Page 1

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4506                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30969 OF 2011)

SAVITRI DEVI .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4830                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27508 OF 2010)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      4508-12                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 33552-33556 OF 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      4513-17         OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 33984-33988 OF 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.  4518-24         OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 36334-36340 OF 2011)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4819  OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 333 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      4525-26 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 1082-1083 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4527 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1104 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4529-30  OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1664-1665 OF 2012)

Page 2

2

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4531                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1739 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4532                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1858 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4533                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2411 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4534                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2537 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4535                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2557 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4536                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2603 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4537                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2607 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4538                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2612 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4539                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2873 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4540                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 3298 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4541                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 3473 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4543                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 3916 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4544                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 3918 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4545                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4021 OF 2012)

Page 3

3

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4546                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4024 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4547                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4223 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4548                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4242 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4549                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4249 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4550                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4542 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4551                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5566 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4552                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5712 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4553                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5959 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4554                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6013 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4555                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6027 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4556                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6121 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4557                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6196 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4558                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6345 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4559                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6353 OF 2012)

Page 4

4

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4560                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6363 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4561                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6368 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4563                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6369 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4564-67                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6466-6469 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4568-73                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6489-6494 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4575-76                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6534-6535 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4577                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6539 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4578                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6629 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4579-80                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6731-6732 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4581-89                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6748-6756 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4591                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7146 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4592                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7436 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4593                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7539 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4594                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7540 OF 2012)

Page 5

5

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4595                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7541 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4596                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7815 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4597-98                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7934-7935 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4599                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8380 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4600                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8439 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4601                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8528 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4602                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8593 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4603                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8849 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4604                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8851 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4605-07                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8853-8855 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4608                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9527 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4609                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9678 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4610                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9748 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4611                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9761 OF 2012)

Page 6

6

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4612                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10052 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4613-15                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10056-10058 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4616                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10315 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4617                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10597 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4618                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11303 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4619                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11304 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4620                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11879 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4621                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11993 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4622                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12299 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4623                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12461 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4624                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12844 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4625-30                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13641-13646 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4631                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15173 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4632                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15905 OF 2012)

Page 7

7

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4633                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16007 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4634                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16336 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4635                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16337 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4636                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16380 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4637                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17041 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4638                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18104 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4639                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19356 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4640                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.15370           OF 2015

@ SLP (C) NO.....CC 20540 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4641 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23723 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4642-4643                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23724-23725 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4644                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24203 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4645                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24720 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4646-4647                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 25551-25552 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4648-4650                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26874-26876 OF 2012)

Page 8

8

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4651                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27023 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4652                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27139 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4653-4660                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27389-27396 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4661-4666                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27502-27507 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4667                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 28140 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4668                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29279 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4669                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 33860 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4670                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37492 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4671                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37989 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4672                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37993 of 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4673                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38288 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4674                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38289 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4675                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 38290 OF 2012)

Page 9

9

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NOS. 237-238 OF 2013 IN

SLP (C) NOS. 1082-1083 OF 2012

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4677                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8631 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4678                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8635 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4679                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 8887 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4680                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9168 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4681                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9297 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4682                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12784 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4683                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13017 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4690-4691                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16722-16723 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4692                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17635 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4693                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18090 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4694                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18735 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4695                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18866 OF 2013)

Page 10

10

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4696-4697                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19200-19201 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4698                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19922 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4699                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 20329 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4700     OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23276 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4701-702                  OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23855-23856 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4703-4704                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23857-23858 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4705-4706                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23859-23860 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4707-4709                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24622-24624 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4710-4711                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26176-26177 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4712                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26178 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4713                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26179 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4714-4715                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26681-26682 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4716                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26868 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4717                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26890 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4718                OF 2015

Page 11

11

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30601 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4719                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30859 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4720                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30860 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4721                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30861 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4722                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 30862 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4723                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 32108 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4724                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 33980 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4726                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 34176 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4727                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 35109 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4728                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37793 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4729                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39351 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4730-4731                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39697-39698 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4732-4733                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39699-39700 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4734                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39701 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4735-4736                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 39702-39703 OF 2013)

Page 12

12

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4737                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 802 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4738                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2495 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4739                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 4566 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4740-4741                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5936-5937 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4742-45                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6024-6027 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4746                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 6682 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4747     OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7019 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4748                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7031 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4749                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 7036 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4750                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10065 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4751-53                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10147-10149 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4754                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 11737 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4755                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13401 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4756                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 14786 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4757                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12443 OF 2014)

Page 13

13

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4758                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 13034 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4759-60                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22298-22299 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4761-63                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22329-22331 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4764-65                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22384-22385 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4766-4768                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 22716-22718 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4769-4770                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36155-36156 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4771                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36436 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4772-74                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36647-36649 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4775                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12433 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4776                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 32391 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4777                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 23772 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4778                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 26260 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4779                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17559 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4780                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36242 OF 2013)

Page 14

14

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4781                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 29351 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4782                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 18356 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4783                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19521 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4784                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19523 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4785                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19525 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4786                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 19777 OF 2014)

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 444 OF 2013 IN

SLP (C) NO. 5566 OF 2012

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4787                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 25279 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4788                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 27102 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4789                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36391 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4790                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36390 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4791                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15397         OF 2015

@ SLP (C) NO...CC 21151 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4792                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 36975 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4793                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 9551 OF 2014)

Page 15

15

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4794-95                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10049-10050 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4796                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 10051 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4797                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12434 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4798-99                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12435-12436 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4800                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12437 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4801                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12438 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4802                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12439 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4803                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12441 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4804                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12442 OF 2014)

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 21 OF 2015 IN

SLP (C) NO. 27023 OF 2012

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4805                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 28167 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4806                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 2057 OF 2015)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4807                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17686 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4808                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37126 OF 2012)

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CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4809                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15636 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4810-18                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17088-17096 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4837                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 35143 OF 2013)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4807  OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17686 OF 2014)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4809                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15635 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4808                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 37126 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4809                OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 15636 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO.        4810-18                    OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 17088-17096 OF 2012)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2197 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2195 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2198 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2199 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2225 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2226 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2704 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2705 OF 2013

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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3022 OF 2013

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4902 OF 2014

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4928 OF 2014

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

These matters were heard in detail for few days and hearing was

concluded on 05.02.2015.  Thereupon, we communicated the result in

the open Court  by pronouncing that  appeals were dismissed and the

reasons shall follow.  These are, thus, our reasons for dismissing the

appeals.

Leave is granted in all the special leave petitions.

PROLOGUE :

2) The subject matter of most of these appeals are the Notifications dated

12-03-2008 issued by the State of  U.P. under  Section 4 of  the Land

Acquisition Act (“Act” for short) read with Section 17 of the Act as well as

declaration  issued  under  Section  6  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act

(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') vide Notification dated 30.06.2008.

Land situate in various villages of  Noida and Greater Noida in Tehsil

Dadri,  District  Gautam  Budh  Nagar  was  acquired.   Some  other

Notifications under  same provisions of  the Act  in  respect  of  lands of

these villages was also acquired by earlier Notifications.  The purpose

stated  in  the  notifications  was  'Planned  Industrial  Development'.

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Urgency  provisions  under  Section  17(1)  and  17(4)  of  the  Act  were

invoked thereby dispensing with the right of objection otherwise given to

the land holders under Section 5A of the Act. The total land which was

acquired  by  these  notification  was  589.188  hectares.   Some  writ

petitions were initially filed in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the

said Notifications, with primary contention that invocation of emergency

provision  and  taking  away  valuable  right  of  the  land  holders  under

Section 5A of  the Act  was illegal,  mala fide,  arbitrary  and colourable

exercise of power. Some of the writ petitions came up before the Division

Bench of the said High Court.  One was Writ Petition (C) 45777 of 2008

in the case of  Harish Chand and Others v. State of  U.P. and Others

wherein  the  High  Court  upholding  the  very  same  Notifications,  on

arriving at the conclusion that invocation of Section 17 of the Act was

justified,  dismissed  that  writ  petition.   It  so  happened  that  another

Division Bench of the same High Court  decided Writ  Petition (C) No.

17068  of  2009;  titled  Karan  Singh  v.  State  of  U.P. and  others.  The

Division Bench rendered its judgment dated 19-07-2011 in the said case

accepting the aforesaid contention of the writ petitioners and holding that

invocation  of  provisions  of  Section  17  of  the  Act  was  not  justified.

Accordingly, the Division Bench quashed these Notifications.

3) As a sequel,  spate of  writ  petitions came to be filed challenging the

lands acquired not only by the notification dated 12-03-2008 but even by

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earlier  notifications  as  well.   When  these  petitions  came  up  before

another  Division  Bench it  noticed  the  aforesaid  two  conflicting  views

expressed by two different Division Benches. This led the said Division

Bench  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  larger  Bench  and  orders  dated

26-07-2011 were passed in this behalf.  This is how the matters were

placed before the Full  Bench and by that  time as many as 471 writ

petitions  had  accumulated.   All  these  writ  petitions  were  taken  up

analogously  by the Full  Bench and disposed of  vide judgment  dated

21.10.2011 with leading case known as Gajraj vs. State of U.P. (W.P. (C)

37443 of 201!). The Full Bench of the High Court has accepted the plea

of  the land holders that  invocation of  emergency clause contained in

Section 17 of the Act was impermissible and unwarranted.   At the same

time, the High Court also noticed that in respect of land of many villages,

possession had already been taken and substantial development work

carried out.  Even compensation was paid in such cases, the High Court,

instead of quashing the Notifications in respect of those villages, chose

to adopt the middle path in an endeavour to balance the equities of both

sides.  Thus, it enhanced the provisional compensation and also directed

allotment of developed Abadi land to the extent 10% of their acquired

land subject to maximum of 2500 sq. mtrs.  However, in respect of three

villages, when it found that no development work had been carried out at

all by the Authorities during the intervening period, the High Court chose

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to quash the Notifications including consequential actions and directed

restoration of the land to the respective land owners.

4) It may also be noticed at this stage that when there was flurry of writ

petitions in the High Court challenging the invocation of Section 17 and

the Division Bench of the High Court in Harkaran Singh (supra) had held

invocation of urgency powers to be bad in law, some land owners whose

land  was  acquired  much  earlier  by  invoking  clause  (some  of  the

Notifications of such land date back to 1979 or early 1980s as well)  took

adventurous step to file the writ petitions in the year 2011 challenging

those  Notifications.  All  these  writ  petitions,  however,  have  been

dismissed by the impugned judgment of the High Court on the ground

that they are filed with inordinate delay and laches.

5) From the aforesaid, it is clear that three sets of directions are issued by

the  High  Court,  namely,  (I)  dismissing  writ  petitions  filed  with

unexplained delays and laches; (ii) quashing the Notification in respect

of three villages where no development work had taken place; and (iii) in

respect of other villages, instead of quashing the action of acquisition of

land in spite of accepting the plea that Section 17 was wrongly invoked,

it has enhanced the compensation as well as extent of entitlement for

allotment of developed Abadi plot.

6) The State Government/U.P. Development Board as well as many land

owners have challenged the said Full Bench decision of the High Court.

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Insofar  as  special  leave  petitioners/appeals  of  the  Government  and

Authority are concerned, they have already been dismissed. In these

batches of matters, thus, we are concerned with the appeals of the land

owners.

7) Most of these appeals are filed against the Full Bench. However, some

of the appeals arise against the earlier Division Bench judgment dated

25-11-2008 whereby the High Court had upheld the same Notifications

and rejected the challenge to the acquisition of land.   Some appeals are

filed by the NOIDA authority where the Division Bench had quashed the

notification.

8) After narrating these preliminaries of the matters, we advert to the facts

and events of the cases.  For the sake of convenience, we will refer to

the facts appearing in the writ petition of Gajraj as that was the lead case

before the High Court as well.

FACTUAL MATRIX

9) This writ petition was filed by 27 writ petitioners claiming themselves to

be Bhumidaars with transferable right and owners of different plots of

land situate in Village Patwari, Pargana, Tehsil – Dadri, District Gautam

Budh Nagar.  The Notification dated 12-03-2008 was issued by the State

Government  under  Section  4(1)  read  with  Section  17  of  the  Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 notifying that the land mentioned in the schedule is

needed  for  the  public  purpose  namely,  for  the  “planned  industrial

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development”  in  Gautam  Buddha  Nagar.   Inquiry  under  Section  5A

having been dispensed with vide Notification dated 12-03-2008, State

Government proceeded to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Land

Acquisition Act dated 30-06-2008.

10) The petitioners had pleaded in the writ petition that dispensation of the

inquiry under Section 5A can only be an exception where the urgency

cannot brook the delay. The respondents, without application of mind,

dispensed  with  the  inquiry.   The  acquisition  proceedings  were

deprecated  as  void,  unconstitutional,  tainted  with  malafide,  abuse  of

authority/power and non application of mind.  It  was pleaded that the

procedure under Section 5A is mandatory which embodies a just and

wholesome principle that a person whose property is being acquired or

intended  to  be  acquired  should  have  occasion  to  persuade  the

authorities that his property be not touched for acquisition.  It was also

argued that land use of village Patwari was changed in the Master Plan

2021 after the issuance of notifications under sections 4 and 6, which is

colourable exercise of powers and entire exercise is arbitrary, illegal and

infringes rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and

300A of the Constitution of India. These petitioners also stated in the writ

petition that  though there was some delay in  filing the writ  petition if

counted from the date of notification but the writ petition was filed only

when it came to their knowledge that the land use of village Patwari was

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changed in the Master Plan 2021 after the notifications under Sections 4

and 6 and land was sought to be allotted to the private builders, thereby

giving go by  to  the  objective  for  which the  land was acquired.   The

petitioners further claimed that the part of the property of the petitioners

is situate in village Abadi.  It was pleaded that the authority had executed

a  lease  deed  dated  31-03-2010  in  favour  of  respondent  no.  4  M/s.

Supertech Ltd, a company engaged in the construction, allotting 2,40,00

square meters land for constructing multi-storied complexes.  It was also

stated that although land was acquired for industrial development but the

same had now been allotted to the builders by the Authority which clearly

indicates that neither there was any appropriate plan and scheme for

industrial development nor there was any urgency in the matter and the

whole proceeding amounted to colourable exercise of power.

11) The State  Government  as  well  as  Authority  contested  the  matter  by

putting its justification to the invocation of Section 17 of the Act. It was

pleaded  that  land  was  acquired  for  the  purpose  of  industrial

development. It was also stated that the Authority had been constituted

vide Notification dated 28-01-1998 issued under the U.P. Industrial Area

Development Act, 1976 (hereafter referred to as the '1976 Act') and the

land was to be developed in accordance with the aims and objectives

contained in the said Act included development of the land for residential

and  other  purposes  as  well  and  was  not  confined  to  industrial

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development alone.  Objection was raised to the maintainability of the

writ  petitions by contending that  except  few petitioners,  all  other  had

received  compensation  on  various  dates  and,  therefore,  they  were

estopped from challenging the acquisition, once the possession of the

land was taken, award was passed and compensation received.  The

Authorities also stated that land owner of about 83% of the land area

had already been paid the compensation.  In terms of numbers, out of

1605  persons,  1403  persons  had  accepted  the  compensation.

Development works had been carried out in the area in question which

had  already  been  demarcated  into  various  sectors.   The  nature  of

development carried out was stated in detail in the affidavit.  Invocation

of urgency clause was also sought to be justified.

12) M/s.  Supertech  Limited,  to  whom  certain  area  was  allotted  for

development  of  the  housing  colony  was  also  impleaded  as  the

respondent. On its impleadment, this respondent also filed its counter

affidavit stating the circumstances under which it was allotted the land

for  development  of  residential  units.   It  also  contended  that  the

substantial work had already been undertaken by the said Company. So

much  so,  out  of  6000  residential  units  which  were  proposed  to  be

constructed, 4471 units had already been booked by the members of

public and paid part considerations. It was pleaded that in this manner

third party interest had also been created.  It would be relevant to point

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out here that apart from M/s. Supertech Limited, there were at least 10

more  such  developers  who  had  been  allotted  the  various  chunks  of

acquired land for similar housing projects etc.

 JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT

13) After noticing the aforesaid facts and the contentions and having regard

to the plethora of writ petitions which were filed pertaining to different

villages, the High Court deemed it appropriate to categorize these writ

petitions  in  different  groups,  village  wise.  65  village  wise  categories

were,  accordingly, carved  out.  Out  of  these  group  1-41  pertained  to

different villages of Greater NOIDA whereas villages in group 42-65 fell

in NOIDA. Village Patwari was taken up as group 1. The High Court,

thereafter, discussed the factual position in respect of each group which

need not  be  mentioned,  as  unnecessary  for  our  purposes.  However,

wherever this exercise is deemed proper, we would be referring to such

factual details at the relevant steps.

14) Keeping in view the various submissions made by the writ petitioners in

their petitions, the High Court framed as many as 17 issues or the points

of  consideration  which  had  fallen  for  its  discussion  and  decision.   It

would be apposite to take note of those issues at this juncture:

“(i) Object and Purpose of the 1976 Act: Whether the development of industries is the dominant purpose and object of U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976.

(ii) Whether  Acquisition  Compulsory:  Whether  for

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carrying out  the development  of  industrial  area under 1976 Act, it is compulsory and necessary to acquire the land by the Authority?

(iii) Delay and Laches : Whether the delay and laches in the facts of the present case can bar the invocation or Constitutional  remedy  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution of India.

(iv) National  Capital  Regional  Planning  Board  Act, 1985,  its  Consequences:  Whether  the  Authority  can carry out development, utilise the land acquired as per its Master Plan 2021 without its approval/clearance by National Capital Regional Planning Board, and what is effect  on  its  function  of  land  acquisition  after enforcement of 1985 Act?

(v) Invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4):  Whether invocation  of  Sections  17(1)  and  17(4)  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act  and  dispensation  of  inquiry  under section  5A was  in  accordance  with  law  in  the  cases which are under consideration?

(vi) Pre-notification  and  Post-notification  delay: Whether  delay  caused before  issuance of  notification under  Section  4  and  delay  caused  subsequent  to notification  under  Section  4  can  be  relied  for determining  as  to  whether  urgency  was  such  that invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was necessary?

(vii) Colourable  Exercise  of  Power:  Whether acquisition  of  land  are  vitiated  due  to  mala  fide  and colourable exercise of powers?

(viii)  Taking of possession: Whether the possession of the land acquired was taken under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act in accordance with law?

(ix) Vesting:  Whether  after  taking  possession  under Section  17(A)  of  the  Act  the  challenge  to  the notifications under Section 4 read with 17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 cannot be entertained due to the reason that land which has already been vested in the State cannot be divested?

(x) Section 11A; Whether acquisition under challenge has  lap0sed  under  Section  11A  of  the  Act  due  to non-declaration of the award within two years from the

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date  of  publication  of  the  declaration  made  under section 6?

(xi) Section 17(3A): Whether non payment of 80% of the compensation as required by Section 17(3A) of the Land  Acquisition  Act  is  fatal  to  the  acquisition  o proceedings?

(xii) Waiver:  Whether  the  petitioners  who  have accepted  compensation  by  agreement  have  waived their right to challenge the acquisition proceedings?

(xiii) Acquiescence:  Whether  the  petitioners  due  to having accepted the compensation by agreement have acquiesced to the proceedings of land acquisition and they  are  estopped  from  challenging  the  acquisition proceedings at this stage?

(xiv) Third  Party  Rights,  Development  and Construction:  Whether  due  to  creation  of  third  party rights,  development  carried  out  by  the  Authority  and developments and co0nstructions made by the allottees on the acquired land subsequent to the acquisition, the petitioners are not entitled for the relief of quashing the notifications  under  Section  4  read  with  Section  17(1) and 17(4) and Section 6 of the Act?

(xv) Effect of Upholding of some of the notifications in some  writ  petitions  earlier  decided:  What  are  the consequences  and  effect  of  earlier  Division  Bench judgment  upholding  several  notifications  which  are subject  matter  of  challenge  in  some  of  these  writ petitions?

(xvi) Conflicts in views of Division Benches: Which of the Division Bench decisions i.e. Harkaran Singh's case holding that invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was invalid  or  earlier  Division  Bench  judgment  in  Harish Chand's case holding that invocation of  Section 17(1) and  17(4)  was  in  accordance  with  law,  has  to  be approved?

(xvii)   Relief:  To what relief,  if  any, the petitioners are entitled in these writ petition?”

15) We are purposely eschewing the detailed discussion by the High Court

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on all the aforesaid issues. Suffice it to state here that after noticing the

object and purpose of 1976 Act and discussing its provisions contained

in this Act with reference to case law explaining the legal position of such

statutory authorities entrusted with the task of development works, the

High Court concluded that the stand of the Authority that unless the land

is acquired by it.  It  cannot carry out any development works until  the

1976 Act was misconceived and incorrect. The High Court remarked that

the  Authority  was  labouring  under  the  aforesaid  misconception  and,

therefore,  concentrated only  on acquisition  of  the land without  taking

care of other modes and means of industrial development and excessive

acquisition of fertile agriculture land was due to the above mindset of the

Authority.  Insofar  as  issues  pertaining  to  compulsive  acquisition  and

invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) are concerned, the High Court has

arrived at a finding that such invocation of emergency/urgency clauses,

thereby depriving the land owners of their most invaluable right to file

objections under Section 5A of the Act, was illegal and unwarranted.  As

this issue is decided in favour of the land owners and against this finding

appeals preferred by the State as well  as the Authority have already

been dismissed, it is not necessary to explain the raison d'etre behind

these findings.  We would be proceeding on the basis that invocation of

Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) was wrong. Similarly, the findings of the

High  Court  that  exercise  of  power  by  the  State  was  colourable  and

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arbitrary need not be restated in detail, the same reason.

16) As far  as  the issue no.  4  pertaining the NCR planning Board Act  is

concerned,  the High Court  has held  that  land could  not  be acquired

without the permission of the Board. Opinion of the High Court on this

aspect was questioned by the State of U.P. as well as Authority in its

appeals.  However, it was found that as a matter of fact, insofar as these

cases are concerned consent of the Board had been obtained.  Having

regard  to  this  position,  while  dismissing  the  appeals  of  the

State/Authority,  we  have  left  the  said  question  of  law  open,  namely,

whether  permission  of  the  deemed  under  the  Act  of  1985  is  a

pre-condition before acquisition of the land.  Therefore, that aspect also

needs no elaboration at our end in these appeals.

17) It  becomes  clear  from  the  above  that  the  High  Court  arrived  at  a

conclusion that since invocation of Section 17(1) and 17(4) was uncalled

for and unwarranted, the acquisition of the land of the appellants herein

was illegal.  Notwithstanding, the same, the High Court did not grant the

relief of setting aside the entire acquisition and restoring the land to the

appellants.  After  the aforesaid findings,  the High Court  observed that

insofar as grant of particular relief to the land owners in land acquisition

proceedings is concerned, it depends on several important factors. Thus,

the issue of 'reliefs' has been discussed specifically and independently

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under the aforesaid caption. Here, the High Court has observed that the

creation of third party rights, development undertaken over the land in

dispute as well as the steps taken by the land owners after declaration

made under Section 6 of the Act would be the relevant consideration in

determining the kind of relief that is to be granted to the land owners.

Discussing the aforesaid aspects in the contexts of these proceedings,

the High Court pointed out that in majority of cases third party rights had

been created after issue of declaration under Section 6 and after taking

possession of the land, substantial developments including constructions

had  been  undertaken.  Thus,  in  those  cases  where  substantial

development had taken place and/or third party rights had been created,

the High Court deemed it proper not to interfere with the acquisition.  At

the same time in order to balance the equities, it felt that grant of higher

compensation  and  better  share  in  the  developed  land  to  these  land

owners would meet the ends of justice.   The exact relief given in this

behalf shall be stated at the appropriate stage.

18) The High Court also found that in three villages no such third party rights

had been created and no developments had taken place. So far as these

villages are concerned, the High Court deemed it apposite to release the

land in favour of the land owners of those villages.

19) The High Court also found that many writ petitions were filed challenging

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the  acquisitions  in  respect  of  which  notifications  were  issued  much

earlier, were totally stale and suffered from laches and delays. In the

opinion  of  the  High  Court,  all  those  writ  petitions  which  pertained  to

notifications issued prior to the year 2000 and the writ petitions were filed

in the year 2011, these writ petitions deserved to be dismissed on the

ground of inordinate delay and laches.

20) In nutshell,  relief  was categorised in  three compartments.  In  the first

instance, those writ petitions which were filed belatedly were dismissed.

In  the  second  category,  three  villages,  namely,  Devala  (Group  40),

village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi (Group 38) and Village Asdullapur (Group

42)  the  acquisition  was  set  aside.   Land  acquisition  in  respect  of

remaining  61  villages  is  concerned,  the  acquisition  was  allowed  to

remain but  the additional  compensation was increased to 64.7% with

further entitlement for allotment of development abadi plot to the extent

of 10% of the acquired land of those land owners subject to maximum of

2500 sq. mtrs.

21) We now reproduce the exact nature of direction given by the High Court,

which reads as follows:  

“In view of the foregoing conclusions we order as follows:

1.  The Writ Petition No. 45933 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 47545 of 2011 relating to village Nithari, Writ Petition No. 47522 of  2011 relating to village Sadarpur, Writ  Petition No. 45196 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 45208 of 2011, Writ Petition  No.  45211 of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  45213  of

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2011,  Writ  Petition No.  45216 of  2011,  Writ  Petition No. 45223  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  45224  of  2011,  Writ Petition  No.  45226  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  45229  of 2011,  Writ  Petition No.  45230 of  2011,  Writ  Petition No. 45235  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  45238  of  2011,  Writ Petition No. 45283 of 2011 relating to village Khoda, Writ Petition  No.  46764  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  46785  of 2011 relating to village Sultanpur, Writ Petition No. 46407 of  2011  relating  to  village  Chaura  Sadatpur  and  Writ Petition No. 46470 of 2011 relating to village Alaverdipur which have been filed with inordinate delay and laches are dismissed.

2(i). The writ petitions of Group 40 (Village Devla) being Writ Petition No. 31126 of 2011, Writ Petition No. 59131 of 2009, Writ  Petition No. 22800 of 2010, Writ  Petition No. 37118  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  42812  of  2009,  Writ Petition  No.  50417  of  2009,  Writ  Petition  No.  54424  of 2009, Writ  Petition No. 54652 of 2009, Writ  Petition No. 55650  of  2009,  Writ  Petition  No.  57032  of  2009,  Writ Petition  No.  58318  of  2009,  Writ  Petition  No.  22798  of 2010, Writ  Petition No. 37784 of 2010, Writ  Petition No. 37787  of  2010,  Writ  Petition  No.  31124  of  2011,  Writ Petition  No.  31125  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  32234  of 2011,  Writ  Petition No.  32987 of  2011,  Writ  Petition No. 35648  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  38059  of  2011,  Writ Petition  No.  41339  of  2011,  Writ  Petition  No.  47427  of 2011 and Writ Petition No. 47412 of 2011 are allowed and the  notifications  dated  26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and all consequential actions are quashed.  The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to deposit of compensation  which  they  had  received  under agreement/award before the authority/Collector.

2(ii) Writ petition No. 17725 of 2010 Omveer and others Vs. State of U.P. (Group 38) relating to village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi  is  allowed.   Notifications dated 10.4.2006 and 6.9.2007 and all consequential actions are quashed. The petitioners shall be entitled for restoration of their land subject to return of compensation received by them under agreement/award to the Collector.

2(iii) Writ Petition No. 47486 of 2011 (Rajee and others Vs. State of U.P. and others) of Group-42 relating to village Asdullapur  is  allowed.   The notification dated 27.1.2010 and 4.2.2010 as well as all  subsequent proceedings are quashed.  The petitioners shall be entitled to restoration of their land.

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3.  All other writ petitions except as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are disposed of with following directions:

(a)   The  petitioners  shall  be  entitled  for  payment  of additional  compensation to the extent of same ratio (i.e. 64.70%)  as  paid  for  village  Patwari  in  addition  to  the compensation received by them under 1997 Rules/award which payment  shall  be  ensured by the  Authority  at  an early date.  It may be open for Authority to take a decision as to what proportion of additional compensation be asked to be paid by allottees.  Those petitioners who have not yet been paid compensation may be paid the compensation as well as additional compensation as ordered above.  The payment of additional compensation shall be without any prejudice to rights of land owners under section 18 of the Act, if any. (b)   All  the  petitioners  shall  be  entitled  for  allotment  of developed Abadi plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired land  subject  to  maximum of  2500  square  meters.   We however, leave it  open  to  the  Authority  in  cases  where allotment  of  abadi  plot  to the extent  of  6% or 8% have already been made either to make allotment of the balance of  the  area  or  may  compensate  the  land  owners  by payment of the amount equivalent to balance area as per average rate of  allotment made of  developed residential plots.

4.  The Authority may also take a decision as to whether benefit of additional compensation and allotment of abadi plot to the extent of 10% be also given to; (a)   those  land  holders  whose  earlier  writ  petition challenging  the  notifications  have  been  dismissed upholding the notifications; and  (b)  those land holders who have not come to the Court, relating  to  the  notifications  which  are  subject  matter  of challenge in writ petitions mentioned at direction No.3.

5.  The Greater NOIDA and its allotees are directed not to carry  on  development  and not  to  implement  the  Master Plan  2021  till  the  observations  and  directions  of  the National Capital Regional Planning Board are incorporated in  Master  Plan  2021  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  National Capital Regional Planning Board.  We make it clear that this direction shall not be applicable in those cases where the development is being carried on in accordance with the earlier Master Plan of  Greater  NOIDA duly approved by the National Capital Regional Planning Board.

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6.  We direct the Chief Secretary of the State to appoint officers not below the level of Principal Secretary (except the  officers  of  Industrial  Development  Department  who have dealt with the relevant files) to conduct a thorough inquiry  regarding  the  acts  of  Greater  Noida  (a)  in proceeding  to  implement  Master  Plan  2021  without approval of N.C.R.P. Board, (b) decisions taken to change the land use, (c) allotment made to the builders and (d) indiscriminate  proposals  for  acquisition  of  land,  and thereafter  the State  Government  shall  taken appropriate action in the matter.”

22) We  may  point  out  at  this  stage  that  in  respect  of  all  these  three

categories, the High Court has provided its justification for granting relief

in  the  aforesaid  nature.   We  shall  be  referring  to  the  same  while

discussing  the  cases  of  appellants  belonging  to  one  or  the  other

category.

23) In nutshell, it may be pointed out that 65 villages which were the subject

matter of bunch of writ petitions before the Full Bench of the High Court

were  grouped  in  65  groups,  village-wise  and  facts  of  acquisition,

possession, if any, payment of compensation, developments,  the nature

of utilisation of  those lands,  and/or creation of  third party rights were

taken note of. Out of these 65 villages, 41 villages fall in Greater NOIDA

and 24 in NOIDA. The High Court discussed the issue of laches and

delays under Issue No. 3, as mentioned above, after referring to various

judgments of this Court and culling out the principles contained therein

on that basis.   The High Court accepted the plea of inordinate delay

insofar as acquisition of land in respect of village Nithari, Village Chauyra

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Sadedpur, Village Khoda, Village Sultanpur are concerned. These writ

petitions  are  dismissed  on  the  ground  of  delay.  In  respect  of  other

villages,  the  Court  repelled  the  contention  of  delay  raised  by  the

department,  accepting the explanation given by land owners of  those

villages that they did not oppose the acquisition earlier at the time of

issuance of notification as the land was taken for industrial development.

However, it  is  only  when these land owners  had come to  know that

instead of developing the land for the purpose for which it was acquired,

the acquiring authority had transferred the land to the private persons

and builders, that these land owners felt  aggrieved and cheated and,

therefore, there was sufficient explanation for coming to the Court at a

time when these land  owners  discovered that  the acquired land  had

been transferred to private persons. The Court, therefore, held that such

writ petitions were to be entertained on merits, ignoring the delay.

24) Some of the appeals are filed by the land owners in respect of aforesaid

villages where their petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay and

laches. We are of the opinion that their writ petitions were rightly rejected

by the High Court applying the principle of delays and laches. We are,

thus, dismissing these appeals, upholding the order of the High Court.

The Arguments  : Appellants

25) Though many counsel appeared on behalf of appellants and argued the

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appeals, Mr. Amarendra Sharan, Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dwivedi, Mr. Jitendra

Mohan  Sharma,  Mr.  Mahabir  Singh,  Mr.  Rakesh  Dwivedi,  Mr.  Vijay

Hansaria, Mr. S.C. Maheshwari, Senior Advocates and Dr. Suraj Singh,

Advocate were the main architects who built the edifice of the appellants'

appeals.  Among themselves, they covered almost all the aspects which

arise in these appeals.  Other counsel either adopted those submissions

or some of them pointed out some distinctive and peculiar facts of their

cases.  It is not necessary to reproduce the submission of each of the

aforesaid senior  counsel  separately  as we think that  better  course of

action would be to spell out these submissions in consolidated form to

avoid any repetition.   The arguments which were advanced by these

counsel, in support of their appeals, are recapitulated hereunder:

(I) In the first instance, the illegalities committed in issuing the notifications

for acquisition of land were pointed out which were even accepted by the

High Court in the impugned judgment, in the following manner:

(a) No permission of NCR Board was taken before issuing the notifications.

(b) There was violation of Section 5-A of the Act which goes to the root of

the  matter,  coupled  with  the  finding  that  it  amounted  to  colourable

exercise of power.

(c) There was violation of mandatory provision contained in Section 11-A of

the Act as well.

(d) Though, Section 17 (1) and Section 17 (4) of the Act were invoked, 80%

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of the compensation, which is mandatory requirement, was not paid to

the appellants.

(e) After  acquiring  the  land  purportedly  for  the  purpose  of  industrial

development, it was sold to private developers/real estate agencies for

residential purposes, that too at a much higher rate.   

As  per  the  appellants,  it  would  amply  demonstrate  that  the

Government acted more like a property dealer with intention to make

money at the cost of the land owners/agriculturists.

(II) It was further argued that even when status quo orders were passed in

many writ petitions, the Government had violated those orders and in

this  manner,  third  party  rights  were  created,  thereby  committing

contempt of  court.   When the third party interest were created in the

aforesaid manner, the High Court should not have influenced itself by the

said consideration in denying the relief to the appellants after holding

that acquisition was illegal.

(III) It was also argued that in a case like this, doctrine of severance should

have been applied by excluding only those portions of land in respect of

which third party rights were created or development had taken place

inasmuch as large chunk of land in these villages have still  not been

utilised for any purpose as these are thickly inhabited.  By applying the

doctrine of  severance,  Abadi land should have been included for  the

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purpose of giving relief, when the acquisition was admittedly bound to be

illegal.  It was only, in this manner, equities could be balanced.

(IV) It  was  sought  to  be  argued  that  in  respect  of  three  villages  where

acquisition is set aside on the ground that no development has taken

place and third party rights are not created, this very principle should

have  been  applied  in  respect  of  lands  of  those  appellants  in  other

villages where no third party rights were created or there was Abadi or

where no possession was taken by the authorities and no compensation

taken by the land owners and the land owners  who belong to lower

strata of society.   

In nutshell, the submission is that such cases are exactly at par

with the cases of 3 villages falling in para 2 of the direction, where the

land acquisition has been quashed even when the compensation was

taken and same treatment be accorded to at least those appellants who

fall in this category.

(V) It was also argued that after holding the acquisition illegal, the Court had

three alternatives namely:

(a) payment of 67.4% compensation plus restoring 10% of the developed

land to the land owners, which is followed by the High Court.

(b) directing restoration of possession in all these cases with liberty to the

Government to negotiate with the land owners.

(c) permitting fresh acquisition.

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Submission  was  that  first  alternative  was  not  the  best  alternative

adopted by the High Court and in the interest of justice, the second or

third alternative should have been resorted to,  more so,  when it  was

found to be case of malice in law which can clearly be inferred from the

findings arrived at by the High Court, on the basis of material established

on record.   

26) In  support  of  these  submissions,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants

referred to the following judgments:

(i) Anand Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.1

“50.  Use of the power by the government under Section 17 for 'planned  development  of  the  city'  or  `the  development  of residential area' or for `housing' must not be as a rule but by way of an exception. Such exceptional situation may be for the public purpose viz., rehabilitation of natural calamity affected persons; rehabilitation of persons uprooted due to commissioning of dam or housing for lower strata of the society urgently; rehabilitation of persons affected by time bound projects, etc. The list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In any case, sans real urgency and need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose, heavy onus lies on the government to justify exercise of such power.

xxx xxx xxx

55.   In  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  present  case, therefore,  the Government  has completely  failed to  justify  the dispensation of an enquiry under Section 5A by invoking Section 17(4). For this reason, the impugned notifications to the extent they  state  that  Section  5A  shall  not  apply  suffer  from  legal infirmity. The question, then, arises whether at this distance of time, the acquisition proceedings must be declared invalid and illegal.

56.   In  the  written  submissions  of  the  GDA,  it  is  stated  that subsequent to the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act in

1 (2010) 11 SCC 242

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the month of December, 2004, award has been made and out of the  400  land  owners  more  than  370  have  already  received compensation. It is also stated that out of the total cost of Rs. 8,85,14,000/- for development of the acquired land, an amount of  Rs. 5,28,00,000/- has already been spent by the GDA and more than 60% of work has been completed. It, thus, seems that barring  the  appellants  and  few  others  all  other  tenure holders/land owners have accepted the `takings' of their land. It is too late in the day to undo what has already been done. We are  of  the  opinion,  therefore,  that  in  the  peculiar  facts  and circumstances of the case, the appellants are not entitled to any relief although dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A was not justified.

57.  On behalf of the appellants, it was vehemently argued that the  government  may  be  directed  to  release  their  land  from proposed  acquisition.  It  was  submitted  by  the  appellants  that houses/structures and buildings (including educational building) are existing on the subject land and as per the policy framed by the State Government, the land deserves to be exempted from acquisition.  The  submission  of  the  appellants  has  been countered  by  the  respondents  and in  the written  submissions filed  by  the  GDA,  it  is  stated  that  the  houses/structures  and buildings which are claimed to exist,  have been raised by the appellants subsequent to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and, therefore, they are not entitled to release of their land from acquisition.

58.  In our view, since the existence of houses/structures and buildings as on November 22, 2003/February 20, 2004 over the appellants'  land  has  been  seriously  disputed,  it  may  not  be appropriate to issue any direction to the State Government, as prayed  for  by  the  appellants,  for  release  of  their  land  from acquisition. However, as the possession has not been taken, the interest of justice would be subserved if the appellants are given liberty  to  make  representation  to  the  State  authorities  under Section 48(1) of the Act for release of their land. We, accordingly, grant liberty to the appellants to make appropriate representation to the State Government and observe that if such representation is  made by the appellants  within  two months  from today, the State  Government  shall  consider  such  representation  in accordance with law and in conformity with the State policy for release of land under Section 48(1) without any discrimination within three months from receipt of such representation.”

27) In support of the arguments that the equities were to be balanced on the

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facts of the case which according to the appellant were in their favour,

following judgments were referred:

(ii) H.M.T. Housing Building  Co-operative  Society  v. Syed Khader  & Ors.2

“22.  In the present case there has been contravention of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior approval of the State Government as required by the said section before steps for acquisition of the lands were taken. The report of Shri G.K.V. Rao points out as to how the appellant-Society admitted large number  of  persons  as  members  who  cannot  be  held  to  be genuine members,  the sole  object  being to  transfer  the lands acquired for “public purpose”, to outsiders as part of commercial venture,  undertaken  by  the  office-  bearer  of  the appellant-Society.  We are in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the statutory notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act have been issued due to the role played by M/s S.R. Constructions, Respondent 11.  On the materials on record, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of the public purpose but at the instance of agent who had collected more than a crore of rupees for getting the lands acquired by the State Government.

23.    The  appeals  are  accordingly  dismissed.  But  in  the circumstances of the case there shall be no orders as to costs.

24.  We direct that as a result of quashing of the land acquisition proceedings  including  the  notifications  as  aforesaid,  the possession  of  the  lands  shall  be  restored  to  the  respective landowners irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the  acquisition  of  their  lands  or  not.  On  restoration  of  the possession  to  the  landowners  they  shall  refund  the  amounts received by them as compensation or  otherwise in  respect  of their  lands.  The  appellant,  the  respondents  and  the  State Government  including  all  authorities/persons  concerned  shall implement the aforesaid directions at an early date.”

(iii) H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society v. M. Venkataswamappa and others3

2 (1995) 2 SCC 677 3 (1995) 3 SCC 128

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respect  of  five respondent societies and the report  of  the Joint  Registrar  in  respect  of  Vyalikaval  House  Building Co-operative  Society,  these  societies  had  indulged  in enrolling  large  number  of  members  illegally  inclusive  of ineligible members and had also indulged in enrolling large number  of  bogus  members.  The  only  inference  that  is possible from this is that the office-bearers of the societies had entered into unholy alliance with the respective agents for  the  purpose  of  making  money,  as  submitted  for  the petitioners otherwise, there is no reason as to why such an agreement  should  have  been  brought  about  by  the office-bearers of the society and the agents. Unless these persons had the intention of making huge profits as alleged by  the  petitioners,  they  would  not  have  indulged  in enrolment  of  ineligible  and  bogus  members.  The circumstance  that  without  considering  all  these  relevant materials  the  Government  had  accorded  its  approval,  is sufficient  to  hold  that  the  agents  had  prevailed  upon the Government to take a decision to acquire the lands without going into all those relevant facts. The irresistible inference flowing from the facts and circumstances of these cases is, whereas the power conferred under the Land Acquisition Act is for acquiring lands for carrying out housing scheme by a housing society, in each of the cases the acquisition of lands is not for a bona fide housing scheme but is substantially for the  purpose  of  enabling  the  concerned  office-bearers  of respondent-societies and their agents to indulge in sale of sites  in  the  guise  of  allotment  of  sites  to  the  members/ associate  members  of  the  society  to  make  money  as alleged by the petitioners and therefore it is a clear case of colourable  exercise  of  power.  Thus  the  decision  of  the Government  to  acquire  the  lands  suffers from  

legal  mala  fides  and therefore  the  impugned notifications are liable to be struck down.”

30) Judgment in the case of  Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Anr. v. G.

Jayarama Reddy and Ors.8 also  relied upon to  counter  the plea of

delay and laches, wherein this Court held:

“24.  The first question which needs consideration is whether the High Court committed an error by granting relief to Respondent 1 despite the fact that he filed the writ petition after a long lapse of

8 (2011) 10 SCC 608

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of the Court and in the three cases, the Division Bench of the High Court nullified the acquisition on the ground of fraud and misuse of the provisions of the Act.”

The Arguments : Respondents

31) Mr.  L.N.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  official

respondents,  emphatically  countered  the  aforesaid  submissions.   He

argued that in most of these appeals, writ petitions were filed in the High

Court challenging the acquisition after passing of the award and taking

possession of the land and in most of the cases, the land owners had

even received the compensation. Therefore, these writ petitions were not

maintainable and should have been dismissed on the ground of laches

and delay inasmuch as acquisition cannot be challenged after the award

is passed and compensation is received.   He sought to distinguish the

judgments cited by the appellants' counsel.   He submitted that the High

Court  has  wrongly  fixed  the  cut-off  date  as  06.07.2011.   He  also

submitted that the High Court was in error in rejecting the arguments of

acquiescence as acceptance of compensation clearly meant that these

land owners had acquiesced into the action of the authorities in acquiring

the land.  His submission was that case should have been examined

keeping in  view the aforesaid  factors  and the plea taken by the writ

petitioners that they felt aggrieved only when they came to know land

was allotted/sold to private builders, was totally irrelevant and could not

have been the ground to entertain the writ petitions on merits.

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32) It  was  also  argued  by  Mr.  Rao  that  the  High  Court  could  not  have

enhanced the compensation by 64.7% in writ petition filed under Article

226 as it was not a public law remedy.  His plea in this behalf was that

Land Acquisition Act provided for complete machinery for determination

of the compensation and reference by the land owners under Section 18

of  the Act  had already been sought  and present  way to  matters  are

pending before the Reference Court to determine the market value of the

land.  He argued that merely because in the case of Patwari village, the

Government had entered into an agreement with some of the villagers

for  payment  of  compensation  by  increasing  it  by  64.70%,  would  not

mean that High Court could extend that to all villages in the absence of

any  agreement  with  those  parties.   In  the  same  wave  length,  he

challenged the  direction for  allotment  of  developed  Abadi plot  to  the

extent of 10% of the acquired land subject to maximum of 2500 square

metres  by  pointing  out  that  the  aforesaid  allotment  was  under  the

scheme  of  the  Government  which  provided  for  allotment  of  5%

developed  Abadi  plot  in  respect  of  Noida land and 6% of  developed

Abadi plot where the land acquired was situated in Greater Noida.  Here

again, it was pleaded, the High Court could not tinker with the said policy

by enhancing the entitlement for allotment to 10%.  It was also argued

that in any case once the compensation was enhanced, there was no

reason to give allotment of larger area of land and it amounted to giving

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double benefit to the land owners.

33) Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Rao submitted that in

spite  of  these  serious  infirmities  in  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,

insofar as Government authorities are concerned, they were ready to

pay the higher compensation and even allot land to the extent of 10%

subject to the condition that  quietus is given to all these cases with no

further benefits.  He pointed out that 64.7% additional compensation had

already been given to about ninety percent land owners.  Further, 6% of

land/flats had already been allotted to ninety percent farmers.  He further

argued that care was taken at the time of acquisition itself not to touch

the Abadi land.  

34) Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. Pramod Swarup, senior  advocates, who

appeared for private respondents/builders to whom the land was allotted,

supported  the  aforesaid  submissions  of  Mr.  Rao  and  submitted  that

substantial justice had been done by the High Court in these cases and,

therefore, in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India, the Court should not interfere with the exercise done by the High

Court.

Our Analysis of the subject matter:

35) We have bestowed our serious consideration to the submissions made

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by learned counsel for parties on both sides.  No doubt, the High Court

has held that it was wrong exercise in law on the part of the Government

to invoke the provisions of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act, thereby

dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act which amounted

to taking away the valuable right of the land owners.  That is a finding on

merit.  However, it is subject to the caveat that the writ petitions filed by

the appellants herein could be considered on merits and were not to be

dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay.  Such a contention was

indeed  taken  by  the  respondents/  authorities  before  the  High  Court.

However, the same has been repelled.   Primary reason given by the

High Court in this behalf is that the delay was explained satisfactorily

inasmuch  as  the  land  acquired  for  the  purposes  of  industrial

development was, at a later period of time, allotted to private builders for

development of residential units and when this was done it came to the

knowledge of the appellants.  Aggrieved by this step taken by the Noida

authorities,  the  appellants  filed  the  writ  petitions.   Thus,  in  nutshell,

allotment of the land by the Noida authorities at a subsequent point of

time has weighed with the High Court.  In other words, it is clear that the

appellants did not challenge the acquisition  per se inasmuch as when

the land was acquired even after invoking urgency provisions contained

in Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the requirement of Section

5A of the Act, this position was accepted by the land owners.  They even

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allowed  the  authorities  to  proceed  further  in  passing  the  award  and

taking possession from many of  these land owners and even paying

compensation to them.  It is a matter of record that before coming to the

Court and filing the writ petitions, most of these appellants had received

the compensation.  They also sought reference under Section 18 of the

Act for higher compensation.  Physical possession of land of many of

these appellants have also been taken.  In many other cases,  paper

possession had been taken before filing of the writ petition.  A great deal

of argument was made as to whether such physical possession/paper

possession should be treated as taking possession in the eyes of law, it

would be a debatable point inasmuch as in various judgments, this Court

has  held  that  whenever  there  is  large  scale  of  acquisition  and

possession of large chunk of land belonging to number of persons is to

be taken, paper possession would be a permissible mode, particularly

when it is Abadi land.  We are not going into this controversy since the

ultimate outcome is not influenced by the aforesaid factor, as would be

noticed in the later part of judgment.    However, what we highlight and

reiterate is that these appellants were not aggrieved by the acquisition

per se in the manner it was done by the respondents.  As per their own

case, they became aggrieved only when they found that land was not

utilised  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  acquired  namely  industrial

development but a large portion thereof was sought to be given away to

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the builders for development of the land as residential.  The High Court,

while accepting such a plea of the land owners on the ground of laches

and delay, has referred to certain  judgments which were relied upon

before us as well and taken note of above.

36) This leads to an incidental issue as to whether development of land for

residential  purposes  is  impermissible  and  could  have  given  a  fresh

cause of action to the land owners to approach the Court.  Here, we

would like to refer to the judgment of this Court in Nand Kishore Gupta

and Ors.  v. State of U.P. and Ors.9 which concerns the same Act viz.

U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976.  In that case, for Yamuna

Express Project, the land was acquired setting it to be 'public purpose'.

The land was utilised for construction of Yamuna Expressway and along

therewith  development  of  the  part  of  the  land  was  undertaken  for

commercial, amusement, industrial, institutional and residential purposes

as well.  It was accepted that construction of Yamuna Expressway was

work  of  public  importance.   However,  the  utilisation  of  land  for

development  of  other  purposes,  namely,  commercial,  amusement,

industrial,  institutional  and  residential  etc.  was  challenged,  as  not

amounting to acquisition for 'public purpose'.  There was another feature

namely for the development of the land in the aforesaid manner Public

Private Partnership (PPP) was formed and private parties were asked to

9 (2010) 10 SCC 282

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undertake the development on BOT (Built, Operate and Transfer) basis.

Such PPP on BOT basis was also challenged as colourable exercise of

power  in  which  private  parties  were  involved.   The  challenge  was

repelled  by  this  Court  holding  that  acquisition  of  land  along  Yamuna

Express  for  development  of  the  same  for  commercial,  amusement,

industrial,  institutional  and residential  purposes was complimentary  to

creation of Expressway.  Such complimentary purpose was also treated

as 'public purpose'.  It was also contended by the land owners that the

acquisition was not for “public purpose” because: (a) its object was not

covered by Section 3(f) of the Act, (b) it really fell not under Part II of the

Act but under Part VII thereof as it virtually amounted to acquisition of

land for the contractor Company J, (c) the compensation was coming

wholly from J and not from the Government or YEIDA, (d) the acquisition

for so-called interchange was not at all necessary and was a colourable

exercise  of  power.   They  further  contended  that  the  application  of

Sections  17(1)  and  17(4)  of  the  Act  was  wholly  unnecessary  and

therefore, the enquiry under Section 5-A could not have been dispensed

with.  All the aforesaid contentions were rejected.  Going by the dicta in

the aforesaid judgment,  it  is  contended by the authorities that merely

because the part of the land is utilised for residential purpose, it cannot

be  said  that  the  respondents-authorities  have  not  adhered  to  the

purpose for  which the land is  acquired.   As per  them, this  would be

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complimentary purpose to the main purpose.

37) We have to keep in mind that  in all  these cases,  after  the land was

acquired,  which was of very large quantity and in big chunks,  further

steps were taken by passing the award, taking possession and paying

compensation.  In many cases, actual possession was taken and in rest

of the cases, paper possession was taken where because of the land

under Abadi, actual possession could not be taken on spot immediately.

Fact  remains that  in many such cases where possession was taken,

these land owners/appellants even received compensation.   All  these

petitions have been filed only thereafter which may not be maintainable

stricto  sensu having regard to  the law laid  down by the Constitution

Bench of this Court in Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and

Ors.10 and the dictum of this judgment is followed consistently by this

Court in various cases [See  Murari and Ors.  v.  Union of India and

Ors.11,  Ravi  Khullar and Anr.  v.  Union of  India and Ors.12,  Anand

Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors.13]

38) Once  we  look  into  the  matter  from  the  aforesaid  prospective,  the

argument of the appellants that giving away of the land by allotment to

the private developers for construction of residential units gave them the

fresh cause of action, gets dented to a great extent.  No doubt, following

10 AIR 1974 SC 2077 11 (1997) 1 SCC 15 12 (2007) 5 SCC 231 13 (2010) 11 SCC 242

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Royal  Orchid  Hotels  Limited case  and  other  similar  cases,  the  High

Court has not dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants on the

ground of delay and laches accepting the plea of the appellants that they

felt aggrieved on coming to know that the land was sought to be given to

the private persons for development.  In this way, discretion is exercised

by the High Court in entertaining the writ petitions on merits.  Since such

a  discretion  is  exercised,  we  would  not  like  to  interfere  with  that

discretion, more so, when a very fair stand is taken by Mr. Rao, learned

senior counsel appearing for the Noida authority, as mentioned above.

However, the aforesaid position in law is stated to highlight that it was

equally possible to dismiss these writ petitions as the same were filed

belatedly after  passing of  the award and when in most of  the cases,

possession was taken and compensation paid.  When we examine the

matter from the aforesaid angle, we reach an irresistible conclusion that

the High Court  has gone an extra  mile  in  finding the solution to  the

problem and balancing the equities in a manner which is favourable to

the land owners.

39) We  have  also  to  keep  in  mind  another  important  feature.   Many

residents  of  Patwari  village  had  entered  into  agreement  with  the

authorities  agreeing to  accept  enhanced compensation at  the rate  of

64.7%.  This additional compensation was, however, agreed to be paid

by the authorities only in respect of land owners of Patwari village.  The

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High  Court  has  bound  the  authorities  with  the  said  agreement  by

applying the same to all the land owners thereby benefiting them with

64.7% additional compensation. There could have been argument that

the  authorities  cannot  be  fastened with  this  additional  compensation,

more  particularly,  when  machinery  for  determination  for  just  and  fair

compensation is provided under the Land Acquisition Act and the land

owners had, in fact, invoked the said machinery by seeking reference

under Section 18 thereof.  Likewise, the scheme for allotment of land to

the land owners provides for 5% and 6% developed land in Noida and

Greater  Noida  respectively.   As  against  that,  the  High  Court  has

enhanced the said entitlement to 10%.  Again, we find that it could be an

arguable  case  as  to  whether  High  Court  could  grant  additional  land

contrary to the policy.  Notwithstanding the same, the Noida authority

have  now  accepted  this  part  of  the  High  Court  judgment  after  the

dismissal of the appeals filed by the Noida authority, and a statement to

that  effect  was  made  by  Mr.  Rao.   We  may  point  out  that  while

dismissing the appeals of Noida authority, following remarks were made:

“9.   Insofar  as  allotment  of  10  per  cent  of  the  plots  is concerned, the High Court, in exercise of its discretionary power, has thought it  fit,  while sustaining the notification issued by the authority for protecting them for allotting 10 per cent of the developed plots; and, there again they have put a cap of 2,500 sq.mtrs.  In fact, in the course of the order,  the  High  Court  has  taken  into  consideration  the agreement that was entered into by the authority with the villagers of Patwari and, in some cases, the authority itself has agreed to raise 6 to 8 per cent of the developed plots to the agriculturists.  The High Court has also taken into

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consideration the observations made by this Court in the case of  Bondu Ramaswamy Vs.  Bangalore Development Authority, 2010 (7) SCC 129, where this Court has gone to the extent of directing the authorities to allot 15 per cent of the developed plots.  In our view and in the peculiar facts and circumtances of these cases, since the relief that is given  to  the  respondents/agriculturists  is  purely discretionary  relief  by  the  Court  in  order  to  sustain  the notification issued by the authorities, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the High Court, at the instance of the petitioners/appellants/ authorities, namely, NOIDA and Greater NOIDA.

10.  This order shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case.”

40) Thus,  we  have  a  scenario  where,  on  the  one  hand,  invocation  of

urgency provisions under Section 17 of the Act and dispensing with the

right to file objection under Section 5A of the Act, is found to be illegal.

On  the  other  hand,  we  have  a  situation  where  because  of  delay  in

challenging these acquisitions by the land owners, developments have

taken in these villages and in most of the cases, third party rights have

been created.  Faced with this situation, the High Court going by the

spirit  behind the judgment  of  this  Court  in  Bondu Ramaswamy and

Others (supra) came out with the solution which is  equitable to both

sides.  We are,  thus,  of  the view that the High Court considered the

ground  realities  of  the  matter  and  arrived  at  a  more  practical  and

workable solution by adequately compensating the land owners in the

form of compensation as well as allotment of developed Abadi land at a

higher rate i.e.  10% of the land acquired of  each of  the land owners

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against the eligibility and to the policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of

Noida and Greater Noida land respectively.

41) Insofar as allegation of some of the appellants that their abadi land was

acquired, we find that this allegation is specifically denied disputing its

correctness. There is specific averment made by the NOIDA Authority at

so many places that village abadi land was not acquired. It is mentioned

that  abadi  area  is  what  was  found  in  the  survey  conducted  prior  to

Section 4 Notification and not what is alleged or that which is far away

from  the  dense  village  abadi.   It  is  also  mentioned  that  as  a

consequence of the acquisition, the Authority spends crores and crores

of rupees in developing the infrastructure such as road, drainage, sewer,

electric and water lines etc. in the unacquired portion of the village abadi.

During the course of hearing, Chart No. 2 in respect of each village of

Greater  Noida  was  handed  over  for  the  consideration  of  this  Court,

wherein   the  amount  spent  by  the  Authority  on  the  development,

including village development (which is  the unacquired village abadi),

has been given in Column No. 4 thereof.   It has been the consistent

stand of  the NOIDA Authority  that  prior  to  the issuance of  Section 4

Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, survey was conducted

and the abadi found in that survey was not acquired. In fact, affidavits in

this respect have also been filed not only in this Court but also in the

High Court. We have mentioned that there has been a long gap between

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acquisition of the land and filing of the writ petitions in the High Court by

these  appellants  challenging  the  acquisition.  If  they  have  undertaken

some construction during  this  period they cannot  be  allowed to  take

advantage thereof. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the argument of the

appellants based on parity with three villages in respect of  which the

High Court has given relief by quashing the acquisition.

42) To sum up, following benefits are accorded to the land owners:

(a) increasing the compensation by 64.7%;  

(b) directing allotment of developed abadi  land to the extent of 10% of the

land acquired of each of the land owners;  

(c) compensation  which  is  increased  at  the  rate  of  64.7%  is  payable

immediately without taking away the rights of the land owners to claim

higher  compensation  under  the  machinery  provided  in  the  Land

Acquisition Act wherein the matter would be examined on the basis of

the evidence produced to arrive at just and fair market value;  

This, according to us, provides substantial justice to the appellants.

Conclusion

43) Keeping in view all these peculiar circumstances, we are of the opinion

that  these are not  the cases where this  Court  should interfere under

Article 136 of the Constitution.  However, we make it clear that directions

of the High Court are given in the aforesaid unique and peculiar/specific

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background and, therefore, it would not form precedent for future cases.

44) We may record that some of the appellants had tried to point out certain

clerical mistakes pertaining to their specific cases.  For example, it was

argued by  one  appellant  that  his  land  falls  in  a  village  in  Noida  but

wrongly included in Greater Noida.  These appellants, for getting such

clerical mistakes rectified, can always approach the High Court.

45) The Full Bench judgment of the High Court is, accordingly, affirmed and

all these appeals are disposed of in terms of the said judgment of the

Full Bench.

46) In view of the aforesaid, the contempt petitions also stand disposed of.

.............................................CJI (H.L. DATTU)

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J. (ARUN MISHRA)

NEW DELHI; MAY 14, 2015.