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REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.618-620 OF 2016 (Arising Out of SLP (C) Nos.9921-9923 of 2014)

         SENIOR DIVISIONAL COMMERCIAL MANAGER & ORS. ………APPELLANTS

Vs.        S.C.R. CATERERS, DRY FRUITS, FRUIT JUICE          STALLS WELFARE ASSOCIATION & ANR. ………RESPONDENTS

     J U D G M E N T

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

     Applications for intervention are allowed.

2.Leave granted.

3.The  present  appeals  arise  out  of  the  impugned

judgment and order dated 12.09.2013 passed by the

High  Court  of  Judicature  of  Andhra  Pradesh  at

Hyderabad in W.A. Nos. 1573-1575 of 2013, whereby

the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the

order of the learned single Judge, wherein it was

held  that  the  respondents  are  entitled  to  get

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their licenses renewed under the Catering Policy,

2010.

4.The relevant facts which are required for us to

appreciate the rival legal contentions advanced on

behalf  of  the  parties  are  stated  in  brief

hereunder:       Respondents before us are the South Central

Railway Caterers, Dry Fruits, Fruit Juice Stalls

Welfare Association, (hereinafter referred to as

“the  Welfare  Association”).  The  members  of  the

Welfare  Association  were  granted  licenses  for

running General Minor Units or Special Minor Units

in Categories “A”, “B” and “C” Railway Stations.

These  licenses  were  granted  in  favour  of  the

members of the respondents prior to the creation

of  the  Indian  Railways  Catering  and  Tourism

Corporation  Limited (hereinafter  referred to  as

“IRCTC”) under the Catering Policy, 2005. In terms

of the said Policy, the contracts under Categories

“A”, “B” and “C” Railway Stations were transferred

to the IRCTC while the contracts granted under

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Categories  “D”  to  “F”  Railway  Stations  were

continued under the control of the South Central

Railways till the IRCTC was equipped to take over

these units. The contracts held by the members of

the Welfare Association were renewed during the

subsistence of the Catering Policy, 2005. The said

policy was replaced by the Catering Policy, 2010.

Under the new Policy, the contracts of all the

existing major and minor catering units were to be

awarded and managed by the Zonal Railways. The

IRCTC was left with the running of the Food Plaza,

Food Courts and Fast Food Units only. Pursuant to

the  Catering  Policy,  2010,  the  South  Central

Railway granted renewal of licenses in favour of

the licensees for a period of three years with

effect  from  21.07.2010,  the  date  on  which  the

Catering  Policy,  2010  was  made  effective  in

respect  of  the  General  Minor  Units  (GMUs)  and

Special Minor Units (SMUs) taken over from the

IRCTC,  subject  to  the  conditions  stipulated  in

paras 16.1.3 and 16.2.1 of the Catering Policy,

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2010.  The  renewed  licenses  were  to  expire  on

20.07.2013. On 26.04.2013, the Senior Divisional

Commercial  Manager,  Vijayawada,  issued  a  bid

notice inviting sealed bids on the Single Stage

Two-Packet System from food and catering service

providers for provision of catering services at

the  various  GMUs  of  Categories  “A”  and  “B”

Railways Stations in the Vijayawada Division. A

similar notification dated 03.05.2013 was issued

for  establishment of  catering stalls/fruits  and

fruit juice stalls in SMUs in “A1”, “A” and “B”

Category  Railway  Stations.  Aggrieved,  the

respondent-Association, the members of which had

existing licenses, filed a Writ Petition before

the single Judge of the High Court of Judicature

of  Andhra  Pradesh  at  Hyderabad.  The

respondent-Association urged that the said action

of inviting fresh bids is discriminatory and also

contrary to the provisions of the Catering Policy,

2010. The main plea of the respondent-Association

was that in terms of the Catering Policy, 2010,

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the existing licensees were entitled for renewal

of their licenses for a period of three years,

subject to their satisfactory performance, payment

of all dues and arrears and withdrawal of court

cases, if any. They prayed that the appellant be

directed to renew the licenses of the existing

license holders of the canteens and fruits and

fruit juice stalls. Vide judgment and order dated

16.08.2013, the learned single Judge came to the

conclusion that the Catering Policy, 2010 did not

differentiate  among  the  licensees  based  on  the

number of years for which they have been carrying

on their business. It was further held that under

the  Catering  Policy,  2010,  the  license  fee  is

liable to be revised based on the potentiality of

each  Railway  Station  and  the  turnover  of  the

licensees  during  the  previous  years.  Since  the

license fee is subject to continuous revision and

does  not  remain  stagnant,  the  question  of  the

Railways suffering any loss due to renewals would

not arise. The learned single Judge held that the

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members of the Welfare Association are entitled

for renewal of the licenses of the members subject

to their satisfying the conditions stipulated in

paras 16.1.3 and 16.2.1 of the Catering Policy,

2010.  On  appeal  filed  by  the  appellants,  the

judgment and order of the learned single Judge was

upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court in

the Writ Appeals vide its judgment and order dated

12.09.2013. Hence, the present appeals are filed

by the appellants. 5.We have heard the learned senior counsel for both

the parties. On the basis of the pleadings and

evidence  on  record  produced  before  us,  the

circumstances of the case and also in the light of

the rival legal contentions urged by the learned

senior  counsel  for  both  the  parties,  the  main

question  that  arises  for  our  consideration  is

whether the members of the respondents before us

are entitled to have their licenses renewed in

terms of the Catering Policy, 2010.

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6.Mr. N.K. Kaul, the learned Additional Solicitor

General appearing on behalf of the appellants drew

our attention to the important provisions of the

Catering Policy, 2010. The objective of the Policy

reads as under:

“1.1  To  provide  hygienic,  good  quality affordable food to the travelling public by adopting  best  trade  and  hospitality practices. 1.2  The  policy  will  have  an  inclusive approach  where  from  the  least  advantaged passenger to the relatively affluent will be provided  catering  services  in  a  socially responsible manner. 1.3 It should meet all the social objectives of  the  Government,  including  provision  of reservations  as  per  Government  Directives issued from time to time.”

7. The learned ASG contends that the terms of the

Catering Policy, 2010 are absolutely clear. The

larger issue here is the right to livelihood of

the licensees who are members of the respondents.

The welfare of the people is the prime concern of

any responsible government under the provisions of

the Constitution. The learned ASG places reliance

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on  the  case  of  Lala  Ram  v. Union  of  India1,

wherein the concept of a welfare state has been

discussed as under:

“A  welfare  state  denotes  a  concept  of government, in which the State plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of all of its citizens,  which  may  include  equitable distribution  of  wealth  and  equal opportunities  and  public  responsibilities for all those, who are unable to avail for themselves, minimal provisions for a decent life.  It  refers  to  "Greatest  good  of greatest number and the benefit of all and the happiness of all". It is important that public weal be the commitment of the State, where  the  state  is  a  welfare  state.  A welfare  state  is  under  an  obligation  to prepare plans and devise beneficial schemes for the good of the common people. Thus, the fundamental feature of a Welfare state is social  insurance.  Anti-poverty  programmes and  a  system  of  personal  taxation  are examples  of  certain  aspects  of  a  Welfare state.  A  Welfare  state  provides  State sponsored  aid  for  individuals  from  the cradle  to  the  grave.  However,  a  welfare state faces basic problems as regards what should be the desirable level of provision of such welfare services by the state, for the  reason  that  equitable  provision  of resources to finance services over and above the  contributions  of  direct  beneficiaries would cause difficulties. A welfare state is one, which seeks to ensure maximum happiness

1  (2015) 5 SCC 813

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of maximum number of people living within its territory. A welfare state must attempt to provide all facilities for decent living, particularly to the poor, the weak, the old and  the  disabled  i.e.  to  all  those,  who admittedly belong to the weaker sections of society.  Articles  38  and  39  of  the Constitution of India provide that the State must strive to promote the welfare of the people of the state by protecting all their economic, social and political rights. These rights  may  cover,  means  of  livelihood, health  and  the  general  well-being  of  all sections  of  people  in  society,  specially those of the young, the old, the women and the  relatively  weaker  sections  of  the society.  These  groups  generally  require special protection measures in almost every set up. The happiness of the people is the ultimate  aim  of  a  welfare  state,  and  a welfare  state  would  not  qualify  as  one, unless it strives to achieve the same.”

                (emphasis laid by this Court)

8. The learned ASG further places reliance on the

case of Ram & Shyam Company v. State of Haryana2,

relevant paragraph of which is quoted hereunder:

“12.  Let  us  put  into  focus  the  clearly demarcated approach that distinguishes the use and disposal of private property and socialist  property.  Owner  of  private property may deal with it in any manner he likes  without  causing  injury  to  anyone else. But the socialist or if that word is jarring to some, the community or further

2 (1985) 3 SCC 267

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the public property has to be dealt with for public purpose and in public interest. The  marked  difference  lies  in  this  that while  the  owner  of  private  property  may have a number of considerations which may permit him to dispose of his property for a song. On the other hand, disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done  at  the  best  price  so  that  larger revenue  coming  into  the  coffers  of  the State  administration  would  serve  public purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficent activities by the availability  of  larger  funds.  This  is subject  to  one  important  limitation  that socialist  property  may  be  disposed  at  a price lower than the market price or even for a token price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposal is for augmentation of revenue and nothing  else,  the  State  is  under  an obligation to secure the best market price available in a market economy An owner of private property need not auction it nor is he  bound  to  dispose  it  of  at  a  current market  price.  Factors  such  as  personal attachment, or affinity, kinship, empathy, religious sentiment or limiting the choice to  whom  he  may  be  willing  to  sell,  may permit him to sell the property at a song and without demur. A welfare State as the owner of the public property has no such freedom  while  disposing  of  the  public property. A welfare State exists for the largest good of the largest number more so when it proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated  to  eradication  of  poverty.  All

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its  attempt  must  be  to  obtain  the  best available  price  while  disposing  of  its property because the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot in the arm. Financial constraint may weaken the tempo of activities. Such an approach serves the larger public purpose of expanding welfare activities primarily for  which  the  Constitution  envisages  the setting up of a welfare State.”

 (emphasis laid by this Court)

9.The interest of the passenger has no correlation

with social objectives. The main objective of the

Catering Policy, 2010 is to provide food at an

affordable price to the railway passengers. The

learned ASG further contends that the State is

entitled in law to frame a new policy in that

respect. The learned ASG contends that the Policy

contains  detailed  mechanisms  and  makes  it  very

clear for whom it is meant. The learned ASG draws

our attention to clause 3.3.1 of the Policy which

reads as under:

“3.3.1  All  existing  major  and  minor catering  units  will  be  awarded  and managed  by  the  zonal  railways,  except Food Plaza, Food Courts, fast food units. All  such  contracts  presently  being

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managed by the IRCTC, on expiry of the contract period, will be awarded by the zonal railways. IRCTC will not renew any contract required to be handed over to zonal  railways  on  expiry  of  the contract.”

10. The learned ASG further draws our attention

to clause 16.1.3 of the 2010 Policy which reads as

under:

“16.1.3  Allotment  of  all  General  Minor Units at A,B & C category stations shall be awarded for a period of five years with a provision for renewal after every 3 years on satisfactory performance and payment of all  dues  and  arrears  and  withdrawal  of court  cases,  if  any.  Allotment  of  all General  Minor  Unis  at  D,E  &  F  category stations will be for a period of 5 years with a provision for renewal after every 5 years for a further period of 5 years on satisfactory performance and payment of all dues and arrears and withdrawal of court cases, if any.”

The learned ASG contends that by virtue of clause

16.1.3, the members of the respondents cannot claim

renewal of their license as a matter of right. The

learned ASG further placed reliance on clause 26.1.1

of the 2010 Policy which reads as under:

“26.1.1 All existing operational catering licenses awarded by IRCTC and transferred

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to Zonal Railways will be governed by the existing  Catering  Policy  2005  upto  the validity of their contractual period.”

Further, Clause 26.1.4 of the policy reads as under:

“26.1.4  This  policy  will  also  apply  in case  of  award  of  fresh  licenses  and licenses  awarded  in  the  event  of termination, non-renewal, vacation etc. of the existing licenses.”

11. The  learned  ASG  further  contends  that  a

welfare State has to generate more money to take

care of the larger public interest. He further

contends  that  the  claim  of  the  members  of  the

respondents that they have a vested right to get

the  renewal  of  their  license  in  the  railway

stations referred to supra and that the government

cannot  expand  its  competitors  is  completely

unsupported in law.

12.The learned ASG further contends that the entire

policy  is  not  under  challenge.  It  is  only  the

clause which confers the right of renewal of the

license which has been challenged. The scope of

the judicial review in such cases is limited. For

the Court to examine the validity of the same, the

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policy  either  needs  to  be  arbitrary,  or  must

suffer  from  some  glaring  error  and  must  be

perverse,  or  be  contrary  to  constitutional

provisions. The learned ASG, in support of his contentions, places reliance on the case of Jivan

Das v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr.3

to  contend  that  the  right  to  livelihood  of

licensees  cannot  be  extended  to  use  public

property to the best advantage as a commercial

venture. It was held in that case as under:

“An owner is entitled to deal with his property in his own way profitable in its use and occupation. A public authority is equally  entitled  to  use  the  public property  to  the  best  advantage  as  a commercial  venture.  As  an  integral incidence  of  ejectment  of  a tenant/licensee  is  inevitable.  So  the doctrine  of  livelihood  cannot discriminately be extended to the area of commercial operation.”

13. On the other hand, Mr. Prashanta K. Goswami,

the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of

some of the respondents, draws our attention to

the  Catering  Policy,  2010.  He  contends  that 3 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694

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revenue  collection  for  the  State  cannot  be  a

yardstick or consideration for deciding renewals

of  licenses  of  licensees.  The  learned  senior

counsel further submits that the licenses of these

small shop/ kiosk owners have been renewed in some

zones  of  the  Railways,  while  in  others  not

renewed,  which  action  of  the  appellants  is

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India.

14. Mr.  Raju  Ramachandran,  the  learned  senior

counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  one  of  the

respondent licensees contends that renewal of the

licenses  of  the  members  is  the  norm  under  the

Catering  Policy,  2010  and  that  the  right  to

renewal must be read into the contracts of the

existing  licensees.  The  learned  senior  counsel

further contends that the social objectives of the

Central Government, which is running the railways

across  the  country  and  which  is  the  major

transport industry catering to the need of a large

number of commuters, must necessarily include the

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protection  of  the  right  to  livelihood  of  the

members  of  the  respondents,  apart  from  the

protection of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution

of India.

15.Mr. Ramachandran further contends that two views

are legitimately possible to construe the renewal

clause. One is that renewals of the licenses that

can be done only through the tender route and the

other is to renew the existing or pre-existing

licenses.  He  contends  that  the  same  can  be

resolved  by  applying  the  principle  of  ‘contra

proferentem’,  or  interpretation  against  the

draftsman. In this connection, reliance has been

placed  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  upon  the

decision of this Court in Bank of India & Ors. v.

K. Mohandas & Ors.4, wherein it has been held as

under:

“31.  It  is  also  a  well-recognized principle of construction of a contract that it must be read as a whole in order to  ascertain  the  true  meaning  of  its several  clauses  and  the  words  of  each

4 (2009) 5 SCC 313

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clause  should  be  interpreted  so  as  to bring  them  into  harmony  with  the  other provisions if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally  susceptible.  [(The  North Eastern Railway Company v. L. Hastings) 1900 AC 260]. 32. The fundamental position is that it is  the  banks  who  were  responsible  for formulation  of  the  terms  in  the contractual  Scheme  that  the  optees  of voluntary  retirement  under  that  Scheme will be eligible to pension under Pension Regulations,  1995,  and,  therefore,  they bear the risk of lack of clarity, if any. It  is  a  well-known  principle  of construction  of  contract  that  if  the terms applied by one party are unclear, an interpretation against that party is preferred  [Verba  Chartarum  Fortius Accipiuntur Contra Proferentum].”  

16.The learned senior counsel further contends that

the social objectives of the Policy are clearly

meant to side step the profit making objective. He

places reliance on a Constitution Bench decision

of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Olga  Tellis  v.

Bombay Municipal Corporation5, wherein it was held

that  the  right  to  life  includes  the  right  to

livelihood. In that case, the Court held as under:

5 (1985) 3 SCC 545

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“32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners' case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which  is  guaranteed  by  Article  21 includes  the  right  to  livelihood  and since,  they  will  be  deprived  of  their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum  and  pavement  dwellings,  their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the  factual  correctness  of  the  premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood.  Upon that  assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right  to  livelihood.  We  see  only  one answer to that question, namely, that it does.  The  sweep  of  the  right  to  life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according  to  procedure  established  by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that  right  is  the  right  to  livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not  treated  as  a  part  of  the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such  deprivation  would  not  only  denude the  life  of  its  effective  content  and meaningfulness  but  it  would  make  life impossible  to  live.  And  yet,  such

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deprivation  would  not  have  to  be  In accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live,  leave  aside  what  makes  life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall  have  deprived  him  of  his  life. Indeed,  that  explains  the  massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which people their desertion of  their  hearths  and  homes  in  the villages that struggle for survival, that is,  the  struggle  for  life.  So unimpeachable  is  the  evidence  of  the nexus  between  life  and  the  means  of livelihood. They have to eat to live : Only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat,  only  if  they  have  the  means  of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas J. in Baksey that the right to work is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. "Life", as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113, means something more than mere animal  existence  and  the  inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to  all  those  limits  and  faculties  by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. 33.  Article  39(a)  of  the  Constitution, which is a Directive Principle of State

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Policy, provides that the State shall, in particular,  direct  its  policy  towards securing that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 41, which is another  Directive  Principle,  provides, inter alia, that the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work in cases of unemployment  and  of  undeserved  want. Article  37  provides  that  the  Directive Principles, though not enforceable by any court,  are  nevertheless  fundamental  in the  governance  of  the  country.  The Principles  contained  in  Articles  39(a) and  41  must  be  regarded  as  equally fundamental  in  the  understanding  and interpretation of the meaning and content of  fundamental  rights.  If  there  is  an obligation upon the State to secure to the  citizens  an  adequate  means  of livelihood  and  the  right  to  work,  it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative  action,  be  compellable  to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who  is  deprived  of  his  right  to livelihood except according to just and fair  procedure  established  by  law,  can challenge  the  deprivation  as  offending the right to life conferred by Article 21.”

 (emphasis laid by this Court) 17.The learned senior counsel further places reliance

on  a  recent  decision  of  this  Court  in  Charu

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Khurana  v. Union  of  India6, wherein  the  above

stated principle enunciated in Olga Tellis (supra)

has been reiterated.

18.Before we advert to the contentions in detail, we

quote Justice Krishna Iyer from the case of  LIC

v. D.J. Bahadur7, wherein the learned Judge has

explained what should be the guiding force for

judges  when  faced  with  matters  pertaining  to

social justice, as under:

“Law is no cold-blooded craft bound by traditional  techniques  and  formal forceps  handed  down  to  us  from  the Indo-Anglian era but a warm-blooded art, with a bleak from the past and a tryst with  the  present,  deriving  its  soul force from the Constitution enacted by the  People  of  India.  Law,  as  Vice President G.S. Pathak used to emphasize in  several  lectures,  is  a  tool  to engineer  a  peaceful  'civil  revolution' one of the components of which is a fair deal to the weaker human sector like the working  class.  The  striking  social justice  values  of  the  Constitution impact on the interpretation of Indian laws  and  to  forget  this  essential postulate  while  relying  on  foreign erudition is to weaken the vital flame of the Democratic, Socialist Republic of

6 (2015) 1 SCC 192 7 (1981) 1 SCC 315

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India.”

19. The case of the appellants, in nutshell, is

that  the  railways  had  the  right  to  enact  the

Catering  Policy,  2010.  In  terms  of  the  said

Policy,  only  such  licensees  who  were  granted

license under the 2010 Policy were entitled to get

their contracts renewed and the same benefit could

not  be  extended  to  those  licensees  who  were

granted  license  prior  to  the  2010  Policy.

According  to  the  Catering  Policy  2010,  no

provision is made for the renewal of the existing

catering units on the expiry of the term of the

licenses.  The  renewal  of  the  licenses  of  the

licensee under para 16 of the Policy would apply

only  to  licensees  allotted  under  the  Catering

Policy 2010. The appellants have further submitted

that the renewals of the licenses by the Zonal

Railways upto 2013 was only meant to operate as a

temporary  arrangement  till  the  bidding  and

allocation process was finally completed.

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20. We are unable to agree with the contention

advanced on behalf of the Appellants. The Railway

Board  issued  Commercial  Circular  No.  37  dated

09.08.2010,  which  contained  the  following

instructions:

“1. Transfer of License Units: d.  Zonal  railways  should  renew  all agreements which have expired or are due for expiry in the next 6 months by giving an extension, subject to a maximum extension of six  months  from  the  date  of  issue  of Catering Policy, 2010.”

This circular clarifies that the renewal of the

license  is  required  to  be  granted  to  all  the

existing  licensees  of  the  Minor  Units  as  per

clauses 16 and 17 of the Catering Policy, 2010.

It also becomes clear that the existing licensees

need  not  be  included  in  the  tender  process.

Circular  dated  23.08.2011  issued  by  the  Chief

Commercial  Manager  of  South  Central  Railway

directed all the Divisional Commercial Managers

and  other  subordinate  officers  of  the  South

Central Railway to confirm that the tenure of all

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GMUs  and  SMUs  at  “A1”,  “A”  and  “B”  category

stations shall be renewed after every 3 years on

their satisfactory performance and payment of all

dues and arrears as per the 2010 Policy. In view

of the said circular, catering licenses of all

the  members  of  the  respondent  Association  were

renewed till July 2013. On this aspect of the

case, the learned single Judge of the High Court

has held as under:

“While the 2010 Policy proper has not envisaged  renewal  of  the  existing licenses for a period not exceeding six months,  the  Immediate  Operative Instructions  issued  in  commercial circular no. 37/2010 dated 09.08.2010 has  directed  the  Zonal  Railways  to renew the licenses for a maximum period of six months from the date of issue of the 2010 Policy. If the 2010 Policy is understood as providing renewals only in respect of the licenses issued under the said Policy, there was no reason why the respondent No. 3 has not called for tenders on the expiry of six months period  from  the  date  of  coming  into force of the 2010 Policy. Instead of calling  for  tenders,  the  respondent No.3 has renewed all the GMU and SMU licenses for a period of three years in terms of paras 16.1.3 and 16.2.1 of the 2010 Policy. This was done even before Para  16.3  was  amended.  Having

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understood the 2010 Policy in its true spirit  even  before  the  amendment  of Para 16.3, it is incomprehensible that respondent  no.3  projects  the  said policy in a different light by seeking to give it an interpretation which runs contrary to its plain language. Nowhere in the 2010 Policy, the licensees are classified into two categories, namely, those who were granted licenses prior to the commencement of the 2010 Policy and  those  who  were  granted  licenses after the said Policy. On the contrary, all  the  GMUs  and  SMUs  were  treated under  one  category.  Irrespective  of whether  the licenses  were granted  by the Railways prior to 2005 or by the IRCTC  from  2005  and  by  the  Indian Railways  after  2010,  renewal  of licenses  is  envisaged  for  all  these categories  of  licensees  subject  to their  fulfillment  of  the  three requirements  as  referred  to hereinbefore.”

(emphasis laid by this Court)

The findings of the learned single Judge have been

upheld by the Division Bench and we do find any

reason to interfere with the same. Article 14 of

the  Constitution  of  India  mandates  that  state

action must not be arbitrary and discriminatory. It

must  also  not  be  guided  by  any  extraneous

considerations which are antithetical to equality.

A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of

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R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority8 held

as under:

“21  ……It  must,  therefore  follow  as  a necessary corollary from the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14 that though the  State is entitled to refuse to enter into relationship with any one, yet if it does so, it cannot arbitrarily choose any person it likes for entering into such relationship and discriminate between persons similarly circumstanced, but it must act in conformity with some standard  or principle  which meets  the test  of  reasonableness  and non-discrimination  and  any  departure from such standard or principle would be invalid unless it can be supported or justified  on  some  rational  and non-discriminatory ground.”

              (emphasis laid by this Court)

21. India is a welfare State. Article 38 of the

Constitution  of  India,  which  is  a  Directive

Principle of State Policy, reads as under:

“38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people.— (1) The State shall strive to promote the welfare  of  the  people  by  securing  and protecting  as  effectively  as  it  may  a social  order  in  which  justice,  social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.

8 (1979) 3 SCC 489

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(2)  The  State  shall,  in  particular, strive  to  minimise  the  inequalities  in income,  and  endeavour  to  eliminate inequalities  in  status,  facilities  and opportunities,  not  only  amongst individuals  but  also  amongst  groups  of people  residing  in  different  areas  or engaged in different vocations.”

22.It is the duty of every welfare state to generate

employment. Presently, millions of youth of the

country are unemployed. The right to livelihood is

a part of right to life, as has been held in the

case of  Olga Tellis (supra). A vast majority of

the unemployed population of the country then, is

susceptible to being exploited by the rich and the

capitalists. It is the duty of the state, acting

through its instrumentalities to ensure that no

person in a vulnerable position is exploited. In

the case of People’s Union for Democratic Rights

& Ors.  v. Union of India9,  Bhagwati,J. lamenting

on the exploitation of the weak and the powerless

held as under:

“………The Rule of Law does not mean that the 9

(1982) 3 SCC 235

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protection  of  the  law  must  be  available only to a fortunate few or that the law should be allowed to be prostituted by the vested  interests  for  protecting  and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement  of  their  civil  and  political rights.  The  poor  too  have  civil  and political  rights  and  the  Rule  of  Law  is meant for them also, though today it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol kings have the Fundamental  Right  to  carry  on  their business  and  to  fatten  their  purses  by exploiting the consuming public, have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata of society  no  Fundamental  Right  to  earn  an honest living through their sweat and toil? ………civil  and  political  rights,  priceless and invaluable as they are for freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast masses of our people. Large numbers of men, women and children who constitute the bulk of  our  population  are  today  living  a sub-human existence in conditions of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has broken their  back  and  sapped  their  moral  fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and  economic  system.  What  civil  and political  rights  are  these  poor  and deprived  sections  of  humanity  going  to enforce?”

23. This Court, being entrusted with the task of

being the countermajoritarian institution, is duty

bound to ensure that the rights of the downtrodden

minorities and the members of the weaker sections

of the society are not trampled upon.

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24. One more important aspect to be taken note of

by this Court is the non governance of railway

property in the past 67 years since independence.

Though, it is a recognized principle of law that

the property of the railways is public property,

yet  in  reality,  it  is  the  private  players  and

industries  that  are  allowed  to  carry  on  their

business for transport of raw materials from one

place  to  another.  After  the  enactment  of  the

Railways  Act,  1989,  the  Rail  Land  Development

Authority has been established under Chapter IIA

of  the  Act  to  manage  the  railway  property  by

framing policy or rules for allotment of the same

in  favour  of  the  licensees,  including  fixing

license fee or occupation charges in respect of

the vast extent of vacant property from which huge

revenue  can  be  collected,  which  is  a  laudable

object  to  cater  to  the  need  of  the  public  at

large. The periodical revision of license fee in

respect of such big operators has not been done by

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the railways. Also, the Policy of not renewing the

licenses of those persons who are members of the

respondents  are  completely  dependent  on

self-earning  from  these  small  units  and  making

them  participate  in  a  public  competition  is

absolutely unfair, unreasonable and arbitrary. The

chances of such persons being deprived of their

right to livelihood is also an important factor

which has to be taken into consideration by this

Court  to  interpret  the  policy  framed  by  the

appellants. The callous attitude as far as the

inaction on the part of the State in tackling the

problem of rising unemployment is appalling. The

situation is made worse by the handing over of

public functions to private entrepreneurs, which

then  exploit  the  policies  of  the  government

against the poor and downtrodden people of the

country. If the appellants under the guise of the

policy are permitted to deny renewal of licenses

in favour of the licensees, it would amount to

deprivation  of  their  right  to  freedom  of

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occupation  guaranteed under  Article 19(1)(g)  of

the  Constitution  as  well  as  the  right  to

livelihood, which action of the appellants would

be diametrically opposed to their constitutional

duty towards social justice as well as uplifting

the  weaker  sections  of  the  society  and  the

unemployed youth of the country.

25.In  the  case  of  Consumer  Education  &  Research

Center v. Union of India10  a three Judge Bench of

this Court observed as under:

“Social justice, equality and dignity of person  are  cornerstones  of  social democracy.  The  concept  'social  justice' which the Constitution of India engrafted, consists  of  diverse  principles  essential for the orderly growth and development of personality  of  every  citizen.……Social justice  is  a  dynamic  device  to  mitigate the sufferings of the poor, weak, Dalits, Tribals  and  deprived  sections  of  the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live a life with dignity of person. Social justice is not a simple or single  idea  of  a  society  but  is  an essential part of complex social change to relieve  the  poor  etc.  from  handicaps, penury to ward off distress, and to make their  life  livable,  for  greater  good  of the society at large. In other words, the

10 (1995) 3 SCC 42

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aim  of  social  justice  is  to  attain substantial degree of social, economic and political  equality,  which  is  the legitimate  expectation.  Social  security, just  and  humane  conditions  of  work  and leisure  to  workman  are  part  of  his meaningful  right  to  life  and  to  achieve self- expression of his personality and to enjoy  the  life  with  dignity,  the  State should  provide  facilities  and opportunities to enable them to reach at least minimum standard of health, economic security  and  civilised  living  while sharing according to the capacity, social and cultural heritage.”

Further,  in  the  case  of  Sadhuram  Bansal  v. Pulin

Sarkar11 this Court held as under:

“There  is  no  ritualistic  formula  or  any magical  charm  in  the  concept  of  social justice.  All  that  it  means  is  that  as between two parties if a deal is made with one party without serious detriment to the other, then the Court would lean in favour of  the  weaker  section  of  the  society, Social  justice  is  the  recognition  of greater  good  to  larger  number  without deprivation  of  accrued  legal  rights  of anybody. If such a thing can be done then indeed social justice must prevail over any technical rule. It is in response to the felt necessities of time and situation in order to do greater good to a larger number even  though  it  might  detract  from  some technical rule in favour of a party.”   

11 (1984) 3 SCC 410

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26.Keeping in view the evolving concept of social

justice, we allow the members of respondents who

are  the  licensees  to  continue  their  petty

business, especially in the absence of employment

potentiality  in  the  country  on  account  of

non-governance  and  non-  implementation  of  the

constitutional  philosophy  of  an  egalitarian

society,  which  provides  the  opportunity  to  all

individuals to lead a life of dignity. The right

to life with dignity has been interpreted to be a

part of right to life by this Court in the case of

Francis  Coralie  Mullin  v. Administrator,  Union

Territory of Delhi & Ors.12 , as under:

“We  think  that  the  right  to  life includes the right to live with human dignity  and  all  that  goes  along  with it,  namely,  the  bare  necessaries  of life  such  as  adequate  nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading,  writing  and  expressing one-self  in  diverse  forms,  freely moving about and mixing and commingling with  fellow  human  beings.  Of  course, the  magnitude  and  content  of  the components of this right would depend upon  the  extent  of  the  economic

12 (1981) 1 SCC 608

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development  of  the  country,  but  it must,  in  any  view  of  the  matter, include  the  right  to  the  basic necessities of life and also the right to  carry  on  such  functions  and activities  as  constitute  the  bare minimum expression of the human-self.”

27. Therefore,  we  have  to  hold  that  the

provisions  of  the  Catering  Policy,  2010  are

applicable  to  the  concerned  respondents.  The

action of the railways in not granting renewals of

the licenses to the members of the respondents is

arbitrary,  unreasonable,  unfair  and

discriminatory, and the same cannot be allowed to

sustain in law.

28.For the reasons stated supra, this Court cannot

interfere with the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court. The Civil Appeals are dismissed.

The order dated 11.04.2014 granting stay of the

impugned order shall stands vacated. We, however,

make it clear that only those licensees may be

eligible for renewal of their licenses who can

declare on affidavit that they do not have the

license of more than one shop or kiosk in their

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name or  benami license at the railway stations

with  periodical  reasonable  increase  of  license

fee. All pending applications are disposed of.

                                 …………………………………………………J.   

                                                            [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

                                      …………………………………………………J.                                           [AMITAVA ROY]

New Delhi, January 29, 2016

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ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment       COURT NO.10               SECTION XIIA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).  618-620/2016 @ SLP(C) Nos.9921-9923/2014 SENIOR DIVISIONAL COMMERCIAL MANAGER & ORS       Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS S.C.R CATERERS,DRY FRUITS,F.J.S.W ASSOCI AND ANR.  Respondent(s)

Date : 29/01/2016 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)                      Mr. Shreekant N. Terdal,Adv.                       For Respondent(s)                      Ms. Ranjeeta Rohtagi,Adv.                      Ms. Diksha Rai,Adv.                      Mr. Venkateswara Rao Anumolu,Adv.

Mr. Goli Rama Krishna, Adv.  Mr. Prabhakar Parnam, Adv.  Mr. Shashwat Goel, Adv.

                    Dr. Rajeev Sharma,Adv.                        

Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment  of  the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy.

Applications for intervention are allowed. Leave granted. The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed

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Reportable Judgment. All pending applications are disposed of.

(VINOD KUMAR) COURT MASTER

(MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER

  (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)