SANTOSH KUMARI Vs STATE OF J & K .
Bench: J.M. PANCHAL,H.L. GOKHALE, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001660-001662 / 2011
Diary number: 40681 / 2010
Advocates: HEMANTIKA WAHI Vs
BIMAL ROY JAD
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 11
Page 12
Page 13
Page 14
Page 15
Page 16
Page 17
Page 18
Page 19
Page 20
Page 21
Page 22
Page 23
Page 24
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1660-1662 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 751-753 of 2011)
Santosh Kumari … Appellant
Versus
State of J & K & Others … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
J.M. PANCHAL, J.
1. The appellant is the widow of late Mr. Surinder Singh,
who was murdered at about 9:00PM on June 28, 2007.
Criminal Appeal No. 1660/2011 is directed against judgment
dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge
of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal
Revision No.29 of 2008 by which the order dated March 24,
2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Kathua framing charges under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148
read with Section 149 of Ranbir Penal Code against
respondent Nos. 3 to 7 is set aside and the matter is
remanded to the learned Judge, Samba to consider the case in
terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1989 (1933 A.D.) (as applicable in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir). Criminal Appeal No. 1661 of 2011 is
directed against order dated October 20, 2010 passed by the
learned Single Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at
Jammu in 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 by which prayer made
by the respondent of the present appeal to quash order dated
March 24, 2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Kathua in a Criminal Challan being File No. 33 of 2007
titled as State Vs. Subhash Singh and Others framing charge
against him for commission of offences under Sections 302,
109, 147, 148 read with 149 of Ranbir Penal Code, is allowed.
Criminal Appeal No. 1662 of 2011 is directed against
judgment dated October 20, 2010 passed by the learned Single
Judge of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Bail
2
Application No.26 of 2010 by which the respondent Nos. 3 to 7
have been released on interim bail pending trial against the
respondents for above mentioned offences. As the three
appeals arise out of common judgment and order dated
October 20, 2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge of
High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Criminal Revision No.29
of 2008, petition filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of
2009 and Bail Application No.26 of 2010, this Court proposes
to dispose of them by this common judgment.
2. The case of the prosecution is that respondent Nos. 3 to
8 in criminal appeal No. 1660 of 2011 formed an lawful
assembly on 29-06-2007, common object of which was to
murder Surinder Singh and in prosecution of the common
object of the said assembly, respondents Nos. 3 to 8 mounted
a murderous assault on Surinder Singh, husband of the
appellant, at village Sanoora, District Samba (J & K). The
injured was immediately shifted to hospital for treatment. On
the basis of the information given by the appellant, FIR
No.113/2007 under Section 307 read with 109 of Ranbir Penal
3
Code was registered at police station Hiranagar, in connection
with the aforesaid incident on June 29, 2007. On July 2,
2007 injured Surinder Singh succumbed to his injuries in
Military Hospital, Satwari, Jammu and, therefore, offence
punishable under Section 302 of Ranbir Penal Code was
added. On the basis of FIR lodged by the appellant,
investigation was undertaken. During the course of
investigation statement of the appellant and other witnesses
were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1989. The dead body of the deceased was sent for
postmortem examination. After completion of the
investigation, the investigating agency had filed charge sheet
in the Court of learned Magistrate for offences punishable
under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of the Ranbir Penal
Code. As the offence punishable under Section 302 is triable
exclusively by a Court of Sessions, the case was committed to
Sessions Court for trial. The learned Additional Sessions
Judge, after hearing the prosecution and the accused on the
question of framing charge, framed necessary charge on March
24, 2008 against each accused for the offences punishable
4
under Sections 302, 109, 147, 148, 149 of Ranbir Penal Code.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the framing of above mentioned
charges by the trial court on March 24, 2008, the respondent
Nos. 3 to 7 in Criminal Appeal No.1660 of 2011 preferred
Criminal Revision No. 29 of 2008 before the High Court. The
High Court by order dated June 6, 2008 issued notice and
summoned the record of the case from the trial court. On
March 20, 2009, the respondent No. 8, who is original accused
No.6, preferred a petition No. 54 of 2009 under Section 561-A
of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash order dated March
24, 2008 passed by the trial court framing charges against
him for commission of offences punishable under Sections
302, 109, 147, 148 read with 149 of the Ranbir Penal Code.
During the pendency of above numbered petitions, the High
Court by order dated August 13, 2009 sent back the record to
the trial court and granted liberty to the respondent Nos. 3 to
8 to seek bail from the trial court. When the above numbered
Revision and the petition filed under Section 561-A were
pending disposal before the High Court, the prosecution
5
examined three eye witnesses to the occurrence viz. (1)
Santosh Kumari, i.e., the appellant herein, (2) Surishta Devi
and (3) Shakti Devi. It may be stated that the appellant and
the Shakti Devi have fully supported the case of the
prosecution.
Pursuant to the liberty granted by the High Court vide
order dated August 13, 2009, the respondent Nos. 3 to 8
applied for bail before the trial court. The trial court rejected
Bail Application filed by the accused vide order dated February
19, 2010. The record of the case indicates that except accused
Iqram, who is respondent No.8 in Criminal Appeal No. 1660 of
2011, all the other accused filed Bail Application No. 26 of
2010 before the High Court claiming bail. The High Court by
order dated August 10, 2010 directed the learned counsel for
the accused to place on record the deposition of the witnesses
recorded by the trial court. On August 13, 2010, Raman
Singh, brother of accused Subash Singh, who is respondent
no.3 in the main appeal, physically assaulted and threatened
the son of the appellant as well as one Kuljit Singh who is one
6
of the witnesses in the case, allegedly in the court premises
itself, to refrain them from deposing against the accused in
the case. They were also warned that if they gave depositions
against the accused they would be killed. Because of the
assault mounted by brother of the accused, son of the
appellant has lodged FIR No.183/2010 under Sections 341,
195-A, 504, 506 of Ranbir Penal Code at Police Station Samba.
With reference to above mentioned FIR statement of the son of
the appellant was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on
August 20, 2010.
On September 8, 2010 and October 7, 2010 the
prosecution examined two more eye witnesses, i.e., (1) Raksha
Devi and (2) Kamlesh Devi who had supported the prosecution
case.
4. The High Court by order dated October 20, 2010 has set
aside the order dated March 24, 2008 passed by the trial court
framing charge against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8 and has
remanded the case to the trial court to consider it in terms of
Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
7
1989. By the said order the High Court has directed release of
all the accused persons except accused Subhash, who is
respondent No.3 in the main appeal, pending consideration of
the prosecution case for framing charge by the trial court. The
above mentioned order dated October 20, 2010 of the High
Court has given rise to the three instant appeals.
5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties
and have considered the documents forming part of the
appeals.
6. The provisions relating to framing of charge against the
accused before the trial commences, are contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure 1989 (1933 A.D.) which is applicable to
the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The statute requires that
every charge framed under the said code should state the
offence with which the accused is charged and if the law which
creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence
should also be described in the charge by that name only. The
statute further requires that the law and section of the law
against which the offence is said to have been committed has
8
to be mentioned in the charge. It is a fundamental principle of
criminal law that the accused should be informed with
certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought
against him. The object of the statement of particulars to be
mentioned in the charge is to enable the accused person to
know the substantive charge, he will have to meet and to be
ready for it before the evidence is given. The extent of the
particulars necessary to be given in the charge depends upon
the facts and the circumstances of each case. It is well settled
law that in drawing up a charge, all verbiage should be
avoided. However, a charge should be precise in its scope and
particular in its details. The charge has to contain such
particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence and
the person against whom it was committed as are reasonably
sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which
he is charged. One of the requirements of law is that when the
nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in
the charge do not give the accused sufficient notice of the
matter with which he is charged, the charge should contain
such particulars of the manner in which alleged offence was
9
committed as would be sufficient for that purpose. If ‘A’ is
accused of the murder of ‘B’ at a given time and place, the
charge need not state the manner in which ‘A’ murdered ‘B’.
7. Like all procedural laws, the Code of Criminal Procedure
is devised to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate
them by mere technicalities. It regards some of its provisions
as vital but others not, and a breach of the latter is a curable
irregularity unless the accused is prejudiced thereby. It places
errors in the charge, or even a total absence of a charge in the
curable class. That is why we have provisions like Sections
215 and 464 in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The object of the charge is to give the accused notice of
the matter he is charged with and does not touch jurisdiction.
If, therefore, the necessary information is conveyed to him in
other ways and there is no prejudice, the framing of the charge
is not invalidated. The essential part of this part of law is not
any technical formula of words but the reality, whether the
matter was explained to the accused and whether he
understood what he was being tried for. Sections 34, 114 and
10
149 of the IPC provide for criminal liability viewed from
different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and
men actuated by a common object or a common intention; and
as explained by five Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in
Willie Slavey Vs. The State of M.P. 1955 (2) SCR 1140 at p.
1189, the charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct
liability and the constructive liability without specifying who
are directly liable and who are sought to be made
constructively liable.
In the light of above principles, the question whether
proper charge was framed against the respondent Nos. 3 to 8,
will have to be viewed.
8. In the present case, what was argued on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 3 to 8 before the High Court was that the
charge was invalid because there was no mention in the order
of the trial court indicating the specific offence found to have
been prima facie committed by one or the other accused
individually or jointly nor there was any indication regarding
the specific names of the offences sufficient for description in
11
the order of framing charge, but only sections of the law
against which the offences were found to have been committed
were mentioned.
The High Court has held that mere mention of the
sections of the law in the order framing the charge would not,
serve the purpose of law, as it was likely to prejudice the
accused in his trial, and that, the accused would be disabled
to know the exact Charge he had to face. In view of the above
mentioned conclusion, the High Court has set aside the order
dated March 24, 2008 framing charge against the accused and
has remanded the matter to the trial court to consider the case
in terms of Sections 267, 268 and 269 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1989 which are pari materia to Sections 226, 227
and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
9. In order to ascertain whether the Charge framed against
respondent was proper or not, this Court proposes to
reproduce order dated March 24, 2008 framing charge against
Rajesh Singh son of Jagdish Singh, resident of Sanoora, tehsil
Hiranagar, which reads as under :-
12
“IN THE COURT OF ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE KATHUA
I, Vinod Chatterji Koul hereby charge you, Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh R/o Sanoora, tehsil Hiranagar as under :
1. That on 28.6.07 at Sanoora at about 9.30 pm with criminal intention along with other accused persons, having common criminal object armed with lathies (sticks) committed rioting and in that attacked deceased Surinder Singh with an intention to murder him attacked and injured him seriously, who thereafter on 2nd July 2007 during treatment succumbed to his injuries at Medical College Jammu, and you thereby committed offence punishable u/s 302/109/147/148/149 of the Ranbir Penal Code and within the cognizance of this Court.
2. And I hereby direct you be tried by this Court on the said charge.
Dated 24.3.08 Sd.”
“Statement of accused dated 24th March 2008
Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh R/o Sanoora, tehsil Hiranagar Caste rajput, employee by profession aged…
Question: Whether you have understood the contents of the charge which has been read over and explained to you?
Answer: Yes
13
Question: Whether you have committed the offence?
Answer: No.
Question: Whether you want to say anything more?
Answer: I am innocent and want trial of the case.
Sd.”
It may be mentioned that similar charge has been framed
against each accused by order dated March 24, 2008.
A fair and reasonable reading of the above quoted order
dated March 24, 2008 makes it abundantly clear that accused
Rajesh Singh on June 28, 2007 at Sanoora about about 9.30
pm with criminal intention along with other accused, having
common object armed with lathies (sticks) committed rioting.
Thus, the charge contains particulars as to the time, place and
date of the offence of rioting. The law which creates the
offence gives it specific name, i.e., “rioting” and, therefore, the
offence is described in the charge by that name, namely,
“rioting”. The charge further proceeds to state that while
committing rioting accused Rajesh Singh and other assaulted
14
deceased Surinder Singh with an intention to murder him and
injured him seriously. Thus the name of person with reference
to whom common criminal object was formed by the members
of the unlawful assembly was stated. It was also stated in the
Charge that during the treatment injured Surinder Singh had
succumbed to his injuries on July 2, 2007 at Medical College,
Jammu. Thus the date on which the deceased succumbed to
this injuries and the place where the deceased succumbed to
his injuries were mentioned with precision. Finally in the
Charge, it was mentioned that accused Rajesh Singh had
committed offences punishable under Sections 302, 109, 147,
148, 149 of the Ranbir Penal code. After framing Charge
immediately the plea of accused Rajesh was recorded. The
first question which asked to him was whether he had
understood the contents of the Charge which was read and
explained to him. In answer to the said question accused
Rajesh Singh had answered in affirmative. The record shows
that thereafter two questions were put to accused Rajesh
Singh in answer to which he had claimed that he was innocent
and had wished to be tried.
15
10. This is not a case of mere mention of the sections of the
law in the charge or the order of framing charge. Therefore,
the High Court was not justified in observing that mere
mention of the sections of the law in the charge was likely to
prejudice the accused in his trial and that he would be
disabled to know the exact charge he had to face, nor the High
court was justified in observing that the trial court was not
alive to the provisions of Chapter XIX of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It is necessary to reproduce part of the order
passed by the trial court which is relied upon by the High
Court for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that mere
mention of the sections of the law in the charge or the order
framing charge, would not serve the purpose of the law. The
said order reads as under :-
“Upon consideration of the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned counsel for the accused and the written arguments besides the judgments cited and also the statements of the witnesses recorded by the police and other connected documents on the file, I am of the considered opinion that there are reasonable grounds to presume that accused Subash Singh S/o Krishen
16
Singh, Rajesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh, Vijay Singh S/o Krishen Singh, Ranjit Singh S/o Baldev Singh, Rakesh Singh S/o Jagdish Singh and Ikram Singh S/o Neter Singh caste Rajput residents of Sonoora Tehsil Hiranagar have prima facie committed offences punishable under Sections 302/109/147/148 and 149 RPC. Offence punishable under Section 302 RPC is exclusively triable by the court of sessions.
Charges under Sections 302/109/147/148 and 149 RPC is framed against accused Subash Singh, Rajesh Singh, Vijay Singh, Ranjit Singh, Rakesh Singh and Ikram Singh. The contents of the charges framed have been read over and explained to the accused persons who have pleaded not guilty to the said chages and have claimed to be tried…..”
11.A glance at the order quoted above would reveal that at
the stage of framing charge the learned counsel for the
accused had pleaded for discharge of the accused under
the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
1989. Not only the learned counsel for the accused had
advanced oral arguments, but he had also submitted
written arguments and cited judgments as well as
statements of the witnesses recorded by the police and
17
relied upon other connected documents on the file to
emphasize that the accused should be discharged. The
order of the trial court which is quoted by the High
Court in the impugned judgment is not the order
framing charge at all. It is a short order indicating that
no case was made out by the learned counsel for the
accused for discharging the accused at the stage of
framing charge and that the accused should be tried for
the offences which were mentioned in the order of
framing charge separately against each accused.
12.On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this
Court is of the opinion that a patent error of law
apparent on the fact of the record was committed by the
High Court in coming to the conclusion that in the order
of framing charge there was mere mention of the
sections of the law which was likely to prejudice the
accused in his trial, as the accused would be disabled to
know the exact charge he had to face. Having noticed
the charge which was separately framed against each
18
accused, the inevitable conclusion to be reached by this
Court is that the High Court erred in law in holding that
it was obligatory for the trial court to have indicated in
its order and the charge sheet the description of the
offences for which one or the other accused had to be
tried because all necessary particulars which should be
stated as required by law were already stated by the
learned Judge of trial court while framing charge.
Further the fact that trial against the accused has / had
made considerable progress in as much as material evidence
of the eye witnesses to the occurrences was recorded by the
trial court could not have been ignored while deciding the
question whether proper charge against each accused was
framed or not. The nature of charge to be faced was clearly
understood by each accused which is evident from the plea
recorded by the trial court after framing necessary charge that
the nature of charge was very well understood by each
accused. The fact is also evident from the averments made in
the Revision Petition which was filed by the accused
19
challenging order framing charge. The fact that charge was
clearly understood by each accused is also evident from the
nature of cross-examination of the eye witnesses made on
their behalf by their learned counsel. In view of the fact that
all the eye witnesses have been examined and cross-examined
on behalf of the accused, the High Court should have resorted
to the provisions of Section 225 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1989 as applicable to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir which reads as under :-
“225. Effect of errors :- No error in stating either the offence or the particulars required to be stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded at any stage of the case as material, unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned failure of justice.”
The cross-examination of the eye witnesses on behalf of
the accused would indicate that none of the accused was in
fact misled by so-called error pointed out by the High Court
nor it could be successfully pointed out by any of them that
so-called error has occasioned failure of justice to him. The
remand of the case to trial court for considering the case
20
afresh on the point of charge was not warranted at all, as
there is nothing to suggest or indicate even remotely that the
accused had or would have been misled by any error or
omission in the Charge. Therefore, the order dated October
20, 2010 rendered in Criminal Revision No.29 of 2008
deserves to be set aside. For the similar reasons the order
dated October 20, 2010 passed by the High Court in petition
filed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 allowing the
prayer made by the respondent No. 8 to quash the order dated
March 24, 2008 will have to be set aside.
13. It may be mentioned that the order admitting the
accused except accused Subhash Singh to interim bail of
Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the trial court pending
consideration of the prosecution case afresh on question of
charge, was not warranted nor justified at all. Before granting
interim bail to the accused the High Court could not have
afforded to ignore the testimony of eye witnesses including
that of the appellant who is wife of the deceased, merely
because deceased had received only one injury nor the
21
accused could have been accorded the benefit of temporary
bail on the spacious plea that they were facing trial over a
period of three years. The record of the case nowhere shows
that the prosecution was responsible in any manner at all for
so called delay in holding trial against the accused. The fact
that accused are involved in commission of a heinous crime
like murder which entails death or life imprisonment as
punishment should have been taken into consideration before
releasing the accused on interim bail. The trial court after
having considered the gravity of the offence and the
apprehension on the part of the prosecution that the accused
would tamper with the evidence in the event of their release on
bail had rightly refused to enlarge the accused on bail. The
High Court while granting the relief of bail to the accused has
completely ignored and over looked the aforementioned
relevant factors which weigh heavily against the accused.
Moreover, the complaint filed by Vijinder Singh that he and
Kuljit singh, who is one of the witnesses in the present case,
were physically assaulted and threatened in the Court
premises will have to be given its due weight. The FIR
22
registered on August 13, 2010 is pending necessary
investigation wherein the statement of Vijinder Singh who is
son of the appellant was recorded on August 20, 2010 under
Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code. The contents of the FIR
would indicate that the accused either themselves or through
their relatives would try to tamper the evidence which is going
to be led by the prosecution in the case.
14. Under the Circumstances, this Court is of the opinion
that release of the accused except accused Subhash Singh on
interim bail deserves to be set aside. The net result of the
above discussion is that all the three appeals will have to be
allowed.
For the foregoing reasons the three appeals succeed.
Order dated October 20, 2010 rendered by the High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu in Criminal Revision No.29 of
2008 is hereby set aside. Similarly the order dated October
20, 2010 passed by the High Court in petition filed under
Section 561-A Cr.P.C. No.54 of 2009 is also set aside. The
order dated October 20, 2010 passed in Bail Application No.26
23
of 2010 by which the accused except accused Subhash Singh
are enlarged on interim bail is also set aside. Accused
Subhash Singh is already in custody. Therefore, it is directed
that the other accused shall be taken in custody immediately.
Having regard to the facts of the case and more
particularly the fact that the trial has already commenced, the
trial court is directed to complete the trial as early as possible
and preferably within 9 months from the date of receipt of writ
from this Court. Subject to above mentioned directions, all
the three appeals stand disposed of.
..…….….…………..J. (J.M. PANCHAL)
..…….….…………..J. (H.L. GOKHALE)
NEW DELHI SEPTEMBER 13, 2011.
24