SAVATRAM RAMPRATAP MILL Vs RADHEYSHYAM S/O LAXMINARAYAN GOENKAR (D) THR. LRS. AND ANR.
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-000751-000751 / 2008
Diary number: 9356 / 2007
Advocates: D. M. NARGOLKAR Vs
SUJATA KURDUKAR
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 751 OF 2008
Savatram Rampratap Mills .. Appellant(s)
Versus
Radheyshyam s/o Laxminarayan Goenka(D) Thr. LRs. & Anr. .. Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9700 OF 2014 AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9704 OF 2014
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.751 OF 2008
1. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 16.01.2007 passed by the Division
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Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,
Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in L.P.A. No.46 of 2004
whereby the Division Bench of the High Court
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein
and upheld the order dated 25.11.2003 passed by
the Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition
No.1795 of 2003 by which the writ petition filed by
respondent No.1 herein was allowed and the order
passed by the Estate Officer of the National Textile
Corporation Ltd. (respondent No.2 herein) was set
aside.
2. Few facts need to be mentioned infra for
disposal of the appeal, which involves a short
question.
3. The appellant was originally a privately owned
Company situated at Akola (Maharashtra). It was
engaged in the business of manufacture of cotton.
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This Mill was later taken over by the National
Textile Corporation (Maharashtra) Ltd., which is a
subsidiary of NTCa Government of India
Undertaking.
4. Since the appellant became the Government of
India Undertaking, the provisions of Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) became
applicable to the appellant’s Mills.
5. On 25.06.1993 and 04.04.2003, the Estate
Officer of the appellant issued the notices under
Sections 4 and 7 (3) of the Act to respondent No.1’s
predecessor, who was alleged to be in an
unauthorized occupation of the appellant's
premises, and called upon him to vacate the
premises specified in the notices. He was, however,
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asked to attend the proceedings, pursuant to the
notices, at Mumbai.
6. Respondent No.1’s predecessor felt aggrieved
by the issuance of the notices, particularly, that
part of the notices, which had directed him to
attend the proceedings at Mumbai, and filed a writ
petition in High Court of Bombay at Nagpur
questioning the legality and validity of the notices.
7. The challenge to the notices was essentially
on the ground that when the public premises in
question is situated at Akola then the proceedings
in relation to such public premises has to be held
only at Akola rather than at Mumbai where no part
of the cause of action had arisen.
8. In other words, the contention was that when
admittedly the entire cause of action to initiate the
proceedings under the Act had arisen at Akola
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within the local limits specified in notification
issued under Section 3 where the public premises
in question is situated, the respondent No.1's
predecessor cannot be asked to attend the
proceedings at Mumbai and the proceedings under
the Act can only be validly initiated at Akola that
being within the local limits specified in the
notification issued under Section 3 of the Act.
9. The Single Judge of the High Court accepted
the ground raised by the respondents herein (writ
petitioners) and by his order dated 25.11.2003
allowed the writ petition, in consequence, quashed
the impugned notices. It was held that the appellant
would be free to initiate the proceedings under the
Act in relation to public premises in question at
Akola. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed Letters
Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.
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10. By impugned order, the Division Bench upheld
the order passed by the Single Judge and dismissed
the appeal, which has given rise to filing of the
present appeal by way of special leave by the
appellantMills in this Court.
11. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are inclined to dismiss the appeal finding no merit
therein.
12. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench
in the impugned order rightly upheld the view taken
by the Single Judge calling for no interference in
this appeal.
13. The short question, which arose for
consideration before the High Court, was that when
the public premises in question is situated at Akola,
whether the proceedings in relation to such public
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premises can be initiated under the Act at Mumbai
or it has to be initiated at Akola, that being the
place falling in the local limits specified in the
notification issued under Section 3 of the Act for
exercise of jurisdiction by the Estate Officer.
14. Section 3(b) of the Act, which is relevant for
this case, reads as under:
“3. Appointment of estate officers The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette
(a)……………………………
(b) define the local limits within which, or the categories of public premises in respect of which, the estate officers shall exercise the powers conferred, and perform the duties imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.”
15. Construing the expression "local limits within
which" occurring in Section 3(b) of the Act, the High
Court held and, in our opinion, rightly that the
Estate Officer has to exercise its jurisdiction in
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relation to the public premises falling in the local
limits specified in the notification.
16. Since in this case, the notification (Annexure
P1), in clear terms, specified that the Mill is
situated at Akola [see Item 5(15)], a fortiori, the
proceedings in relation to such public premises
under the Act could only be initiated at Akolathat
being the area falling in the local limits specified in
the notification for exercise of powers by the Estate
Officer. The High Court was, therefore, right in
interpreting Section 3(b) of the Act and, in
consequence, was legally justified in quashing the
notices impugned in the writ petition as being
without jurisdiction.
17. Before parting, we consider it apposite to state
that the appellant would be free to issue fresh
notices to respondent No.1 under the Act and
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initiate the proceedings for their eviction from the
public premises at Akola.
18. If the respondents are dispossessed on the
strength of any order passed by the Estate Officer,
the possession will remain with the appellant but it
will be subject to final adjudication of the
proceedings once initiated by the appellant.
19. Let fresh notices be issued by the appellant
within one month from the date of this order to
respondent No.1 or/and to any person(s), who
claim(s) to be in possession in relation to specified
public premises under the Act.
20. The proceedings be held at Akolathat being
the proper place for deciding the proceedings under
the Act, as specified in the notification issued under
Section 3 referred supra.
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21. The proceedings, once initiated, be completed
expeditiously strictly in accordance with law.
22. With these directions, the appeal fails and is
accordingly dismissed.
IN CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 9700 & 9704 of 2014
In view of the above order passed in C.A.
No.751 of 2008, these appeals are also dismissed
with the same directions.
…...……..................................J.
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
………...................................J. [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
New Delhi; August 20, 2018
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