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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.920 of 2011  

SATVIR  SINGH        ….APPELLANT

VS.

STATE OF DELHI THROUGH CBI.    …..RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

This appeal is filed by the appellant against the  

judgment dated 07.01.2011  and order on sentence dated  

08.03.2011 passed in Criminal Appeal No.337 of 1999 by  

the  High  Court  of  Delhi,  whereby  the  High  Court  

reversed  the  order  of  acquittal  dated  11.03.1999

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recorded by the Trial Court in C.C No. 19 of 1993 and  

convicted  the  appellant  for  the  offence  punishable  

under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  

1988  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)  with  

rigorous  imprisonment  for  one  year  and  a  fine  of  

Rs.50,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further  

undergo three months simple imprisonment. The appellant  

has prayed for allowing the appeal by setting aside the  

impugned judgment of the High Court and to acquit him  

from the charge urging various facts and grounds in  

support of the questions of law framed in this appeal.

2.  For  the  purpose  of  considering  the  rival  legal  contentions  urged  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties and with a view to find out whether this Court  

is  required  to  interfere  with  the  impugned  judgment  

and  order  of  conviction  and  sentence  of  the  High  

Court,  the  necessary  facts  are  briefly  stated  

hereunder:

The complainant, Ramesh Suri (PW-2), was running a  

business of import and export of buttons, zips, etc. in  

the  name  and  style  of  M/s  Erica  Enterprises.  It  is

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alleged  that  the  appellant  along  with  his  colleague  

P.S.Saini (both Inspector Customs (Preventive)) visited  

the  office  cum  godown  of  the  complainant  (PW2)  on  

4.07.1989 and that P.S.Saini demanded a bribe of Rs.2  

lakhs from the complainant, one lakh each for himself  

and the accused as the articles kept in the godown were  

notified goods and since his firm was not a notified  

dealer, the complainant has violated the provisions of  

Customs Act, 1962.  

3. Further,  on  07.07.1989,  it  is  alleged  by  the  prosecution that the appellant telephonically contacted  

the  complainant  (PW-2)  and  reiterated  the  demand  as  

made  by  P.S.Saini.  During  the  time  of  telephonic  

conversation, the brother-in-law of the complainant Ram  

Malhotra  was  sitting  with  him.  The  complainant  said  

only an amount Rs.60,000/- could be arranged by him and  

the  same  was  delivered  at  the  residence  of  the  

appellant on 08.07.1989 at 8.00 a.m. as the  rest of  

the amount would be arranged within 3-4 days and will  

be paid to the appellant.  

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4. It is alleged that on the written complaint lodged  in the CBI office and on the directions of the Deputy  

Superintendent of Police a raid was conducted in the  

house of the appellant with the help of the complainant  

and a shadow witness (PW-3), the appellant was arrested  

on  8.7.1989.  The  charge  sheet  was  filed  by  the  

prosecution under Section 173 Cr.P.C. before the court  

of Special Judge on the basis of which it has framed  

the  charges  against  the  appellant  for  trial  for  

offences  punishable  under  Sections  7  and  13(2)  read  

with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act.  

5. The Trial Court after evaluating the evidence on  record has come to the conclusion and held that the  

prosecution  had  failed  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  

accused under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section  

13(1) (d) of the Act and recorded the acquittal of the  

appellant from the charges vide its judgment and order  

dated 11.03.1999.  

6. The  respondent-prosecution,  aggrieved  by  the  judgment  and  order  of  the  Trial  Court  has  filed  an  

appeal before the High Court of Delhi urging various

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grounds.  After  hearing  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties, the High Court vide its judgment and order  

dated  07.01.2011  reversed  the  order  of  acquittal  

recorded by the Trial Court and convicted the appellant  

for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act.  

The  correctness  of  the  same  is  challenged  in  this  

appeal  by  the  appellant  by  raising  certain  legal  

questions and urging grounds in support of the same.

7. It  is  contended  by  Mr.  Altaf  Ahmed,  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  

that P.S. Saini on all the occasions demanded the bribe  

money from the complainant but he was neither arrayed  

as accused nor examined as witness by the prosecution  

in the case. Further, he submits that recovery memo  

Exh. PW-2/D is not proved because neither its author  

Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,  Darshan  Singh  was  

available nor the signatures of the other witnesses on  

the said memo have been proved. Therefore, recovery of  

money from the appellant alleged to have been paid to  

him  by  the  complainant-PW-2  is  not  proved  by  the  

prosecution. It is urged by him that the further lacuna

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in  the  prosecution  case  is  that  Ram  Malhotra,  the  

Brother-in-law of the complainant, who was stated to be  

present at the time of the telephonic demand made by  

the accused with the complainant was examined by the  

prosecution.  The prosecution could neither prove the  

demand  and  acceptance  of  the  gratification  by  the  

appellant  nor  were  they  able  to  prove  conscious  

possession of the black rexine bag containing the GC  

notes with him.  Therefore, the alleged recovery of  

money cannot be stated to be “acceptance” of illegal  

gratification  by  the  appellant  as  alleged  by  the  

prosecution.  

8. It has been further submitted by the learned senior  counsel for the appellant that the appellate court in  

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction has erroneously  

re-appreciated the evidence produced by the prosecution  

and has set aside the valid finding of fact recorded by  

the learned trial judge on the charges framed against  

the appellant. Therefore, the finding recorded on this  

aspect of the matter in the impugned judgment by the  

appellate court is not only erroneous on facts but in

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law, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.  

Further,  it  is  contended  by  him  that  the  learned  

appellate judge has not noticed a very important lacuna  

in the prosecution case that as per the evidence of PW-

2 and PW-3 Rameshwar Nath, the bribe money which was  

sought to be given to the accused on 08.07.1989 in a  

black rexine bag and not in the brown bag as shown to  

the prosecution witnesses by the learned counsel for  

the prosecution.   

9. He has further urged that the Appellate Court can  exercise its jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances  

where  there  are  compelling  circumstances  and  the  

judgment  under  appeal  is  found  to  be  perverse.  In  

support  of  the  aforesaid  legal  submission  he  placed  

reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of  

Babu  v. State  of  Kerala,1 wherein  it  has  been  

categorically held that:

“In  exceptional  cases  where  there  are  compelling  circumstances  and  the  judgment  under the appeal is found to be perverse,  the appellate court can interfere with order  of  acquittal.  The  appellate  court  should  bear in mind the presumption of innocence of  

1 (2010) 9 SCC 189

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the  accused  and  further  that  the  trial  Court’s  acquittal  bolsters  the  presumption  of  innocence.  Interference  in  a  routine  manner  where  the  other  view  is  possible  should  be  avoided,  unless  there  are  good  reasons for interference” (Para 19).

The presumption of innocence of the appellant  is  

further strengthened by the order of acquittal recorded  

by the trial judge on proper appreciation of evidence  

on record.  He had the occasion to examine the demeanor  

of the prosecution witnesses. The Trial Court came to  

the right conclusion on facts and evidence on record  

and it has recorded a finding of fact holding that the  

accused is innocent of the charges leveled against him  

and consequently acquitted him from the said charges.  

It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel  

that the Appellate Court could only interfere in rare  

cases where it is found that the order of acquittal is  

erroneous or error in law.  Therefore, he submits that  

the  High  Court  should  not  have  interfered  with  the  

judgment  and  order  of  the  Trial  Court.  The  learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  further  placed  

reliance  on  the  following  judgments  of  this  Court,

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namely,  1)  State  of Kerala  & Anr.  v. C.P. Rao2, 2)  

Murugesan & Ors. v. State through Inspector of Police3  

in support of his submission that the High Court has  

exceeded  its  parameters  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  

reversing the judgment and order of acquittal of the  

accused.  The  relevant  paragraphs  from  the  above  

judgments are extracted in the answering portion of the  

contentious points.

10. The  learned  senior  counsel  further  submits  that  ‘presumption’  of  offence  committed  by  the  appellant  

under Section 20 of the Act can be invoked against him  

by  the  prosecution,  only  if  the  prosecution  

successfully  proves  the  foundational  facts.   In  the  

case in hand, since the demand, acceptance of bribe  

money and recovery of the same from him has not been  

proved  by  the  prosecution,  the  statutory  presumption  

under Section 20 of the Act against the guilt of the  

accused does not arise and therefore rebuttal of such  

2 (2011) 6 SCC 450       3 (2012) 10 SCC 383     

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presumption by the appellant also did not arise in this  

case.    

11.  The other legal contention urged by the learned  senior counsel is that mere recovery of the alleged  

tainted  money  without  there  being  any  demand  and  

acceptance by the appellant from the complainant does  

not prove the guilt of the appellant. In support of his  

aforesaid legal submission, he has placed reliance upon  

the  following  decisions  of  this  Court:  (1)  K.S.  

Panduranga  Vs.  State  of  Karnataka4 (2)Subash  Parbat  

Sonvane  Vs.  State  of  Gujarat5 and (3)Mukut  Bihari  &  

Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan6.   

      In  Mukut Bihari & Anr.,  this Court has held  

thus:

“11. The law on the issue is well settled that  demand  of  illegal  gratification  is  sine  qua  non for constituting an offence under the 1988  Act.  Mere  recovery  of  tainted  money  is  not  sufficient  to  convict  the  accused,  when  the  substantive  evidence  in  the  case  is  not  reliable,  unless  there  is  evidence  to  prove  payment of bribe or to show that the money was  taken  voluntarily  as  bribe.  Mere  receipt  of  amount  by  the  accused  is  not  sufficient  to  fasten the  guilt,  in  the  absence  of  any  

4 (2013) 3  SCC 721 5(2002) 5  SCC 86 6(2012) 11 SCC 642  

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evidence with regard to demand and acceptance  of  the  amount  as  illegal  gratification,  but  the burden rests on the accused to displace  the statutory presumption raised under Section  20  of  the  1988  Act,  by  bringing  on  record  evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to  establish  with  reasonable  probability,  that  the money was accepted by him, other than as a  motive or reward as referred to in Section 7  of the 1988 Act. While invoking the provisions  of  Section  20  of  the  Act,  the  court  is  required to consider the explanation offered  by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone  of preponderance of probability and not on the  touchstone  of  proof  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt. However, before the accused is called  upon  to  explain  as  to  how  the  amount  in  question  was  found  in  his  possession,  the  foundational facts must be established by the  prosecution. The complainant is an interested  and  partisan  witness  concerned  with  the  success of the trap and his evidence must be  tested in the same way as that of any other  interested witness and in a proper case the  court may look for  independent corroboration  before convicting the accused person.”  

12.  The learned senior counsel for the appellant has  further contended that mere recovery by itself cannot  

prove  the  charge  against  the  accused  and  placed  

reliance upon the decision of this Court in C.M. Girish  

Babu  Vs.  CBI,  Cochin,  High  Court  of  Kerala7. The  

7 (2009) 3 SCC 779  

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relevant  paragraph  is  extracted  in  the  reasoning  

portion.

 13. In view of the aforesaid legal contentions urged by  the learned senior counsel he has prayed this Court to  

set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High  

Court and restore the trial court judgment and order by  

allowing this appeal.

14. On  the  other  hand,  the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent Dr. Ashok Dhamija has strongly relied upon  

the version of PW-3, who is an independent witness and  

sought to justify the impugned judgment and order as  

the High Court has rightly reversed the judgment and  

order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. It has  

been urged by the learned counsel for the respondent  

that even though the complainant-PW2 has turned hostile  

in the case he has admitted his version in the cross-

examination and corroborated the evidence of PW-3.

15. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent has  contended that the complainant, PW-2 called PW-3 inside

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the residence of the accused introducing him as his  

uncle. When PW-3 went inside, the appellant enquired  

with  the  complainant  if  he  had  brought  the  money.  

PW-2, thereafter asked if there was anything to worry  

about and whether his work would be done.  PW-2 handed  

over  the  handbag  containing  the  notes  towards  

gratification to the accused who touched the notes with  

his right hand and placed the hand bag containing the  

money on the cot made up of steel. Thus, the demand and  

acceptance of gratification by the appellant from the  

complainant is duly proved by the witness-PW3.

16. Further, he has contended that the testimony of PW- 3 is corroborated by the testimony of PW-4 R.S.Manku,  

the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had conducted  

the  trap  and  also  PW-8  A.S.Chhabra,  the  Senior  

Scientific Officer who gave the report that the right–

hand wash solution of the appellant gave positive test  

for Phenolphthelin and sodium. Therefore, the fact that  

the money was demanded and given to the appellant for  

illegal  gratification,  which  fact  is  further  

corroborated by another fact that money was withdrawn

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from the bank account of PW-2 who has clearly deposed  

about it before the court in his evidence.

17. The  High  Court  has  concluded  on  the  material  evidence on record and held that the reasons of the  

Trial  Court  on  the  charge  against  the  appellant  is  

erroneous;  stating  that,  at  the  time  of  demand,  

normally nobody else, except the complainant-PW2 would  

be present. Therefore, rejecting his testimony by the  

Trial Court for want of corroboration of his evidence  

by recording the findings of fact by him stating that  

it was unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of the  

complainant-PW-2,  to  convict  the  appellant  would  be  

contrary to the settled principles of appreciation of  

evidence on record.   

18. Further, the findings of the trial court that there  was  no  motive  for  the  appellant  to  demand  the  

gratification from the complainant as Sudan, the Custom  

(Supdt.) had satisfied himself that the complainant had  

valid documents in support of his claim and that he was  

not  a  notified  dealer  is  also  perverse  as  the  

complainant, PW-2 in his testimony has clearly stated

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that the money was given to the appellant so that no  

harassment would be caused to him in his business in  

future.   

19. It has been further held by the High Court that the  Trial Court has also failed to apply the settled legal  

principles of law laid down by this Court. The Trial  

Court has erred in not accepting the testimony of a  

hostile witness-PW2, his evidence cannot be treated as  

effaced or washed off the record altogether; part of  

his evidence which is otherwise acceptable could have  

been acted upon at the time of recording his findings  

on the charges.  

20.  Further,  it  is  urged  by  him  that  it  has  been  further held by the High Court that since the illegal  

gratification is large, the same could not have been  

accepted by the appellant as cash-in-hand and the same  

was handed over to him by keeping in bags, suitcases,  

etc… which can never be recovered from the person of an  

accused.  

21. The High Court further held that once demand and  acceptance  by  the  accused  has  been  proved  then  the

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statutory  presumption  under  Section  20  of  the  Act  

arises against him and the onus of proof shifts on him  

to  rebut  the  presumption  by  adducing  acceptable  

evidence to prove that he is not guilty of offence. In  

support of the aforesaid contention, the decision of  

this Court in the case of  M. Narsinga Rao v. State of  

Andhra Pradesh,8 was relied upon wherein it was held  

thus:   

“13. Before proceeding further, we may point out  that the expressions “may presume” and “shall  presume”  are  defined  in  Section  4  of  the  Evidence Act. The presumptions falling under the  former  category  are  compendiously  known  as  “factual  presumptions”  or  “discretionary  presumptions” and those falling under the latter  as  “legal  presumptions”  or  “compulsory   presumptions”.  When  the  expression  “shall  be  presumed” is employed in Section 20(1) of the  Act it must have the same import of compulsion.

14. When  the  sub-section  deals  with  legal  presumption  it  is  to  be  understood  as  in  terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has  to  be  presumed  that  the  accused  accepted  the  gratification as a motive or reward for doing or  forbearing to do any official act etc., if the  condition envisaged in the former part of the  section  is  satisfied.  The  only  condition  for  drawing such a legal presumption under Section  20 is that during trial it should be proved that  the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any  gratification. The section does not say that the  said  condition  should  be  satisfied  through  direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it  

8 2001 (1) SCC 691

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must be proved that the accused has accepted or  agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence  is one of the modes through which a fact can be  proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged  in the Evidence Act.

15. The word “proof” need be understood in the  sense in which it is defined in the Evidence Act  because proof depends upon the admissibility of  evidence.  A  fact  is  said  to  be  proved  when,  after  considering  the  matters  before  it,  the  court either believes it to exist, or considers  its  existence  so  probable  that  a  prudent  man  ought, under the circumstances of the particular  case,  to  act  upon  the  supposition  that  it  exists.  This  is  the  definition  given  for  the  word  “proved”  in  the  Evidence  Act.  What  is  required  is  production  of  such  materials  on  which the court can reasonably act to reach the  supposition  that  a  fact  exists.  Proof  of  the  fact depends upon the degree of probability of  its having existed. The standard required for  reaching the supposition is that of a prudent  man acting in any important matter concerning  him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells  Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd. observed like this:

“Proof  does  not  mean  proof  to  rigid  mathematical  demonstration,  because  that  is  impossible; it must mean such evidence as would  induce a reasonable man to come to a particular  conclusion.”

16. The said observation has stood the test of  time and can now be followed as the standard of  proof. In reaching the conclusion the court can  use the process of inferences to be drawn from  facts produced or proved. Such inferences are  akin to presumptions in law. Law gives absolute  discretion to the court to presume the existence  of  any  fact  which  it  thinks  likely  to  have  happened.  In  that  process  the  court  may  have  regard to common course of natural events, human  conduct,  public  or  private  business  vis-à-vis  the facts of the particular case. The discretion

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is  clearly  envisaged  in  Section  114  of  the  Evidence Act.

17. Presumption  is  an  inference  of  a  certain  fact  drawn  from  other  proved  facts.  While  inferring the existence of a fact from another,  the  court  is  only  applying  a  process  of  intelligent  reasoning  which  the  mind  of  a  prudent  man  would  do  under  similar  circumstances.  Presumption  is  not  the  final  conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it  could as well be final if it remains undisturbed  later. Presumption in law of evidence is a rule  indicating the stage of shifting the burden of  proof. From a certain fact or facts the court  can  draw  an  inference  and  that  would  remain  until  such  inference  is  either  disproved  or  dispelled.

18. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion  the  court  can  rely  on  a  factual  presumption.  Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled  or rebutted, the court can treat the presumption  as tantamounting to proof. However, as a caution  of prudence we have to observe that it may be  unsafe  to  use  that  presumption  to  draw  yet  another  discretionary  presumption  unless  there  is  a  statutory  compulsion.  This  Court  has  indicated so in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State  of Maharashtra.   “A presumption can be drawn  only  from  facts  —  and  not  from  other  presumptions  —  by  a  process  of  probable  and  logical reasoning.”  

22. The High Court further held that in view of the  presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of the Act,  

it was the duty of the accused to have rebutted the  

same  by  producing  cogent  evidence  on  record.  The  

accused has failed to discharge that onus. No doubt as

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held  in  the  case  of  Subash  Parbat  (supra);  “The  

Statutory presumption cannot be raised for an offence  

u/s  13(1)  (d)  of  the  Act.”  However,  for  an  offence  

under  section  7  of  the  Act  this  presumption  would  

arise.  

23. On  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the  parties,  the  

following points would arise for consideration of this  

Court.

1)  Whether  the  demand,  acceptance  and  recovery of gratification are proved by the  prosecution and whether the presumption of  offence alleged to have been committed by the  appellant would arise in this case?

2) Whether the findings and reasons recorded  on the charges by the High Court in reversing  the  findings  of  acquittal  recorded  by  the  Trial  Court  are  based  on  proper  re- appreciation of legal evidence on record and  within the legal parameters laid down by this  Court in its decisions?

3) What order?

24. The  point  Nos.  1  and  2  are  inter-related  and  therefore, the same are answered together by assigning  

the following reasons:

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The  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant has rightly placed reliance upon the evidence  

elicited  in  the  cross  examination  of  PW-2  by  the  

prosecutor.  The  relevant  portion  from  translation  of  

deposition  of  PW-2  made  by  appellant  is  extracted  

hereunder:  

“One  P.S.Saini  from  the  customs  department  asked me to pay Rs. 2 lakhs and at that time  the  appellant/accused  Satvir  Singh  was  checking the goods in the godown. On the same  day,  at  about  4.00  p.m.  they  took  me  to  Customs House at C.R. Building, and produced  me  before  Shri  Sudan,  Custom  (Suptd.)  who  checked my papers.  Thereafter, I was advised  to  keep  cordial  relations  with  his  subordinates. Thereafter, when I came out of  the office of the superintendent, the accused  Satvir Singh was standing outside the office  with P.S. Saini who again demanded money from  me. I refused to pay the same.  On 7th July,  1989,  I  received  a  telephone  call  from  the  accused Satvir Singh.   At about 5-6 p.m. the  accused told me over the telephone, either to  make the payment or otherwise they would seize  the  goods  from  my  premises.   The  accused  further asked me to make the payment at Gagan  Vihar residence. The accused asked me to pay  Rs.60,000/- first on 8.7.1989 at 8.00 a.m. as  I could not arrange the entire amount.  The  accused further asked to make the payment of  the remaining balance amount within three-four  days.  My brother in law, Shri Ram Malhotra  was  sitting  with  me  at  the  time  of  the  telephonic conversation.”

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25. During the cross-examination of PW-2, he has stated  that the demand of Rs.2 lakhs was made by P.S. Saini on  

4.7.1989 at his godown between 11.30 to 12.30 p.m.  On  

the very same day, he was taken to office of Customs  

department where Saini demanded the money at two places  

i.e. firstly just outside the office of Superintendent  

and secondly, at the staircase of the office building  

and on both the occasions, the accused had not demanded  

the money from the complainant, PW-2 at any time. It  

has  been  further  stated  by  him  during  his  cross-

examination that on both the occasions, the accused was  

at a distance of three-four feet.  It has been further  

stated by him that he did not have any direct talk with  

the  accused  either  at  the  C.R.  Building  or  at  his  

godown.  He has further stated that he had met the  

accused only once, so he had neither conversant with  

the  voice  of  the  accused  nor  knows  his  style  of  

talking.

26.  It has been further stated by PW-2 in his evidence  that, when he had gone to the house of the accused  

along  with  the  punch witness,  during  the  entire

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conversation, there was no talk about the contents of  

the rexine bag which he was carrying and neither did  

the accused enquire about the money nor received the  

same from the complainant.   

27. Further,  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  rightly  placed  reliance  upon  the  

questions put to the appellant by the Court seeking the  

explanation  from  him  under  Section  313,  CrPC  which  

reads thus:

“Question:  It is further in evidence against  you that while you were checking the goods on the  same day, Mr. P.S. Saini of the Customs Department  demanded  a  bribe  of  Rs.  2  lakhs  from  the  complainant, one lakh each for himself and the  accused failing which he threatened the seizure of  the said goods.  What have you to say?

Ans:  It is incorrect.  No Customs officer  demanded any money in my presence.”

A reading of the question framed by the learned trial  

Judge for seeking explanation from the appellant, would  

certainly go to show that he has not demanded illegal  

gratification from the complainant.

28. The  learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellant has further rightly placed reliance upon the

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letter written by PW-2 Exh. PW-1/DA dated 15.11.1989 to  

the Collector of Customs, which reads thus:

“In this connection, it is submitted that as  written earlier Shri Satvir Singh, Inspector  has never demanded any money on 4.7.1989 when  they visited my premises. As far as telephone  of 7.7.1989 is concerned, someone telephoned  me in the name of Satvir Singh, but I could  not recognize his voice as I have met Satvir  Singh  only  once  and  that  on  4.7.1989.  However, when I visited his house on 8.7.1989,  Satvir  Singh  did  not  demand  any  money  nor  accepted  the  same.    This  is  for  your  information please.”

In this regard, the relevant portion of the evidence of  

Shri  AGL  Kaul,  PW-9,  Inspector,  CBI,  is  extracted  

hereunder:

“During the course of investigation conducted  by  him,  he  came  across  the  letter  Exh.  PW- 1/DAwhich was already in the investigation file.  He further stated that he cannot tell whether or  not  this  letter  was  referred  by  the  Customs  Department to the CBI for verification because  the letter was neither received nor seized by  him.  He recorded the statements of Chamanlal  Marwaha and Shri Sharwan Kumar Marwaha during  the  investigation  and  after  recording  their  statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.,   the said  witnesses  stated  that  they  were  told  by  the  complainant that he has got the accused falsely  implicated in this case.  After consulting the  crime  file,  witnesses  have  stated  that  it  is  correct that initially this case was recommended  for being sent for departmental action and not  for  criminal  prosecution.  This  recommendation  was made after obtaining legal opinion.”

(emphasis supplied)

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29.  It  is  clear  from  the  contents  of  the  aforesaid  documentary evidence on record upon which appellant has  

rightly placed strong reliance that he is innocent is  

evident from the version of the investigating officer  

PW-9, who had examined those witnesses at the time of  

the investigation of the case. They have stated that  

initially this case was recommended for being sent for  

departmental  action  and  not  for  criminal  prosecution  

against the appellant. The said evidence would clearly  

go  to  show  that  there  is  no  case  of  illegal  

gratification either demanded by him or paid to him by  

the  complainant  PW-2.  This  important  aspect  of  the  

matter has been over-looked by the High Court at the  

time  of  exercising  its  appellate  jurisdiction  for  

setting aside the order of acquittal passed in favour  

of the appellant. In fact, the Trial Court on proper  

appreciation  of  both  oral  and  documentary  evidence  

particularly the contents of the said letter-Ex.PW-1/DA  

as admitted by PW-9 was considered by him and come to  

the right conclusion to hold that the appellant is not  

guilty of the offence and rightly passed the order of

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acquittal which has been erroneously reversed by the  

High Court as the same is contrary to the laws laid  

down by this Court in the cases referred to supra which  

relevant  paragraphs  are  extracted  while  adverting  to  

the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the  

appellant.

Therefore, this Court has to hold that the High  

Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by not adhering to  

the  legal  principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  

reversing the judgment and order of the Trial Court in  

exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

30. Further,  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant has relied upon the statement of PW-3 who in  

his testimony has stated thus:

“He along with the complainant left the  CBI  office at 7.35 a.m. and reached the residence  of the accused at 8.00 a.m.  The government  vehicle was parked at a distance and he was  instructed to remain sitting in the car of the  complainant while the complainant would go to  the residence of the accused in order to find  out if the accused is available or not.   The  other members of the raiding party took their  positions here and there at a distance. The  complainant came back after an hour and asked  him to accompany him.   They both entered the  residence of the accused.  The complainant was  carrying the bag containing the money.”

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    [Extracted from the translation made by  the appellant]

It  is  also  an  undisputed  fact  that  neither  

Inspector  P.S.  Saini  was  arrayed  as  a  witness  nor  

accused by the Investigating Officer. Ram Malhotra, the  

brother-in-law of the complainant-PW2 who was stated to  

be present at the time of the telephonic conversation  

with him was also not examined during the investigation  

to prove the fact that the appellant had telephonic  

conversation with  him.   

31. The learned counsel for the prosecution has also  relied  upon  the  case  of  C.K.  Damodaran  Nair  Vs.  

Government  of  India9 in  support  of  presumption  of  

offence alleged against the appellant which reads thus:  “Where,  in  any  trial  of  an  offence  punishable  under Section 7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or  clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is  proved  that  an  accused  person  has  accepted  or  obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to  obtain for himself, or for any other person, any  gratification (other than legal remuneration) or  any valuable thing from any person,  it shall be  presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he  accepted  or  obtained or  agreed  to  accept  or  attempted  to  obtain  that  gratification or  that  valuable thing, as the case may be,  as a motive  or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as  the  case  may  be,  without  consideration  or  for  consideration which he knows to be inadequate.”

  9   (1997) 9 SCC 477

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32. This Court, in K.S. Panduranga’s  case  (supra) has  held that the demand and acceptance of the amount of  

illegal  gratification  by  he  accused  is  a  condition  

precedent  to  constitute  an  offence,  the  relevant  

paragraph in this regard from the above-said decision  

is extracted hereunder:

 “39. Keeping  in  view  that  the  demand  and  acceptance of the amount as illegal gratification  is  a  condition  precedent  for  constituting  an  offence under the Act, it is to be noted that  there is a statutory presumption under Section 20  of the Act which can be dislodged by the accused  by bringing on record some evidence, either direct  or circumstantial, that money was accepted other  than for the motive or the reward as stipulated  under Section 7 of the Act. When some explanation  is offered, the court is obliged to consider the  explanation under Section 20 of the Act and the  consideration of the explanation has to be on the  touchstone of preponderance of probability. It is  not to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt. In  the case at hand, we are disposed to think that  the explanation offered by the accused does not  deserve any acceptance and, accordingly, we find  that the finding recorded on that score by the  learned  trial  Judge  and  the  stamp  of  approval  given to the same by the High Court cannot be  faulted.”

(emphasis supplied)

33.  The learned senior counsel for the appellant has  also  placed  reliance  upon  the  case  of  Banarsi  Das  

referred to supra wherein it was held that:  

“24. In M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala this  Court  in  somewhat  similar  circumstances,

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where  the  tainted  money  was  kept  in  the  drawer of the accused who denied the same and  said that it was put in the drawer without  his knowledge, held as under: “8. … It is in this context the courts have  cautioned that as a rule of prudence, some  corroboration is necessary. In all such type  of  cases  of  bribery,  two  aspects  are  important. Firstly, there must be a demand and  secondly,  there  must  be  acceptance  in  the  sense  that  the  accused  has  obtained  the  illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself  is not sufficient to establish the offence.  Therefore,  the  other  aspect,  namely,  acceptance  is  very  important  and  when  the  accused has come forward with a plea that the  currency notes were put in the drawer without  his knowledge, then there must be clinching  evidence to show that it was with the tacit  approval of the accused that the money had  been  put  in  the  drawer  as  an  illegal  gratification.”  

The above-said paragraph from the above mentioned case  

would go to show that the divergent findings recorded  

by  the  High  Court  on  the  factum  of  demand  and  

acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant is  

not proved in this case. In the said case this Court in  

unequivocal terms has held that mere demand by itself  

is not sufficient to establish the offence under the  

Act. The other aspect, namely acceptance is also very  

important. There must be clinching evidence with the  

tacit approval of the accused that money was put by PW-

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2 on the steel cot as stated by him in his evidence as  

illegal gratification. In the case in hand, as per the  

evidence of PW-2 and PW-3, the illegal gratification  

was in a black rexine bag with a broken zip which was  

put on a steel cot. As the contents of the bag were not  

within  the  knowledge  of  the  accused,  therefore,  the  

relevant  aspect  of  the  case  that  the  appellant  has  

accepted  the  illegal  gratification  as  required  under  

Section 7 of the Act is not proved by the prosecution  

by adducing cogent evidence in this regard.

34. We  have  examined  the  evidences  on  record  as  a  whole, the said evidence is read along with documentary  

evidence  of  Exh.PW-1/DA,  the  contents  of  which  are  

extracted above. The said document is written by PW-2  

in the year 1989, therefore, reliance should be placed  

on the said evidence. The explanation which is sought  

to be elicited from the appellant by the prosecution to  

discard the said positive evidence in favour of the  

appellant would further support his plea that he has  

not demanded gratification from the complainant, PW-2.  

We  are  not  at  all  impressed  with  the  plea  of  the

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prosecution that the said letter was written by PW-2  

under  pressure  as  stated  by  him  in  his  cross  

examination in the year 1993. If it is true that the  

letter  was  written  by  PW-2  under  pressure,  then  he  

should have lodged the complaint in this regard with  

the jurisdictional police or to the higher officers at  

that relevant point of time or to the Trial Court when  

the case was pending.  Therefore, the said portion of  

the evidence of PW-2 cannot be accepted by us as the  

same is untrustworthy. The black rexine bag containing  

the illegal gratification which was kept on the steel  

cot at the residence of the accused on 08.07.1989 was  

not  recovered  from  the  person  of  the  accused.  

Therefore, neither acceptance nor recovery of illegal  

gratification from the appellant is proved.  Further,  

the  reliance  placed  upon  the  relevant  paragraphs  

extracted above from the judgments of this Court by the  

learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  

applies aptly to the factual situation.  Therefore, the  

demand,  acceptance  and  recovery  of  the  illegal  

gratification  alleged  to  have  been  paid  to  the

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appellant is not proved by the prosecution.  Thus, the  

Trial Court on overall appreciation of the oral and  

documentary evidence on record has come to the right  

conclusion and recorded its findings of fact and held  

that  the  demand,  acceptance  and  recovery  of  

gratification  from  the  appellant  is  not  proved,  

therefore there is no presumption under Section 20 of  

the Act. The learned trial judge in his judgment has  

rightly held that presumption of innocence is in favour  

of the appellant and he was acquitted on merits.

35. The  evidence  of  PW-3,  who  is  an  independent  witness, who had participated in the proceedings of the  

raid at the appellant’s house, the relevant portion of  

his  deposition  before  the  Trial  Court  is  extracted  

hereunder:

“The complainant went to the residence of the  accused  while  I  remained  sitting  in  the  car….Thereafter I along with the accused went  inside the house of the accused………The accused  Satbir Singh inquired from the complainant if he  had  brought  the  money.   He  further  enquired  about  me.  Complainant  introduced  me  as  his  uncle.  The complainant told the accused that  there was nothing to worry and that his work  would be done……The accused took the money.  The  complainant handed over the hand-bag containing  the  GC  notes  to  the  accused.    The  accused

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touched ten toes with his right hand and placed  that hand bag containing the money on the cot  made of steel…….The complainant told that the  bag was containing Rs. 60,000/-.

36. The  prosecution  has  placed  reliance  upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  viz.  State  of  Madras  v.  A  

Vaidhyanatha Iyer10  in support of the prosecution to  

justify the findings and reasons recorded by the High  

Court on the charges leveled against the appellant, to  

reverse the acquittal and to convict and sentence him  

for the offence, the relevant portion from the above  

referred case reads thus:  “13. ….Where it is proved that a gratification  has been accepted, then the presumption shall  at once arise under the section. It introduces  an exception to the general rule as to the  burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts  the onus on to the accused. It may here be  mentioned that the legislature has chosen to  use  the  words  “shall  presume”  and  not  “may  presume”, the former a presumption of law and  latter of fact. Both these phrases have been  defined in the Indian Evidence Act, no doubt  for the purpose of that Act, but Section 4 of  the Prevention of Corruption Act is  in pari  materia with the Evidence Act because it deals  with  a  branch  of  law  of  evidence  e.g.  presumptions,  and  therefore  should  have  the  same meaning. “Shall presume” has been defined  in the Evidence Act as follows:    Whenever it is directed by this Act that  the  court  shall  presume  a  fact,  it  shall  

10  AIR 1958 SC 61

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regard such fact as proved unless and until it  is disproved.  It is a presumption of law and therefore it  is  obligatory  on  the  court  to  raise  this  presumption  in  every  case  brought  under  Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act  because  unlike  the  case  of  presumption  of  fact, presumptions of law constitute a branch  of  jurisprudence.  While  giving  the  finding  quoted above the learned Judge seems to have  disregarded  the  special  rule  of  burden  of  proof  under  Section  4  and  therefore  his  approach in this case has been on erroneous  lines.”

  It  is  rightly  contended  by  the  learned  senior  

counsel on behalf of the appellant that the presumption  

of the guilt is not proved in the case on hand as the  

prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of the  

provision  of  Section  7  of  the  Act,  viz.  demand  and  

acceptance of illegal gratification by the appellant to  

constitute an offence alleged to have committed by him.  

Therefore,  the  reliance  placed  on  the  evidence  of  

prosecution witnesses i.e. PW-2, PW-3 and others by the  

respondent’s counsel, the relevant portion of which is  

extracted  in  the  aforesaid  portion  of  the  judgment,  

does not amount to presumption of offence as provided  

under Section 20 of the Act.  Therefore, the question

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of onus of proof to disprove the presumption did not  

arise at all on the part of the appellant.

37. The  High  Court  in  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction has exceeded its parameters laid down by  

this  Court  in  reversing  the  acquittal  order  of  the  

trial  court.   Therefore,  the  findings  are  not  only  

erroneous  in  law  but  also  vitiated  in  law.   The  

relevant  paragraphs  from  the  judgment  in  State of  Kerala v. C.P.Rao (supra) are extracted hereunder:      

“13.  In  coming  to  this  conclusion,  we  are  reminded  of  the  well-settled  principle  that  when the Court has to exercise its discretion  in  an  appeal  arising  against  an  order  of  acquittal,  the  Court  must  remember  that  the  innocence  of  the  accused  is  further  re- established  by  the  judgment  of  acquittal  rendered  by  the  High  Court.  Against  such  decision  of  the  High  Court,  the  scope  of  interference  by  this  Court  in  an  order  of  acquittal has been very succinctly laid down by  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Sanwat  Singh v.  State  of Rajasthan.  At SCR  p. 129,  Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then was) culled  out the principles as follows:   

“9. The foregoing discussion yields  the  following  results:  (1)  an  appellate  court  has  full  power  to  review  the  evidence  upon  which  the  order of acquittal is founded; (2) the  principles  laid  down  in  Sheo  Swarup  case, afford a correct guide for the  appellate court’s approach to a case  in  disposing of  such an  appeal; and  (3) the different phraseology used in

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the judgments of this Court, such as,  (i)  ‘substantial  and  compelling  reasons’, (ii) ‘good and sufficiently  cogent  reasons’,  and  (iii)  ‘strong  reasons’, are not intended to curtail  the  undoubted  power  of  an  appellate  court in an appeal against acquittal  to review the entire evidence and to  come  to  its  own  conclusion;  but  in  doing so it should not only consider  every  matter  on  record  having  a  bearing on the questions of fact and  the reasons given by the court below  in support of its order of acquittal  in  its  arriving  at  a  conclusion  on  those facts, but should also express  those reasons in its judgment, which  lead it to hold that the acquittal was  not justified.”

Further, in the case of Murugesan,(supra) it is held as  under:   

19. An early but exhaustive consideration of the law  in this regard is to be found in the decision of  Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor wherein it was held that  the power of the High Court extends to a review of  the entire evidence on the basis of which the order  of acquittal had been passed by the trial court and  thereafter to reach the necessary conclusion as to  whether  order  of  acquittal  is  required  to  be  maintained  or  not.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Privy  Council no limitation on the exercise of power of the  High Court in this regard has been imposed by the  Code though certain principles are required to be  kept  in  mind  by  the  High  Court  while  exercising  jurisdiction  in  an  appeal  against  an  order  of  acquittal. The following two passages from the report  in Sheo Swarup adequately sum up the situation:   

“There is, in their opinion, no foundation for  the  view,  apparently  supported  by  the  judgments of some courts in India,  that the  High Court has no power or jurisdiction to

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reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of  fact, except in cases in which the lower court  has ‘obstinately blundered’, or has ‘through  incompetence, stupidity or perversity’ reached  such ‘distorted conclusions as to produce a  positive miscarriage of justice,’ or has in  some  other  way  so  conducted  itself  as  to  produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or  has  been  tricked  by  the  defence  so  as  to  produce a similar result.                      (emphasis supplied)

Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to  the High Court full power to review at large  the evidence upon which the order of acquittal  was founded, and to reach the conclusion that  upon  that  evidence  the  order  of  acquittal  should  be  reversed.  No  limitation  should  be  placed  upon  that  power,  unless  it  be  found  expressly  stated  in  the  Code.  But  in  exercising the power conferred by the Code and  before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the  High Court should and will always give proper  weight  and  consideration  to  such  matters  as  (1) the views of the trial judge as to the  credibility  of  the  witnesses;  (2)  the  presumption  of  innocence  in  favour  of  the  accused, a presumption certainly not weakened  by the fact that he has been acquitted at his  trial; (3) the right of the accused to the  benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of  an appellate court in disturbing a finding of  fact  arrived  at  by  a  Judge  who  had  the  advantage  of  seeing  the  witnesses.  To  state  this, however, is only to say that the High  Court in its conduct of the appeal should and  will  act  in  accordance  with  rules  and  principles  well  known  and  recognised  in  the  administration of justice.”  

20. The  principles  of  law  laid  down  by  the  Privy  Council  in  Sheo  Swarup have  been  consistently  followed  by  this  Court  in  a  series  of  subsequent  pronouncements  of  which  reference  may  be

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illustratively made to the following:  Tulsiram Kanu  v.  State,  Balbir  Singh v.  State  of  Punjab,  M.G.  Agarwal v.  State  of  Maharashtra,  Khedu  Mohton v.  State  of  Bihar,  Sambasivan v.  State  of  Kerala,  Bhagwan Singh v.  State of M.P. and  State of Goa v.  Sanjay Thakran.

 21. A concise statement of the law on the issue that  had emerged after over half a century of evolution  since  Sheo Swarup is to be found in para 42 of the  Report in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka. The same  may, therefore, be usefully noticed below:

“42.  From  the  above  decisions,  in  our  considered  view,  the  following  general  principles regarding powers of the appellate  court while dealing with an appeal against an  order of acquittal emerge:

(1)  An  appellate  court  has  full  power  to  review,  re-appreciate  and  reconsider  the  evidence upon which the order of acquittal is  founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts  no  limitation,  restriction  or  condition  on  exercise of such power and an appellate court  on the evidence before it may reach its own  conclusion, both on questions of fact and of  law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial  and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient  grounds’,  ‘very  strong  circumstances’,  ‘distorted  conclusions’,  ‘glaring  mistakes’,  etc.  are  not  intended  to  curtail  extensive  powers  of  an  appellate  court  in  an  appeal  against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more  in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to  emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court  to  interfere  with  acquittal  than  to  curtail  the power of the court to review the evidence  and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in  mind  that  in  case  of  acquittal,  there  is  double presumption in favour of the accused.  Firstly,  the  presumption  of  innocence  is  available  to  him  under  the  fundamental  principle of criminal jurisprudence that every  person shall be presumed to be innocent unless  he is proved guilty by a competent court of  law. Secondly, the accused having secured his  acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is  further  reinforced,  reaffirmed  and  strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible  on the basis of the evidence on record, the  appellate court should not disturb the finding  of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. Another significant aspect of the law in this  regard which has to be noticed is that an appeal to  this  Court  against  an  order  of  the  High  Court  affirming  or  reversing  the  order  of  conviction  recorded by the trial court is contingent on grant  of  leave by  this Court  under Article  136 of  the  Constitution.  However,  if  an  order  of  acquittal  passed by the trial court is to be altered by the  High Court to an order of conviction and the accused  is  to  be  sentenced  to  death  or  to  undergo  life  imprisonment or imprisonment for more than 10 years,  leave to appeal to this Court has been dispensed  with  and  Section  379  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  provides  a  statutory  right  of  appeal to the accused in such a case. The aforesaid  distinction, therefore, has to be kept in mind and  due notice must be had of the legislative intent to  confer a special status to an appeal before this  Court against an order of the High Court altering  the acquittal made by the trial court. The issue had  been dealt with by this Court in State of Rajasthan  v. Abdul Mannan in the following terms, though in a  different context: (SCC pp. 70-71, para 12)

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“12. As is evident from the above recorded  findings,  the  judgment  of  conviction  was  converted to a judgment of acquittal by the  High  Court.  Thus,  the  first  and  foremost  question that we need to consider is in what  circumstances  this  Court  should  interfere  with the judgment of acquittal. Against an  order of acquittal, an appeal by the State is  maintainable  to  this  Court  only  with  the  leave of the court. On the contrary, if the  judgment  of  acquittal  passed  by  the  trial  court is set aside by the High Court, and the  accused  is  sentenced  to  death,  or  life  imprisonment or imprisonment for more than 10  years,  then  the  right  of  appeal  of  the  accused  is  treated  as  an  absolute  right  subject to the provisions of Articles 134(1) (a)  and  134(1)(b)  of  the  Constitution  of  India and Section 379 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973.  In  light  of  this,  it  is  obvious that an appeal against acquittal is  considered on slightly different parameters  compared to an ordinary appeal preferred to  this Court.”

23. Having dealt with the principles of law that ought  to be kept in mind while considering an appeal against  an order of acquittal passed by the trial court, we may  now proceed to examine the reasons recorded by the trial  court for acquitting the accused in the present case and  those that prevailed with the High Court in reversing  the said conclusion and in convicting and sentencing the  appellant-accused.”

38. Further, as contended by the learned senior counsel  for the appellant, the High Court has not noticed the  

very important lacuna in the prosecution case that as  

per the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 Rameshwar Nath, the  

bribe money which was sought to be given to the accused  

on 08.07.1989 was in a black rexine bag and not in the  

brown rexine bag as shown to the witnesses before the

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trial court by the prosecution. It has further come to  

our  notice  that  neither  the  two  witnesses  nor  the  

C.B.I.  officials  put  any  signature  or  identification  

mark on the bottles containing solution which is the  

most  crucial  evidence  in  the  case  to  prove  the  

acceptance of the gratification by the appellant from  

the  complainant.  As  per  the  statements  of  PW-2  and  

C.B.I.  officials,  the  GC  notes  were  not  counted.  

However, it is a matter of serious doubt of acceptance  

the  notes  containing  in  the  black  rexine  bag  were  

touched by the accused.  

    The aforesaid findings and reasons recorded by the  

High Court are supported with the statements of law  

laid down by this Court in  C.M. Girish Babu  (supra)  

upon which the learned senior counsel on behalf of the  

appellant  has  rightly  placed  reliance.  The  relevant  

paragraph is extracted below:   

“18. In  Suraj Mal v.  State (Delhi Admn.) this  Court took the view that mere recovery of tainted  money divorced from the circumstances under which  it  is  paid  is  not  sufficient  to  convict  the  accused when the substantive evidence in the case  is  not  reliable.  The  mere  recovery  by  itself

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cannot  prove  the  charge  of  the  prosecution  against  the  accused,  in  the  absence  of  any  evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show  that the accused voluntarily accepted the money  knowing it to be bribe.”

39.  After careful observation of the above-mentioned  facts and evidence on record and on careful examination  

of  the  aforesaid  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  

behalf of the parties, with reference to the extracted  

portion of the evidence of PW-2, PW-3 and PW-9, we are  

of the considered view that the prosecution has failed  

to  prove  the  demand  and  acceptance  of  illegal  

gratification by the appellant from the complainant PW-

2, upon whose evidence much reliance has been placed by  

the learned counsel for the respondent.

40. We, accordingly answer the point No. 2 in favour of  the appellant that exercise of appellate jurisdiction  

by the High Court to reverse the judgment and order of  

acquittal is not only erroneous but also suffers from  

error in law and liable to be set aside. Accordingly,  

we  answer  the  point  Nos.  1  and  2  in  favour  of  the  

appellant.

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Point No. 3.

41.  We have answered the point Nos. 1 and 2 in favour  of the appellant after adverting to the legal evidence  

and  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on  behalf  of  the  

parties.  We have arrived at the aforesaid conclusions  

after accepting the well founded submissions made by  

the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant.  

In view of our findings and reasons on point Nos. 1 and  

2,  the  submissions  made  by  the  learned  counsel  on  

behalf of the respondent are rejected as the same are  

wholly untenable in law.  

For the foregoing reasons, we have to restore the  

judgment and order of acquittal of the trial court by  

setting  aside  the  impugned  judgment  dated  07.01.2011  

and  order  on  sentence  dated  08.03.2011  of  the  High  

Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.337 of 1999.   

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42.  Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant  is on bail.  The bail bonds shall stand discharged.   

………………………………………………………………………J.   [DIPAK MISRA]

                    ………………………………………………………………………J.   

[V. GOPALA GOWDA]

New Delhi,   August 20,2014