Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4988 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.22040/2008]

and CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4989 OF 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No.23566/2008]

The Secretary, Sh. A. P. D.Jain Pathshala & Ors. … Appellants

Vs.

Shivaji Bhagwat More & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J.

Leave granted in both the petitions.  

2. The  Government  of  Maharashtra  by  Government  Resolution  dated  

27.4.2000  accorded  sanction  for  implementation  of  the  Shikshan  Sevak  

scheme in all recognized private secondary/higher secondary schools/Junior  

colleges/B.Ed. colleges, in the state. The said scheme in essence provided  

for (i) appointment of Shikshan Sevaks for a term of one year on payment of  

a fixed honorarium, (ii) renewal of such appointment annually, if the work  

was found to be satisfactory, (iii) absorption of such Shikshan Sevaks into

service  as  teachers  on  completion  of  the  specified  years  of  service.  It  

provided for constitution of a three member Grievance Redressal Committee  

(consisting of the concerned Divisional Deputy Director of Education, the  

Assistant  Director  and the Education Officer)  to consider  and decide the  

grievances relating to selection,  appointment,  re-appointment  or  mid-year  

cancellation of appointment. The scheme provided as follows:  

“All the complaints received under the Shikshan Sevak scheme are to be  referred to the aforesaid Three Member Committee. This committee will  hold  monthly  meetings  and  render  its  decision  on  the  complaints  and   would inform the same to the concerned. An opportunity to put up the case   would be given to the complainant.”

(Emphasis supplied]

3. The  Bombay  High  Court  disposed  of  several  writ  petitions  

challenging  the  said  scheme,  by  order  dated  16.8.2000,  recording  the  

submission made on behalf of the state government that it would amend the  

scheme by incorporating the several modifications suggested by the court.  

While  doing  so,  the  High  Court  also  directed  the  state  government  to  

reconstitute the Grievance Redressal Committee with a retired District Judge  

as Chairman and the Deputy Director and Education Officer (Secondary) of  

the  concerned  region  as  members.  The  High  Court  further  directed  as  

follows :  

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“All complaints relating to unsatisfactory work or misconduct etc. will be  forwarded to the Committee who shall take decision within 30 days from  the date of receipt of record after giving an opportunity to the concerned  parties to file their  replies so as to avoid prolonged procedure of oral   hearing.

All complaints in respect of appointment, termination etc. shall be dealt  with only by the Committee constituted above and by no other authority.  As the scheme is being implemented on interim basis we direct that no   Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application in respect of disputes   which are required to be dealt with by the Committee.”

(emphasis supplied)

4. In  compliance  with  the  said  decision  dated  16.8.2000,  the  State  

Government  by  Government  Resolution  dated  13.10.2000  modified  the  

scheme. Clause (17) of the modified scheme implemented the direction of  

the  High  Court  regarding  the  re-constitution  of  the  Three  Member  

Committee  and provided that  the  Committee  would function at  Mumbai,  

Aurangabad  and  Nagpur,  the  area  of  jurisdiction  of  the  committees  

corresponding to the jurisdiction of the benches of High Court at Mumbai,  

Aurangabad and Nagpur.  

5. By order dated 21.6.2001 in subsequent writ petitions, the High Court  

recorded the following submissions of the State Government :  

“The  learned  Advocate  General  stated  that  the  State  Government  will  appoint a nine member Grievance Committee and the pending grievances  of the Shikshan Sevaks will be referred to the said Grievance Committee.  The Committee will be headed by a retired Civil Judge, Sr. Division, who  will  be appointed  in  consultation  with the Registrar  of this  Court.  The  

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learned Advocate General assured the Court that the appointment of the  Committee member will  be notified within a period of six weeks from  today. He also stated that the Member of the Grievance Committee will be  given  salary  and  emoluments  as  paid  to  the  member  of  the  School  Tribunal and necessary infrastructure will also be provided. He stated that  the  Committee  will  hold  the  proceedings  in  Mumbai,  Aurangabad  and  Nagpur  to  consider  the  grievances  of  the  Shikshan  Sevaks  of  the  respective regions.”    

Thereafter,  Government  Resolution  dated  27.7.2001  was  issued  directing  

that  the  grievances  will  be  considered  by  a  Single  Member  committee  

consisting  of  retired  Judge  (higher  level)  at  Mumbai,  Aurangabad  and  

Nagpur  by way of circuit  bench and  resolve  the complaints  of  Shikshan  

Sevaks.

Facts of this case

6. The appellants appointed the first respondent as a Shikshan Sevak on  

29.7.2000 for the period 1.8.2000 to 31.7.2003. The first respondent alleges  

that his services were orally terminated on 11.6.2001. On the other hand, the  

appellants allege that services of first respondent came to an end in March-

April, 2001 (as his appointment was not approved due to lack of prescribed  

qualifications); and the first respondent joined another school as an assistant  

teacher in July,  2001. The first  respondent challenged his termination  by  

filing  an  appeal  before  the  School  Tribunal.  Later  he  withdrew the  said  

appeal on 18.10.2003 and filed an appeal before the Grievance Committee in  

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the year 2004. The appellants raised various preliminary objections about the  

maintainability  of  the  complaint.  As  the  Grievance  Committee  did  not  

consider them, the appellants filed W.P. No.7597/2005 seeking a direction to  

the Grievance Committee to decide the preliminary issues. The High Court  

admitted the said writ petition was admitted, but did not stay the proceedings  

before the Grievance Committee.  Therefore,  the Committee  proceeded to  

hear the matter and allowed the appeal by order dated 28.7.2006. It quashed  

the termination dated 11.6.2001 and directed the appellants to reinstate the  

first respondent forthwith in any of their high schools without back wages  

but  with  continuity  of  service  with  a  further  direction  to  the  Education  

Officer  to  approve  the  appointment  of  the  first  respondent  as  a  regular  

teacher/assistant  teacher.  The  appellants  filed  W.P.No.6196/2006  

challenging the order dated 28.7.2006. A learned Single Judge admitted the  

said writ petition on 2.5.2008 but refused to stay the order of the Grievance  

Committee.  The  said  order  dated  2.5.2008  refusing  the  interim  relief  is  

challenged in the second of these two appeals.   

7. The  first  respondent  filed  a  writ  petition  (W.P.No.7362/2007)  in  

September, 2007 seeking a direction to the appellants to implement the order  

dated  28.7.2006  passed  by  the  Grievance  Committee.  In  the  said  writ  

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petition,  the  High  Court  while  issuing  notice  on  31.3.2008,  directed  the  

Education officer to ensure the compliance by the appellants, of the order  

dated 28.7.2006 passed by the Grievance Committee forthwith, unless the  

said  order  was  challenged  and  a  stay  obtained.  The  appellants  filed  an  

application seeking vacation of the said interim order dated 31.3.2008 which  

was  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  by  order  dated  5.8.2008,  holding  as  

follows :  

(i) The Grievance Committee had the power to decide the legality of the  

termination.  

(ii) When the Grievance Committee comes to a conclusion that the order  

of  termination  is  bad  or  illegal,  the  Shikshan  Sevak  whose  services  are  

terminated, would continue to be on the rolls of the school.   

(iii) As the management receives grant-in-aid in regard to Shikshan Sevak,  

the  appellants  were  bound  to  comply  with  the  direction  issued  by  the  

Grievance Committee.  

The said order is challenged in the first of these two appeals.  This Court  

on  15.9.2008  while  issuing  notice  granted  interim  stay  of  the  orders  

dated 31.3.2008 and 5.8.2008.  

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The Issue

8. Under the  Shikshan Sevak Scheme,  as originally formulated by the  

State  Government  by  Government  Resolution  dated  27.4.2000,  the  

Grievance Redressal Committee was merely a mechanism to hear grievances  

of  Shikshan  Sevaks and  give  its  recommendation  to  the  Education  

Department,  so  that  the  department  could  take  appropriate  action.  The  

Grievance Committee was not intended to be a quasi-judicial forum as was  

evident  from  the  following:  (a)  The  committee  was  constituted  only  to  

consider  the  grievances  of  the  Shikshan  Sevaks by  giving  them  an  

opportunity  of  putting  forth  their  grievances.  (b)  The  scheme  did  not  

contemplate issue of notice to the employer, nor hearing both parties, nor  

rendering any adjudicatory decision. (c) The committee was a departmental  

committee with only the concerned officers as members.

9. The High Court  while  recommending  various  modifications  to  the  

said scheme, in its order dated 16.8.2000, issued specific directions making  

significant  changes  in  the constitution  and functioning of  the committee.  

Firstly it directed a change in the constitution of the committee by requiring  

a retired District Judge to head the Committee. Secondly, it directed that an  

opportunity  should  be  given  to  the  ‘parties’,  that  is,  the  complainant  

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(Shikshan Sevak) and the person against whom the complaint was made (the  

employer)  to  file  their  statements/replies,  before  adjudicating  upon  the  

dispute.  Thirdly,  it  directed  that  the  committee  should  be  the  only  

adjudicatory authority and excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts (and  

any other  authority)  to  entertain  any  suit  or  application  in  regard  to  the  

disputes relating to selection, appointment, re-appointment or cancellation of  

appointment of  Shikshan Sevaks. The aforesaid three changes by the High  

Court converted what was originally conceived by the State Government to  

be an administrative grievance redressal  mechanism,  into a quasi  judicial  

adjudicatory Tribunal.  This was reiterated by a subsequent order of the High  

Court  converting the  committee  into a  one-man Tribunal  consisting  of  a  

retired Judge (of the rank of Civil Judge, Senior Division).  

10. The appellants contend that the constitution of such a quasi judicial  

tribunal, by a judicial fiat to the state government, was without the authority  

of law and invalid, and consequently, the decisions by such a forum are void  

and unenforceable.  On the contentions raised, the following questions arise  

for our consideration :  

(i) Whether the High Court can direct the State Government to create a  quasi  judicial  forum;  and whether  creation  of  such a  forum by an  

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executive  order,  by  the  State  Government,  in  pursuance  of  such a  direction, is valid?

(ii) Whether  the  High  Court  could,  by  a  judicial  order,  exclude  the  jurisdiction  of  civil  courts  to  entertain  any  suits  or  applications  in  respect of disputes raised by Shikshan Sevaks?  

(iii) Whether  the  High  Court  was  justified  in  holding  that  when  the  Grievance Committee holds that the order of termination is bad or  illegal, it does not amount to ordering reinstatement, but the Shikshan  Sevak would  as  a  result  continue  to  be  in  the  employment  of  the  employer?

(iv) Whether the orders dated 2.5.2008 and 5.8.2008 of the High Court  call for interference?  

11. In the State of Maharashtra, the conditions of service of employees of  

private  schools  are  governed  by  the  Maharashtra  Employees  of  Private  

Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (‘Act’ for short). The  

said Act applies to employees of primary schools, secondary schools, higher  

secondary schools, junior colleges of education or any other institutions by  

whatever name called including technical, vocational or art institutions. The  

term ‘employee’ was initially defined as any member of the teaching and  

non-teaching  staff  of  a  recognized  school.  Section  8  provided  for  

constitution  of  School  Tribunals  consisting  of  single  member  who is  an  

officer of the rank of Civil Judge (Senior Division). Section 9 gave a right of  

appeal to the employees of private schools to the Tribunal. The Tribunal was  

given the power to give appropriate reliefs and directions to the management  

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including reinstatement, awarding of lesser punishment, restoration of rank,  

payment of arrears of emoluments etc., and also the power to levy penalty.  

When the  Shikshan Sevak Scheme was introduced in the year 2000, it was  

assumed that the Shikshan Sevaks were not “employees” of private schools  

and therefore will not be entitled to approach the School Tribunals for relief.  

Therefore, the scheme provided a grievance redressal mechanism. When the  

validity of the scheme was challenged, the High Court was also of the view  

that  the  Act  would  not  apply  to  Shikshan  Sevaks as  they  were  not  

‘employees’ as defined under the Act. The High Court however was of the  

view that Shikshan Sevaks  should have recourse to remedies similar to the  

regular employees of private schools and therefore directed reconstitution of  

the grievance committees on the lines of the School Tribunal. The Act was  

amended  by  Amendment  Act  14  of  2007  whereby  the  definition  of  

‘employee’  was  expanded  to  include  Shikshan  Sevaks.  Ever  since  the  

amendments  to  the  Act,  by  Act  14  of  2007,  came  into  force,  Shikshan  

Sevaks have  the  remedy  of  approaching  the  statutory  School  Tribunals  

constituted under the Act for redressal of their grievances and the Grievance  

Committees became redundant. Thus what falls for consideration in this case  

is the position that existed prior to the 2007 Amendment to the Act.  

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Re: Question (i)

12. Chapter  VI  of  the  Constitution  of  India  deals  with  Sub-ordinate  

Courts.  Article 233 of the Constitution of India relates to appointment of  

District  Judges.  Article  234  relates  to  recruitment  of  persons  other  than  

District  Judges  to  the  judicial  service  and  provides  that  appointment  of  

persons to the judicial service of a State (other than District Judges) shall be  

made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the Rules made by  

him  in  that  behalf  after  consultation  with  the  State  Public  Service  

Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to  

such State. Article 247 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in  

Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution, Parliament may by law provide for  

the establishment of any additional courts for the better administration of  

laws made by the Parliament or of any existing laws with respect to a matter  

enumerated in the union list.  

13. Part  XIV-A  of  the  Constitution  of  India  deals  with  Tribunals.  

Article  323A  provides  for  the  creation  of  Administrative  Tribunals.  

Article 323B provides that the appropriate Legislature may by law provide  

for  the  adjudication  or  trial  by  Tribunals  of  any  disputes,  complaints  or  

offences  with respect  to all  or  any of  the matters  specified  in clause (2)  

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thereof with respect to which such Legislature has power to make laws. The  

matters enumerated in clause (2) of Article 323B do not include disputes  

relating  to  employees  of  educational  institutions.  This  Court  in  State  of   

Karnataka vs.  Vishwabharathi House Building Co-op., Society – 2003 (2)  

SCC 412 has clarified that Articles 323A and 323B enabling the setting up  

of Tribunals,  are not to be interpreted as prohibiting the legislature from  

establishing Tribunals not covered by the said Articles as long as there is  

legislative competence under an appropriate entry in the Seventh Schedule.  

14. Courts and Tribunals are constituted by the State, to invest judicial  

functions,  as  distinguished  from  purely  administrative  or  executive  

functions, (vide Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh – 1955 (1)  

SCR  267).   ‘Courts’  refer  to  hierarchy  of  courts  invested  with  state’s  

inherent  judicial  power  established  to  administer  justice  in  pursuance  of  

constitutional mandate.  Tribunals are established under special Statutes to  

decide  the  controversies  arising  under  those  special  laws.  In  Associated  

Cement  Companies  Ltd.  vs.  P.N.Sharma [1965  (2)  SCR 366]  this  Court  

observed :  

“…Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes  of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its  judicial  functions  and  powers  mainly  to  the  courts  established  by  the  Constitution;  but  that  does  not  affect  the  competence  of  the  State,  by  

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appropriate  measures,  to  transfer  a  part  of  its  judicial  powers  and  functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon  special matters and disputes between parties.”  

[emphasis supplied]

In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu [1992  Supp(2) SCC 651], this Court held:  

“Where there is a lis - an affirmation by one party and denial by another -  and  the  dispute  necessarily  involves  a  decision  on  the  rights  and  obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it,  there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if  it does not have all the trappings of a court.”

In  Union  of  India  v.  Madras  Bar  Association [2010  (11)  SCC  1],  a  

Constitution Bench of this Court held:   

“The term `Courts' refers to places where justice is administered or refers  to Judges who exercise judicial functions. Courts are established by the  state for administration of justice that is for exercise of the judicial power  of the state to maintain and uphold the rights, to punish wrongs and to  adjudicate  upon  disputes.  Tribunals  on  the  other  hand  are  special  alternative institutional mechanisms, usually brought into existence by or   under a statute to decide disputes arising with reference to that particular   statute, or  to  determine  controversies  arising  out  of  any administrative  law.  Courts  refer  to  Civil  Courts,  Criminal  Courts  and  High  Courts.  Tribunals can be either private Tribunals (Arbitral Tribunals), or Tribunals  constituted under the Constitution (Speaker or the Chairman acting under  Para  6(1)  of  the  Tenth  Schedule)  or  Tribunals  authorized  by  the  Constitution (Administrative Tribunals under Article 323A and Tribunals  for other matters  under Article  323B) or Statutory Tribunals  which are  created under a statute (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Debt Recovery  Tribunals and consumer fora).”

(emphasis supplied)

15. Apart  from  constitutional  provisions,  Tribunals  with  adjudicatory  

powers can be created only by Statutes. Such Tribunals are normally vested  

with  the  power  to  summon  witnesses,  administer  oath,  and  compel  

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attendance of witnesses and examine them on oath, and receive evidence.  

Their powers are derived from the statute that created them and they have to  

function within the limits imposed by such statute. It is possible to achieve  

the independence associated with a judicial authority only if it is created in  

terms  of  the  Constitution  or  a  law  made  by  the  Legislature.   Creation,  

continuance or existence of a judicial  authority in a democracy must  not  

depend  on  the  discretion  of  the  executive  but  should  be  governed  and  

regulated by appropriate law enacted by a Legislature. In this context, it is  

worthwhile  to  refer  to  the  following  observations  of  the  European  

Commission of Human Rights in Zand vs. Austria (Appeal No.7360 of 1976  

decided on 12.10.1978): “The judicial organization in a democratic society  

must not depend on the discretion of the executive, but should be regulated  

by law emanating from the Parliament”.  

16. Article 162 of the Constitution, no doubt, provides that subject to the  

provisions of the constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to  

the  matters  upon  which  the  Legislature  of  the  State  has  competence  to  

legislate and are not  confined to matters  over which legislation has been  

already passed. It is also well settled that so long as the State Government  

does not go against the provisions of the Constitution or any law, the width  

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and  amplitude  of  its  executive  power  under  Article  162  cannot  be  

circumscribed; and if there is no enactment covering a particular aspect, the  

Government  could  carry  on  the  administration  by  issuing  administrative  

directions or instructions, until the legislature makes a law in that behalf.  

(See  Ram Jawaya  Kapur  Vs.  State  of  Punjab –  1955  (2)  SCR 225  and  

Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan vs. State of U.P. – 1982 (1) SCC 39.  But  

the  powers  of  the  State  to  exercise  executive  powers  on  par  with  the  

legislative  powers  of  the  legislature,  is  “subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  

Constitution”. The provisions of the Constitution, namely Articles 233, 234  

and 247 for constituting sub-ordinate courts, and Articles 323A and 323B  

for constituting tribunals by law made by the legislature, make it clear that  

judicial Tribunals shall  be created only by statutes or rules framed under  

authority granted by the Constitution. If the power to constitute and create  

judicial  Tribunals  by  executive  orders  is  recognized,  there  is  every  

likelihood  of  Tribunals  being  created  without  appropriate  provisions  in  

regard  to  their  constitution,  functions,  powers,  appeals,  revisions,  and  

enforceability of their orders, leading to chaos and confusion. There is also  

very  real  danger  of  citizen’s  rights  being  adversely  affected  by  ad  hoc  

authorities  exercising  judicial  functions,  who  are  not  independent  or  

competent  to adjudicate disputes and render binding decisions. Therefore,  

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the  executive  power  of  the  State  cannot  be extended to  creating  judicial  

Tribunals  or  authorities  exercising  judicial  powers  and rendering judicial  

decisions.

17. Neither the Constitution nor any statute empowers a High Court to  

create or constitute quasi judicial Tribunals for adjudicating disputes. It has  

no legislative powers. Nor can it  direct the executive branch of the State  

Government to create or constitute quasi judicial Tribunals, otherwise than  

by legislative Statutes. Therefore, it is not permissible for the High Court to  

direct the State Government to constitute judicial authorities or Tribunals by  

executive  orders,  nor  permissible  for  the  State  by  executive  order  or  

resolution create them for adjudication of rights of parties.  

Re: Question (ii)

18. Section  9  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  provides  that  the  courts  

shall, subject to the provisions of the Code, have jurisdiction to try all suits  

of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly  

or impliedly barred. The express or implied bar necessarily refers to a bar  

created  by  the  Code  itself  or  by  any  statute  made  by  a  Legislature.  

Therefore,  the  High  Court  in  exercise  of   the  power  of  judicial  review,  

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cannot issue a direction that the civil courts shall not entertain any suit or  

application in regard to a particular type of disputes (in this case, disputes  

relating  to  Shikshan Sevaks)  nor  create  exclusive  jurisdiction  in  a  quasi-

judicial forum like the Grievance Committee will be entitled to deal with  

them.  The High Court,  cannot,  by  a  judicial  order,  nullify,  supersede  or  

render ineffectual the express provisions of an enactment.  

19. Therefore, we hold that constitution of a Grievance Committee as a  

public adjudicatory forum, whose decisions are binding on the parties to the  

disputes,  by  an  executive  order  of  the  Government  is  impermissible.  

Secondly, the High Court cannot in exercise of judicial power interfere with  

the jurisdiction of the civil  courts vested under Code of Civil  Procedure.  

Any such Grievance Committee created by an executive order, either on the  

direction of the High Court or otherwise, can only be fact finding bodies or  

recommending  bodies  which  can  look  into  the  grievances  and  make  

appropriate recommendations to the government or its authorities, for taking  

necessary  actions  or  appropriate  reports  to  enable  judicial  Tribunals  to  

render decisions. The Grievance Committee cannot be public quasi-judicial  

forum nor can its decisions be made final and binding on parties, in disputes  

relating to  Shikshan Sevaks. Therefore, it has to be held that any order or  

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opinion of the Grievance Committee on a complaint or grievance submitted  

by a  Shikshan Sevak were only recommendations to the State Government  

(Education Department) for taking further action and nothing more.  

Re : Questions (iii) & (iv)

20. Even assuming that  the committees  constituted under the  Shikshan  

Sevaks scheme were quasi judicial tribunals, they cannot direct reinstatement  

nor direct that the employees are deemed to continue in service by declaring  

the  termination  to  be  bad.  It  is  well  settled  that  courts  would  not  direct  

reinstatement of service nor grant a declaration that a contract of personnel  

service subsists and that the employee even after removal is deemed to be in  

service. [See :  S.B. Dutt vs. University of Delhi – AIR 1958 SC 1050]. The  

three recognized exceptions to the said rule are : (i) where a public servant  

having the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution is dismissed from  

service is in contravention of the provision; (ii) where a dismissed workman  

seeks  reinstatement  before  Industrial  Tribunals/Labour  Courts  under  the  

industrial law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of  

the mandatory obligation imposed by Statute. [See : Executive Committee of   

Vaish Degree College, Shamli vs. Lakshmi Narain – 1976 (2) SCR 1006].  

The direction of the High Court in its order dated 5.8.2008 that when the  

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grievance committee holds that the termination is bad, the Shikshan Sevak  is  

deemed to continue on the rolls of the management is therefore erroneous  

and liable to be set aside.  

21. If a Grievance Committee opines that the termination or cancellation  

of appointment of a  Shikshan Sevak was bad, the State Government may  

consider such opinion/recommendation and if it  decides to accept it,  take  

appropriate action by directing the school to take back the Shikshan Sevak,   

and if the school fails to comply, take such action as is permissible including  

stoppage  of  the  grant.  An opinion by the  Grievance  Committee  that  the  

termination of the services of a  Shikshan Sevak  is illegal can not however  

have the effect of either reinstating the employee into service, nor deemed to  

be a declaration that the  Shikshan Sevak  continues to be an employee of  

school. Even if a Shikshan Sevak is wrongly removed, the department could  

only  direct  the  school  to  take  him back  into  service  and  if  it  does  not  

comply, take action permissible in law for disobedience of its directions.  

22. Therefore the decision of  the committee  dated 28.7.2006 is  not  an  

enforceable or executable order but only a recommendation that can be made  

the basis by the Education Department to issue appropriate directions. It is  

needless  to  add  that  persons  aggrieved  by  such  directions  of  the  state  

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government will be entitled to challenge such directions either before the  

civil court or in a writ proceedings.  

23. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed and the orders dated  

2.5.2008 and 5.8.2008, are set aside. The order of the Grievance Committee  

is treated as a recommendation rendered for the benefit  of the Education  

Department  which can  on the  basis  of  the  said  opinion take  appropriate  

action in accordance with law. It is also open to the Shikshan Sevak to seek  

appropriate remedy if he is aggrieved by his termination, in accordance with  

law.

………………………J [R. V. Raveedran]

………………………J [A. K. Patnaik]

New Delhi; July 4, 2011.  

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