SATISH CHANDRA Vs STATE OF M.P.
Bench: SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,A.K. SIKRI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000211-000211 / 2010
Diary number: 2947 / 2009
Advocates: PRATIBHA JAIN Vs
C. D. SINGH
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Crl. A. No. 211 of 2010
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 211 OF 2010
Satish Chandra & Anr. ….........Appellant(s)
Versus
State of M.P. ….........Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
1. The two appellants before us are the son and the mother.
Appellant No. 1 was the husband and Appellant No. 2 was
the mother-in-law, respectively, of the deceased Smt.
Sunita. Marriage between Appellant No. 1 and Smt. Sunita
was solemnised in April, 1988. Smt. Sunita committed
suicide on 14.1.1991 i.e. within three years of the
marriage. This led to the prosecution of the two appellants
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as well as father and sister of Appellant No. 1 under
Sections 304-B and 498-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. We may mention that as per the prosecution, just before
her death, she even gave a statement which was recorded
as Ex. P.9. After her death, it was treated as dying
declaration and case was registered against the accused
persons. After the completion of the investigation they
were all committed to their trial. The accused persons did
not admit to the charge and abjured their guilt. As per
them they were falsely implicated in the matter. The trial
proceeded. Various prosecution witnesses were examined.
On the basis of the oral and documentary evidence
brought on record, the Sessions Court returned the verdict
of guilty qua the appellants herein, as well as sister of
Appellant no.1.
3. The Trial Court sentenced both the appellants as well as
Sunita, sister of Appellant no.1 to undergo one year
rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498 2
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A of IPC. A fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each of the appellants
was also imposed and in default the appellants were to
undergo an additional R.I. for six months. For offence
under Section 304-B, both the appellants were sentenced
to 10 years rigorous imprisonment with Rs. 1,000/- as fine
with similar default clause.
4. The appellants filed the appeal before the High Court
against the said conviction and sentence. By the
impugned judgment dated 21.10.2008 the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh has affirmed the conviction and
sentence, thereby dismissing the appeal qua these two
Appellants. However, Sunita has been acquitted. Special
Leave Petition was filed questioning the validity of the said
verdict of the High Court in which leave was granted. This
is how the present appeal has been heard finally by this
Court.
5. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court would
demonstrate that the High Court has primarily relied upon 3
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the dying declaration (Exhibit P9) which according to the
High Court is a strong iron clad testimony from the
clutches of which the appellants cannot escape. It has
found that the said dying declaration is worthy of
credence which was recorded in the presence of the
Magistrate (P.W.2) that too with certification from the
Doctor (P.W.5) to the effect that Sunita was in a fit state of
mind to give the statement, notwithstanding the fact that
she has suffered 92 percent burns. In so far as charge
under Section 498A is concerned, the High Court has
found that this was proved on the basis of Ex. P8, which
was a letter written by the deceased stating she was
being treated with cruelty. The High Court also recorded
that the dying declaration as well as allegations in letter
(Ex. P.8) were duly supported by the testimony of the
father (P.W.1), the brother (P.W.7) and the uncle (P.W.4) of
the deceased. It is observed that even when they are
interested witnesses being close relation of the deceased,
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there was no reason to discard their testimony. More so,
when their testimony was supported by written
documents namely letters written by the deceased which
were Exhibit P1, P3, P4 and P5.
6. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the appellants endeavoured to find loopholes in the
depositions of various witnesses. Thrust of his argument
was that their testimonies could not have been relied
upon to record the guilt of the appellants for both the
charges i.e. under Section 498A as well as 304B of I.P.C. In
this attempt, he referred to various portions of the
testimonies of these witnesses with the purpose to show
that there was an acceptance on their part that no dowry
was taken at the time of Marriage; there was no demand
of dowry even thereafter and the deceased was not
treated with cruelty at all. His further endeavour was to
show that the deceased had committed suicide because of
her own reasons and frustrations which could not be
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attributed to the appellants and for which appellants could
not be held responsible in any manner in as much as she
was not happy with her marriage with Appellant No. 1.
which was her creation with no blemish on the part of the
appellants. Before we take note of these arguments in
detail and deal with them, it would be apposite to take
note of the testimonies of material witnesses as well as
documentary evidence produced. It is only thereafter the
arguments of Mr. Jain would be better discernible and
appreciated for our analysis/ discussion.
7. As per Rameshwar Dayal (P.W.1), whenever his daughter
Sunita used to come to Guna she would say that her
parents in law had persistent demand for gold chain. In
the month of Shravan in the year 1989, they had come to
Jaora to take the daughter then her mother-in-law had
beaten her in his presence. Rameshwar Dayal has also
said that it was guessed from the letters of the girl that
her husband and parents in law were harassing her.
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8. Ashok Sharma (PW. 7) stated that he was sent a letter Ex.
P.5 by his sister to him. Rameshwar Dayal has also stated
letters Ex. P.3 and P4 to have been written by Sunita. It is
revealed from the statement of Ashok Sharma that Sunita
had told him in Guna and Sagar that in laws had
demanded gold chain and money. Also, she was troubled
in her in-laws house. Ashok Sharma had met Sunita about
one and half months before death when she had gone to
Sagar.
9. Ram Behari Lal Sharma (P.W.4) is the mousa of deceased
Sunita.The police had prepared the map of the place of
occurrence in his presence. The police had seized letters
Ex. P3, P4 and P5 from Ram Behali Lal Sharma. Ram
Behari Lal Sharma had got the information of burning of
Sunita when he was in school. Thereupon, he reached the
spot and later on he had gone to Sunita in the Hospital.
10. Naib Tehsildar SPS Chauhan (P.W.2) had recorded the
statement (Ex. P.9) of Sunita, before her death. This 7
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witness has proved the statement from B to B in Ex. P.9 by
Sunita. Before taking statement, the certificate of the
doctor was taken. Dr. S.K. Jain (PW. 5) had examined
Sunita and had advised to take her statement. Report
relating to it is Ex. P.15. After death Dr. Chandelkar (P.W.6)
had performed postmortem of Sunita. Dr. Jain has
mentioned about the smell of kerosene from Sunita's body
and that she had suffered 92% burns. As per him, the
cause of death is the burning, flowing of water from the
body and the state of shock arising from loss of chemicals.
Dr. Chandelkar has also mentioned about kerosene smell
from the body. The postmortem report given by him is Ex.
P.16.
11. The defence side produced one witness viz. Pravin Dixit,
brother-in-law of Appellant No. 1 who is the husband of his
sister Sunita.
12. Perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court shows that
detailed submissions were made by the defence 8
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questioning the trustworthiness of the prosecution case. It
was argued that deceased was not treated with cruelty,
much less on the ground of dowry. The defence also
attacked the dying declaration of the deceased – Sunita,
on the plea that it was unreliable because of many
loopholes therein. The Trial Court stated that there were
two decisive questions which were to be determined and
they were:
“(i) Whether the accused used to behave with cruelty with Sunita wife of Satish Chandra Trivedi for illegal object of getting more dowry. (ii) Whether the accused tortured Sunita on the night of 14.1.1991 in fulfilment of the illegal object of getting more dowry and Sunita died in the manner different from natural death?”
13. While answering the aforesaid questions, apart from
relying on oral testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court
referred to Ex. P-3, which is a letter written by Sunita to her
aunt (Mausi) stating that she would do nothing except but to
give up her life. Mention was also made to Ex. P-8 which
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Satish had written to his father-in-law as well as Ex. P-1 which
was a letter written by deceased Sunita to her parents 15
days before her death, mentioning that there was no change
in the atmosphere and she was not happy in her matrimonial
house. From these letters coupled with oral testimonies, the
Trial Court concluded that there was a demand of dowry
because of which the deceased was harassed.
14. The Trial Court also discussed Ex. P-9, namely, the dying
statement and returned the finding that since the
statement was taken only after certifying the state of
health of Sunita by the doctor that she was in a proper
state of mind to make such a statement. The Trial Court
also discarded the theory of the defence that Sunita was
tutored by her Mausa in giving the statement. From the
reading of this dying statement, the trial court came to the
conclusion that there was in fact a quarrel which took
place on the date of occurrence immediately before she
put herself on fire. On the basis of such discussion, the 10
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Trial Court returned the verdict of the guilty against the
appellants and sister of Appellant no.1 in the manner
mentioned in the beginning of this judgment.
15. The High Court went through the gamut of all the issues
and upheld the judgment qua these two appellants recording
the following reasons:
“(i) On considering the above submissions, I find that there is no merit in the appeal, primarily, on the ground that because evidence of the prosecution is supported and corroborated by the documentary evidence available on record, the dying declaration Ex. - P/9 is a strong iron clad testimony from the clutches of which the accused cannot escape. Ex. P/9 is recorded and proved in accordance with law. Dr. S.K. Jain PW-5 has certified that although deceased Sunita had recorded 92% burn, she was in a fit state of mind. The dying declaration of the deceased has been recorded in presence of the Magistrate Shri S.P.S. Chauhan PW-2 and no fault can be found in the same. The letter Ex. P/8 available on record also amply proved that the deceased was being treated with cruelty.
(ii) It would be profitable to rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Muthu Kutty and another v. State of T.N. (2005) 9 SCC 113 whereby the Apex Court has held that conviction can be accorded solely on the basis of dying declaration, if it is worthy and reliable and there is
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no infirmity in it reinforcing the maxim 'Nemo Moriturus praesumitur', which means that a person will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth.
(iii) Then, in this light it is important to consider the fact that the dying declaration is duly supported by the testimony of Rameshwar Dayal PW-1; Ashok Sharma PW-7 and Rambiharilal Sharma P4-4 the father, the brother and uncle of the deceased and although they are interested witnesses being related to the deceased. It is only natural in the circumstances since the offence under Section 498-A pertains to cruelty being meted out to the deceased soon before her death and she was bound to report the same to these persons only. Besides their testimony is duly supported by written documents, letters Ex. P1, P3, P4 and P5 by the deceased Sunita. The fact that Rameshwar Dayal PW-1 has stated in his deposition that accused Sohanbai had slapped his daughter in his presence is corroborated by letter Ex. P5 to the brother that she (deceased Sunita) was aboused in front of her father who had watched helplessly and the situation could never be rectified.”
16. However, in so far as sister of Appellant No. 1 is
concerned, benefit of doubt was given as after the marriage
she had been living separately at Indore.
17. We now proceed to take note of the detailed
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submissions of Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants. He began his submission by arguing that at the
time of marriage the father of the deceased did not consider
the fact that Appellant No. 1 was not in service. He was
under the wrong impression that boy's father was a wealthy
person and his daughter would be happy in the matrimonial
house even if Appellant No. 1 was earning his livelihood only
by running a small shop i.e. namkeen selling business. He
further submitted that there was no question of demanding
any dowry as marriage between the parties was a part of
group marriage solemnised on that day.
18. According to him, reading of the letters as well as
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses would bring out
that the real problem was the unemployment of Appellant
No. 1 which became the villain of the peace. Thus, he tried
to weave the story in his own way, presenting the events in
the following manner:-
Appellant No. 1 was continuing his studies (he 13
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was doing LLB) which is clear from the letter
dated 29.1.1998 written by the brother of the
deceased. In this letter Shri Ashok, brother of the
deceased also wrote that deceased was kept with
affection. The deceased Sunita was a graduate.
She did not like the business of Namkeen being
run by Appellant No. 1 in a small shop. She forced
Appellant No. 1 to close the said business. The
fact that the said business was closed at the
instance of the deceased and/or her brother is
clear from the letter dated 29.1.1989 written by
Ashok Kumar Sharma, the brother of the
deceased to Appellant No. 1's family, wherein he
wrote:-
“Ch. Satish ji how your business is going on. You had told to close the shop. How it is going on? LL.B result would have not been out yet.”
In another letter dated 22.9.1989 the deceased brother
Ashok Kumar Sharma had written to the deceased -
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“How the shop is functioning. The shop must have
been closed.”
After closing of the shop, Appellant No. 1 and the
deceased, who was a graduate, took job as teachers in
private school as is evident from the statement of
Rameshwar Dayal Sharma P.W.1, the father of the deceased,
himself. Further at the instance of the deceased, Appellant
No. 1 started living separately from his parents. This was
done at the advice of the deceased brother Ashok Kumar
Sharma, who has admitted this in his statement.
The deceased lost her job. This is evident from Ex. D-6
wherein P.W. 7 Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of deceased
had asked Sunita to prepare a certificate of domicile of any
district of Madhya Pradesh and send the same to him. Mr.
Jain argued that this letter also shows that deceased's
brother was also trying to find a job for the deceased. On
account of losing the job by the deceased, Appellant No. 1
and the deceased trapped in a financial crisis. With the 15
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meager income as primary school teacher in private school,
it was difficult for Appellant No. 1 to carry on the family. On
account of financial crisis Appellant No. 1 again came back
to his parents, as is evident from the testimony of P.W.1
Rameshwar Dayal Sharma, father of the deceased. He thus,
argued that it is this financial crisis which led the deceased
go into depression. Otherwise, various letters written by the
relatives show their cordial relations.
19. Coming specifically to charge under Section 498A of
I.P.C. namely that of harassment, Mr. Jain submitted that
even P.W.1 in his cross-examination had stated:
“11. Ex. P-8 letter was written by my son-in- law Satish Chandra before the death of my daughter. It is correct that my daughter Sunita did not make any complaint to me with regard to the behaviour of her husband i.e. accused Satish or any other complainant whatsoever.”
P.W.7 Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of the
deceased Sunita also admitted:
“6........My sister never told or complained
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me about her husband i.e, accused Satish Chandra that he ever tortured her or ever demanded dowry or torment her. She has certainly said that her husband does not say anything when her mother-in-law does such things.”
Mr. Jain submitted that in view of the aforesaid
statements of none else than the father and brother of the
deceased, the conviction of Appellant No. 1 under Section
498A and thereby under Section 304-B I.P.C. is ex-facie
untenable.
For this he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court
in the case of Satkar Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana
reported in (2004) 11 SCC 291 wherein it is, inter alia,
held:-
“23. It is based on these erroneous inference drawn on unproved facts and placing reliance on statements of interested witnesses whose evidence has not stood the test of cross-examination, the trial court came to a wrong conclusion as to the guilt of the accused persons. It is to be noted that 3 letters, Exts. P-28, DA and DB which though not very proximate in time clearly show that there was no demand as has been alleged by the prosecution by the
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accused and the contents of the said letter clearly show that the allegation made after the death of Devinder Kaur of dowry demand or harassment leading to cruelty is unsubstantiated. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the trial Court committee serious error in coming to the conclusion that the prosecution had established its case against the appellants.”
20. It was argued by Mr. Jain that the learned Trial Court has
not found Appellant No. 1 ever made any demand of dowry.
The High Court has further acquitted Sunita (sister) and,
therefore, so far as Appellant No. 1 (husband) is concerned,
neither there is any evidence nor any finding by the learned
trial court or the High Court that he ever demanded dowry. In
the absence of any evidence with regard to dowry, the
conviction of Appellant No. 1 (husband) under Section 304
(B) IPC is ex-facie untenable in as much as Section 304 (B)
IPC envisages “that soon before her death she was subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry.”
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21. Questioning the veracity of the dying declaration, Mr.
Jain argued that it was tutored one in as much as the same
was recorded in the presence of family members of the
deceased and when Appellant No. 2 was sitting outside.
More over, in this very statement the deceased had stated
about Appellant No. 1 that “he is innocent”. He also argued
that this dying declaration was not recorded in a proper
manner namely in the form of questions and answers.
22. Mr. Jain concluded his submission by arguing that the
aforesaid facts amply prove that this is not a case of demand
of dowry but is a case where on account of family
circumstances the deceased did not adjust herself and
placed herself in a situation where first she forced her
husband to close his business of Namkeen, forced her
husband to separate from his parents and to take up a job in
a private school and she also joined service in a private
school. On account of the fact that when the deceased
became unemployed and it was difficult for the couple to
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bear the expenses, this resulted in financial problem and
forced the Appellant No. 1 to go back to the house of
parents, which he left before marriage of his sister. In the
present matter it is also borne out from the record that the
deceased tried to take away all the ornaments of the family
resulting in some altercation between Appellant No. 2 and
the deceased which was the solitary incident where
allegation of physical assault was made. He submitted that
under the circumstances no case under Section 498A or
304-B was made out. He referred to the decision in the case
of Mahendra Singh reported in 1005 Supp. (3) SCC 371
wherein the Court has observed as under:-
“Abetment has been defined in Section 107 IPC to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages with one or more persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing, or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Neither of the ingredients of abetment are under Section 306 IPC merely on the allegation of
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harassment to the deceased is not sustainable. The appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charge.”
23. He also drew sustenance from another judgment of the
case of Kishori Lal vs. State of M.P. reported in 2007 (10)
SCC 797 observing as under:
“7. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the deceased wife with cruelty is not enough. Merely on the allegation of harassment conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. There is ample evidence on record that the deceased was disturbed because she had not given birth to any child. Pws 8, 10 and 11 have categorically stated that the deceased was disappointed due to the said fact that her failure to beget a child and she was upset due to this.” If the background facts analysed it is crystal clear that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. That being so, the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct.”
24. The learned Counsel for the State, countered the
aforesaid submissions by arguing that there was clinching
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evidence against both the appellants, thereby proving the
charges of commission of offences under Sections 304 B and
498 A of I.P.C., beyond any reasonable doubt. He referred to
the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 in support of the
charges of demand of dowry and harassment on that
account. He also read out from the letters Exhibits P1, P3, P4
and P5 of the deceased and her relatives, which according to
him, proved that the deceased was living in a miserable
condition because of the harassment meted out at her at the
hands of the appellants. He further submitted that there was
no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration of the
deceased which was rightly acted upon by the Courts below.
He also referred to the reasons advanced by the Trial Court
as well as High Court in holding the appellants guilty of the
aforesaid offences. He further submitted that the
truthfulness of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses namely
P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 could be gauged from the fact that
they never indulged in over stating the events and fairly
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accepted some of the suggestions put forth in cross-
examination to them truthfully. His submission was that the
entire statement of these witnesses was to be read to arrive
at correct conclusion which was done by the Courts below.
25. We have given our due consideration to the aforesaid
submissions of the Counsel for the parties with reference to
the record. It is now time to have analytical critique of these
submissions to find out as to whether the conviction and
sentence as recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court for these appellants is sustainable or not.
26. There is no dispute about the fact that Smt. Sunita
committed suicide on 14.1.1991 by pouring kerosene on her
person and then putting herself on fire. Marriage between
her and Appellant No. 1 was solemnised sometime in April
1988. Thus, this incident had occurred within a period of 3
years from the date of marriage. Since it is within 7 years of
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the marriage, presumption under Section 304 B of I.P.C.
will stand attracted if the ingredients of the said Section are
established.
27. In the statement, the deceased had given the
description of the incident namely the manner in which she
committed suicide. She has also given the reason for taking
such a step and described the behaviour of her in laws
towards her. There is a specific allegation that her mother-in-
law (Appellant No. 2) and Sister-in-law used to tease her on
the ground that her parents had not given gold chain and
they used to fight on account of dowry. This fact was known
to her father. She had stated that she was putting an end to
her life on account of continuous fight. She has also stated
that her husband (Appellant No. 1) has come under the
influence of her mother-in-law because of which he would
beat her up, but otherwise he was innocent.
28. In view of the above disclosure in the said dying
declaration, according to us starting point should be to 24
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decide as to whether deceased had made such a statement
and it is believable or not.
29. The said statement is recorded by the Executive
Magistrate, Jawra. As per this document at the time when the
statement was recorded, no police officer was present.
Before the Executive Magistrate started recording the
statement of Sunita, Dr. S.K. Jain certified that she was fully
conscious and was in a position to give her statement. It is
again testified by the doctor that while recording of her
statement, she remained fully conscious. Primarily, two
objections are raised questioning the veracity of this dying
declaration. It is stated that Sunita was tutored before she
made the statement as it was made in the presence of the
family members of the deceased and Appellant No. 2 was
made to sit outside when the statement was being recorded.
Secondly, it is not recorded in the form of questions and
answers. On the facts of this case both these contentions are
to be rejected. It is clear that the Executive Magistrate took
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due precautions and even obtained the certificate about the
state of health of Sunita before recording her statement. He
has entered the witness box as P.W.2 and deposed to this
effect. There is nothing on record which would indicate that
Sunita may have been tutored by her Mausa. Nothing could
be pointed out to show that after reaching hospital, she had
occasion to meet her Mausa and he got an opportunity to
tutor her. It is also to be borne in mind that in some of her
letters written to her relatives prior to the date of occurrence,
she had categorically stated that she was not happy with her
matrimonial life and may put end to same. There is a
different slant which is sought to be given by the defence, to
these letters. We will revert to that aspect at the appropriate
stage. At this juncture we are only highlighting that Sunita
was not happy with her matrimonial life and she had
expressed so on earlier occasions as well. This fact has now
surfaced in her statement. It is also pertinent to point out
that she has primarily blamed her mother-in-law and sister-
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in-law. There is no accusation against her husband to the
effect that he was also demanding dowry. She is forthright in
stating that whatever her husband did was under the
influence of her mother-in-law, and he was even beating her
occasionally. Otherwise, she has categorically stated that her
husband is innocent. Had there been any tutoring, it would
not have come in such a form which appears to be more
natural and voluntary. For all these reasons we do not agree
with the contention of Mr. Jain that Sunita was tutored before
she made the statement.
30. Simply because the statement is not recorded in the
form of questions and answers, is no reason to discard it
once. It is otherwise found to be trustworthy and can be
treated as the dying declaration admissible under Section 32
of the Evidence Act. No doubt, it is emphasised by this Court
that recording of such a statement in the form of question
and answer is more appropriate method which should
generally be resorted to. However, that would not mean that
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if such a statement otherwise meets all the requirements of
Section 32 and is found to be worthy of credence, it is to be
rejected only on the ground that it was not recorded in the
form of questions and answers. As pointed out above, all the
requisite precautions were taken before recording the
statement by the Executive Magistrate (P.W.2). It has come
on record that Sunita remained conscious even after
concluding her statement and during the period when her
statement was being recorded, Certificate to this effect was
also obtained by P.W.2.
31. Having held that the aforesaid statement of the
deceased was rightly accepted as admissible under Section
32 of the Evidence Act treating the same as the dying
declaration, we proceed further to find out as to whether
conviction of the appellants under Section 498A and 304B of
IPC is rightly recorded by the Courts below. From the tenor of
the letters, reference to which have been made above, there
may be a possibility that deceased was not happy with her
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matrimonial life also because of the reason that her husband
was not well off and settled in life. Possibility also cannot be
ruled out that she was not happy with the small business of
Namkeen which was being carried on by Appellant No. 1 in a
small shop and her aspirations were much higher. She made
him wind up that business and both of them viz. the husband
and the deceased had started joined service as teachers in a
private school. Later she even lost that job of hers. But the
question is as to whether this was the reason for her to
commit suicide? This question has to be answered in the
negative having regard to her statement made in the dying
declaration. She has very categorically stated that her
mother-in-law used to fight with her regularly on account of
demand of gold chain which her parents could not fulfill. She
had fight on that day also and being tired of such regular
fights she poured kerosene oil on her and set herself on fire.
It is thus, clear that immediate cause of committing suicide
was regular fights with mother-in-law on account of dowry
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demand. It, thus, stands established that there was
continuous dowry demand by Appellant No. 2, mother-in-law
of the deceased and Appellant No. 2 was even treating her
with cruelty for not fulfilling this demand.
32. Section 498A IPC reads as under:-
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. -
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section, 'cruelty' means –
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet demand.”
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We find that ingredients of the aforesaid Section stand
satisfied qua Appellant No. 2 as deceased was subject to
cruelty on account of unlawful demand for property viz. gold
chain in the instant case and failure on her part to meet that
demand. So much so, it ultimately had driven Sunita to
commit suicide.
33. In so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned it is difficult to
sustain his conviction under Section 498A. The deceased in
her statement has accused only her mother-in-law and sister-
in-law for this demand. She has not blamed her husband at
all. On the contrary, she has categorically stated that her
husband is innocent. May be at times Appellant No. 1 had
beaten his wife on the saying of her mother-in-law but the
deceased had not connected this with demand of dowry.
Therefore, it is not conclusively proved that there was any
“cruelty” on his part. Here, reading the statement of the
deceased along with various letters becomes somewhat
important. Tenor of those letters, in so far as they relate to
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Appellant No. 1, indicates that as far as Appellant No. 1 is
concerned, he is not to be blamed. In fact, in order to please
and satisfy his wife, Appellant No. 1 was making all efforts to
become something in life and was struggling for that. We
thus, are persuaded to give benefit of doubt to Appellant No.
1 for change under Section 498A. As a consequence while
upholding the conviction of Appellant No. 2 under Section
498A of IPC, we acquit Appellant No. 1 from this charge.
34. With this, we come to the question of conviction under
Section 304B of IPC. It is couched in the following language:-
“304B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death' and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. - For the purposes of this sub-section, 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961)
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(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
35. Undoubtedly, death of Sunita is caused by burns and
has occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. It
has happened within 7 years of her marriage. Further, the
trigger point for committing suicide was the quarrel between
her and her mother-in-law on the fateful day. At the same
time it is also to be borne in mind that it is not a case where
appellants have poured kerosene and put her on fire. That is
the act of deceased herself and thus it is a case of suicide.
The question is whether the quarrel between the deceased
and her mother-in-law can be treated as satisfying the
condition that “soon before her death she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, in demand
for dowry”. On the reading the statement in totality, it
becomes clear that cause/ reason for regular fights was
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dowry. One can clearly find out from the statement that on
that day also Appellant No. 2 fought with her for that reason.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that commission of offence
under Section 304B against Appellant No. 2 stands
conclusively proved in view of iron clad dying declaration.
Here again, for the reason stated by us while discussing the
accusation against Appellant No. 1 under Section 498A of
IPC, it cannot be said that he had committed any act of
“cruelty” soon before her death which forced the deceased to
take such a step. She has nowhere stated that on that date
when her mother-in-law had quarreled with her, Appellant No.
1 was associated or even responsible for that. We thus acquit
Appellant No. 1 of charge under Section 304B as well.
36. Coming to the sentence of Appellant No. 2 in respect of
the aforesaid offences, we maintain the sentence of one year
rigorous imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498A
of IPC. However, in so far as Section 304B of IPC is concerned
we are of the opinion that there are certain extenuating and
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mitigating circumstances which persuade us to reduce the
sentence of 10 years R.I. as awarded to Appellant No. 2. First
of all, even when the immediate cause to commit suicide was
the fight, at the same time it has to be kept in mind that
deceased was not happy with her matrimonial life for other
reasons as well. In fact, she was not happy with this marriage
at all which she stated in some of the letters to her mausi or
mausa. We are of the view that ends of justice would be sub
served by reducing the sentence from 10 years to 7 years
Rigorous Imprisonment. The appeals are partly allowed in the
aforesaid terms. The Appellant no.2 shall be taken into
custody to serve remaining sentence.
......................................................J. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
...................................................J. [A.K. SIKRI]
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New Delhi May 6, 2014
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