order such  

as  the  one  sought  by  the  respondent  herein  during  the  

pendency of his appeal, for that issue has not been argued  

before us.   

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30. We presume (we emphasize that we only presume for  

the  purpose  of  this  appeal)  that  the  Sessions  Court  does  

have such power.  If such a power exists then it can certainly  

be  exercised  by  the  Sessions  Court  on  such  terms  and  

conditions  which in  the opinion of  the Sessions Court  are  

justified in the facts and circumstances of a given case.  In  

the  alternative,  if  the  Sessions  Court  does  not  have  the  

power to grant interim orders during the pendency of the  

appeal,  the  Sessions  Court  ought  not  to  have  stayed the  

execution  of  the  maintenance  order  passed  by  the  

Magistrate.   Since the respondent did not comply with such  

conditional order, the Sessions Court thought it fit to dismiss  

the  appeal.   Challenging  the  correctness  of  the  said  

dismissal, the respondent carried the matter before the High  

Court  invoking  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure, 1973 and Article 227 of the Constitution.   

31. The issue before the High Court in Crl. MC. No. 1975 of  

2013 is limited i.e.  whether the sessions court could have  

dismissed the respondent’s appeal only on the ground that  

respondent did not  discharge the obligation arising out  of  

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the conditional interim order passed by the sessions court.  

Necessarily the High Court will have to go into the question  

whether the sessions court has the power to grant interim  

stay of the execution of the order under appeal before it.

32. In  a  matter  arising  under  a  legislation  meant  for  

protecting the rights of the women, the High Court should  

have been slow in granting interim orders, interfering with  

the orders by which maintenance is granted to the appellant.  

No  doubt,  such  interim  orders  are  now  vacated.   In  the  

process  the  appellant  is  still  awaiting  the  fruits  of  

maintenance order even after 2 years of the order.

33. We find it difficult to accept that in a highly contested  

matter  like  this  the  appellant  would  have  instructed  her  

counsel not to press her claim for maintenance.   In our view,  

the High Court ought not to have accepted the statement of  

the counsel without verification.  The impugned order is set  

aside.

34. We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  conduct  of  the  

respondent is a gross abuse of the judicial process.  We do  

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not see any reason why the respondent’s petition Crl. MC No.  

1975 of  2013 should  be kept  pending.   Whatever  be the  

decision of the High Court, one of the parties will  (we are  

sure)  approach  this  Court  again  thereby  delaying  the  

conclusion of the litigation.  The interests of justice would be  

better served if the respondent’s appeal before the Sessions  

Court is heard and disposed of on merits instead of going  

into the residuary questions of the authority of the appellate  

Court to grant interim orders or the legality of the decision of  

the Sessions Court to dismiss the appeal only on the ground  

of the non-compliance by the respondent with the conditions  

of the interim order. The Criminal Appeal No.23/2012 stands  

restored to the file of the Sessions Court.

35. We also direct that the maintenance order passed by  

the  magistrate  be  executed  forthwith  in  accordance  with  

law.    The  executing  court  should  complete  the  process  

within 8 weeks and report compliance in the High Court. We  

make it clear that such hearing by the Sessions Court should  

only  be  after  the  execution  of  the  order  of  maintenance  

passed by the Magistrate.    

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36. In the event of the respondent’s success in the appeal,  

either  in  full  or  part,  the  Sessions  Court  can  make  

appropriate orders regarding the payments due to be made  

by the respondent in the execution proceedings.

The appeal is disposed off accordingly.

………………………….J.                                                           (J. Chelameswar)

……………………..….J.                              (A.K. Sikri)

New Delhi; September 18, 2014

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