13 September 2011
Supreme Court
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SANTOSH KUMARI Vs STATE OF J & K .

Bench: J.M. PANCHAL,H.L. GOKHALE, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001660-001662 / 2011
Diary number: 40681 / 2010
Advocates: HEMANTIKA WAHI Vs BIMAL ROY JAD


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1660-1662 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 751-753 of 2011)

Santosh Kumari … Appellant

Versus

State of J & K & Others  … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

J.M. PANCHAL, J.

1. The appellant is the widow of late Mr. Surinder Singh,  

who  was  murdered  at  about  9:00PM  on  June  28,  2007.  

Criminal Appeal No. 1660/2011 is directed against judgment  

dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge  

of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal  

Revision No.29 of 2008 by which the order dated March 24,

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2008  passed  by  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  

Kathua framing charges under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148  

read  with  Section  149  of  Ranbir  Penal  Code  against  

respondent  Nos.  3  to  7   is  set  aside  and  the  matter  is  

remanded to the learned Judge, Samba to consider the case in  

terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure,  1989  (1933  A.D.)  (as  applicable  in  the  State  of  

Jammu and Kashmir).  Criminal Appeal No. 1661 of 2011 is  

directed against order dated October 20, 2010 passed by the  

learned Single Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at  

Jammu in 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 by which prayer made  

by the respondent of the present appeal to quash order dated  

March  24,  2008 passed  by  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  

Judge, Kathua in a Criminal Challan being File No. 33 of 2007  

titled as State Vs. Subhash Singh and Others framing charge  

against him for commission of offences under Sections 302,  

109, 147, 148 read with 149 of Ranbir Penal Code, is allowed.  

Criminal  Appeal  No.  1662  of  2011  is  directed  against  

judgment dated October 20, 2010 passed by the learned Single  

Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Bail  

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Application No.26 of 2010 by which the respondent Nos. 3 to 7  

have been released on interim bail pending trial against the  

respondents  for  above  mentioned  offences.   As  the  three  

appeals  arise  out  of  common  judgment  and  order  dated  

October  20,  2010  rendered  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  of  

High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Criminal Revision No.29  

of 2008, petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of  

2009 and Bail Application No.26 of 2010, this Court proposes  

to dispose of them by this common judgment.  

2. The case of the prosecution is that respondent Nos. 3 to  

8  in  criminal  appeal  No.  1660  of  2011  formed  an  lawful  

assembly  on  29-06-2007,  common  object  of  which  was  to  

murder  Surinder  Singh  and  in  prosecution  of  the  common  

object of the said assembly, respondents Nos. 3 to 8 mounted  

a  murderous  assault  on  Surinder  Singh,  husband  of  the  

appellant,  at  village  Sanoora,  District  Samba (J  & K).   The  

injured was immediately shifted to hospital for treatment.  On  

the  basis  of  the  information  given  by  the  appellant,  FIR  

No.113/2007 under Section 307 read with 109 of Ranbir Penal  

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Code was registered at police station Hiranagar, in connection  

with the  aforesaid  incident  on June 29,  2007.   On July  2,  

2007  injured  Surinder  Singh  succumbed  to  his  injuries  in  

Military  Hospital,  Satwari,  Jammu  and,  therefore,  offence  

punishable  under  Section  302  of  Ranbir  Penal  Code  was  

added.   On  the  basis  of  FIR  lodged  by  the  appellant,  

investigation  was  undertaken.   During  the  course  of  

investigation statement of the appellant and other witnesses  

were  recorded  under  Section  164  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure 1989.  The dead body of the deceased was sent for  

postmortem  examination.   After  completion  of  the  

investigation, the investigating agency had filed charge sheet  

in  the  Court  of  learned  Magistrate  for  offences  punishable  

under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the Ranbir Penal  

Code.  As the offence punishable under Section 302 is triable  

exclusively by a Court of Sessions, the case was committed to  

Sessions  Court  for  trial.   The  learned  Additional  Sessions  

Judge, after hearing the prosecution and the accused on the  

question of framing charge, framed necessary charge on March  

24,  2008  against  each accused  for  the  offences  punishable  

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under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of Ranbir Penal Code.  

3. Feeling  aggrieved  by  the  framing  of  above  mentioned  

charges by the trial court on March 24, 2008, the respondent  

Nos.  3  to  7  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1660  of  2011  preferred  

Criminal Revision No. 29 of 2008 before the High Court.  The  

High Court  by order dated June 6,  2008 issued notice and  

summoned the record of  the case from the trial  court.   On  

March 20, 2009, the respondent No. 8, who is original accused  

No.6, preferred a petition No. 54 of 2009 under Section 561-A  

of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash order dated March  

24,  2008 passed by the  trial  court  framing charges against  

him  for  commission  of  offences  punishable  under  Sections  

302, 109, 147, 148 read with 149 of the Ranbir Penal Code.  

During the pendency of above numbered petitions, the High  

Court by order dated August 13, 2009 sent back the record to  

the trial court and granted liberty to the respondent Nos. 3 to  

8 to seek bail from the trial court.   When the above numbered  

Revision  and  the  petition  filed  under  Section  561-A  were  

pending  disposal  before  the  High  Court,  the  prosecution  

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examined  three  eye  witnesses  to  the  occurrence  viz.  (1)  

Santosh Kumari,  i.e., the appellant herein, (2) Surishta Devi  

and (3) Shakti Devi.  It may be stated that the appellant and  

the  Shakti  Devi  have  fully  supported  the  case  of  the  

prosecution.   

Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court vide  

order  dated  August  13,  2009,  the  respondent  Nos.  3  to  8  

applied for bail before the trial court.  The trial court rejected  

Bail Application filed by the accused vide order dated February  

19, 2010.  The record of the case indicates that except accused  

Iqram, who is respondent No.8 in Criminal Appeal No. 1660 of  

2011,  all  the other accused filed Bail  Application No.  26 of  

2010 before the High Court claiming bail.  The High Court by  

order dated August 10, 2010 directed the learned counsel for  

the accused to place on record the deposition of the witnesses  

recorded  by  the  trial  court.   On  August  13,  2010,  Raman  

Singh, brother of accused Subash Singh, who is respondent  

no.3 in the main appeal, physically assaulted and threatened  

the son of the appellant as well as one Kuljit Singh who is one  

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of the witnesses in the case, allegedly in the court premises  

itself,  to refrain them from deposing against the accused in  

the case.  They were also warned that if they gave depositions  

against  the accused they would be killed.    Because of  the  

assault  mounted  by  brother  of  the  accused,  son  of  the  

appellant  has lodged FIR No.183/2010 under  Sections 341,  

195-A, 504, 506 of Ranbir Penal Code at Police Station Samba.  

With reference to above mentioned FIR statement of the son of  

the  appellant  was  recorded  under  Section  164  Cr.P.C.  on  

August 20, 2010.  

On  September  8,  2010  and  October  7,  2010  the  

prosecution examined two more eye witnesses, i.e., (1) Raksha  

Devi and (2) Kamlesh Devi who had supported the prosecution  

case.  

4. The High Court by order dated October 20, 2010 has set  

aside the order dated March 24, 2008 passed by the trial court  

framing charge against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 and has  

remanded the case to the trial court to consider it in terms of  

Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  

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1989.  By the said order the High Court has directed release of  

all  the  accused  persons  except  accused  Subhash,  who  is  

respondent No.3 in the main appeal, pending consideration of  

the prosecution case for framing charge by the trial court.  The  

above mentioned order dated October  20,  2010 of  the High  

Court has given rise to the three instant appeals.   

5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties  

and  have  considered  the  documents  forming  part  of  the  

appeals.   

6. The provisions relating to framing of charge against the  

accused before the trial commences, are contained in the Code  

of Criminal Procedure 1989 (1933 A.D.) which is applicable to  

the State of Jammu and Kashmir.  The statute requires that  

every  charge  framed  under  the  said  code  should  state  the  

offence with which the accused is charged and if the law which  

creates  the  offence  gives  it  any  specific  name,  the  offence  

should also be described in the charge by that name only.  The  

statute further requires that the law and section of the law  

against which the offence is said to have been committed has  

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to be mentioned in the charge.  It is a fundamental principle of  

criminal  law  that  the  accused  should  be  informed  with  

certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought  

against him.  The object of the statement of particulars to be  

mentioned in the charge is to enable the accused person to  

know the substantive charge, he will have to meet and to be  

ready for it  before the evidence is given.   The extent  of the  

particulars necessary to be given in the charge depends upon  

the facts and the circumstances of each case.  It is well settled  

law  that  in  drawing  up  a  charge,  all  verbiage  should  be  

avoided.  However, a charge should be precise in its scope and  

particular  in  its  details.   The  charge  has  to  contain  such  

particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and  

the person against whom it was committed as are reasonably  

sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which  

he is charged.  One of the requirements of law is that when the  

nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in  

the  charge  do  not  give  the  accused  sufficient  notice  of  the  

matter with which he is charged, the charge should contain  

such particulars of the manner in which alleged offence was  

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committed as would be sufficient for that purpose.   If ‘A’ is  

accused of the murder of ‘B’ at a given time and place, the  

charge need not state the manner in which ‘A’ murdered ‘B’.  

7. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal Procedure  

is devised to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate  

them by mere technicalities.  It regards some of its provisions  

as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is a curable  

irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby.  It places  

errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the  

curable class.  That is why we have provisions like Sections  

215 and 464 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.   

The object of the charge is to give the accused notice of  

the matter he is charged with and does not touch jurisdiction.  

If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to him in  

other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the charge  

is not invalidated.  The essential part of this part of law is not  

any technical  formula of  words but the reality,  whether the  

matter  was  explained  to  the  accused  and  whether  he  

understood what he was being tried for.  Sections 34, 114 and  

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149  of  the  IPC  provide  for  criminal  liability  viewed  from  

different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and  

men actuated by a common object or a common intention; and  

as explained by five Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in  

Willie Slavey Vs. The State of M.P. 1955 (2) SCR 1140 at p.  

1189,  the  charge  is  a  rolled-up  one  involving  the  direct  

liability and the constructive liability without specifying who  

are  directly  liable  and  who  are  sought  to  be  made  

constructively liable.

In  the  light  of  above  principles,  the  question  whether  

proper charge was framed against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8,  

will have to be viewed.

8. In the present case, what was argued on behalf  of  the  

respondent Nos. 3 to 8 before the High Court was that the  

charge was invalid because there was no mention in the order  

of the trial court indicating the specific offence found to have  

been  prima  facie  committed  by  one  or  the  other  accused  

individually or jointly nor there was any indication regarding  

the specific names of the offences sufficient for description in  

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the  order  of  framing  charge,  but  only  sections  of  the  law  

against which the offences were found to have been committed  

were mentioned.

The  High  Court  has  held  that  mere  mention  of  the  

sections of the law in the order framing the charge would not,  

serve  the  purpose  of  law,  as  it  was  likely  to  prejudice  the  

accused in his trial, and that, the accused would be disabled  

to know the exact Charge he had to face.  In view of the above  

mentioned conclusion, the High Court has set aside the order  

dated March 24, 2008 framing charge against the accused and  

has remanded the matter to the trial court to consider the case  

in terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure 1989 which are pari materia to Sections 226, 227  

and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

9. In order to ascertain whether the Charge framed against  

respondent  was  proper  or  not,  this  Court  proposes  to  

reproduce order dated March 24, 2008 framing charge against  

Rajesh Singh son of Jagdish Singh, resident of Sanoora, tehsil  

Hiranagar, which reads as under :-

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“IN THE COURT OF ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE  KATHUA

I, Vinod Chatterji Koul hereby charge you, Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh R/o Sanoora,  tehsil Hiranagar as under :

1. That on 28.6.07 at Sanoora at about 9.30  pm  with  criminal  intention  along  with  other  accused  persons,  having  common  criminal object armed with lathies (sticks)  committed  rioting  and  in  that  attacked  deceased  Surinder  Singh  with  an  intention  to  murder  him  attacked  and  injured him seriously, who thereafter on  2nd July  2007  during  treatment  succumbed  to  his  injuries  at  Medical  College  Jammu,  and  you  thereby  committed  offence  punishable  u/s  302/109/147/148/149  of  the  Ranbir  Penal Code and within the cognizance of  this Court.  

2. And I hereby direct you be tried by this  Court on the said charge.  

Dated 24.3.08 Sd.”

“Statement of accused dated 24th March 2008

Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh R/o Sanoora,  tehsil  Hiranagar  Caste  rajput,  employee  by  profession aged…  

Question:  Whether  you  have  understood  the  contents  of  the  charge  which has been read  over and explained to you?

Answer: Yes

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Question:  Whether  you  have  committed  the  offence?

Answer: No.

Question: Whether you want to say anything  more?

Answer:  I  am innocent and want trial  of  the  case.

Sd.”

It may be mentioned that similar charge has been framed  

against each accused by order dated March 24, 2008.

A fair and reasonable reading of the above quoted order  

dated March 24, 2008 makes it abundantly clear that accused  

Rajesh Singh on June 28, 2007 at Sanoora about about 9.30  

pm with criminal intention along with other accused, having  

common object armed with lathies (sticks) committed rioting.  

Thus, the charge contains particulars as to the time, place and  

date  of  the  offence  of  rioting.   The  law  which  creates  the  

offence gives it specific name, i.e., “rioting” and, therefore, the  

offence  is  described  in  the  charge  by  that  name,  namely,  

“rioting”.   The  charge  further  proceeds  to  state  that  while  

committing rioting accused Rajesh Singh and other assaulted  

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deceased Surinder Singh with an intention to murder him and  

injured him seriously.  Thus the name of person with reference  

to whom common criminal object was formed by the members  

of the unlawful assembly was stated. It was also stated in the  

Charge that during the treatment injured Surinder Singh had  

succumbed to his injuries on July 2, 2007 at Medical College,  

Jammu.  Thus the date on which the deceased succumbed to  

this injuries and the place where the deceased succumbed to  

his  injuries  were  mentioned  with  precision.   Finally  in  the  

Charge,  it  was  mentioned  that  accused  Rajesh  Singh  had  

committed offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147,  

148,  149  of  the  Ranbir  Penal  code.   After  framing  Charge  

immediately  the plea of  accused Rajesh was recorded.   The  

first  question  which  asked  to  him  was  whether  he  had  

understood the contents of the Charge which was read and  

explained  to  him.   In  answer  to  the  said  question accused  

Rajesh Singh had answered in affirmative.  The record shows  

that  thereafter  two  questions  were  put  to  accused  Rajesh  

Singh in answer to which he had claimed that he was innocent  

and had wished to be tried.  

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10. This is not a case of mere mention of the sections of the  

law in the charge or the order of framing charge.  Therefore,  

the  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  observing  that  mere  

mention of the sections of the law in the charge was likely to  

prejudice  the  accused  in  his  trial  and  that  he  would  be  

disabled to know the exact charge he had to face, nor the High  

court was justified in observing that the trial court was not  

alive to the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure.   It  is  necessary  to  reproduce  part  of  the  order  

passed by the  trial  court  which is  relied upon by the High  

Court for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that mere  

mention of the sections of the law in the charge or the order  

framing charge, would not serve the purpose of the law.  The  

said order reads as under :-

“Upon consideration of the arguments of  the  learned  Public  Prosecutor,  the  learned counsel for the accused and the  written arguments besides the judgments  cited  and  also  the  statements  of  the  witnesses  recorded  by  the  police  and  other connected documents on the file, I  am of the considered opinion that there  are reasonable grounds to presume that  accused  Subash  Singh  S/o  Krishen  

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Singh, Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh,  Vijay  Singh  S/o  Krishen  Singh,  Ranjit  Singh  S/o  Baldev  Singh,  Rakesh  Singh  S/o Jagdish Singh and Ikram Singh S/o  Neter  Singh  caste  Rajput  residents  of  Sonoora  Tehsil  Hiranagar  have  prima  facie  committed  offences  punishable  under  Sections  302/109/147/148  and  149  RPC.  Offence  punishable  under  Section 302 RPC is exclusively triable by  the court of sessions.  

Charges  under  Sections  302/109/147/148  and  149  RPC  is  framed  against  accused  Subash  Singh,  Rajesh Singh, Vijay Singh, Ranjit Singh,  Rakesh  Singh  and  Ikram  Singh.   The  contents of the charges framed have been  read over and explained to the accused  persons who have  pleaded not  guilty  to  the said chages and have claimed to be  tried…..”

11.A glance at the order quoted above would reveal that at  

the stage of framing charge the learned counsel for the  

accused had pleaded for discharge of the accused under  

the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure  

1989.  Not only the learned counsel for the accused had  

advanced  oral  arguments,  but  he  had  also  submitted  

written  arguments  and  cited  judgments  as  well  as  

statements of the witnesses recorded by the police and  

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relied  upon other  connected  documents  on  the  file  to  

emphasize that the accused should be discharged.  The  

order  of  the  trial  court  which  is  quoted  by  the  High  

Court  in  the  impugned  judgment  is  not  the  order  

framing charge at all.  It is a short order indicating that  

no case was made out by the learned counsel  for  the  

accused  for  discharging  the  accused  at  the  stage  of  

framing charge and that the accused should be tried for  

the  offences  which  were  mentioned  in  the  order  of  

framing charge separately against each accused.  

12.On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this  

Court  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  patent  error  of  law  

apparent on the fact of the record was committed by the  

High Court in coming to the conclusion that in the order  

of  framing  charge  there  was  mere  mention  of  the  

sections  of  the  law  which  was  likely  to  prejudice  the  

accused in his trial, as the accused would be disabled to  

know the exact charge he had to face.  Having noticed  

the  charge  which  was  separately  framed  against  each  

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accused, the inevitable conclusion to be reached by this  

Court is that the High Court erred in law in holding that  

it was obligatory for the trial court to have indicated in  

its  order  and  the  charge  sheet  the  description  of  the  

offences for which one or the other accused had to be  

tried because all necessary particulars which should be  

stated  as  required  by  law were  already  stated  by  the  

learned Judge of trial court while framing charge.  

Further the fact that trial against the accused has / had  

made considerable progress in as much as material evidence  

of the eye witnesses to the occurrences was recorded by the  

trial  court  could  not  have  been  ignored  while  deciding  the  

question  whether  proper  charge  against  each  accused  was  

framed or not.  The nature of charge to be faced was clearly  

understood by each accused which is evident from the plea  

recorded by the trial court after framing necessary charge that  

the  nature  of  charge  was  very  well  understood  by  each  

accused.   The fact is also evident from the averments made in  

the  Revision  Petition  which  was  filed  by  the  accused  

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challenging order framing charge.  The fact that charge was  

clearly understood by each accused is also evident from the  

nature  of  cross-examination  of  the  eye  witnesses  made  on  

their behalf by their learned counsel.  In view of the fact that  

all the eye witnesses have been examined and cross-examined  

on behalf of the accused, the High Court should have resorted  

to  the  provisions  of  Section  225  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure,  1989  as  applicable  to  the  State  of  Jammu and  

Kashmir which reads as under :-

“225.  Effect  of  errors  :-  No  error  in  stating  either the offence or the particulars required to  be stated  in the  charge,  and no omission to  state the offence or those particulars, shall be  regarded at any stage of the case as material,  unless the accused was in fact misled by such  error or omission, and it has occasioned failure  of justice.”

The cross-examination of the eye witnesses on behalf of  

the accused would indicate that none of the accused was in  

fact misled by so-called error pointed out by the High Court  

nor it could be successfully pointed out by any of them that  

so-called error has occasioned failure of justice to him.  The  

remand  of  the  case  to  trial  court  for  considering  the  case  

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afresh on the point  of  charge  was not  warranted  at  all,  as  

there is nothing to suggest or indicate even remotely that the  

accused  had  or  would  have  been  misled  by  any  error  or  

omission in the Charge.  Therefore, the order dated October  

20,  2010  rendered  in  Criminal  Revision  No.29  of  2008  

deserves  to  be  set  aside.  For  the  similar  reasons  the  order  

dated October 20, 2010 passed by the High Court in petition  

filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 allowing the  

prayer made by the respondent No. 8 to quash the order dated  

March 24, 2008 will have to be set aside.  

13. It  may  be  mentioned  that  the  order  admitting  the  

accused  except  accused  Subhash  Singh  to  interim  bail  of  

Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the trial court pending  

consideration of  the  prosecution case afresh on question of  

charge, was not warranted nor justified at all.  Before granting  

interim bail  to  the  accused  the  High  Court  could  not  have  

afforded  to  ignore  the  testimony  of  eye  witnesses  including  

that  of  the  appellant  who  is  wife  of  the  deceased,  merely  

because  deceased  had  received  only  one  injury  nor  the  

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accused could have  been accorded the  benefit  of  temporary  

bail  on the spacious plea that they were facing trial  over  a  

period of three years. The record of the case nowhere shows  

that the prosecution was responsible in any manner at all for  

so called delay in holding trial against the accused.  The fact  

that accused are involved in commission of a heinous crime  

like  murder  which  entails  death  or  life  imprisonment  as  

punishment should have been taken into consideration before  

releasing the accused on interim bail.   The trial  court  after  

having  considered  the  gravity  of  the  offence  and  the  

apprehension on the part of the prosecution that the accused  

would tamper with the evidence in the event of their release on  

bail had rightly refused to enlarge the accused on bail.  The  

High Court while granting the relief of bail to the accused has  

completely  ignored  and  over  looked  the  aforementioned  

relevant  factors  which  weigh  heavily  against  the  accused.  

Moreover, the complaint filed by Vijinder Singh that he and  

Kuljit singh, who is one of the witnesses in the present case,  

were  physically  assaulted  and  threatened  in  the  Court  

premises  will  have  to  be  given  its  due  weight.   The  FIR  

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registered  on  August  13,  2010  is  pending  necessary  

investigation wherein the statement of Vijinder Singh who is  

son of the appellant was recorded on August 20, 2010 under  

Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code.  The contents of the FIR  

would indicate that the accused either themselves or through  

their relatives would try to tamper the evidence which is going  

to be led by the prosecution in the case.  

14. Under  the Circumstances,  this  Court  is  of  the opinion  

that release of the accused except accused Subhash Singh on  

interim bail deserves to be set aside.   The net result of  the  

above discussion is that all the three appeals will have to be  

allowed.   

For  the  foregoing  reasons  the  three  appeals  succeed.  

Order dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the High Court of  

Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal Revision No.29 of  

2008 is hereby set aside.  Similarly the order dated October  

20,  2010 passed  by  the  High  Court  in  petition  filed  under  

Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 is also set aside.  The  

order dated October 20, 2010 passed in Bail Application No.26  

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of 2010 by which the accused except accused Subhash Singh  

are  enlarged  on  interim  bail  is  also  set  aside.   Accused  

Subhash Singh is already in custody.  Therefore, it is directed  

that the other accused shall be taken in custody immediately.

Having  regard  to  the  facts  of  the  case  and  more  

particularly the fact that the trial has already commenced, the  

trial court is directed to complete the trial as early as possible  

and preferably within 9 months from the date of receipt of writ  

from this Court.  Subject to above mentioned directions, all  

the three appeals stand disposed of.

 

..…….….…………..J.  (J.M. PANCHAL)

..…….….…………..J.  (H.L. GOKHALE)

NEW DELHI SEPTEMBER 13, 2011.   

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