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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.              /2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7821/2011)

SATYAJIT BALLULBHAI  DESAI & ORS.      ..Appellants

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT            ..Respondent   

J U D G E M E N T

GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  appellants  herein  have  assailed  the  

judgment and order   of  the High Court  of  Gujarat at  

Ahmedabad  dated  29.09.2011  passed  in  Special  Crl.  

Application  No.810/2011  alongwith  Criminal  

Miscellaneous Application No.11636/2011 whereby  the  

learned  single  Judge   was  pleased   to  dismiss  the

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applications and thus upheld the order passed by the  

learned  Magistrate  permitting  police  remand  of   the  

appellants herein for three days for their interrogation  

in complaint case No.3/2004 registered  in the court of  

Judicial Magistrate (1st Class) Valod, Gujarat which had  

been referred to the police for investigation after which  

the  said complaint  was registered as Talod M. Case  

No.1/2004.   

3. Before  we  consider  the  justification   and  

correctness  of  the  impugned  order  permitting  police  

remand of the appellants,  the relevant factual details  

are required to be  recorded which disclose that a lady  

named  Surjaben  widow  of  Badharsinh  @  Babarsinh  

Chauhan aged approximately 80 years filed a criminal  

complaint  before  the  Judicial  Magistrate  1st Class  

(JMIC) , Valod in Gujarat  being case No.3/2004 against  

the  appellants  alleging  inter – alia  that the husband  

of the complainant   namely Badharsinh @  Babarsinh  

Ratnaji Chauhan  had expired on 10.6.1967 and after  

his death and death of other brothers of  the husband  

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of  the  complainant,  name  of  the  complainant  got  

entered  in  the revenue record.   However,  when the  

complainant obtained  a copy of the revenue record in  

respect of the aforesaid  land, she came to know that  

one  Satyajitbhai  Ballubhai Desai  forged and created  

a bogus power of attorney at the instance of the owner  

of  the  property  in  the  name  of   one  Jaydipbhai  

Ranchhodbhai  Solanki who is a fictitious  person and  

on  the  basis  of  the  bogus  and  fabricated  power  of  

attorney, he got executed a registered sale deed  on  

2.8.2003   in  favour  of  a  3rd party   without  the  

knowledge  of the complainant.  The learned Magistrate  

sent  the matter  for  investigation to  the police  which  

registered it as  Talod M.Case No.1/2004.

4. The  complainant  apart  from  filing  the  

complaint  against  the   appellants   also  instituted   a  

Regular Civil Suit No. 15/2004  in the court of  learned  

Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Valod  against  the appellant  

No.1  herein for declaration, permanent injunction and  

cancellation  of   registered  sale  deed  executed  on  

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2.8.2003.   However,  on  appearance  of  the  appellant  

No.1 in the civil suit,  a compromise came to be arrived  

at between the  appellant No.1 Satyajit Ballubhai Desai  

and  the  complainant  Surjaben  wherein  the  parties  

agreed  that  the  criminal  complaint  filed  by  the  

complainant   will  be  withdrawn unconditionally.   The  

learned Civil Judge accepted the said compromise and  

directed  to  draw  a  decree  as  per  the  terms  of  the  

compromise.  

5. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  compromise,  the  

complainant as also the appellant No.1 appeared before  

the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Valod  and  

prayed to withdraw the criminal complaint.  In view of  

the request made by the parties, the Judicial Magistrate  

directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police  Vyara to  

return the complaint by February  15, 2005.   However,  

a third  person and a stranger to the dispute namely  

Randhirsing  Deepsing  Parmar,  who  according  to  the  

appellants had nothing to do with the dispute between  

the   complainant   and  the  appellants  herein,  felt  

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aggrieved  with  the  order   dated  February  15,  2005  

passed  by  the  JMFC  and  filed  a  Special  Criminal  

Application  No.  918/2007  before  the  High  Court  of  

Gujarat  challenging  the order of  JMFC by which the  

order of investigation in the  complaint case had been  

directed to be returned.   

6. The High Court,   however,   was pleased to  

allow this application and directed for investigation of  

the complaint which had been lodged by  Surjaben.   As  

a result of this order of the High Court dated November  

30, 2007, the criminal complaint case  No. 3/2004/Talod  

M.Case 1/2004  got revived  in spite of  the fact that a  

compromise decree  had been drawn before the Civil  

Court  in  regard  to  the  property  for  which  criminal  

complaint had been lodged and the complainant had  

withdrawn the complaint but was revived by order of  

the  High  Court.   The  appellants,  therefore,  had  to  

approach the High Court seeking  anticipatory bail  in  

the criminal complaint which was revived and the same  

was rejected but subsequently the High Court by order  

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dated 23rd March, 2011 enlarged the appellants herein  

on regular bail.  However, the Dy. S.P. Vyara only six  

days  thereafter  on  29.3.2011,  filed  an  application  

before the Judicial Magistrate First Class,Valod  Court,  

Valod  seeking  police  remand  of   the  appellants  for  

seven days in connection with  M.Case No.1/2004 based  

on the complaint of  the  complainant lady – Surjaben  

which had been registered with the Valod Police Station  

on the basis of the complaint lodged for offences under  

Section  406, 420, 467,468, 471, 504, 506 (2) and 114  

of the Indian Penal  Code and had been withdrawn but  

was later revived as stated hereinbefore.  

7. The  prayer  made  by  the  Dy.  S.P.  in  the  

application seeking police remand for three days was  

partly allowed by the  Principal Civil Judge and Judicial  

Magistrate First Class, Valod permitting police remand  

of  the  appellants  for  three  days  against  which   the  

appellants  moved  the  High  Court  whereby  a   stay  

against  the  order  of  police  remand  was  passed  in  

favour  of  the appellants  herein.   However,  when the  

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matter was heard  finally,  the High Court upheld the  

order  passed  by  the   magistrate   permitting   police  

remand of the appellants for a period of three days in  

view of the investigation which was conducted in regard  

to the case  lodged by the complainant-Surjaben, finally  

giving rise to a case before  the police for investigation  

at the instance of  a third party, namely, Randhirsing  

Deepsing Parmar who was a stranger to the dispute.

8. The  appellants  feeling  aggrieved   with  the  

order passed by the High Court and the JMIC permitting  

police remand of the appellants for a period of three  

days has challenged this order in this appeal essentially  

on the ground that the order granting police remand of  

the  appellants   are  not  based  on  valid  or  justifiable  

reason  on  the  part  of  the  investigating  agency  and  

hence the same encroaches on the personal liberty of  

the appellants as the appellants have  never tried to  

scuttle the investigation justifying police remand.   It  

was further submitted that  the grant of police remand  

is  an  exception  and  not  the  rule  and  therefore  the  

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investigating agency was required to make  a  strong  

case  for  taking police  custody of  the appellants   in  

order to undertake further investigation and only in that  

event police custody would be justified.   The appellants  

having   fully  co-operated  with  the  investigating  

authority and having  appeared for questioning  as and  

when required after the grant of bail, should not have  

been  allowed  to  be  sent  for  police  remand  on  the  

pretext  of  conducting  further  investigation  as  prayed  

for by the investigating authority.   

9. Learned counsel  for the  State however  has  

supported the order of the JMFC and the High  Court  

permitting  police  remand of  the  appellants  herein  in  

view of revival of investigation by the police.  

10. Having  considered and deliberated  over the  

issue involved herein in the light of the legal position  

and existing facts of the case, we find substance  in the  

plea raised on behalf of the appellants that the grant of  

order for police remand should be an exception and not  

a rule and for that  the investigating agency is required  

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to make out a strong case and must satisfy  the learned  

Magistrate that without the police custody  it would be  

impossible  for  the  police  authorities   to  undertake  

further  investigation  and  only  in  that   event  police  

custody would be justified as  the authorities specially  

at  the  magisterial  level  would  do  well  to  remind  

themselves that detention in police custody is generally  

disfavoured by law.  The provisions of law lay down that  

such detention/police remand  can be allowed only in  

special  circumstances  granted  by  a  magistrate  for  

reasons  judicially  scrutinised  and  for  such  limited  

purposes  only  as  the  necessities  of  the  case  may  

require.   The scheme of  Section 167 of  the Criminal  

Procedure  Code,  1973  is  unambiguous  in  this  regard  

and  is  intended  to  protect  the  accused  from  the  

methods which may be adopted by some overzealous  

and unscrupulous police officers which at times may be  

at the instance of an interested party also.   But it is  

also equally true that the police custody although is not  

the be-all and end-all of the whole investigation, yet it is  

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one  of  its  primary  requisites  particularly  in  the  

investigation  of  serious  and  heinous  crimes.   The  

Legislature  also  noticed  this  and,  has  therefore,  

permitted  limited  police  custody.    

11. It may, therefore, be  noted that Article 22 (2)  

of the Constitution of India and Section 57 of the Cr.P.C.  

gives a mandate that every person who is arrested and  

detained in police custody shall be produced before the  

nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such  

arrest  excluding  the  time  necessary  for  the  journey  

from the place of  arrest to the court of the magistrate  

and  no  such  person  can  be  detained  in  the  police  

custody beyond the said period without the authority of  

a magistrate.  These two provisions clearly manifest the  

intention of the law in this regard and therefore it is the  

magistrate  who  has  to  judicially  scrutinise  

circumstances  and if  satisfied can  order  detention  of  

the accused in police custody.  The resultant position is  

that the initial period of custody of an arrested person  

till  he  is  produced  before  a  Magistrate  is  neither  

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referable  to  nor  in  pursuance of  an order  of  remand  

passed by a Magistrate.  In fact, the powers of remand  

given to a Magistrate becomes exercisable only after an  

accused is produced before him in terms of sub section  

(1) of Section 167 Cr.P.C.

12. The  Judicial  Magistrate  thus  in  the  first  

instance can authorise the detention of the accused in  

such custody i.e. either police or judicial from time to  

time but the total  period of detention cannot exceed  

fifteen days in the whole.  Within this period of fifteen  

days there can be more than one order changing the  

nature of such custody either from police to judicial or  

vice-versa.  If the arrested accused is produced before  

the Executive Magistrate he is empowered to authorise  

the detention in such custody either police or judicial  

only for a week, in the same manner namely by one or  

more orders but after one week he should transmit him  

to  the  nearest  Judicial  Magistrate  along  with  the  

records.  When the arrested accused is so transmitted  

the Judicial Magistrate, for the remaining period, that is  

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to say excluding one week or the number of days of  

detention  ordered  by  the  Executive  Magistrate,  may  

authorise  further  detention  within  that  period  of  first  

fifteen  days to  such custody either  police or  judicial.  

After the expiry of first period of fifteen days  further  

remand during the period of investigation can only be  

in judicial custody.  There cannot be any detention in  

the police custody after the expiry of first fifteen days  

even  in  a  case  where  some  more  offences  either  

serious  or  otherwise  committed  by  him  if  the  same  

transaction come at a later stage.  But this bar does not  

apply  if  the  same  arrested  accused  is  involved  in  a  

different case arising out of a different transaction.   

13. As  the  legal  position  noted  above  have  an  

important  bearing  in  discharge  of  the  day  to  day  

magisterial powers contemplated under Section 167 (2)  

of the Cr.P.C., we considered it appropriate to sum up  

briefly  and  reiterate  the  settled  legal  position  that  

whenever  any  person  is  arrested  under  Section  57  

Cr.P.C.,  he  should  be  produced  before  the  nearest  

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Magistrate within 24 hours as mentioned therein.  Such  

Magistrate may or may not have jurisdiction to try the  

case.   This  position  was  further  enunciated  upon  in  

Chaganti Narayan Satyanarayan & Ors  Vs. State  

of Andhra Pradesh (1986 AIR 2130) wherein it was  

held that the terms of sub section (1) of Section 167  

have to be read in conjunction with Section 57 which  

interdicts  a  police  officer  from keeping  in  custody  a  

person  without  warrant  for  a  longer  period  than  24  

hours without production before a Magistrate, subject  

to  the  exception  that  the  time  taken  for  performing  

journey  from  the  place  of  arrest  to  the  Magistrate’s  

court can be excluded from the prescribed period of 24  

hours.   Since  sub  section  (1)  provides  that  if  the  

investigation cannot be completed within the period of  

24 hours  fixed by Section 57 the accused has to be  

forwarded to the Magistrate alongwith the entries in the  

Diary, it follows that a police officer is entitled to keep  

an arrested person in custody for a maximum period of  

24 hours for purposes of investigation.  In the landmark  

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judgement of C.B.I. Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992) 3  

SCC 141, it was held that the law does not authorise a  

police  officer  to  detain  an  arrested  person  for  more  

than 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for the  

journey from the place of arrest to the magistrate court.  

Sub-section (1) of Section 167 covers all this procedure  

and  also  lays  down  that  the  police  officer  while  

forwarding  the  accused  to  the  nearest  magistrate  

should also transmit a copy of the entries in the diary  

relating to the case.  As already stated herein before,  

the initial period of police custody of an arrested person  

till  he  is  produced  before  a  Magistrate  is  neither  

referable  to  nor  in  pursuance of  an order  of  remand  

passed by a Magistrate.  In fact the powers of remand  

given to a Magistrate become exercisable only after an  

accused is produced before him in terms of sub section  

(1) of Section 167.  But there cannot be any detention  

in the police custody after the expiry of first 15 days  

even  in  a  case  where  some  more  offences  either  

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serious  or  otherwise  committed  by  him  if  the  same  

transaction comes to light at the later stage.

14. While examining the case of the appellants  

in the light of the aforesaid legal position,  it is apparent  

from  the  provisions  of  the  Cr.P.C.  that  the  order  

permitting police remand cannot be treated lightly or  

casually and strict adherence to the statutory provision  

is  mandatory.   In  view  of  this,  the  order  for  police  

remand of the appellants cannot be sustained for more  

than one reason.  In the first place, the courts below  

have  overlooked  that  the  complainant  Surjaben  who  

had lodged the complaint herself chose not to pursue  

the complaint as she had entered into a compromise  

with  the  alleged  accused/appellant  in  the  civil  suit  

which she had filed against them and finally withdrew  

the  complaint.    The  Judicial  Magistrate  1st Class  by  

order  dated  14.2.2005  therefore  had  rightly  directed  

the Dy. S.P. Vyara  to return the complaint  by February  

15, 2005.   But, thereafter, what weighed  with the High  

Court   to  set  aside   this  order  and  entertain   an  

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application at the instance of a third  person namely  

Randhirsing Deepsing  Parmar  who had nothing  to do  

with the complaint  lodged by  Surjaben is neither clear  

nor does it stand to reason, but the appellants having  

not challenged the said order passed by the High Court  

permitting revival of the investigation at the instance  

of Sri  Parmar as they had not been made party in the  

said application,  this  aspect  of  the matter  cannot be  

examined herein by us.

15. However,  even  if  the  revival  of  the  

investigation was rightly  or wrongly justified, the High  

Court as also the Magistrate lost sight of  an important  

factor which is the order of the High Court granting bail  

to  the  appellants  on  23.3.2011  which  clearly  had  a  

bearing on the plea seeking police remand.   When the  

appellants  were  enlarged  on  bail  vide  order  dated  

23.3.2011,  it  was  incumbent  upon  the  magistrate  to  

meticulously examine the facts and circumstance as to  

whether  it  was  so  grave which  persuaded the  police  

authorities   only  after  six  days  to  file  an  application  

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seeking police remand of the appellants for seven days  

by  filing  an  application   on  29.3.2011  which  was  

allowed  by  the  Principal  Civil  Judge  and  Judicial  

Magistrate 1st Class, Valod by order dated  31.3.2011 as  

apparently the same is beyond comprehension since no  

reason had been assigned.  It is thus obvious that an  

extremely casual approach has  been adopted by the  

Judicial  Magistrate  permitting  such  police  remand  

overlooking the legal position and yet the High Court  

has also confirmed it overlooking and ignoring two very  

important aspects - first one being that the complainant  

although  had  withdrawn  the  complaint,   the  

investigation  was  revived  at  the  instance  of  a  third  

party namely Sri Parmar who was wholly unconnected  

with the case and secondly that the appellants although  

had been enlarged on bail by the High Court in the case  

for  which  investigation  had  been  revived,  yet  police  

remand was sought only six days after the grant of bail.  

In spite of these glaring inconsistencies writ  large on  

the matter, the Judicial Magistrate allowed the request  

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of the investigating authorities  seeking police remand  

of  the  appellants  without  judicially  scrutinizing  and  

disclosing a single  circumstance as  to  why it  was so  

essential  to  seek police remand of  the appellants for  

seven days in the interest of investigation which could  

not proceed until they were  taken into police custody  

although they had already been enlarged on bail.

16. When the accused appellant  in the instant  

matter had already been enlarged on bail by the High  

Court, it was all the more  essential and judicial duty of  

the Judicial Magistrate to ensure  and ascertain as to  

why the appellant was required to be taken into police  

custody/police  remand  for  conducting  further  

investigation specially when revival  of the investigation  

was done  not even at the instance of the complainant  

but  by  a  third   person,  namely,  Sri  Parmar    whose  

locus-standi for revival of the investigation  is itself not  

clear.   We  find  sufficient   force  in  the  submission  

advanced  on behalf  of the appellants that the plea  for  

grant of  police remand should be an exception and not  

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the  rule   and  the  investigating  agency   ought  to  

advance  strong  reasons  seeking  police  remand  for  

further  investigation  specially  in  a  matter  where  the  

alleged  accused  had  been  enlarged  on  bail  and  the  

dispute  had  practically   come  to  an  end  when  the  

complainant   had  arrived  at  a  compromise  with  the  

accused  persons  and  subsequently  withdrew  the  

complaint;  yet  the  investigation  was  revived  at  the  

instance of a stranger,  namely, Randhirsing Deepsing  

Parmar who admittedly is a third  party unconnected  

with  the  dispute  and  is  alleged  to  have  demanded  

money from the appellants by taking undue interest in  

the  matter  and  getting   the  investigation  revived  

without the consent of the complainant who herself had  

entered into a compromise with the appellant and had  

not sought revival of the complaint.   

17. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the  

learned Magistrate  as also the High Court appears  to  

have adopted a  casual   or  a   mechanical   approach  

permitting  police  remand  of  the  appellants  without  

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scrutinizing  the  reasons  ignoring  the  fact  that  the  

appellants  had already been enlarged on bail  by  the  

High  Court    and  the  dispute   with  the  complainant  

Surjaben who had lodged the complaint  had already  

been settled.  Thus, the existing facts and circumstance  

prima facie were clearly not so grave or extraordinary  

justifying  police  remand  which  could  have  been  

overlooked by the High Court even though it  was for  

three days only as it was bound to have ramification not  

only affecting the liberty of the person who was already  

granted bail but also the magistrate nullifying the order  

of  the  High  Court  granting  bail  even  if  it  was  for  a  

period of three days only.   In fact when the accused  

had been enlarged on bail by the High Court, it was all  

the more essential initially for the police authorities and  

thereafter  by  the  magistrate  to  disclose  and  assign  

convincing reasons why investigation could not proceed  

further without seeking police remand of the accused  

and in case police remand was sought on any ground of  

interference  with  the  investigation  in  any  manner  

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alleging influencing the witnesses or tampering with the  

evidence  in  any  manner,  straightaway  it  could  have  

been  a case for cancellation of bail of the accused and  

the  magistrate  could  have  directed  the  police  

authorities  to  approach  the  High  Court  seeking  

cancellation or any other appropriate direction.  What is  

sought  to  be  emphasized  is  that  the  disclosure  of  

reasons  by  the  magistrate  allowing  police  remand  

specially  in  a  matter  when  the  accused  has  been  

enlarged  on  bail  by  the  High  Court  is  all  the  more  

essential and cannot be permitted in absence of a valid  

and sufficiently weighty reason seeking such custody as  

it  clearly  affects  the liberty  of  an individual  who has  

been  enlarged  on  bail  by  a  court  of  competent  

jurisdiction.   In  fact,  the  correct  course  for  the  

investigating authorities  seeking police  remand of  an  

accused who had been granted bail by the High Court,  

should have been to approach the High Court as power  

of  the  magistrate  to  grant  police  remand  after  the  

accused has been granted bail by the High Court, would  

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cease to exist and any direction to that effect can be  

permitted by the High Court only in view of the fact that  

the  High  Court  considered  it  just  and  appropriate  to  

enlarge the accused on bail and the magistrate cannot  

be permitted to over-ride the order of bail even if it be  

for a brief period of few days.  This in our view is the  

only  appropriate  course  considering  the  strict  legal  

provisions in the Code of  Criminal  Procedure wherein  

the  Legislature  has  earmarked  24  hours   minus  the  

period  of  transportation  of  the  accused  from  police  

station  to  the  magistrate  as  the  maximum period  of  

police  custody  during  the  initial  stage  and  not  more  

than  fifteen  days  by  order  of  the  Judicial  Magistrate  

clearly is  an indication that police custody cannot be  

permitted without adherence to strict judicial  scrutiny  

from  which  it  is  obvious  that  it  cannot  be  allowed  

without  assigning  clear  and  cogent  reason  for  

enhancement of the period of police remand and the  

same  would  all  the  more  be  essential  when  police  

remand  is  sought  for  an  accused  who  has  been  

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enlarged on bail  by the High Court.  The inference is  

thus  candid  and  clear  that  police  remand  of  the  

accused  -  more  so,  who  has  been  enlarged  on  bail  

cannot  be  granted  for  an  undisclosed  or   a  flimsy  

reason.  

18. In view of the aforesaid analysis of the legal  

position,   we  are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  the  

High Court  as also the Judicial  Magistrate  were not  

legally justified  in permitting the police remand of the  

appellants  even  for  three  days  in  the  wake  of  the  

existing  facts  and  features  of  the  matter  narrated  

hereinbefore.    Consequently,  we  set  aside  the  

impugned  order passed  by the High Court as also the  

order dated  31.3.2011  passed by the Principal Civil  

Judge  and  Judicial  Magistrate  First  Class,   Valod  

permitting  police  remand of  the  appellants  and  thus  

allow this appeal.   

……………………………….J. (G.S. Singhvi)

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……………………………….J.                                                        (Gyan Sudha Misra)     

New Delhi; July 20, 2012      

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