20 August 2018
Supreme Court
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SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILL Vs RADHEYSHYAM S/O LAXMINARAYAN GOENKAR (D) THR. LRS. AND ANR.

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-000751-000751 / 2008
Diary number: 9356 / 2007
Advocates: D. M. NARGOLKAR Vs SUJATA KURDUKAR


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       REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 751 OF 2008

Savatram Rampratap Mills           .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Radheyshyam s/o Laxminarayan Goenka(D) Thr. LRs. & Anr.           .. Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9700 OF 2014 AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9704 OF 2014

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.751 OF 2008

1. This appeal is filed against the final judgment

and order dated 16.01.2007 passed by the Division

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Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

Nagpur  Bench,  Nagpur in L.P.A.  No.46   of 2004

whereby the Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein

and upheld the order dated 25.11.2003 passed by

the Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition

No.1795 of 2003 by which the writ petition filed by

respondent No.1 herein was allowed and the order

passed by the Estate Officer of the National Textile

Corporation Ltd. (respondent No.2 herein) was set

aside.

2. Few facts need to be mentioned  infra  for

disposal of the appeal, which involves a short

question.

3. The appellant was originally a privately owned

Company situated  at  Akola (Maharashtra). It  was

engaged in the business of manufacture of cotton.

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This Mill was later taken over by the National

Textile Corporation (Maharashtra) Ltd., which is a

subsidiary of NTC­a Government of India

Undertaking.  

4. Since the appellant became the Government of

India Undertaking, the provisions of Public Premises

(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) became

applicable to the appellant’s Mills.

5. On 25.06.1993 and 04.04.2003, the Estate

Officer of the appellant issued the  notices  under

Sections 4 and 7 (3) of the Act to respondent No.1’s

predecessor,   who was alleged to be in an

unauthorized occupation of the appellant's

premises, and called upon him to vacate the

premises specified in the notices. He was, however,

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asked  to  attend  the  proceedings,  pursuant to the

notices, at Mumbai.  

6. Respondent No.1’s   predecessor felt aggrieved

by the issuance of the notices, particularly, that

part of the notices, which had directed him to

attend the proceedings at Mumbai, and filed a writ

petition in High Court of Bombay at Nagpur

questioning the legality and validity of the notices.

7. The challenge to the notices was essentially

on the  ground that  when the  public  premises in

question is situated at Akola then the proceedings

in relation to such public premises has to be held

only at Akola rather than at Mumbai where no part

of the cause of action had arisen.  

8. In other words, the contention was that when

admittedly the entire cause of action to initiate the

proceedings under the Act had arisen at Akola

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within the local limits specified in notification

issued under Section 3 where the public premises

in question is situated, the   respondent No.1's

predecessor cannot be asked to attend the

proceedings at Mumbai and the proceedings under

the Act can only be validly  initiated at Akola that

being within the local limits specified in the

notification issued under Section 3 of the Act.

9. The Single Judge of the High Court accepted

the ground raised by the respondents herein (writ

petitioners) and by his order dated 25.11.2003

allowed the writ petition, in consequence, quashed

the impugned notices. It was held that the appellant

would be free to initiate the proceedings under the

Act in relation to  public  premises in question  at

Akola. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed Letters

Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.  

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10. By impugned order, the Division Bench upheld

the order passed by the Single Judge and dismissed

the appeal,  which  has given rise to filing of the

present appeal by way of special leave by the

appellant­Mills in this Court.

11. Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

are inclined to dismiss the appeal finding no merit

therein.

12. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench

in the impugned order rightly upheld the view taken

by the Single  Judge calling  for  no  interference  in

this appeal.

13. The short question, which arose for

consideration before the High Court, was that when

the public premises in question is situated at Akola,

whether the proceedings in relation to such public

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premises can be initiated under the Act at Mumbai

or it  has to  be initiated  at  Akola, that  being the

place falling in the local limits specified in the

notification  issued under Section 3 of the Act for

exercise of jurisdiction by the Estate Officer.

14. Section 3(b)  of the Act,  which  is relevant  for

this case, reads as under:

“3. Appointment of estate officers­ The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette­

(a)……………………………

(b)   define the local limits within which, or the categories of public premises in respect of  which, the estate officers shall exercise the powers conferred, and perform the duties imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.”

15. Construing the expression "local  limits within

which" occurring in Section 3(b) of the Act, the High

Court held and, in our opinion, rightly that the

Estate Officer has to exercise its jurisdiction in

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relation to the public premises falling  in the local

limits specified in the notification.

16. Since in this case, the notification (Annexure

P­1), in clear terms, specified that the Mill is

situated at Akola [see Item 5(15)], a  fortiori, the

proceedings in relation to such public premises

under the Act could only be initiated at Akola­that

being the area falling in the local limits specified in

the notification for exercise of powers by the Estate

Officer.    The High Court  was, therefore, right in

interpreting Section 3(b) of the Act and, in

consequence, was legally  justified in quashing the

notices impugned in the writ petition as being

without jurisdiction.  

17. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state

that the appellant would be free to issue fresh

notices to respondent No.1 under the Act and

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initiate the proceedings for their eviction from the

public premises at Akola.  

18. If the respondents are dispossessed on the

strength of any order passed by the Estate Officer,

the possession will remain with the appellant but it

will be subject to final adjudication of the

proceedings once initiated by the appellant.  

19. Let fresh  notices  be issued  by the  appellant

within  one  month from  the  date  of this order to

respondent No.1 or/and to any person(s), who

claim(s) to be in possession in relation to specified

public premises under the Act.

20. The  proceedings  be  held  at  Akola­that  being

the proper place for deciding the proceedings under

the Act, as specified in the notification issued under

Section 3 referred supra.  

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21. The proceedings, once initiated, be completed

expeditiously strictly in accordance with law.     

22. With these directions, the appeal fails and is

accordingly dismissed.  

IN CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 9700 & 9704 of 2014

In view of the above order passed in C.A.

No.751 of  2008, these appeals are also dismissed

with the same directions.

                         …...……..................................J.

        [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

………...................................J.     [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

New Delhi; August 20, 2018  

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