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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.829 OF 2005

Mrs. Sarah Mathew … Appellant

Versus

The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its Director  – Dr. K.M. Cherian & Ors. … Respondents

WITH

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos.5687-5688 of 2013

M/s. HT Media Ltd. & Ors. … Petitioners

Versus

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) … Respondent

WITH

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5764 of 2013

M/s. Hindustan Media Venture  Ltd. & Ors. …          Petitioners

Versus

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State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) … Respondent

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. While dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005 a  

two-Judge Bench of this Court noticed a conflict between a  

two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Damodar  

Kale  &  Anr.  v.  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  1   which  is  

followed  in  another  two-Judge  Bench   decision  in  Japani  

Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty2  and a three-Judge  

Bench  decision  of  this  Court  in  Krishna  Pillai  v.  T.A.  

Rajendran & Anr.  3   . In Bharat Kale it was held that for the  

purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant  

date is the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal  

proceedings  and  not  the  date  of  taking  cognizance  by  a  

Magistrate or issuance of a process by court.  In  Krishna  

Pillai this Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child  

Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which stated that no court shall  

take  cognizance  of  any  offence  under  the  Child  Marriage  1 (2003) 8 SCC 559 2 (2007) 7 SCC 394 3 (1990) supp. SCC 121

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Restraint  Act,  1929 after  the expiry of  one year  from the  

date  on  which  the  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been  

committed.   The  three-Judge  Bench  held  that  since  

magisterial  action  in  the  case  before  it  was  beyond  the  

period  of  one  year  from  the  date  of  commission  of  the  

offence,   the  Magistrate  was  not  competent  to  take  

cognizance when he did in view of bar under Section 9 of the  

Child  Marriage  Restraint  Act,  1929.   Thus,  there  was  

apparent conflict on the question whether for the purpose of  

computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) in  

respect of a criminal complaint the relevant date is the date  

of  filing  of  the  complaint  or  the  date  of  institution  of  

prosecution  or  whether  the  relevant  date  is  the  date  on  

which a Magistrate takes cognizance.  The two-Judge Bench,  

therefore, directed that this case may be put up before a  

three-Judge  Bench  for  an  authoritative  pronouncement.  

When the matter was placed before the three-Judge Bench,  

the three-Judge Bench doubted the correctness of  Krishna  

Pillai and observed that as a co-ordinate Bench, it cannot  

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declare that  Krishna Pillai  does not lay down the correct  

law and, therefore, the matter needs to be referred to a five-

Judge Bench to examine the correctness of the view taken in  

Krishna Pillai.  Accordingly,  this appeal  along with other  

matters where similar issue is involved is placed before this  

Constitution Bench.  

2. No specific questions have been referred to us.  But, in  

our  opinion,  the  following  questions  arise  for  our  

consideration:

A. Whether for  the purposes of computing the  

period of limitation under Section 468 of the  

Cr.P.C the relevant date is the date of filing of  

the  complaint  or  the  date  of  institution  of  

prosecution or whether the relevant date is  

the  date  on  which  a  Magistrate  takes  

cognizance of the offence?

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B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai  or  

Bharat  Kale (which  is  followed  in  Japani  

Sahoo) lays down the correct law.  

3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at great  

length and carefully read their written submissions.  We may  

give gist of their submissions and then proceed to answer  

the questions which fall for our consideration.  

4. Gist  of  submissions  of  Mr.  Krishnamurthi  Swami,  

learned counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 829  

of 2005.  

a. Krishna Pillai was rendered in the context  

of Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint  

Act,  1929.   There is  no reference to  either  

Section 468 or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in  

this judgment.  This judgment merely focuses  

on  the  meaning  of  the  term  ‘taking  

cognizance’ and has accordingly interpreted  

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Section 9 without reference to any provisions  

of the Cr.P.C.  Hence, this judgment cannot  

be considered authority for the purposes of  

interpretation of provisions of Chapter XXXVI.  

On  the  other  hand  Bharat  Kale considers  

various provisions of Chapter XXXVI.  All the  

provisions  have  been  cumulatively  read  to  

conclude that the limitation prescribed is not  

for  taking  cognizance  within  the  period  of  

limitation,  but  for  taking  cognizance  of  an  

offence in regard to which a complaint is filed  

or prosecution is initiated within the period of  

the  limitation  prescribed  under  the  Cr.P.C.  

This judgment lays down the correct law.  

b. Section  468  of  the  Cr.P.C.  has  to  be  read  

keeping in view other provisions particularly  

Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.  A person filing a  

complaint  within  time  cannot  be  penalized  

because  the  Magistrate  did  not  take  

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cognizance.  A person filing a complaint after  

the period of limitation can file an application  

for condonation of delay and the Magistrate  

could  condone  delay  if  the  explanation  is  

reasonable.  If Section 468 is interpreted to  

mean  that  a  Magistrate  cannot  take  

cognizance of an offence after the period of  

limitation without any reference to the date  

of filing of the complaint or the institution of  

the  prosecution  it  would  be  rendered  

unconstitutional.   A  court  of  law  would  

interpret  a  provision  which  would  help  

sustaining the validity of the law by applying  

the  doctrine  of  reasonable  construction  

rather than accepting an interpretation which  

may make such provision unsustainable and  

ultra  vires the  Constitution.  [U.P.  Power  

Corpon. Ltd. v. Ayodhya Prasad Mishra  

& Anr4].  

4 (2008) 10 SCC 139

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c. Chapter  XXXVI  requires  to  be  harmoniously  

interpreted keeping the interests of both the  

complainant as well as the accused in mind.  

d. The  law  of  limitation  should  be  interpreted  

from  the  standpoint  of  the  person  who  

exercises the right and whose remedy would  

be  barred.   The  laws  of  limitation  do  not  

extinguish the right but only bar the remedy.  

[Mela  Ram  v.  The  Commissioner  of  

Income Tax Punjab  5  ].    

e. If delay in filing a complaint can be condoned  

in terms of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. then,  

Section  468  of  the  Cr.P.C  cannot  be  

interpreted  to  mean  that  a  complaint  or  

prosecution instituted within time cannot be  

proceeded  with,  merely  because  the  

5 1956 SCR 166

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Magistrate took cognizance after the period  

of limitation.  

f. The question of delay in launching a criminal  

prosecution  may  be  a  circumstance  to  be  

taken into  consideration  while  arriving at  a  

final decision.  However, the same may not  

by  itself  be  a  ground  for  dismissing  the  

complaint at the threshold.  [Udai Shankar  

Awasthi  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Anr.  6  ].  In  

certain exceptional circumstances delay may  

have to be condoned considering the gravity  

of the charge.  

g. The  contention  that  Section  468  should  be  

interpreted  to  mean  that  where  the  

Magistrate  does  not  take cognizance within  

the period of limitation it must be treated as  

having the object of giving quietus to petty  

6 (2013) 2 SCC 435

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offences  in  the  Indian  Penal  Code  is  

untenable.  Some offences which fall  within  

the periods of limitation specified in Section  

468 of the Cr.P.C are serious. It could never  

have been the intention of the legislature to  

accord quietus to such offences.  

h. Procedure is meant to sub-serve and not rule  

the cause of justice.   Procedural laws must  

be  liberally  construed  to  really  serve  as  

handmaid.   Technical  objections which tend  

to defeat and deny substantial justice should  

be strictly discouraged. [Sushil Kumar Jain  

v.  State  of  Bihar  7  ,  Sardar  Amarjeet    

Singh  Kalra  (dead)  by  LRs.  &  Ors.  v.   

Promod Gupta (dead)  by  LRs.  & Ors.  8  ,    

Kailash v. Nanhku & Ors.  9  ]   

7 1975 (3) SCR 944 8 (2003) 3 SCC 272 9 (2005) 4 SCC 480]

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5. Gist  of  submissions  of  Mr.  S.  Guru  Krishnakumar,  

learned senior counsel and Mrs. V. Mohana, learned counsel  

for respondent 1 in Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005.  

a. Bharat  Kale and  Japani  Sahoo do  not  

represent  the  correct  position  in  law.  

Krishna Pillai rightly holds that the relevant  

date for considering period of limitation is the  

date of taking cognizance.

b. The  settled  principles  of  statutory  

construction  require  that  the  expression  

‘cognizance’  occurring  in  Chapter  XXXVI  of  

the Cr.P.C.  has to be given its  legal  sense,  

since it has acquired a special connotation in  

criminal  law.  It  is  a settled position in law  

that taking cognizance is judicial application  

of mind to the contents of a complaint/police  

report for the first time.  [R.R. Chari v. The  

State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  10  ,   Bhushan  10 AIR 1951 SC 207

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Kumar & Anr. v. State  (NCT of Delhi) &  

Anr.  11  ]  .  If  an  expression  has  acquired  a  

special  connotation  in  law,  dictionary  or  

general  meaning  ceases  to  be  helpful  in  

interpreting such a word. Such an expression  

must  be  given  its  legal  meaning  and  no  

other.   [State  of  Madras  v.  Gannon  

Dukerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd.  12  ].   

c. The heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for  

limitation  for  taking  cognizance  of  certain  

offences is clearly reflective of the legislative  

intent to treat the date of taking cognizance  

as the relevant date in computing limitation.  

Pertinently,  Section  467  defines  the  

expression ‘period of limitation’ as the period  

specified in Section 468 for taking cognizance  

of  an  offence.   The  express  language  of  

Section  468  makes  it  clear  that  the  

11 (2012) 5 SCC 424 12 1959 SCR 379

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legislature  considers  the  relevant  date  for  

computing  the  date  of  limitation  to  be  the  

date of taking cognizance and not the date of  

filing of a complaint.  Further, the situations  

in  Section  470  of  the  Cr.P.C.  providing  for  

exclusion  in  computing  the  period  of  

limitation  are  again  relatable  to  taking  

cognizance and institution of prosecution.  So  

also,  exclusion  under  Section  471  of  the  

Cr.P.C. relates only to taking cognizance and  

Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.  also provides for  

extension  of  period  of  limitation  in  taking  

cognizance.  

d. The  scheme  of  the  Cr.P.C.  envisages  

cognizance  to  be  the  point  of  initiation  of  

proceedings. Chapter XIV of the Cr.P.C. which  

contains  provisions  of  taking  cognizance  is  

titled  “Conditions  requisite  for  initiation  of  

proceedings”.   All  provisions  contained  

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therein  use  the  expression  ‘cognizance’.  

They do not refer to filing of complaint at all.  

e. Where the words of a statute are absolutely  

clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be  

had to the principles of interpretation other  

than  the  literal  rule.   Even  if  the  literal  

interpretation  results  in  hardship  or  

inconvenience  it  has  to  be  followed  

(Raghunath  Rai  Bareja  and  Anr.   v.   

Punjab National Bank and Ors.)  13  .  On a  

plain and literal interpretation of Section 468  

of  the  Cr.P.C.  read  in  the  background  of  

object of Chapter XXXVI the intention of the  

legislature  is  clearly  evident  that  bar  of  

limitation is only for taking cognizance of an  

offence  after  the  expiry  of  the  period  

specified therein.  

13 (2007) 2 SCC 230

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f. Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. sets out procedure  

to be followed in respect of complaints filed  

directly to a Magistrate.  It reflects a well laid  

out  scheme  which  envisages  judicial  

application of mind to be a pre-requisite for  

initiation  of  proceedings.   The  definition  of  

the  term  ‘complaint’  contained  in  Section  

2(d) also makes this evident.  Thus, initiation  

of  proceedings  in  criminal  law  can  only  be  

upon taking cognizance.  It is clear, therefore,  

that  under  Section  468  of  the  Cr.P.C.  

legislature has barred taking of cognizance as  

envisaged  by  Chapters  XIV  and  XV  after  

expiry of period of limitation. Hence, the date  

for purpose of limitation would be the date of  

taking cognizance. Mere filing of a complaint  

does not result in cognizance being taken, for  

the law requires the court to apply its mind  

judicially  even  before  deciding  to  issue  

process.  

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g. There was no period of limitation under the old  

Cr.P.C.  A long delay led to serious negligence  

on  the  part  of  the  prosecuting  agencies,  

forgetfulness  on  the  part  of  the  prosecution  

and  defence  witness  and  mental  anguish  to  

the  accused.   Infliction  of  punishment  long  

after  the  commission  of  offence  impairs  its  

utility as social retribution to the offender.  To  

obviate  these  lacunae  Chapter  XXXVI  was  

introduced in the Cr.P.C.  

h. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo have missed  

the object of introduction of Chapter XXXVI in  

the Cr.P.C. namely to serve larger interest of  

administration of criminal justice keeping in  

view  the  interest  of  the  accused  and  the  

interest  of  prosecuting  agencies.   These  

judgments fail to advert to the prejudice that  

will  be  caused  to  the  accused  if  benefit  of  

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delay  in  taking  cognizance  is  not  given  to  

them.   The  likelihood  of  prejudice  being  

caused  to  the  complainant  which  weighed  

with this court in the above two decisions can  

be  taken  care  of  by  Section  473  which  

provides for condonation of delay. [State of  

Punjab  v.  Sarwan  Singh  14  ,   Vanka  

Radhamanohari (Smt.) v. Vanka Venkata  

Reddy and others15 and State of H.P. v.  

Tara Dutt & Anr.16]  

i. Object of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. has not  

been considered in Bharat Kale  and Japani  

Sahoo.  They are sub-silentio in this regard.  

(Municipal  Corporation  of  Delhi  V.  

Gurnam Kaur17).  They have also not taken  

note  of  difference  of  language  in  Sections  

468 and 469 of the Cr.P.C.  

14 AIR 1981 SC 1054 15 (1993) 3 SCC 4  16 (2000) 1 SCC 230 17 (1989) 1 SCC 101

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j. There are seven exceptions in the Cr.P.C. to  

Section  468  namely  Sections  84(1),  96(1),  

198(6),  199(5),  378(5),  457(2)  and  the  

proviso  to  Section  125(3).   In  all  these  

provisions  period  of  limitation  has  been  

expressly  provided  by  the  legislature.   The  

language  of  each  of  these  provisions  is  

different  from language  of  Section  468.   A  

perusal of these seven exceptions show that  

what is intended in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C.  

is limitation for taking cognizance and not for  

filing complaints.  

6. Gist  of  submissions  of  Mr.  Padmanabhan,  learned  

counsel  for   respondent  2  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  829  of  

2005.  

a. The  legislature  has  been  very  specific  

wherever  time  limit  has  to  be  fixed  for  

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initiation  of  prosecution.   In  certain  special  

legislations  like  the  Negotiable  Instruments  

Act  bar  of  limitation  is  not  co-related  to  

taking cognizance of an offence by a court,  

but  it  is  co-related  to  filing  of  a  complaint  

within a specific period.  It is apparent that  

the bar  under Chapter  XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.  

must be co-related to taking cognizance of an  

offence  by  the  court  in  view  of  specific  

language  used  by  the  relevant  sections  

contained therein.  

b. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. is captioned as  

‘Limitation for  Taking Cognizance of Certain  

Offences’.  Therefore, this Chapter has to be  

understood  as  a  Chapter  placing  limitation  

upon  the  court  for  the  purposes  of  taking  

cognizance within  the timeframe prescribed  

and  not  for  filing  of  a  complaint.   In  this  

Chapter  the  word  ‘complaint’  or  

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‘complainant’  are  conspicuously  absent.  

Emphasis is on ‘offences’.  

c. Section 473 of the Cr.P.C enjoins a duty on  

the court  to  examine not  only  whether  the  

delay has been explained or not but whether  

it  is  necessary  to  do  so  in  the  interest  of  

justice.  

d. If the charge-sheet is hit by Section 468, the  

Court  may  then  resort  to  Section  473  in  

exceptional  cases  in  the  interest  of  justice.  

The  same consideration  may  not  arise  if  a  

private  complaint  is  filed.   Section  473  is  

designed  to  cater  to  situations  when  for  

genuine reasons investigation is delayed.  It  

is not intended to give long rope to litigants  

who take long time to approach the court.  

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e. Marginal  Heading  or  Note  can  be  usefully  

referred  to,  to  determine  the  sense  of  any  

doubtful expression in a section ranged under  

that heading though it cannot be referred to  

for giving a different effect to clear words in  

the section.  

7. Gist  of  submissions of  Mr.  Amrendra Sharan,  learned  

senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in SLP (Crl.) Nos.  

5687-5688 of 2013 and SLP (Crl.) No. 5764 of 2013.  

a. Chapter  XXXVI  of  the  Cr.P.C.  is  a  complete  

code in itself which deals with issue of bar of  

limitation for taking cognizance of an offence.  

b. A bare reading of Section 468 of the Cr.P.C  

leaves no manner  of  doubt  that  the bar  of  

limitation  applies  as  on  the  date  of  

cognizance.  It specifically targets cognizance  

and it debars taking cognizance of an offence  

after  expiration  of  the  statutory  period  of  

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limitation.   One  cannot  make  fundamental  

alteration in the words of the statute.  Taking  

cognizance  cannot  be  altered  to  filing  

complaint within statutory period.  

c. Taking  cognizance  is  distinct  from  filing  

complaint.   The  term cognizance  has  been  

defined  by  this  Court  in  R.R.  Chari and  

Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v.  State of   

Maharashtra18.   Cognizance  takes  place  

when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of  

an  offence  on  a  complaint,  or  on  a  police  

report or upon information of a person other  

than a police officer.  

d. Operation of legal maxims can be excluded  

by statutes but operation of statutes cannot  

be excluded by legal maxims. Reliance on a  

maxim  by  this  Court  in  Japani  Sahoo for  

carving  out  an  exception  and  supplying  18 (1971) 2 SCC 654

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words to the complete Code of limitation is  

erroneous.  

e. Penal statutes have to be interpreted strictly.  

[Tolaram Relumal & Anr. v. The State of  

Bombay]19.   It  is  the  cardinal  rule  of  

interpretation that where a statute provides a  

particular thing should be done, it should be  

done in the manner prescribed and not in any  

other way. (State of Jharkhand & Anr.  v.   

Ambay Cements & Anr.  20  )   

f. The rule of  Casus Omissus stipulates that a  

matter which should have been, but has not  

been provided for  in  the statute cannot  be  

supplied by the courts as,  to do so, will  be  

legislation by court and not construction. The  

legislative  casus omissus cannot be supplied  

by judicial interpretative process. There is no  

scope  for  supplying/  supplanting  any  word,  

19 AIR 1954 SC 496 20 (2005) 1 SCC 368

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phrase or sentence or creating any exception  

in Chapter XXXVI which is a complete Code in  

itself.  [Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing  

Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers &  

Ors  21  .,  Bharat  Aluminum  Co.  etc.  v.    

Kaiser  Aluminum  Technical  Services  

etc.  22  ,  Assistant  Commissioner,    

Assessment-II,  Bangalore  &  Ors.  v.   

Velliappa Textiles Ltd. & Anr.  23  ].    

g. Japani Sahoo does not lay down the correct  

law because by stipulating that the date of  

limitation is to be calculated from the date of  

filing of complaint rather than from the date  

on  which  the  cognizance  is  taken,  it  has  

created a casus omissus, where the language  

of  the  statute  was  plain  and  no  casus  

omissus existed.  

21 (2003) 6 SCC 659 22 (2012) 9 SCC 552 23 (2003) 11 SCC 405

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h. The  Golden  Rule  of  Interpretation  provides  

that  a  statute  has  to  be  interpreted  by  

grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of  

the  consequences  if  the  language  of  the  

statute  is  plain  and  simple.  [Maulavi  

Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of   

Gujarat & Anr  24  ].  

i. The  Law  Commission’s  42nd Report  

demonstrates the rational for introduction of  

limitation in Cr.P.C.  The legislature wanted to  

ensure that prosecution should not result in  

persecution  especially  in  cases  of  minor  

offences which could be tried and disposed of  

speedily.  

j. The  accused  has  a  fundamental  right  to  

speedy  trial  which  is  a  facet  of  Article  21.  

[A.R. Antulay v.  R.S. Nayak  25   (“Antulay    

24 (2004) 6 SCC 672 25 (1992) 1 SCC 225

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‘1992’ Case”)]  Therefore, it is the duty of  

the  courts  to  take  cognizance  within  a  

prescribed timeframe.  If the court fails to do  

so, it is not open to it to take cognizance of  

such offence as it might prejudice the right of  

the accused. Therefore, no cognizance can be  

taken after the period of limitation. [Raj Deo  

Sharma  (II)  v.  State  of  Bihar  26   and  

Sarwan Singh.]  

k. The accused has a right to be heard at the  

time  of  condonation  of  delay  in  taking  

cognizance by the courts.  Delay cannot be  

condoned  without  notice  to  the  accused.  

[State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra  

Vinayak  Dongre  &  Ors.  27  ,  P.K.    

Choudhary  v.  Commander,  48  BRTF,  

26 (1999) 7 SCC 604 27 (1995) 1 SCC 42

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(GREF)  28  ,  Krishna  Sanghai  v.  State  of    

M.P.  29  ]   

l. The  accused  have  to  be  heard  when  an  

application under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. is  

moved by the prosecution before cognizance  

is taken.  Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is clear  

and  unambiguous  and  it  bars  taking  

cognizance of  an offence,  if  on the date of  

taking  cognizance  the  period  prescribed  

under  Section  468(2)  of  the  Cr.P.C.  has  

expired.  Japani Sahoo, therefore, does not  

lay down the correct law.  

8. Gist  of  submissions  of  Mr.  Sidharth  Luthra,  learned  

Additional Solicitor General,  appearing for the respondent–

State (NCT of Delhi) in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5687-5688 of 2013 and  

SLP (Crl.) No. 5764 of 2013.  

28 (2008) 13 SCC 229 29 1997 Cr.L.J 90 (MP)

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a. Bharat Kale lays down the correct law and  

not Krishna Pillai.  

b. Legislative history of Chapter XXXVI indicates  

its object.  

c. Stage of  process  is  not  to  be  mistaken for  

cognizance.  Cognizance indicates the point  

when  a  court  takes  judicial  notice  of  an  

offence  with  a  view to  initiating  process  in  

respect  of  the  offence  [S.K.  Sinha,  Chief  

Enforcement  Officer  v.  Videocon  

International Ltd. & Ors.  30  ]  . Cognizance is  

entirely  a  different  thing  from  initiation  of  

proceedings,  rather  it  is  the  condition  

precedent to the initiation of proceedings by  

the  court.  Cognizance  is  taken  of  the  case  

and not of persons.  Under Section 190 of the  

Cr.P.C.  it  is  the  application  of  mind  to  the  

averments in the complaint that constitutes  

30 (2008) 2 SCC 492

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cognizance  (Bhushan  Kumar).   Stage  of  

process   is  not  relevant  for  the purpose of  

computing limitation under Section 468 of the  

Cr.P.C.

d. Chapter XXXVI has to be read as a whole. To  

understand  the  scheme  of  this  Chapter  

reference  may  be  made  to  Vanka  

Radhamanohari.  

e. On interpretation of Section 473 of the Cr.P.C  

particularly  the disjunctive ‘or’  used therein  

reference  may  be  made  to  Municipal  

Corporation  of  Delhi  v.  Tek  Chand  

Bhatia  31  .  Once  the  complainant  has  acted  

with due diligence and there are delays on  

the  part  of  the  Court,  it  would  be  in  the  

interest of justice to condone such delay and  

not call for explanation from the complainant  

which in  any case he cannot possibly  give.  

31 (1980) 1 SCC 158

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On condonation  of  delay  reference may be  

made to Sharadchandra Dongre.  

f. Taking  cognizance  is  not  dictated  by  the  

prosecution of the complaint or police report  

but is predicated upon application of judicial  

mind by the Magistrate which is  not  in  the  

control  of  the  individual  instituting  the  

prosecution.  If date of taking cognizance is  

considered  to  be  relevant  in  computing  

limitation, the act of the court can prejudice  

the  complainant  which  will  be  against  the  

maxim  ‘the  acts  of  courts  should  not  

prejudice  anyone’.  [Rodger  v.  Comptoir  

D’Escompte De Paris  32  ]  .  

g. Krishna  Pillai relates  to  Section  9  of  the  

Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a  

special  law  and  which  provides  for  a  

limitation  for  taking  cognizance  and  could  32 (1870-71) VII Moore N.S. 314

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exclude  the  application  of  Chapter  XXXVI  

and,  hence,  Section 473 of  the Cr.P.C.  and  

perhaps in such facts there was no reference  

to Section 473 of the Cr.P.C.  Similar is the  

view  in  P.P.  Unnikrishnan  &  Anr.  v.   

Puttiyottil Alikutty & Anr.  33  .  

h. It is settled law that Sections 4 and 5 of the  

Cr.P.C.  create an exception for  special  laws  

with special procedures.  Krishna Pillai was  

in  the  context  of  specific  limitation  period  

where  Section  473  of  the  Cr.P.C.  had  no  

application.  Thus, it cannot be considered or  

applied to interpret Sections 468 and 473 of  

the Cr.P.C. as they stand.  On the contrary,  

view  taken  in  Bharat  Kale  and  Japani  

Sahoo relying upon Rashmi Kumar (Smt.)  

v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada,34 reach the same  

33 (2000) 8 SCC 131 34 (1997) 2 SCC 397

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conclusion as contended herein i.e. the acts  

of the court should not prejudice anyone.    

9. Having given the gist of the submissions, we shall now  

advert to  Krishna Pillai,  Bharat Kale and  Japani Sahoo  

which  have  led  to  this  reference.  In  Krishna Pillai  this  

Court was concerned with Section 9 of the Child Marriage  

Restraint Act, 1929 which reads as under:  

“No  court  shall  take  cognizance  of  any  offence under this Act after the expiry of one   year from the date on which the offence is   alleged to have been committed.”

It was not disputed that cognizance of the offence had  

been taken by the court more than a year after the offence  

was committed.  The appellant challenged the continuance  

of prosecution by filing an application under Section 482 of  

the  Cr.P.C.  before  the  High  Court  contending  that  the  

cognizance was barred under Section 9 of the Child Marriage  

Restraint Act,  1929.   It  was contended by the respondent  

that since the complaint had been filed within a year from  

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the  commission  of  the  offence  it  must  be  taken  that  the  

court has taken cognizance on the date when the complaint  

was filed.   Therefore,  the complaint  cannot be said to  be  

barred  by  limitation.   This  Court  quoted  the  following  

observations of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in  

A.R.  Antulay  v.  Ramdas  Sriniwas  Nayak  (“Antulay  

‘1984’ Case”  35  :   

“When a private complaint is filed, the court has   to examine the complainant on oath save in the   cases set out in the proviso to Section 200 CrPC  After  examining  the  complainant  on  oath  and  examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning   thereby that the witnesses not present need not   be  examined,  it  would  be  open  to  the  court  to   judicially determine whether a case is made out   for  issuing  process.  When  it  is  said  that  court   issued  process,  it  means  the  court  has  taken   cognizance  of  the  offence  and  has  decided  to   initiate  the  proceedings  and  a  visible   manifestation  of  taking  cognizance  process  is   issued  which  means  that  the  accused  is  called   upon to appear before the court.”

This  Court  observed  that  cognizance  has  assumed  a  

special meaning in our criminal jurisprudence and the above  

extract from Antulay ‘1984’ Case indicates that filing of a  35 (1984) 2 SCC 500

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complaint  is  not  taking  cognizance  and  what  exactly  

constitutes  taking  cognizance  is  different  from  filing  a  

complaint.   This Court observed that since the magisterial  

action in the case before it was beyond the period of one  

year  from  the  date  of  commission  of  the  offence,  the  

Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance when he  

did in view of the bar under Section 9 of the Child Marriage  

Restraint Act, 1929.  

10. Before discussing Bharat Kale, it is necessary to go to  

Rashmi  Kumar  (Smt.) on  which  reliance  is  placed  in  

Bharat Kale.  In that case, the question was whether the  

complaint filed by the complainant-wife against the husband  

under Section 406 of the IPC in September, 1990 was time  

barred.   The  offence  under  Section  406  of  the  IPC  is  

punishable with imprisonment which could extend to three  

years or  with fine or with both.   Therefore,  under Section  

468(3)  of  the  Cr.P.C.,  the  limitation  period  for  the  said  

offence is three years.  It was urged by the counsel for the  

husband that the evidence of the complainant-wife recorded  

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under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. establishes that in October,  

1986 the complainant-wife demanded return of jewelry and  

the husband refused to return the jewelry.  Therefore, the  

period of limitation began to run from October, 1986 and the  

complaint  filed  in  September,  1990  was  time  barred,  it  

having been filed beyond the period of three years.  A three-

Judge Bench of this Court negatived this contention and held  

that  it  was  clearly  averred  in  the  complaint  that  on  

5/12/1987, the complainant-wife had demanded jewelry from  

the husband and the  husband had refused to  do so  and,  

therefore, the complaint filed on 10/9/1990 was within three  

years  from the date  of  demand of  jewelry  and refusal  to  

return  it  by  the  husband.   Thus,  for  the  purpose  of  

computation of period of limitation, the date of filing of the  

complaint was held to be relevant.

11. In  Bharat  Kale, the  offence under the Drugs and  

Magic  Remedies  (Objectionable  Advertisements)  Act,  1954  

was  detected  on  5/3/1999.   The  complaint  was  filed  on  

3/3/2000 which was within the period of  limitation of  one  

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year.   However,  the  Magistrate  took  cognizance  on  

25/3/2000 i.e. beyond the period of one year.  It was argued  

that since cognizance was taken beyond the period of one  

year,  the  bar  of  limitation  applies.   After  considering  the  

provisions  of  Chapter  XXXVI  of  the  Cr.P.C.  this  Court  

observed  that  they  indicate  that  the  limitation  prescribed  

therein is only for the filing of the complaint or initiation of  

the prosecution and not for taking cognizance.  It, of course,  

prohibits  the  court  from  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  

where the complaint is filed before the court after the expiry  

of  the  period  mentioned  in  the  said  Chapter.   This  Court  

further  observed  that  taking  cognizance  is  an  act  of  the  

court over which the prosecuting agency or the complainant  

has  no  control.   A  complaint  filed  within  the  period  of  

limitation cannot be made infructuous by an act of the court  

which  will  cause  prejudice  to  the  complainant.   Such  a  

construction  will  be  against  the  maxim  ‘actus  curiae  

neminem  gravabit’, which  means  the  act  of  court  shall  

prejudice no man.  It was also observed relying on Rashmi  

Kumar (Smt.) that the legislature could not have intended  

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to put a period of limitation on the act of the court for taking  

cognizance of  an offence so as to  defeat  the case of  the  

complainant.  

 12.  In  Japani  Sahoo,  the  complainant  therein  filed  a  

complaint in the court of the concerned Magistrate alleging  

commission of offences punishable under Sections 161, 294,  

323 and 506 of the IPC.  On 8/8/1997 learned Magistrate on  

the  basis  of  statements  of  witnesses  issued summons for  

appearance of  the accused.   The accused surrendered on  

23/11/1998 and thereafter filed a petition under Section 482  

of  the  Cr.P.C.  in  the  High  Court  for  quashing  criminal  

proceedings contending  inter alia that no cognizance could  

have been taken by the court after the period of one year of  

limitation  prescribed  for  the  offences  punishable  under  

Sections 294 and 323 of the IPC.  The High Court held that  

the relevant date for deciding the bar of limitation was the  

date of taking cognizance by the court and since cognizance  

was taken after the period of one year and the delay was not  

condoned by the court by exercising power under Section  

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473 of the Code, the complaint is liable to be dismissed.  On  

appeal,  this  Court  referred  to  another  well  known maxim  

‘nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi’ which means that a  

crime  never  dies.   This  Court  elaborately  discussed  the  

scheme of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. and after following  

Bharat Kale held that it is the date of filing of complaint or  

the date on which criminal proceedings are initiated which is  

material.  

13. At the outset, we must deal with the criticism leveled  

against  Bharat Kale   and  Japani Sahoo that  they place  

undue reliance on legal maxims.   It was argued that legal  

maxims  can  neither  expand  nor  delete  any  part  of  an  

express  statutory  provision,  nor  can  they  give  an  

interpretation which is directly contrary to what the provision  

stipulated.  Their operation can be excluded by statutes but  

operation of statutes cannot be excluded by legal maxims.  

14. It is true that in Bharat Kale  and Japani Sahoo  this  

Court has referred to two important legal maxims.  We may  

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add that in Vanka Radhamanohari, to which our attention  

has been drawn by the counsel, it is stated that the general  

rule of limitation is based on Latin maxim ‘vigilantibus et non  

dormientibus, jura subveniunt’, which means the vigilant and  

not  the  sleepy,  are  assisted  by  laws.   We  are,  however,  

unable  to  accept  the  submission  that  reliance  placed  on  

legal maxims was improper. We  are  mindful  of  the  fact  

that  legal  maxims  are  not  mandatory  rules  but  their  

importance  as  guiding  principles  can  hardly  be  

underestimated.  Herbert Broom in the preface to the First  

Edition of  his  classical  work “Legal  Maxims” (as seen in  

Broom’s Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, 1939) stated:

“In  the  Legal  Science,  perhaps  more  frequently   than in any other, reference must be made to the  first  principles.   Indeed,  a  very  limited  acquaintance  with  the  earlier  Reports  will  show  the  importance  which  was  attached  to  the  acknowledged Maxims of the Law, in periods when  civilization  and  refinement  had  made  comparatively little progress.  In the ruder ages,   without  doubt,  the  great  majority  of  questions   respecting the rights,  remedies, and liabilities of   private  individuals  were  determined  by  an   immediate  reference  to  such  maxims,  many  of   which  obtained  in  the  Roman  law,  and  are  so   manifestly founded in reason, public convenience,   

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and necessity,  as to find a place in the code of   every civilized nation.  In more modern times, the   increase of commerce, and of national and social   intercourse,  has  occasioned  a  corresponding   increase  in  the  sources  of  litigation,  and  has   introduced many subtleties and nice distinctions,   both in legal reason and in the application of legal   principles,  which  were  formerly  unknown.   This   change,  however,  so  far  from  diminishing  the   value of simple fundamental rules, has rendered  an  accurate  acquaintance  with  them  the  more   necessary,  in  order  that  they  may  be  either   directly applied, or qualified, or limited, according   to the exigencies of the particular case, and the   novelty  of  the  circumstances  which  present   themselves.  

In  our  opinion,  therefore,  use  of  legal  maxims  as  

guiding  principles  in  Bharat  Kale and  Japani  Sahoo is  

perfectly justified.

15. To address the questions which arise in this reference,  

it  is  necessary to have a look at the legislative history of  

Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. The Criminal Procedure Code,  

1898 contained no general provision for limitation.  Though  

under certain special  laws like the Negotiable Instruments  

Act,  1881,  Trade  and  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1958,  the  

Police Act, 1861, The Factories Act, 1948 and the Army Act,  

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1950, there are provisions prescribing period of limitation for  

prosecution  of  offences,  there  was  no  general  law  of  

limitation for prosecution of other offences.   The approach  

of this Court while dealing with the argument that there was  

delay  in  launching  prosecution,  when  in  the  Criminal  

Procedure  Code  (1898),  there  was  no  general  provision  

prescribing  limitation,  could  be  ascertained  from  its  

judgment  in  The  Assistant  Collector  of  Customs  ,  

Bombay & Anr.  v.  L.R. Melwani & Anr.36.  It was urged  

before the High Court in that case that there was delay in  

launching prosecution.  The High Court held that the delay  

was  satisfactorily  explained.   While  dealing  with  this  

question, this Court held that in any case prosecution could  

not have been quashed on the ground of delay because it  

was not the case of the accused that any period of limitation  

was prescribed for filing the complaint.  Hence the complaint  

could  not  have been thrown out  on  the  sole  ground that  

there  was  delay  in  filing  the  same.   This  Court  further  

observed that the question of delay in filing complaint may  

36 AIR 1970 SC 962

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be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in arriving  

at  the  final  verdict  and  by  itself  it  affords  no  ground  for  

dismissing the complaint. This position underwent a change  

to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was introduced in the  

Cr.P.C. as we shall soon see.  

16. It is pertinent to note that the Limitation Act, 1963 does  

not  apply  to  criminal  proceedings  except  for  appeals  or  

revisions for which express provision is made in Articles 114,  

115, 131 and 132 thereof.  After conducting extensive study  

of criminal laws of various countries, the Law Commission of  

India  appears  to  have realized  that  providing provision  of  

limitation for prosecution of criminal offences of certain type  

in general law would, in fact, be good for the criminal justice  

system.   The  Law Commission  noted  that  the  reasons  to  

justify  introduction  of  provisions  prescribing  limitation  in  

general  law  for  criminal  cases  are  similar  to  those  which  

justify  such  provisions  in  civil  law  such  as  likelihood  of  

evidence being curtailed, failing memories of witnesses and  

disappearance of witnesses.  Such a provision, in the opinion  

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of  the  Law  Commission,  will  quicken  diligence,  prevent  

oppression and in the general public interest would bring an  

end  to  litigation.   The  Law Commission  also  felt  that  the  

court  would  be  relieved  of  the  burden  of  adjudicating  

inconsequential claims.  Paragraph 24.3 is material. It reads  

thus:  

“24.3  –  In   civil  cases,  the  law  of  limitation  in   almost all countries where the rule of law prevails,   Jurists  have given several  convincing reasons to   justify the provision of such a law; some of those   which  are  equally  applicable  to  criminal   prosecutions may be referred to here:-

(1) The defendant ought not to be called on to   resist  a  claim  when  “evidence  has  been  lost,   memories  have  faded,  and  witnesses  have   disappeared.”

(2) The  law  of  limitation  is  also  a  means  of   suppressing  fraud,  and  perjury,  and  quickening   diligence and preventing oppression.  

(3) It is in the general public interest that there   should  be  an  end  to  litigation.   The  statute  of   limitation is a statute of repose.  

(4) A party who is insensible to the value of civil   remedies and who does not assert his own claim  with promptitude has little or no right to require   the aid of the state in enforcing it.  

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(5) The court should be relieved of the burden of   adjudicating inconsequential or tenuous claims.”  

The  Law  Commission  stated   its  case  for  extending  

limitation to original prosecutions as under:

“24.11 - It seems to us that there is a strong case   for having a period of limitation for offences which   are  not  very  serious.   For  such  offences,   considerations of fairness to the accused and the   need for ensuring freedom from prosecution after   a  lapse  of  time  should  outweigh  other   considerations.   Moreover,  after  the  expiry  of  a   certain period the sense of social retribution loses   its edge and the punishment does not serve the   purpose of social retribution.  The deterrent effect   of punishment which is one of the most important   objectives of penal law is very much impaired if   the punishment is not inflicted promptly and if it is   inflicted at a time when it has been wiped off the   memory of the offender and of other persons who  had knowledge of the crime.  

Paragraphs 24.13,  24.14,  24.20,  24.22,  24.23,  24.24,  

24.25,  and 24.26  could also be advantageously quoted.  

“24.13  –  At  present  no  court  can  throw  out  a   complaint solely on the ground of delay, because,   as  pointed  out  by  the  Supreme  Court,  “the   question of delay in filing a complaint may be a   circumstance  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in   arriving at the final verdict, but by  itself, it affords   

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no grounds  for  dismissing  the  complaint”.   It  is   true that unconscionable delay is a good ground   for  entertaining grave doubts about the truth of   the complainant’s story unless he can explain it to   the  satisfaction  of  the  court.   But  it  would  be   illegal for a court to dismiss a complaint merely   because there was inordinate delay.

24.14. - We,  therefore,  recommend  that  the  principle of limitation should be introduced for less   serious  offences  under  the  Code.   We  suggest   that, for the present, offences punishable with fine   only or with imprisonment upto three years should   be  made  subject  to  the  law  of  limitation.   The   question of extending the law to graver offences   may  be  taken  up  later  on  in  the  light  of  the   experience actually gained.

24.20. - The  question  whether  prosecution  commences on the date on which the court takes   cognizance of the offence or only on the date on   which process is issued against the accused, has   been settled by the Supreme Court with reference   to Section 15 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889.   Where the complaint was filed within one year of   the discovery of offence, it cannot be thrown out   merely because process was not issued within one   year  of  such  discovery.   The  complainant  is   required by section 15 of the Act to “commence   prosecution” within this period, which means that   if  the complaint is  presented within one year of   such discovery, the requirements of section 15 are   satisfied.  The period of limitation is intended to   operate  against  complainant  and  to  ensure   diligence on his part in prosecuting his rights, and   not against the Court.  It will defeat the object to   the enactment  deprive traders  of  the protection   which the law intended to give them, to hold that   unless process is issued on their complaint within   

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one year of the discovery of the offence, it should   be thrown out.

24.22 - Secondly, as in civil cases, in computing   the period of  limitation for  taking cognizance of   offence,  the  time  during  which  any  person  has   been prosecuting with the due diligence another   prosecution whether in a court of first instance or   in  a  court  of  appeal  or  revision,  against  the   offender,  should  be  excluded,  where  the   prosecution  relates  to  the  same  facts  and  is   prosecuted in  good faith  in  a court  which,  from  defect  of  jurisdiction  or  other  cause  of  a  like   nature, is unable to entertain it.  

24.23 - Thirdly,  in  the  case  of  a  continuing   offence, a fresh period of limitation should begin   to run at every moment of the time during which   the  offence  continues;  and  we  recommend  the   insertion of a provision to that effect.  

24.24 - Impediments  to  the  institution  of  a  prosecution have also to be provided for.   Such  impediments  could  be  (a)  legal,  or  (b)  due  to   conduct  of  the accused,  or  (c)  due to the court   being closed on the last day.  

As regards legal  impediments,  two aspects may   be considered, first, the time for which institution   of prosecution is stayed under a legal provision,   and  secondly,  prosecutions  for  which  previous   sanction  is  required,  or  notice  has  to  be  given,   under legal provision. Both are appropriate cases   for a special provision for extending the period of   limitation.   We  recommend  that,  where  the   institution  of  the  prosecution  in  respect  of  an   offence has been stayed by an injunction or order,   than,  in  computing  the  period  of  limitation  for   taking cognizance of that offence, the time of the   

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continuance of the injunction or order, the day on   which  it  was  issued  or  made,  and  the  day  on   which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded.  

24.25 - We also recommend that where notice   of prosecution for an offence has been given, or   where for prosecution for an offence the previous   consent  or  sanction  of  the  Government  or  any   other authority is required, in accordance with the   requirements  of  any  law  for  the  time  being  in   force, then in computing the period of limitation   for taking cognizance of the offence, the period of   such  notice  or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  time   required for  obtaining such consent or  sanction,   shall be excluded.  

24.26 - As  illustrations  of  impediments  caused  by the conduct of the accused, we may refer to his   being  out  of  India,  and  his  absconding  or   concealing  himself.   Running  of  the  period  of   limitation should be excluded in both cases.”

17. The Joint Parliament Committee (“the JPC”) accepted  

the recommendations of the Law Commission for prescribing  

period  of  limitation  for  certain  offences.  The  relevant  

paragraphs of its report dated 30/11/1972 read as under:  

“Clauses 467 to 473 (new clauses) –  These  are new clauses prescribing periods of limitation   on  a  graded  scale   for  launching  a  criminal   prosecution in certain cases.  At present, there is   no period of limitation for criminal prosecution and  

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a Court cannot throw out  complaint or a police   report  solely  on  the  ground  of  delay  although   inordinate  delay  may  be  a  good  ground  for   entertaining  doubts  about  the  truth  of  the   prosecution story.  Periods of limitation have been   prescribed for criminal prosecution in the laws of   many countries and the Committee feels  that  it   will be desirable to prescribe such periods in the   Code as recommended by the Law Commission.  

Among the grounds in  favour  of  prescribing the   limitation may be mentioned the following:

1. As  time  passes  the  testimony  of  witnesses   become weaker and weaker because of lapse of   memory and evidence becomes more and more   uncertain with the result that the danger of error   becomes greater.  

2. For  the  purpose  of  peace  and  repose  it  is   necessary  that  an  offender  should  not  be  kept   under  continuous  apprehension  that  he  may  be   prosecuted at any time particularly because with   the multifarious laws creating new offences many  persons at some time or the other commit some   crime or the other.  People will have no peace of   mind if  there is  no period of  limitation even for   petty offences.  

3. The  deterrent  effect  of  punishment  is   impaired  if  prosecution  is  not  launched  and  punishment is not inflicted before the offence has   been  wiped  off  the  memory  of  the  persons   concerned.  

4. The sense of social retribution which is one of   the purposes of criminal law looses its edge after   the expiry of a long period.  

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5. The  period of limitation would put pressure   on  the  organs  of  criminal  prosecution  to  make   every  effort  to  ensure  the  detection  and  punishment of the crime quickly.  

The actual periods of limitation provided for in the   new clauses would, in the Committee’s opinion be   appropriate  having  regard  to  the  gravity  of  the   offences and other relevant factors.  

As regards the date from which the period is to be   counted the Committee considered has fixed the   date as the date of the offence. As, however this   may  create  practical  difficulties  and  may  also   facilitate an accused person to escape punishment   by simply absconding himself  for  the prescribed   period,  the  Committee  has  also  provided  that   when  the  commission  of  the  offence  was  not   known to the person aggrieved by the offence or   to any police officer, the period of limitation would   commence  from  the  day  on  which  the  participation  of  the  offender  in  the  offence  first   comes to the knowledge of a person aggrieved by   the offence or of any police officer, whichever is   earlier.  Further, when it is not known by whom  the offence has committed, the first day on which   the identity of the offender is known to the person  aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer   making investigation into the offence.  

The  Committee  has  considered  it  necessary  to   make  a  specific  provision  for  extension  of  time  whenever the court is  satisfied on the materials   that the delay has been properly explained or that   the accused had absconded.  This provision would   be   particularly  useful  because  limitation  for   criminal  prosecution  is  being  prescribed  for  the   first time in this country”.

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18. Read  in  the  background  of  the  Law  Commission’s  

Report and the Report of the JPC, it is clear that the object of  

Chapter  XXXVI  inserted  in  the  Cr.P.C.  was to  quicken the  

prosecutions  of  complaints  and  to  rid  the  criminal  justice  

system  of  inconsequential  cases  displaying  extreme  

lethargy, inertia or indolence.  The effort was to make the  

criminal  justice system more orderly,  efficient  and just by  

providing  period  of  limitation  for  certain  offences.   In  

Sarwan  Singh,  this  Court  stated  the  object  of  Cr.P.C  in  

putting a bar of limitation as follows:  

“The  object  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code  in   putting  a  bar  of  limitation  on  prosecutions  was   clearly  to  prevent  the  parties  from  filing  cases   after  a  long time,  as  a  result  of  which material   evidence  may  disappear  and  also  to  prevent   abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court  by  filing   vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the   date of the offence. The object which the statutes   seek to sub-serve is clearly in consonance with the   concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article   21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of   the  utmost  importance  that  any  prosecution,   whether  by  the  State  or  a  private  complainant   must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of   the  prosecution  failing  on  the  ground  of   limitation.”

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19. It is equally clear however that the law makers did not  

want  cause  of  justice  to  suffer  in  genuine  cases.   Law  

Commission recommended provisions for exclusion of time  

and those provisions were made part of Chapter XXXVI.  We,  

therefore, find in Chapter XXXVI provisions for exclusion of  

time in certain cases (Section 470), for exclusion of date on  

which  the  Court  is  closed  (Section  471),  for  continuing  

offences  (Section  472)  and  for  extension  of  period  of  

limitation  in  certain  cases  (Section  473).   Section  473  is  

crucial.   It  empowers  the  court  to  take  cognizance  of  an  

offence after the expiry of the period of limitation,  if  it  is  

satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case  

that  the  delay  has  been  properly  explained  or  that  it  is  

necessary  to  do  so  in  the  interest  of  justice.   Therefore,  

Chapter XXXVI is not loaded against the complainant.  It is  

true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial and  

this right is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution.  Chapter  

XXXVI of  the Cr.P.C.  does not  undermine this  right  of  the  

accused.  While  it  encourages  diligence  by  providing  for  

limitation  it  does  not  want  all  prosecutions  to  be  thrown  

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overboard  on  the  ground  of  delay.   It  strikes  a  balance  

between the interest of the complainant and the interest of  

the  accused.   It  must  be  mentioned here  that  where  the  

legislature  wanted  to  treat  certain  offences  differently,  it  

provided  for  limitation  in  the  section  itself,  for  instance,  

Section 198(6) and 199(5) of the Cr.P.C.  However, it chose  

to make general provisions for limitation for certain types of  

offences for the first time and incorporated them in Chapter  

XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.

20. To understand the scheme of Chapter XXXVI it would be  

advantageous to quote Sections 467, 468, 469 and 473 of  

the Cr.P.C.   Section 467 reads as under:

“467.  Definitions.  –  For  the  purposes  of  this   Chapter,  unless  the  context  otherwise  requires,   “period of limitation” means the period specified   in section 468 for taking cognizance of an offence”

Section 468  reads as under:   

“468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of  the  period  of  limitation.  –(1)  Except  as  otherwise  provided  elsewhere  in  this  Code,  no   Court, shall take cognizance of an offence of the   

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category  specified  in  sub-section(2),  after  the   expiry of the period of limitation.  

(2) The period of limitation shall be-

(a) six  months,  if  the  offence  is   punishable with fine only;  

(b) one  year,  if  the  offence  is   punishable  with  imprisonment  for  a   term not exceeding one year;  

(c) three  years,  if  the  offence  is   punishable  with  imprisonment  for  a   term  exceeding  one  year  but  not   exceeding three years.  

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of   limitation,  in  relation  to  offences  which  may  be  tried together, shall be determined with reference   to the offence which is punishable with the more   severe punishment or,  as the case may be,  the   most severe punishment.”

Section 469  reads as under:

“469. Commencement  of  the  period  of  limitation.  -  (1)  The  period  of  limitation,  in   relation to an offender, shall commence, -

(a) on the date of the offence; or  

(b) where  the  commission  of  the   offence  was  not  known  to  the  person  aggrieved by he offence or to any police   officer,  the  first  day  on  which  such  offence comes to the knowledge of such  

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person  or  to  any  police  officer,   whichever is earlier; or  

(c) where it is not known by whom the   offence was committed, the first day on   which  the  identity  of  the  offender  is   known to the person aggrieved by the  offence or to the police officer making  investigation  into  the  offence,   whichever is earlier.  

(2) In computing the said period, the day from  which  such  period  is  to  be  computed  shall  be   excluded.”

  Section 473  reads as under:

“473. Extension of period of limitation in  certain  cases.  –  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  foregoing  provisions  of  this   Chapter,  any  Court  may  take  cognizance  of  an   offence after the expiry of the period of limitation,   if  it  is  satisfied  on  the  facts  and  in  the   circumstances of the case that the delay has been  properly explained or that it is necessary so to do   in the interests of justice.”

21. Gist of these provisions could now be stated.  Section  

467 defines  the phrase ‘period of  limitation’  to  mean the  

period  specified  in  Section  468  for  taking  cognizance  of  

certain offences.  Section 468 stipulates the bar of limitation.  

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Sub-section (1) of Section 468 makes it clear that a fetter is  

put on the court’s power to take cognizance of an offence of  

the category mentioned in sub-section (2) after the expiry of  

period of limitation. Sub-section (2) lays down the period of  

limitation for certain offences.  Section 469 states when the  

period of limitation commences.  It is dexterously drafted so  

as to prevent advantage of bar of limitation being taken by  

the accused.  It states that period of limitation in relation to  

an offence shall commence either from the date of offence  

or from the date when the offence is detected.  Section 470  

provides for exclusion of time in certain cases.  It  inter alia  

states  that  while  computing  the  period  of  limitation  in  

relation to an offence, time taken during which the case was  

being diligently prosecuted in another court or in appeal or  

in revision against the offender,  should be excluded.  The  

explanation  to  this  section  states  that  in  computing  

limitation,  the  time  required  for  obtaining  the  consent  or  

sanction of the government or any other authority should be  

excluded.  Similarly  time  during  which  the  accused  is  

absconding or is absent from India shall also be excluded.  

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Section 471 provides for exclusion of date on which court is  

closed  and  Section  472  provides  for  continuing  offence.  

Section 473 is an overriding provision which enables courts  

to  condone  delay  where  such  delay  has  been  properly  

explained or where the interest of justice demands extension  

of period of limitation.  Analysis of these provisions indicates  

that Chapter XXXVI is a Code by itself so far as limitation is  

concerned.  All the provisions of this Chapter will have to be  

read cumulatively.   Sections 468 and 469 will  have to be  

read with Section 473.   

22. It  is  now  necessary  to  see  what  the  words  ‘taking  

cognizance’ mean.  Cognizance is an act of the court.  The  

term ‘cognizance’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C.  To  

understand what this term means we will  have to have a  

look at certain provisions of the Cr.P.C. Chapter XIV of the  

Code  deals  with  ‘Conditions  requisite  for  initiation  of  

proceedings’. Section 190 thereof empowers a Magistrate to  

take  cognizance  upon  (a)  receiving  a  complaint  of  facts  

which constitute such offence;  (b)  upon a police report of  

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such facts; (c) upon information received from any person  

other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that  

such offence has been committed.   Chapter XV relates to  

‘Complaints to Magistrates’. Section 200 thereof provides for  

examination of the complainant and the witnesses on oath.  

Section 201 provides for the procedure which a Magistrate  

who  is  not  competent  to  take  cognizance  has  to  follow.  

Section 202 provides for postponement of issue of process.  

He  may,  if  he  thinks  fit,  and  shall  in  a  case  where  the  

accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he  

exercises  his  jurisdiction,  postpone  the  issue  of  process  

against the accused and either inquire into the case himself  

or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer for  

the purpose of deciding whether there is sufficient ground  

for proceeding.  Chapter XVI relates to commencement of  

proceedings before the Magistrate.  Section 204 provides for  

issue of process.  Under this section if the Magistrate is of  

the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding and  

the  case  appears  to  be  a  summons  case,  he  shall  issue  

summons for the attendance of the accused.  In a warrant  

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case,  he  may  issue  a  warrant.   Thus,  after  initiation  of  

proceedings  detailed  in  Chapter  XIV,  comes the  stage  of  

commencement of proceedings covered by Chapter XVI.  

23. In  Jamuna Singh & Ors. v.  Bhadai Shah  37  , relying  

on R.R. Chari and Gopal Das Sindhi  & Ors. v.  State of   

Assam & Anr.  38  , this Court held that it is well settled that  

when on a petition or complaint being filed before him, a  

Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various  

provisions of Chapter XVI of the Cr.P.C., he must be held to  

have  taken  cognizance  of  the  offences  mentioned  in  the  

complaint.     

24. After referring to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. quoted by  

us  hereinabove,  in  S.K.  Sinha,  Chief  Enforcement  

Officer,  this  Court  explained  what  is  meant  by  the  term  

‘taking cognizance’. The relevant observations of this Court  

could be quoted:  

37 AIR 1964 SC 1541 38 AIR 1961 SC 986

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“19.  The  expression  “cognizance”  has  not  been   defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is   of indefinite import.  It  has no esoteric or mystic   significance  in  criminal  law.  It  merely  means   “become aware of” and when used with reference   to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of   judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a   Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with   a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such   offence said to have been committed by someone.

20.  “Taking  cognizance”  does  not  involve  any   formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a   Magistrate  applies  his  mind  to  the  suspected  commission  of  an  offence.  Cognizance  is  taken   prior to commencement of criminal proceedings.   Taking of  cognizance is  thus a  sine qua non or   condition  precedent  for  holding  a  valid  trial.   Cognizance is taken of an offence and not of an   offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken   cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and  circumstances  of  each  case  and  no  rule  of   universal application can be laid down as to when   a  Magistrate  can  be  said  to  have  taken   cognizance.”

In several judgments, this view has been reiterated.  It  

is not necessary to refer to all of them.

25. Thus, a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies  

his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to  

initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to  

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have  been  committed.   This  is  the  special  connotation  

acquired by the term ‘cognizance’ and it has to be given the  

same meaning wherever  it  appears  in  Chapter  XXXVI.   It  

bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is entirely an  

act of the Magistrate.   Taking cognizance may be delayed  

because of several reasons.  It may be delayed because of  

systemic  reasons.   It  may  be  delayed  because  of  the  

Magistrate’s personal reasons.   

26. In  this  connection,  our  attention  is  drawn  to  the  

judgment of  this  Court  in  Sharadchandra Dongre.   It  is  

urged on the basis of this judgment that by condoning the  

delay, the Court takes away a valuable right which accrues  

to the accused.  Hence, the accused has a right to be heard  

when an application for condonation of delay under Section  

473 of the Cr.P.C. is presented before the Court.  Keeping  

this argument in mind, let us examine both the view points  

i.e.  whether  the date of  taking cognizance or  the date of  

filing complaint is material for computing limitation.  If the  

date on which complaint is filed is taken to be material, then  

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if the complaint is filed within the period of limitation, there  

is no question of it being time barred.  If it is filed after the  

period  of  limitation,  the  complainant  can  make  an  

application for condonation of delay under Section 473 of the  

Cr.P.C.  The Court will have to issue notice to the accused  

and after hearing the accused and the complainant decide  

whether to condone the delay or not.  If the date of taking  

cognizance is considered to be relevant then,  if  the Court  

takes cognizance within the period of limitation, there is no  

question  of  the complaint  being time barred.  If  the Court  

takes  cognizance  after  the  period  of  limitation  then,  the  

question is how will  Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. work.  The  

complainant will be interested in having the delay condoned.  

If  the  delay  is  caused  by  the  Magistrate  by  not  taking  

cognizance in time, it is absurd to expect the complainant to  

make  an  application  for  condonation  of  delay.   The  

complainant surely cannot explain that delay.  Then in such  

a situation,  the question is  whether the Magistrate has to  

issue  notice  to  the  accused,  explain  to  the  accused  the  

reason why delay was caused and then hear the accused  

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and decide whether to condone the delay or not.   This would  

also  mean  that  the  Magistrate  can  decide  whether  to  

condone delay or not, caused by him.   Such a situation will  

be anomalous and such a procedure is not known to law.  Mr.  

Luthra, learned A.S.G. submitted that use of disjunctive ‘or’  

in Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. suggests that for the first part  

i.e. to find out whether the delay has been explained or not,  

notice will have to be issued to the accused and for the later  

part i.e. to decide whether it is necessary to do so in the  

interest  of  justice,  no notice will  have to be issued.   This  

question has not directly arisen before us.  Therefore, we do  

not want to express any opinion whether for the purpose of  

notice, Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. has to be bifurcated or not.  

But, we do find this situation absurd.  It is absurd to hold that  

the Court should issue notice to the accused for condonation  

of delay, explain the delay caused at its end and then pass  

order condoning or not condoning the delay.  Law cannot be  

reduced to such absurdity.  Therefore, the only harmonious  

construction which can be placed on Sections 468, 469 and  

470 of the Cr.P.C. is that the Magistrate can take cognizance  

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of an offence only if  the complaint in respect of it  is filed  

within the prescribed limitation period.  He would, however,  

be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable.  

27. The role of the court acting under Section 473 was aptly  

described by this Court in  Vanka Radhamanohari (Smt.)  

where  this  Court  expressed  that  this  Section  has  a  non-

obstante clause, which means that it has an overriding effect  

on Section 468.  This Court further observed that there is a  

basic difference between Section 5 of the Limitation Act and  

Section  473  of  the  Cr.P.C.   For  exercise  of  power  under  

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the onus is on the applicant  

to  satisfy  the  court  that  there  was  sufficient  cause  for  

condonation of delay, whereas, Section 473 enjoins a duty  

on the court to examine not only whether such delay has  

been explained but as to whether, it is the requirement of  

justice to ignore such delay.  These observations indicate the  

scope of  Section 473 of  the Cr.P.C.   Examined in  light  of  

legislative  intent  and  meaning  ascribed  to  the  term  

‘cognizance’ by this Court, it is clear that Section 473 of the  

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Cr.P.C.  postulates  condonation  of  delay  caused  by  the  

complainant in filing the complaint.  It is the date of filing of  

the complaint which is material.   

28. We are inclined to take this view also because there  

has  to  be  some  amount  of  certainty  or  definiteness  in  

matters  of  limitation  relating  to  criminal  offences.   If,  as  

stated by this Court, taking cognizance is application of mind  

by the Magistrate to the suspected offence, the subjective  

element  comes  in.   Whether  a  Magistrate  has  taken  

cognizance or not will depend on facts and circumstances of  

each case.  A diligent complainant or the prosecuting agency  

which promptly files the complaint or  initiates prosecution  

would be severely prejudiced if it is held that the relevant  

point for computing limitation would be the date on which  

the Magistrate takes cognizance.   The complainant or  the  

prosecuting agency would be entirely left at the mercy of the  

Magistrate,  who  may  take  cognizance  after  the  limitation  

period because of several reasons; systemic or otherwise.  It  

cannot be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent  

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complainant out of the court in this manner.  Besides it must  

be  noted  that  the  complainant  approaches  the  court  for  

redressal  of  his  grievance.   He  wants  action  to  be  taken  

against  the perpetrators  of  crime.   The courts  functioning  

under  the  criminal  justice  system  are  created  for  this  

purpose.  It would be unreasonable to take a view that delay  

caused by the court in taking cognizance of a case would  

deny  justice  to  a  diligent  complainant.   Such  an  

interpretation  of  Section  468  of  the  Cr.P.C.  would  be  

unsustainable and would render it unconstitutional.  It is well  

settled that a court of law would interpret a provision which  

would help sustaining the validity of the law by applying the  

doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a  

doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and  

ultra vires the Constitution.  (U.P. Power Corporation Ltd.  

v.  Ayodhaya Prasad Mishra).  

29. The conclusion reached by us is reinforced by the fact  

that the Law Commission in clause 24.20 of its Report, which  

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we  have  quoted  hereinabove,  referred  to  Dau  Dayal  39    

where the three-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with a  

Special Act i.e. the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889.  Section 15  

of  the  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1889  stated  that  no  

prosecution shall be commenced after expiration of one year  

after the discovery of the offence by the prosecution.  The  

contention  of  the  appellant  was  that  the  offence  was  

discovered on 26/4/1954 when he was arrested, and that, in  

consequence,  the  issue  of  process  on  22/7/1955,  was  

beyond the period of one year provided under Section 15 of  

the Merchandise Marks Act, 1889 and that the proceedings  

should therefore be quashed as barred by limitation. While  

repelling this contention, the three-Judge Bench of this Court  

observed as under:

“6. It  will  be  noticed  that  the  complainant  is   required to  resort to the court within one year of   the discovery of the offence if he is to have the   benefit of proceeding under the Act. That means   that if the complaint is presented within one year   of such discovery, the requirements of Section 15   are satisfied. The period of limitation, it should be   remembered,  is  intended to operate against the   complainant and to ensure diligence on his part in   

39 AIR 1959 SC 433

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prosecuting his rights, and not against the court.   Now, it will defeat the object of the enactment and   deprive  traders  of  the  protection  which  the  law   intended to  give  them,  if  we were  to  hold  that   unless process is issued on their complaint within   one year of the discovery of the offence, it should   be thrown out. It will be an unfortunate state of   the  law  if  the  trader  whose  rights  had  been  infringed and who takes up the matter promptly   before the criminal court is, nevertheless, denied  redress owing to the delay in the issue of process   which occurs in court.”

Though, this Court was not concerned with the meaning  

of  the  term  ‘taking  cognizance’,  it  did  not  accept  the  

submission that limitation could be made dependent on the  

act of the Magistrate of issuing process.  It held that if the  

complaint was filed within the stipulated period of one year,  

that satisfied the requirement.  The complaint could not be  

thrown out because of the Magistrate’s act of issuing process  

after one year.

30. As we have already noted in reaching this conclusion,  

light can be drawn from legal maxims.  Legal maxims are  

referred  to  in  Bharat  Kale,  Japani  Sahoo and  Vanka  

Radhamanohari (Smt.).  The object of the criminal law is  

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to punish perpetrators of crime.  This is in tune with the well  

known legal maxim ‘nullum tempus aut locus occurrit regi’,   

which means that a crime never dies.  At the same time, it is  

also  the  policy  of  law  to  assist  the  vigilant  and  not  the  

sleepy.  This is expressed in the Latin maxim ‘vigilantibus et  

non dormientibus, jura subveniunt’.   Chapter XXXVI of the  

Cr.P.C. which provides limitation period for certain types of  

offences for which lesser sentence is provided draws support  

from this maxim.  But, even certain offences such as Section  

384 or 465 of the IPC, which have lesser punishment may  

have serious social consequences.   Provision is, therefore,  

made for  condonation of delay.   Treating date of filing of  

complaint or date of initiation of proceedings as the relevant  

date for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code  

is  supported  by  the  legal  maxim  ‘actus  curiae  neminem  

gravabit’  which means that the act of court shall prejudice  

no man.  It bears repetition to state that the court’s inaction  

in taking cognizance i.e. court’s inaction in applying mind to  

the suspected  offence  should   not  be allowed to  cause  

prejudice to a diligent complainant.   Chapter   XXXVI  thus  

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presents the  interplay  of   these   three  legal  maxims.  

Provisions of this Chapter, however,  are  not  interpreted  

solely on the basis  of  these  maxims.  They  only  serve as  

guiding principles.  

31. It  is submitted that the settled principles of statutory  

construction  require  that  the  expression  ‘cognizance’  

occurring in Chapter XXXVI should be given its legal sense.  

It  is  further  submitted  that  if  an  expression  acquires  a  

special  connotation  in  law,  dictionary  or  general  meaning  

ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word.  Reliance is  

also placed on the heading of Chapter XXXVI providing for  

“Limitation  for  taking  cognizance  of  certain  offences”.  

Reliance is placed on observations of the three-Judge Bench  

of  this  Court  in  Sarwan Singh, where  in  the  context  of  

limitation on prosecution it is observed that it is of utmost  

importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or by  

the  private  complainant,  must  abide  by the  letter  of  law.  

Relying on Raghunath Rai Bareja, it is urged that the first  

principle of interpretation of the statute in every system is  

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the literal rule of interpretation.  Purposive interpretation can  

only  be  resorted  to  when  the  plain  words  of  statute  are  

ambiguous.  It is submitted that there is no ambiguity here  

and, therefore, literal interpretation must be resorted to.

32. There  can  be  no  dispute  about  the  rules  of  

interpretation cited by the counsel.  It is true that there is no  

ambiguity in the relevant provisions.  But, it must be borne  

in mind that the word ‘cognizance’ has not been defined in  

the Cr.P.C.   This Court had to therefore interpret this word.  

We have adverted to that interpretation.  In fact, we have  

proceeded  to  answer  this  reference  on  the  basis  of  that  

interpretation and keeping in mind that special connotation  

acquired by the word ‘cognizance’. Once that interpretation  

is accepted, Chapter XXXVI along with the heading has to be  

understood in that light.  The rule of purposive construction  

can be applied in such a situation.  A purposive construction  

of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative  

purpose by following the literal meaning of the enactment  

where  that  meaning  is  in  accordance  with  the  legislative  

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purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal  

meaning is  not in accordance with the legislative purpose  

(See:  Francis  Bennion  on  Statutory  Interpretation).  

After noticing this definition given by  Francis Bennion in  

National Insurance Co. Ltd.   v.  Laxmi Narain Dhut  40  ,    

this  Court  noted  that  more  often  than  not,  literal  

interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results  

in  absurdity.   Therefore,  while  interpreting  statutory  

provisions, the courts should keep in mind the objectives or  

purpose for which statute has been enacted. In light of this  

observation, we are of the opinion that if in the instant case  

literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with  

the  legislative  intent  or  is  leading  to  absurdity,  purposive  

interpretation will have to be adopted.  

33. In  New India Assurance Company Ltd.  v.  Nusli   

Neville  Wadia  and  another  etc.  41   while  dealing  with  

eviction  proceedings  initiated  under  the  Public  Premises  

(Eviction of  Unauthorised Occupants)  Act,  1971 this  Court  

was  concerned  with  interpretation  of  Sections  4  and  5  40 (2007) 3 SCC 700 41 (2008) 3 SCC 279

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thereof.   This  Court  was  of  the  view that  literal  meaning  

thereof would place undue burden on the noticee and would  

lead to conclusion that the landlord i.e. the State would not  

be  required  to  adduce  any  evidence  at  all.   This  Court  

observed  that  such  a  construction  would  lead  to  an  

anomalous  situation.   In  the  context  of  fairness  in  State  

action this Court observed that with a view to reading the  

provisions of the said Act, in a proper and effective manner,  

literal interpretation which may give rise to an anomaly or  

absurdity  will  have  to  be  avoided.   This  Court  further  

observed that so as to enable a superior court to interpret a  

statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in  

the chair of a reasonable legislator.  So done, the rules of  

purposive  construction  will  have  to  be  resorted  to  which  

would  require  the  construction  of  the  statute  in  such  a  

manner so as to see that it’s object is fulfilled.  

34.   In this connection, we may also usefully refer to the  

following paragraph from Justice G.P. Singh’s ‘Principles of  

Statutory Interpretation’ [13  th   edition – 2012]  .

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“With  the  widening  of  the  idea  of  context  and   importance  being  given  to  the  rule  that  the  statute has to be read as a whole in its context it   is nowadays misleading to draw a rigid distinction   between literal  and  purposive  approaches.   The   difference  between  purposive  and  literal   constructions is in truth one of degree only.  The  real distinction lies in the balance to be struck in   the particular case between literal meaning of the   words  on  the  one  hand  and  the  context  and   purpose of the measure in which they appear on   the other.   When there is  a  potential  clash,  the   conventional  English  approach has been to  give   decisive  weight  to  the  literal  meaning  but  this   tradition  is  now  weakening  in  favour  of  the   purposive approach for the pendulum has swung  towards purposive methods of constructions.”

35. We must also bear in mind that we are construing rules  

of  limitation.   Our  approach  should,  therefore,  be  in  

consonance with this Court’s observation in Mela Ram  that  

“it  is  well  established  that  rules  of  limitation  pertain  to   

domain of adjectival law and that they operate only to bar   

the remedy but not to extinguish the right”.  

36. It  is argued that legislative  Casus Omissus cannot be  

supplied by judicial  interpretation.   It  is  submitted that to  

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read Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. to mean that the period of  

limitation as period within which a complaint/charge-sheet is  

to be filed, would amount to adding words to Sections 467  

and 468.  It is further submitted that if the legislature has  

left a lacuna, it is not open to the Court to fill  it on some  

presumed intention of the legislature.  Reliance is placed on  

Shiv  Shakti  Co-operative  Housing  Society, Bharat  

Aluminum, and several other judgments of this Court where  

doctrine of Casus Omissus is discussed. In our opinion, there  

is no scope for application of doctrine of  Casus Omissus to  

this case.  It is not possible to hold that the legislature has  

omitted to incorporate something which this Court is trying  

to  supply.   The  primary  purpose  of  construction  of  the  

statute is  to  ascertain the intention of the legislature and  

then  give  effect  to  that  intention.   After  ascertaining  the  

legislative intention as reflected in the 42nd Report of the Law  

Commission and the Report  of  the  JPC,  this  Court  is  only  

harmoniously  construing  the  provisions  of  Chapter  XXXVI  

along with other relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C.  to give  

effect  to  the  legislative  intent  and  to  ensure  that  its  

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interpretation  does  not  lead  to  any  absurdity.   It  is  not  

possible to say that the legislature has kept a lacuna which  

we are trying to fill up by judicial interpretative process so as  

to  encroach  upon  the  domain  of  the  legislature.   The  

authorities  cited  on  doctrine  of  Casus  Omissus are,  

therefore, not relevant for the present case.  

37. We also concur with the observations in Japani Sahoo,  

where this Court has examined this issue in the context of  

Article  14  of  the  Constitution  and  opted  for  reasonable  

construction rather  than literal  construction.   The relevant  

paragraph reads thus:

“The matter can be looked at from different angle   also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute  about it)  that it  is  not within the domain of the   complainant  or  prosecuting  agency  to  take  cognizance of an offence or to issue process and   the  only  thing  the  former  can  do  is  to  file  a   complaint  or  initiate  proceedings  in  accordance   with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings   has been taken within the period of limitation, the   complainant  is  not  responsible  for  any delay on   the  part  of  the  court  or  Magistrate  in  issuing   process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if   he  is  sought  to  be  penalised  because  of  the   

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omission,  default  or  inaction  on  the  part  of  the   court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have   to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the   Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a   provision  is  totally  arbitrary,  irrational  and   unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law  would  interpret  a  provision  which  would  help   sustaining  the  validity  of  law  by  applying  the   doctrine  of  reasonable  construction  rather  than   making  it  vulnerable  and  unconstitutional  by   adopting  rule  of  litera  legis.  Connecting  the  provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code   with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by   the  court  may  make  it  unsustainable  and  ultra   vires Article 14 of the Constitution.”

38. So far ‘heading’ of the chapter is concerned, it is well  

settled that ‘heading’ or ‘title’ prefixed to sections or group  

of sections have a limited role to play in the construction of  

statutes.   They may be taken as  very  broad and general  

indicators  or  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter  dealt  with  

thereunder  but  they  do  not  control  the  meaning  of  the  

sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading  

the section in proper perspective along with other provisions.  

In M/s. Frick India Ltd.  v.  Union of India & Ors.  42  , this  

Court has observed as under:

42 (1990) 1 SCC 400

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“It  is  well  settled  that  the  headings  prefixed to   sections or entries cannot control the plain words   of the provisions; they cannot also be referred to   for the purpose of construing the provision when   the  words  used  in  the  provision  are  clear  and   unambiguous;  nor  can  they  be  used  for  cutting   down  the  plain  meaning  of  the  words  in  the   provision.  Only, in the case of ambiguity or doubt   the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as   an aid in construing the provision but even in such   a case it could not be used for cutting down the   wide application  of  the  clear  words  used in  the   provision.”

Therefore,  the  submission  that  heading  of  Chapter  

XXXVI is an indicator that the date of taking cognizance is  

material must be rejected.

39. It  is  true  that  the  penal  statutes  must  be  strictly  

construed.  There are, however, cases where this Court has  

having regard to the nature of the crimes involved, refused  

to  adopt  any  narrow  and  pedantic,  literal  and  lexical  

construction of penal statutes.  [See  Muralidhar Meghraj  

Loya  &  Anr.  v.   State  of  Maharashtra  &  Ors.  43   and  

Kisan  Trimbak  Kothula  &  Ors.   v.   State  of   43 (1976) 3 SCC 684

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Maharashtra  44  ].    In  this  case,  looking  to  the  legislative  

intent,  we have  harmoniously  construed  the  provisions  of  

Chapter XXXVI so as to strike a balance between the right of  

the complainant and the right of the accused.  Besides, we  

must bear in mind that Chapter XXXVI is part of the Cr.P.C.,  

which  is  a  procedural  law  and  it  is  well  settled  that  

procedural  laws  must  be  liberally  construed  to  serve  as  

handmaid of justice and not as its mistress.   [See  Sardar  

Amarjeet Singh Kalra, N. Balaji v.  Virendra Singh &  

Ors.  45   and Kailash].   

40. Having  considered  the  questions  which  arise  in  this  

reference  in  light  of  legislative  intent,  authoritative  

pronouncements  of  this  Court  and  established  legal  

principles,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  Krishna  Pillai will  

have  to  be  restricted  to  its  own  facts  and  it  is  not  the  

authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant  

date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation  

under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily because in that  

44 (1977) 1 SCC 300 45 (2004) 8 SCC 312  

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case,  this  Court  was  dealing  with  Section  9  of  the  Child  

Marriage  Restraint  Act,  1929  which  is  a  special  Act.   It  

specifically stated that no court shall take cognizance of any  

offence under the said Act after the expiry of one year from  

the  date  on  which  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been  

committed.  There is no reference either to Section 468 or  

Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer  

to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. which carve out exceptions  

for  Special  Acts.   This  Court  has  not  adverted  to  diverse  

aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the  

court  in  taking  cognizance  within  limitation,  though  the  

complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the  

complainant. Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay ‘1984’  

Case, in our opinion, was not apt. In  Antulay ‘1984’ Case,  

this Court was dealing  inter alia with the contention that a  

private complaint is not maintainable in the court of Special  

Judge  set-up  under  Section  6  of  the  Criminal  Law  

Amendment Act, 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’).  It was urged that  

the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more  

speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant.  It  

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was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is  

maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge  

will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses  

as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.  He will have to postpone  

issue of process against the accused and either inquire into  

the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a  

police officer and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption  

Act,  1947  by  police  officers  of  designated  rank  for  the  

purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground  

for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the  

object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial.  

This contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is  

not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the  

court  of  necessity  must  hold  the inquiry  as  envisaged by  

Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. or direct investigation as therein  

contemplated. That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus,  

the questions which arise in this reference were not involved  

in  Antulay ‘1984’ Case:  Since there, this Court was not  

dealing  with  the  question  of  bar  of  limitation  reflected  in  

Section  468 of  the  Cr.P.C.  at  all,  in  our  opinion,  the  said  

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judgment  could  not  have  been  usefully  referred  to  in  

Krishna  Pillai while  construing    provisions  of  Chapter  

XXXVI of the Cr.P.C.  For all these, we are unable to endorse  

the view taken in Krishna Pillai.

41. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of  

computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the  

Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint  

or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on  

which the Magistrate takes cognizance.  We further hold that  

Bharat Kale  which  is  followed  in  Japani Sahoo  lays  

down  the  correct  law.   Krishna  Pillai will  have  to  be  

restricted  to  its  own  facts  and  it  is  not  the  authority  for  

deciding the question as to what is the relevant date  for  the  

purpose  of computing the  period of limitation under Section  

468  of  the  Cr.P.C.

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42. The Reference is answered accordingly.  The Registry  

may  list  the  matters  before  the  appropriate  courts  for  

disposal.  

…………………………………………..CJI (P. SATHASIVAM)

……………………………………………..J. (B.S. CHAUHAN)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

……………………………………………..J. (RANJAN GOGOI)

……………………………………………..J. (S.A. BOBDE)

NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 26, 2013.

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