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   “Non-reportable”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA     

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.27519 of 2014

Satendra Singh .......Petitioner

versus

Vinod Kumar Bhalotia                 ......Respondent  

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1. The petitioner before this Court, took on rent the shop in question,  

from the respondent-landlord, in the year 1979.  It is the contention of the  

learned counsel for the petitioner, that after taking the shop on rent, the  

basic rental was enhanced from time to time.  Finally, the rival parties  

executed an agreement dated 1.8.1981, whereby the shop in question,  

was  rented  by  the  respondent  to  the  petitioner,  for  the  period  from  

August, 1981 to June, 1982.  As the petitioner did not vacate the premises  

on  the  expiry  of  the  period  depicted  in  the  rent  agreement  dated  

1.8.1981,  a  suit  for  the  eviction  of  the  petitioner  was  filed  by  the  

respondent on 24.11.1982.

2. In order to contest the suit filed by the respondent, the petitioner  

raised a variety of pleas.  First and foremost, it was the assertion of the  

petitioner,  that  the  suit  filed  by  the  respondent-landlord,  was  

unsustainable,  on account  of  the  applicability  of  the  provisions  of  the  

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Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)  

Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as, the 1972 Act).   While raising the  

instant  contention,  the petitioner adopted the stance that  the shop in  

question  had  been  constructed  in  1970.   This  position  was  adopted  

because the provisions of  the 1972 Act are not applicable to building,  

during a period of  ten years,  from the date of  their  completion.   The  

second contention of the petitioner was, that the eviction suit was not  

sustainable because the notice issued by the respondent-landlord under  

Section  106  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  was  invalid.   The  third  

contention of the petitioner was on the subject of the payment of rent.  It  

was the contention of the petitioner, that the entire rent was paid to the  

respondent-landlord, through a demand draft.  It was submitted, that the  

aforesaid demand draft of Rs. 3,000/- was shown to have been encashed  

by  the  respondent-landlord.   It  is  on  the  above  grounds,  that  the  

petitioner had contested the suit filed by the respondent.

3. Despite the fact that the suit was filed as far back on 24.11.1982,  

the matter has reached this Court for hearing only on 27.10. 2014.  By  

now, 32 years have passed, since the filing of the suit.  The petitioner has  

been successful in retaining the possession of the suit premises till date.  

Through the present petition, the petitioner has assailed the impugned  

judgment and final order dated 20.8.2014, passed by the High Court of  

Judicature  at  Allahabad  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  High  Court),  

ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises.

4. While perusing the impugned judgment, we were dismayed by the  

following observations,  which were recorded by the High Court,  in  the  

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impugned  order,  while  dismissing  the  revision  petition,  filed  by  the  

petitioner:

“While  parting  with  the  case,  I  am  constrained  to  make  certain  observations. A simple case of arrears of rent and ejectment filed in  the year 1982 against the revisionist on the basis of rent agreement  executed merely for a period of 11 months has taken more than  three decades to complete its journey up to this Court.  It is indeed a  very  sorry  state  of  affairs.   Judiciary  is  an  institution  where  the  people repose faith.  It is the justice which this institution dispenses.  It  is  the confidence of  people  who approach the judiciary  that  it  commands.  It is the sanctity which strengthens the justice delivery  system  but  it  is  very  alarming  that  justice  delivery  system  is  weighed  down  with  pending  and  backlog  cases.   The  major  contributing factors inter alia for this were an inadequate number of  Judges and infrastructure deficiencies.  Nothing short of immediate  and emergent measures are required to solve this crisis, otherwise  this magnificent edifice of justice will crumble down.”

5. During the course of first hearing of this petition on 27.10.2014, we  

heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.  We, however, did not find  

any merit, in the submissions advanced.  It was at that junction, that this  

Court invited the attention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the  

observations  recorded  by  the  High  Court  (as  have  been  extracted  

hereinabove).  Learned counsel, then sought permission to withdraw the  

petition.   While  declining the liberty to  the petitioner  to  withdraw the  

petition, this Court passed the following order:

“Learned counsel for the petitioner states, that the petitioner may  be  permitted  to  withdraw  the  petition.   In  the  facts  and  circumstances of this case, we decline the aforesaid prayer made by  the petitioner.

We consider it just and appropriate to issue notice to the petitioner,  in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of  India, as to why the petitioner should not be required to pay user  charges  at  the  rate  of  Rs.  1,000/-  per  month  with  effect  from  1.7.1982 till  date for having occupied the premises, and fought a  false legal battle on false pleas.  The affidavit of the petitioner be  filed within four weeks from today.  List thereafter.”

6. In  compliance,  the  petitioner  has  filed  his  affidavit  dated  

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22.11.2014.

7. We may in the first instance examine the three pleas raised at the  

hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner.   The  first  contention  

advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that  

the suit filed by the respondent-landlord was not sustainable, in view of  

the provisions of the 1972 Act.  For the purpose of demonstrating the  

applicability  of  the  provisions  of  the  1972  Act,  the  factual  assertion  

advanced at the hands of the petitioner was, that the shop in question,  

was constructed by the respondent, in the year 1970.  As against the  

above assertion, it was the contention of the respondent, that the shop  

was constructed in the year 1978, and as such, the provisions of the 1972  

Act, would be inapplicable, when the suit under reference was filed on  

24.11.1982.

8. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the first contention, we  

are of the view, that the contention raised at the hands of the petitioner  

was clearly false to his  knowledge.  The same, in our view, had been  

raised by the petitioner, only to prolong the litigation between the parties  

endlessly, or with some luck to defeat the suit itself.   In this  behalf  it  

would  be  relevant  to  mention,  that  in  the  rent  agreement  executed  

between the parties on 1.8.1981, it  was expressly mentioned, that the  

shop in  question was constructed in  the year  1978.   Interestingly  the  

petitioner himself relied on a judgment rendered between the respondent  

and five other co-owners of the land, on which the rented shop, had been  

constructed.   The said  judgment recording the compromise,  expressed  

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the respective shares of the six co-owners, in the land.  The above suit  

was filed in 1970.  It is therefore clear, that the petitioner was also aware,  

that the nature of property in 1970 was only land.  If any building had  

been raised thereon, partition would have been sought in respect of land  

and  buildings.   Besides  the  above,  the  respondent-landlord  while  

adducing evidence, had produced the first Municipal Assessment Order,  

depicting that  the first  assessment  was  made in  consonance with  the  

submissions advanced by the respondent-landlord.

9. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it would be  

relevant to mention, that the provisions of the 1972 Act, are inapplicable  

for the period of 10 years, from the date of completion of construction of  

the premises.  The said mandate emerges from Section 2(2) of the 1972  

Act, more particularly Explanation 1(a), thereof, which provides that the  

construction of a building would be deemed to have been completed, on  

the  date  of  which  the  completion  thereof  is  recorded  by  the  Local  

Authority, having jurisdiction.  The respondent-landlord has established,  

that the construction of the premises was completed in the year 1978, to  

the hilt.  In our view it was not justified for the petitioner-tenant to have  

raised  such  a  plea,  when  in  the  rent  agreement  itself,  it  was  

acknowledged  that  the  building  leased  out  by  the  respondent  to  the  

petitioner,  had  been  constructed  in  the  year  1978.   It  is  therefore  

apparent,  that  the first  contention  raised at  the  hands  of  the  learned  

counsel for the petitioner, lacked bona fides.

10. Now, we shall deal with the second contention.  Insofar as the plea  

under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it was the  

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assertion of the respondent-landlord, that there was a fixed term tenancy  

under the rent agreement dated 1.8.1981.  The rent agreement was only  

for a period of 11 months, from August, 1981 to June, 1982, and that, on  

the expiry of the express term of tenancy depicted in the rent agreement,  

the petitioner did not remain the respondent’s tenant.  It was submitted,  

that  on  the  expiry  of  the  rent  agreement,  the  petitioner  was  truly  a  

trespasser.  Accordingly no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of  

Property Act was required to be issued by the respondent-landlord, before  

filing the suit for the eviction of the petitioner.

11. The factual position as has been noticed in the foregoing paragraph,  

has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.  It is,  

therefore, apparent that even the instant plea raised by the petitioner,  

was  wholly  frivolous,  and  had  been  raised,  to  somehow or  the  other,  

defeat the claim of the respondent.

12. The third contention of the petitioner, relates to the payment of rent.  

As  against  the  demand  of  arrears  of  rent,  raised  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent-landlord, it was the assertion of the petitioner, that all rental  

dues  stood discharged.   In  order  to  demonstrate  the  above payment,  

reliance  was  placed  by  the  petitioner,  on  the  demand draft  drawn in  

favour of the respondent-landlord, in the sum of Rs. 3,000/-.  It was the  

assertion of the petitioner-tenant, that the aforesaid amount constituted  

the entire rent, payable by the petitioner, to the respondent-landlord.

13. The  aforesaid  claim  made  by  the  petitioner-tenant,  for  having  

discharged the liability of rent, has neither been accepted by the First  

Appellate Court nor by the High Court.  The courts below have arrived at  

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the conclusion, that the demand draft in question was not issued by the  

petitioner-tenant, but by Pritam Medical Agency.  It is nobody’s case that  

Pritam Medical Agency had taken the shop on rent, from the respondent-

landlord.  It was the petitioner alone, who had been inducted as a tenant  

in  the  shop  premises,  vide  the  rent  agreement  dated  1.8.1981.  

Therefore,  the  payment  made  by  the  Pritam  Medical  Agency,  to  the  

respondent-landlord cannot be accepted as a discharge of a liability of  

rent,  payable by the petitioner-tenant to the respondent-landlord.   Not  

only that the petitioner-tenant was in arrears of rent, he was remained in  

denial all through, right up to this Court.  The instant plea of the petitioner  

cannot be considered as innocent.  Surely, the petitioner was aware, that  

the  demand  draft  relied  upon  by  him,  had  not  been  issued  by  the  

petitioner,  but  had  been  issued  by  Pritam Medical  Agency.   The  said  

demand  draft,  could  not  establish  the  discharge  of  his  rental  liability  

towards the respondent.  We therefore find no justification, in recording  

the view different from the clear and simple determination, on the subject  

of arrears of rent, rendered by the courts below.

14. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the pleas  

raised by the petitioner-tenant.

15. The  consideration  recorded  hereinabove  demonstrates,  how  the  

process of law has been sought to be misused, to defeat a simple claim of  

eviction, on the expiry of a rent agreement.   Even though, as already  

noticed hereinabove, the rent agreement was for a period from August,  

1981 to June, 1982, and the petitioner should have voluntarily vacated  

the suit premises, and should have handed over the possession of the suit  

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premises  voluntarily  to  the  respondent-landlord  in  July,  1982,  he  has  

successfully repulsed all attempts of the respondent-landlord, to recover  

the  possession  of  the  suit  premises.   The  petitioner-tenant  is  still  in  

occupation of the premises even though more than 32 years have been  

elapsed, since the expiry of the rent agreement.  It was in the instant  

background, that this Court had issued notice to the petitioner, calling  

upon him to  show cause,  why he should not  be required to  pay user  

charges at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month with effect from 1.7.1982.

16. Having  considered  the  response  of  the  petitioner,  we  are  wholly  

satisfied,  that  the  petitioner  should  be  imposed  with  aforesaid  user  

charges,  for  remaining in occupation of  the rented premises,  after  the  

expiry of the rent agreement.  Accordingly, while dismissing the instant  

petition, we direct the petitioner to pay user charges at the rate of Rs.  

1,000/-  per  month,  to  the  respondent-landlord  commencing  from  

1.7.1982.   The petitioner-tenant shall  make the aforesaid payment,  by  

way of a demand draft, drawn in favour of the respondent-landlord, within  

two months from today, and place photocopy of the same on the record  

of the case file, along with the receipt thereof by the respondent landlord,  

within three months from today.  In case of non-compliance, the Registry  

is  directed to  place the instant petition for further hearing,  to enforce  

compliance.

                 ……………...........................J.                             

        (Jagdish Singh Khehar)                                                                                               

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………….............................J.                                                    (Arun Mishra)

New Delhi; December 18, 2014.

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