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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.1651     OF     2009   

SANDEEP ….APPELLANT

VERSUS    STATE OF U.P.  ….RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NOS.1425-26     OF     2011   

SHASHI BHUSHAN …APPELLANT

VERSUS         STATE OF U.P. …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1. These appeals arise out  of the common judgment  

of the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in  

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Criminal Appeal No.4148/2007 along with Criminal  

Reference No.19/2007 by which, the High Court while  

accepting the Criminal Reference insofar as it related to  

appellant Sandeep in Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009,  

rejected the same insofar as it related to appellant Shashi  

Bhushan in Criminal Appeal Nos.1425-26/2011.  In  

other words, while upholding the sentence of death  

awarded to Sandeep, the appellant in Criminal Appeal  

No.1651/2009, the Division Bench modified the sentence  

into one of life imprisonment insofar as it related to  

Shashi Bhushan, the appellant in Criminal Appeal  

Nos.1425-26/2011.   

2. Shorn of unnecessary facts, the case of the  

prosecution as projected before the trial Court was that  

on 17.11.2004 I D.N. Verma (PW-1) along with Sub-

Inspector Chander Pal Singh (PW-2), Constable Rambir  

Singh, Constable Sukhram, Constable Ashok Kumar and  

Driver Yashvir Singh were on patrolling duty; that when  

they reached ahead of Badsu on Khatoli Road leading  

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towards Falut, they met Constable Rajesh Kumar and  

another Constable Ramavtar who informed PW-1 and  

other persons accompanying him that one Indica car  

took a turn for going towards Falut road and that they  

heard some screaming noise from that vehicle.  PW-1,  

accompanied by the other personnel referred to above,  

proceeded towards Falut road and after a distance saw  

an Indica car.  They stated to have seen through the  

focus light of the police jeep two young men trying to pull  

out a girl in an injured condition by opening the rear  

door of the car.  It is stated that it was around 21.30  

hours.  The police jeep in which PW-1 and others were  

proceeding stopped ahead of the Indica car and caught  

hold of the two young men and also noticed a girl, with  

injuries all over, on whom acid was also sprinkled.  The  

girl had also sustained injuries on the head as well as on  

her right cheek.  On noticing the above, according to PW-

1, when he questioned her, she responded by stating that  

her name was Jyoti and she is the daughter of one  

Baljeet Singh, R/o Lane No.16, House No.56, Jagatpuri,  

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P.S. Preet Vihar, New Delhi and that her mother’s name  

was Varsha whose cell number was 9871020368.  

Inspector D.N. Verma (PW-1) stated to have gathered  

information from her that she developed friendship with  

the appellant Sandeep while she was working in a mobile  

shop.  She also stated to have revealed that she was  

pregnant.  According to the information gathered from  

Jyoti, accused Sandeep had called her on that evening  

and asked her to come to Laxmi Nagar market, Delhi,  

around 6 p.m. promising her that he will marry her at  

Haridwar.  Believing his words, she went to Laxmi Nagar  

market from where she was taken in a car and that while  

they were moving in the vehicle, accused Sandeep asked  

Jyoti to get the foetus aborted at Meerut, to which she  

disagreed.  On this, he started beating her inside the  

vehicle right from the point of Modinagar.  She stated to  

have further informed PW-1 and others that she told  

accused Sandeep that she would reveal all facts to his  

family members as well as to the police and that when  

the vehicle in which they were travelling turned towards  

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an isolated place near Khatoli, they tried to throw her  

into the sugarcane field at which point of time PW-1 and  

other police members reached the spot.  According to her  

information to PW-1, accused Sandeep and Shashi  

Bhushan caused the injuries on her with the aid of a jack  

and pana (spanner) apart from cutting her with a blade  

and also by pouring acid on her head.  PW-1 stated that  

on noticing the condition of the girl, he arranged for  

shifting her to Muzaffarnagar Government Hospital in the  

police jeep along with Constable Rambir Singh and the  

driver of the jeep.  It was further stated that accused  

Sandeep and Shashi Bhushan, on being apprehended,  

also revealed their names and informed that accused  

Sandeep used to visit deceased Jyoti while she was  

working in a mobile shop in Mayur Vihar Phase-I for the  

last six months prior to the date of occurrence and  

developed friendship with her, and that in course of time,  

deceased Jyoti pressurized him to marry her.  On the  

date of occurrence, around 6 p.m. he stated to have  

called her over phone to meet him at Laxmi Nagar red  

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light, that she responded to his call and came to Laxmi  

Nagar red light where accused Sandeep was waiting  

along with his friend Shashi Bhushan who drove the  

vehicle Indica car bearing registration No. DL 3CR 6666  

which belonged to his mother. Accused Sandeep stated to  

have extended a promise to marry her at Haridwar.  

While the vehicle started moving, accused Sandeep asked  

Jyoti to get the foetus aborted to which she did not agree  

instead threatened him by saying that she will reveal all  

facts to his parents as well as to the police and that as  

they reached Modinagar, he started beating her.  

According to the version of accused Sandeep, as told to  

PW-1, at Modinagar he purchased two bottles of acid and  

four shaving blades, that when they reached Khatoli, on  

seeing an isolated place, they tried to pull out the injured  

Jyoti from the vehicle and that at that point of time they  

were apprehended by the police.  It is the case of the  

prosecution that while both the accused were taken into  

custody, the vehicle in which they were travelling was  

also seized along with the jack and pana, four blades and  

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two acid bottles.  The articles, namely, blood stained floor  

mat, empty bottles of acid, one pair of ladies footwear  

were stated to have been seized after preparing a seizure  

memo.  A copy of the seizure memo was stated to have  

been handed over to the accused.  It is the specific case  

of the prosecution that since it was late in the night and  

it was a lonely place, there were no independent  

witnesses other than the police personnel.  The seizure  

memo was marked as Exhibit K-1.

3. The statement of PW-1 was registered as FIR  

No.Nil/2004 on the files of P.S. Ratanpuri on 17.11.2004  

against both the accused persons for offences under  

Sections 307, 326, 324 and 328, Indian Penal Code (in  

short ‘IPC’) which came to be subsequently altered later  

on as one under Sections 302/34 IPC after the victim  

was declared dead by the hospital authorities.  On the  

above set of facts, District and Sessions Judge,  

Muzaffarnagar framed charges against both the accused  

persons for offences under Section 302, IPC read with  

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Section 34, IPC and Section 316, IPC read with Section  

34, IPC and proceeded with the trial.  In support of the  

prosecution as many as 10 witnesses were examined.

4. When the accused persons were questioned  

under Section 313, Cr.P.C. for offences under Section  

304, IPC read with Section 34, IPC and Section 316 read  

with Section 34, IPC, both the accused pleaded not guilty  

and also filed a written statement to that effect.  The trial  

Court in its judgment dated 02.06.2007 ultimately found  

the accused persons guilty of offences under Section 302  

read with Section 34, IPC and 316 read with Section 34,  

IPC and after hearing both the accused persons on the  

question of sentence, took the view that having regard to  

the magnitude and the diabolic manner in which the  

offences were committed by them and also having regard  

to the various principles laid down in the decisions of  

this Court in relation to the award of death penalty  

concluded that, the case on hand was one such case  

which fell under the category of ‘rarest of rare case’  in  

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which the accused deserved to be inflicted with the  

capital punishment of death under Section 302, IPC read  

with Section 34, IPC.  Ultimately, the trial Court  

convicted and sentenced both the accused persons to  

death under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC apart  

from imposing a fine of Rs.30,000/- each and also  

sentenced them to undergo 10 years rigorous  

imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each for  

offences under Section 316 read with Section 34, IPC and  

in default of payment of fine sentenced them to undergo  

further rigorous imprisonment for one year.  The  

sentences were to run concurrently.  On realization of  

fine from the accused persons, a sum of Rs.50,000/- was  

directed to be paid to the parents of the deceased Jyoti as  

compensation.  

5. While hearing the Criminal Reference  

No.19/2007 as well as Criminal Appeal No.4148/2007  

preferred by the appellants, the High Court while  

confirming the death penalty imposed on appellant  

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Sandeep held that the case of accused Shashi Bhushan  

was distinguishable and that the gravity of the offence  

did not warrant infliction of extreme punishment of death  

and consequently altered the same into one of  

imprisonment for life.   

6. We heard Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior  

counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal  

No.1651/2009 assisted by Mr. Daya Krishan Sharma  

and Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the  

appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.1425-26/2011 for  

appellant Shashi Bhushan.  We also heard Mr. Ratnakar  

Dash, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Rajeev  

Dubey, for the State.

7. Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior counsel in his  

elaborate submissions after referring to the evidence of  

the prosecution witnesses and medical evidence as well  

as expert witnesses submitted that the so  called dying  

declaration of the deceased Jyoti was not proved, that the  

confessional statement of the accused cannot be relied  

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upon, that there were very many missing links in the  

chain of circumstances and therefore the guilt of the  

accused cannot be held to be made out. According to the  

learned senior counsel there were discrepancies in the  

timing of registration of the F.I.R., delay in sending of the  

report to the Magistrate apart from vital contradictions in  

the evidence of the police witnesses.

8. Learned senior counsel also contended that there  

were serious lacunae in the preservation of foetus  

samples and, therefore, the ultimate D.N.A. test result  

cannot be accepted.

9. Learned senior counsel further contended that  

non-examination of some of the cited witnesses caused  

prejudice to the accused and on that ground also the  

case of the prosecution should be faulted. He further  

contended that the case of the accused about the theft of  

the Indica car was not properly appreciated by the Courts  

below. It was also contended that there were infirmities  

in regard to the recoveries which were not properly  

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examined by the Courts below. Lastly, it was contended  

that it was not a case for conviction and in any event not  

‘rarest of rare case’ for imposition of capital punishment  

of death sentence.

10. Mr. D.P. Chaturvedi, learned counsel appearing  

for the accused –Shashi Bhushan apart from adopting  

the arguments of Mr. Sushil Kumar, learned senior  

counsel contended that out of 17 injuries alleged to have  

been sustained by the deceased Jyoti, at least 7 to 8  

injuries were serious and in such circumstances there  

would not have been any scope for the deceased Jyoti to  

have made any statement as claimed by the prosecution.  

According to him there was absolutely  no overt act  

attributed to the accused Shashi Bhushan in the matter  

of infliction of injuries on the body of the deceased Jyoti  

and  consequently even the imposition of life sentence  

was not warranted.

11. As against the above submission, Shri Ratnakar  

Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State  

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contended that evidence of the prosecution witnesses  

who were all police personnel was fair, impartial and  

natural and there was no reason to doubt their version.  

He would contend that when there was no independent  

witness present at the place of occurrence, there was no  

question of examining any such private witness.  

According to him, the deceased was alive at the time  

when the accused were apprehended by the police on  

17.11.2004 at 21.30 hrs. and the injuries noted by the  

doctor would show that the deceased was capable of  

making a statement and, therefore, the recording of such  

statement by PW-1 in his complaint was perfectly in  

order. He further contended that even in the statements  

of the accused such of those versions made by them  

which did not in any way implicate them in the offence  

was admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act while  

the rest of the statements which are likely to implicate  

them can be distinguished and eliminated from  

consideration.

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12. Learned senior counsel relied upon the decision  

of this Court in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar  

& Ors.- 2000 (8) SCC 382 and Somappa Vamanappa  

Madar & Shankarappa Ravanappa Kaddi v. State of  

Mysore –  (1980) 1 SCC 479] in support of his  

submissions.

13. Learned counsel also contended that no prejudice  

was demonstratively shown by the non examination of  

the cited witnesses. Learned counsel contented that  

going by the version of the expert witnesses, the  

preservation of the foetus was according to the  

prescribed norms and the D.N.A. result having been  

proved in the manner known to law cannot be doubted.  

He also contended that when the registration of the F.I.R.  

was promptly made, simply because there was minor  

delay in the alteration of the offence from Section 307,  

IPC to Section 302, IPC and the subsequent forwarding of  

the express report to the Magistrate cannot be fatal to the  

case of the prosecution.

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14. Learned counsel relied upon the decision in Sunil  

Kumar and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan - (2005) 9 SCC  

283, Ram Kumar v. State (NCT) of Delhi- [(1999) 9  

SCC 149, Tej Prakash v. The State of Haryana -

(1995) 7 JT 561 in support of his submissions.

15. Having heard learned Senior counsel for the  

appellants and learned senior counsel for the State and  

having perused the material papers, original records and  

the judgments of the trial Court as well as the Division  

Bench of the High Court, we wish to note the broad  

spectrum of the appellants’  challenge to the conviction  

and sentence which can be noted as under:

(I) The case of the prosecution which was  mainly based on the so-called dying declaration  of the deceased and the confessional statement  of the accused cannot be accepted as the same  was not proved.  

(II)    The accused were able to demonstrate that  they were not present at the time of the  commission of the alleged offence on  17.11.2004, as there were very many  disruptions in the chain of circumstances to  rope in the appellants.

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16. When the submissions made on behalf of the  

appellants are analyzed, the following facts were  

claimed to support their stand:-

a) The entire case of the prosecution was  dependent on the version of witnesses, majority  of whom were police personnel and there was no  independent witness to support the version of  the police.   

b) The source of the FIR was the alleged dying  declaration of the deceased which was not  proved and the so-called confession of the  accused Sandeep was inadmissible under  Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

c) If the confession is inadmissible, the whole case  depended on circumstantial evidence.

d) The case which was originally registered under  Section 307, IPC was altered into one under  Section 302, IPC belatedly.   

e) There were very many missing links in the chain  of circumstances.

f) There were serious infirmities in the tests  conducted in the samples of the foetus which  seriously undermine the case of the  prosecution.   

g) Though the occurrence took place in a public  place near a crusher unit where number of  labourers were working, the absence of  examination of independent witnesses was fatal  to the case of the prosecution.   

h) Non-examination of some of the key witnesses  cited in the charge-sheet whose evidence would  have otherwise supported the case of the  

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accused caused serious prejudice and on that  ground the case of the prosecution should fail.

i) The delay in sending the express report was a  serious violation of Section 157, Cr.P.C. which  would again vitiate the case of the prosecution.  

j) The alleged seizure of materials from the car  was highly doubtful, having regard to certain  vitiating circumstances.    

k) Accused Sandeep was roped in falsely by  creating a link with his mother’s car, which  according to Sandeep, was stolen on the date of  occurrence, which was omitted to be considered  in the proper perspective.   

l) When admittedly there was a pending rape case  relating to the deceased in which certain  persons were accused of having committed rape  on the deceased on 17.04.2004 which was  tacitly admittedly by Baljeet Singh (PW-8),  father of the deceased, there was every scope for  the aggrieved persons in the said criminal case  to have involved in the crime against the  deceased.   

17. As against the above, when the stand of the  

learned counsel for the State is analyzed, the following  

points emerge for consideration:-

i)The relationship of Sandeep (A-1) with the  deceased and the carrying of the foetus in  the womb of the deceased was not in  dispute.

ii) Merely because the key witnesses were  police personnel, that by itself cannot be a  

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ground to eschew that evidence from  consideration.

iii) The case of the prosecution based on the  statement of the deceased as spoken to  by the witnesses cannot be doubted.

iv)  The statement of the deceased to the  police insofar as it related to the incident  and such of those admissions of the  accused not implicating them to the  offence was admissible in evidence under  Section 8 and not hit by Section 25 of the  Evidence Act.

v) when there were no independent  witnesses present at the place of  occurrence, the grievance of the accused  on that score does not merit  consideration.   

vi) The medical evidence, in particular,  injuries noted in the post-mortem  certificate show that the deceased was  capable and did make the statement as  demonstrated by the prosecution.   

vii) The forensic report established the  presence of blood on the weapons used  as well as in the car which was one of the  clinching circumstances to prove the guilt  of the accused.  

viii) The outcome of the DNA test established  the link of the accused with the deceased  to prove the motive for the crime.   

ix) The claim of theft of the car was not  established before the trial Court in the  manner known to law.   

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x) The presence of the accused at the time  and place of occurrence was proved  beyond all reasonable doubts.   

xi) The handling of the samples sent for  chemical and forensic examination was  carried out in accordance with the  prescribed procedure.   

xii)  The accused failed to show that the non- examination of any of the cited witnesses  caused prejudice to them before the trial  Court and, therefore, the grievance now  expressed will not vitiate the case of the  prosecution.  

xiii) The various other discrepancies alleged  were all minor and the same do not in  any way affect the case of the  prosecution.

18. Keeping the above respective submissions in  

mind, when we analyze the case in hand the following  

facts are indisputable:-

a. The relationship of Sandeep with deceased,  prior to the date of occurrence, namely,  17.11.2004 as his girlfriend;

b. The deceased was carrying the foetus of six  months old in her womb;  

c. The Indica car in which the deceased was  found on the date and time of occurrence  belonged to the mother of accused  Sandeep;

d. At the time when the deceased was  secured by the police on 17.11.2004 at  

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21.30 hours she was seriously injured but  was alive;

e. The death of the deceased was ascertained  by the Dr. B.S. Chaudhary (PW-6) at 10.55  p.m.  

f. As per the post-mortem certificate, there  were as many as 17 injuries which were  caused by blunt weapons like jack and  pana (spanner), shaving blades and also  chemical acid.   

g. Police witnesses were all on patrol duty on  the date of occurrence.

h. The DNA test disclosed that accused  Sandeep was the biological father of the  foetus found in the womb of the deceased.

i. The theory propounded by the accused i.e.  the car was stolen on 17.11.2004 was not  established before the trial Court in the  manner known to law.

j. The statement of the accused as stated to  have been made to PW-1 contained various  facts unconnected to the crime and also  the self incriminating facts which could be  distinguished.

k. The absence of any independent witness at  the place of occurrence.

19. Keeping the above factors, the existence of which  

is borne out by acceptable legal evidence, when we  

examine the submissions made on behalf of the  

appellants, in the foremost, it was contended that the  

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deceased could not have made a statement as claimed by  

Inspector D.N. Verma (PW-1) since according to  

Constable Ramavatar Singh (PW-3), he noticed acid  

injuries in the inner mouth of the deceased.  However  

forceful the above submissions may be, we find that such  

a submission merely based on the version of PW-3 alone  

cannot be accepted.  Whatever injuries sustained by the  

deceased were borne out by medical record, namely,  

post-mortem certificate and the evidence of the doctor  

who issued the said certificate.  As many as 17 injuries  

were noted in the post-mortem certificate.  According to  

the version of PW-3, injury in the mouth was caused by  

acid.  When we examine such of those injuries caused by  

acid and as spoken to by PW-6, doctor, injury Nos. 4 and  

17 alone were stated to have been caused by acid.  Injury  

Nos.4 and 17 have been described as under:-

“4. chemical burn injury from all over head,  hair were charring and skin burnt  chemically.

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17. Chemical burn injury all over body ranging  from 12cm x 8cm to 2cm x 4 cm except  upper part of chest.”

20. Going by the above description of the injuries, as  

noted by the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, it is  

difficult to accept the statement of learned senior counsel  

for the accused that the injury in the mouth was such as  

the deceased could not have made any oral statement at  

all to the witnesses.  It is true that by the pouring of the  

acid, injury might have been caused on the head and  

other parts of the body of the deceased but by no stretch  

of imagination, those injuries appear to have caused any  

severe damage to the mouth of the deceased, much less  

to the extent of preventing her from making any  

statement to the witnesses.  In this context, when we  

peruse the evidence of the Doctor (PW-6), he has  

specifically expressed an opinion that he was not in a  

position to state whether after receipt of injury on the  

body of the deceased she would have been in a position  

to speak or not.  In other words, the doctor who had  

examined the injuries sustained by the deceased did not  

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rule out the possibility of the deceased making any  

statement irrespective of injuries sustained by her.  In  

this context, when we refer to the submission made on  

behalf of the appellants themselves before the Division  

Bench of the High Court, we find that it was specifically  

contended that the deceased sustained multiple injuries  

and except one injury, all other injuries were simple in  

nature and none of the injuries were sufficient in the  

ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the  

deceased.  Therefore, even going by the stand of the  

appellants, the condition of the deceased, even after  

sustaining multiple injuries, was such that she was alive,  

conscious and her death was not instantaneous.  

21. Having regard to the above factors, we are  

convinced that the case of prosecution that the deceased  

made a statement about the sequence of the occurrence  

was really made as spelt out by the witnesses PW Nos. 1  

to 5.   

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22. With this, we come to the next submission of  

learned counsel for the appellants, that in the absence of  

independent witnesses, no reliance can be placed upon  

PW Nos.1 to 5, who were all police personnel.  To deface  

the evidence of PW Nos. 1 to 5, it was contended that  

near the place of occurrence, a crusher unit was existing,  

and at that point of time, the crusher unit was also  

working.  It was suggested to PW-1 that the crusher unit  

was around 100 yards away from the place of  

occurrence.  It was also suggested to PW-2 that the  

crusher unit was running at that point of time which was  

100 yards away from the place of occurrence.  In another  

place, it was stated by PW-3 that the crusher unit was  

around ½ KM away from the bridge and it was working.  

It was also stated by him that at that point of time, 3-4  

persons were working in the crusher unit.  From what  

has been stated by the above witnesses, what all that can  

be inferred was that a crusher unit was at least 100  

yards away from the place of occurrence and that even at  

that point of time, namely, at 21.30 hours, the unit was  

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working with at least 3-4 labourers.  Beyond the above  

fact, it was not the case of the appellant that any worker  

from the crusher unit was present at the spot and yet he  

was neither shown as a witness nor examined and  

thereby any prejudice was caused to the appellants.  It is  

also not the case of the appellants that apart from the  

labourers working in the crusher unit, any other  

independent witness was present at the spot who was  

not cited nor examined as a witness.  Therefore, when  

the above facts are clear, we are at a loss to understand  

as to how the grievance of the appellants as regards non-

examination of any independent witness can be taken as  

a factor to put the case against the prosecution and to  

hold that the whole case of the prosecution should be set  

at naught.  Apart from the above, no other point was  

raised as regards the non-examination of any  

independent witness as to the occurrence narrated by the  

prosecution.  

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23. One other submission made by the learned  

senior counsel was that after finding out the cause of the  

occurrence from the deceased and after noting that she  

was seriously injured, the police party arranged for  

shifting her to the hospital in the police jeep along with  

Rambir Singh and the driver of the jeep within 2-3  

minutes and that there was no justifiable ground for not  

examining Rambir Singh who was also cited as a witness  

but yet not examined and also for the non-examination of  

the driver of the jeep.  The contention of the learned  

senior counsel was that after shifting the deceased from  

the Indica car to the jeep in a serious condition, the jeep  

would have travelled for at least an hour or so to reach  

the hospital and Constable Rambir Singh who  

accompanied her would have been in a better position to  

state as to what transpired during that period and what  

was heard by him from the deceased which would have  

thrown much light on the occurrence.  The learned senior  

counsel, therefore, contended that serious prejudice was  

caused to the accused by non-examination of the said  

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Rambir Singh as well as the driver whose version would  

have otherwise been favourable to the appellants.

24. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State,  

however, contended that in every criminal case it is not a  

rule that all cited witnesses should be necessarily  

examined.  He also contended that the non-examination  

of a witness can be put against the prosecution if non-

examination would have caused any serious prejudice to  

the defence.  He also relied upon the decision reported in  

Tej Prakash (supra) in support of his submission.  As  

far as the said submission is concerned, when we  

examine the sequence of events, we find that after  

gathering whatever information from the deceased, as  

regards the occurrence implicating the accused, which  

were the required details for PW-1 to lodge the necessary  

complaint, his immediate priority was to attend on the  

injured person in order to save her life.  Such a course  

adopted by PW-1 and other police personnel at the place  

of occurrence was quite natural and appreciable.  

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Visualizing what had happened at the place of  

occurrence as narrated by the prosecution witnesses, it  

was brought out that whatever basic information  

required to ascertain the cause of occurrence was  

gathered by the prosecution witnesses as disclosed in the  

complaint, which was registered as FIR and also as  

stated by the witnesses before the Court.  The contention  

that the examination of Constable Rambir Singh and the  

driver of the jeep, who took the injured deceased to the  

hospital, would have disclosed very many other factors  

favourable to the accused was only a wishful thinking.  

In any case, what those persons would have deposed as a  

witnesses and to what extent it could have been  

advantageous to the appellants was not even highlighted  

before us.  We ourselves wonder what other evidence,  

much less, favourble to the accused could have been  

spoken to by Constable Rambir Singh who was entrusted  

with the task of admitting the injured victim in the  

hospital in order to give necessary treatment for her  

injuries.  Since PW-1 thought it fit to shift the injured to  

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the hospital after noticing her serious condition, and the  

further fact that by the time they reached the hospital  

around 10.55 p.m., doctor found that the deceased was  

dead, it can be safely held that nothing worthwhile could  

have been drawn from the mouth of Constable Rambir  

Singh or the driver of the jeep except stating that they  

dutifully carried out the task of admitting the injured in  

the hospital as directed by their superiors.  We, therefore,  

hold that the appellants could not demonstrate as to any  

prejudice that was caused by the non-examination of  

Constable Rambir Singh and the jeep driver in order to  

find fault with the case of the prosecution on that score.  

In this context, reliance placed upon by the learned  

senior counsel for the State in Tej Prakash (supra) can  

be usefully referred to.  In para 18 of the said decision,  

this Court made it clear that all the witnesses of the  

prosecution need not be called and it is sufficient if  

witnesses who were essential to the unfolding of the  

narrative are examined.  Applying the said principle to  

the case, it can be safely held that the witnesses who  

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were examined were able to unfold the narration of  

events in a cogent and convincing manner and the non-

examination of Constable Rambir Singh  and the jeep  

driver was, therefore, not fatal to the case of the  

prosecution.   

25. Learned senior counsel for the appellants then  

contended that the appellants were not present at all at  

the time of occurrence, that the appellant Sandeep was  

called to the police station in furtherance of the  

complaint lodged by him as regards the theft of his  

mother’s car on 17.11.2004 and that for that purpose  

when he went to the police station, he was falsely  

implicated into the offence.  According to the appellants,  

the deceased was already involved in a case of rape  

committed by one Manoj on 17.04.2004.  In that case,  

the complaint preferred by the deceased was at the stage  

of trial before the Court of Sessions Judge.  It was  

contended that by misusing the stolen car of the  

appellant’s (Sandeep) mother, the crime could have been  

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committed by somebody else but unfortunately the  

appellants were implicated into the offence.  In order to  

appreciate the said submission of the appellant-Sandeep,  

in the first place, when we examine the stand that his  

mother’s car was stolen on 17.11.2004, we find that  

except the ipse dixit statement made in the written  

statement to the questioning made under Section 313  

Cr.P.C. and reference to an alleged report as regards the  

theft of the car, there was no other fact placed before the  

trial Court.  The trial Court while dealing with the said  

contention has noted as under:-

“…………the accused Sandeep filed a photo copy  of the report which is neither proved nor it can be  taken into consideration. No FIR has been filed  nor the same is proved by any police officials.  The accused has also not examined himself or  any other person in support of his above  contention.  The contention of the accused  Sandeep that the car was stolen on 17.11.2004  from Geeta Colony is totally false and frivolous.  ADGC contended that father of accused Sandeep  is in police department posted as Sub-Inspector  and had tried to manipulate a false story.  The  recovery of Indica car, namely, DL 3CR 6666 on  the spot along with accused persons by Inspector  D.N. Verma (PW-1) of PS Ratanpuri with the  injured Jyoti is a very important factor which  

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proved the involvement of the accused person  and strengthens the prosecution case.”   

26. We see no reason to differ from the above  

conclusion of the trial Court.  If the theory of theft of  

Indica car is ruled out and the presence of the car on the  

spot was indisputable, it should automatically follow that  

the car could have been brought at that place along with  

the deceased, driven by accused Shashi Bhushan along  

with Sandeep only in the manner narrated by the  

prosecution.  Apart from merely suggesting that the  

Indica car was stolen which was not fully supported by  

any legally admissible evidence, no other case was  

suggested by the appellants.

27. When the accused Sandeep took a positive stand  

that he was not present at the place of occurrence by  

relying upon a fact situation, namely, he was not  

responsible for bringing the Indica car belonging to his  

mother at the place of occurrence along with the  

deceased, the burden was heavily upon him to establish  

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the plea that the car was stolen on that very date of  

occurrence, namely, 17.11.2004 and, therefore, he could  

not have brought the deceased in that car at that place.  

Unfortunately, by merely making a sketchy reference to  

the alleged theft of the car in the written statement and  

the so-called complaint said to have been filed with the  

Geeta Colony police station nothing was brought out in  

evidence to support that stand.  In this situation, Section  

106 of the Evidence Act gets attracted.  When according  

to the accused, they were not present at the place of  

occurrence, the burden was on them to have established  

the said fact since it was within their special knowledge.  

In this context, the recent decision of this Court reported  

in – Prithipal Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and  

Anr.-(2012) 1 SCC 10 can be usefully referred to where  

it has been held as under in para 53 :

“In State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad  Omar, this Court held that if fact is especially  in the knowledge of any person, then burden of  proving that fact is upon him.  It is impossible  for the prosecution to prove certain facts  particularly within the knowledge of the  

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accused.  Section 106 is not intended to relieve  the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt  of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.  But  the section would apply to cases where the  prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from  which a reasonable inference can be drawn  regarding the existence of certain other facts,  unless the accused by virtue of his special  knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer  any explanation which might drive the Court to  draw a different inference.  Section 106 of the  Evidence Act is designed to meet certain  exceptional cases, in which, it would be  impossible for the prosecution to establish  certain facts which are particularly within the  knowledge of the accused……”

The contention of accused Sandeep was, therefore,  

bound to fail and the said defence taken was not proved  

to the satisfaction of the Court.  The failure of the  

accused Sandeep in not having taken any steps to prove  

the said fact strikes at the very root of the defence,  

namely, that he was not present at the place of  

occurrence.  As a sequel to it, the case of the prosecution  

as demonstrated before the Court stood fully established.  

28. Having regard to the above conclusion that the  

deceased did narrate the occurrence right from the  

invitation made by the accused Sandeep to her over  

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phone at 6 p.m. under the guise of taking her to  

Haridwar to marry her, that after she responded to the  

said call and met him from where she was picked up by  

both the accused in the Indica car belonging to the  

mother of accused Sandeep, and the other sequence of  

events, namely, the threat posed to the deceased to get  

the foetus aborted and her refusal ultimately enraged the  

appellants to cause the assault with the weapon, namely,  

jack and pana, shaving blades and chemical acid was  

quite convincing and there were no good grounds to dis-

believe her statement.  No other motive or any other  

basis was shown to disbelieve her statement.  In that  

respect, when we consider the reliance placed upon the  

admissible portion of the statement of the accused, we  

are unable to reject outrightly the entirety of the  

statement by application of Section 25 of the Evidence  

Act.  According to learned senior counsel for the  

appellants, the prosecution could not have relied upon  

the confessional statement of the accused implicating  

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themselves in the offence alleged against them by virtue  

of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

29. As against the said submission, Mr. Ratnakar  

Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for the State  

rightly pointed out that Section 25 of the Evidence Act  

can be pressed into service only insofar as it related to  

such of the statements that would implicate himself  

while the other part of the statement not relating to the  

crime would be covered by Section 8 of the Evidence Act  

and that a distinction can always be drawn in the  

statement of the accused by carefully sifting the said  

statement in order to identify the admission part of it as  

against the confession part of it.  Learned senior counsel  

drew our attention to the evidence of PW-1 where the  

said witness narrated the statement made by accused  

Sandeep which consisted of mixture of admission as well  

as confession.  In that learned senior counsel pointed out  

that the accused Sandeep made certain statements,  

namely; that Jyoti was working in a mobile shop in  

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Mayur Vihar, Phase I where he used to visit; that during  

that period around six months before he developed  

physical relations with her; that the deceased Jyoti was  

applying pressure on him to marry her, and that around  

6 p.m. on the date of occurrence, he called her over  

telephone to meet him at Laxmi Nagar red light.  He  

further told the witness that the Indica car bearing  

registration NO.DL 3CR 6666 was owned by his mother  

and that promising to marry her at Haridwar, he took the  

deceased Jyoti along with him.  He also told the witness  

that while the car was moving he asked the deceased  

Jyoti to get the foetus aborted to which she did not agree.  

According to PW-1, Sandeep also told him that he  

purchased two bottles of acid and four blades at  

Modinagar, that when they reached Khatoli, he saw a  

road free from disturbance towards which the vehicle was  

driven and that in that place they were apprehended by  

the police.  Learned senior counsel also referred to  

certain other statements made by Sandeep to PW-1,  

namely, that on that day he planned with his friend  

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Shashi Bhushan to eliminate Jyoti from his life and that  

when Jyoti told him that she was going to reveal the fact  

of carrying his child in her womb to his family members  

and the police, he started beating her along with his  

friend.  Learned senior counsel fairly stated that while  

the last part of the statement would fall under the  

category of confession, which would be hit by Section 25  

of the Evidence Act, the former statements which do not  

in any way implicate the accused to the offence, would be  

protected by Section 8 of the Evidence Act and  

consequently the said part of the statement was fully  

admissible.  We find force in the submission of learned  

senior counsel for the State.  It is quite common that  

based on admissible portion of the statement of accused  

whenever and wherever recoveries are made, the same  

are admissible in evidence and it is for the accused in  

those situations to explain to the satisfaction of the Court  

as to the nature of recoveries and as to how they came  

into possession or for planting the same at the places  

from where they were recovered.  Similarly this part of  

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the statement which does not in any way implicate the  

accused but is mere statement of facts would only  

amount to mere admissions which can be relied upon for  

ascertaining the other facts which are intrinsically  

connected with the occurrence, while at the same time,  

the same would not in any way result in implicating the  

accused into the offence directly.   

30. In that view, when we examine the statements  

referred to by learned senior counsel for the State which  

were stated to have been uttered by the accused to PW-1,  

we find the first statement only reveals the fact of  

accused Sandeep’s friendship developed with the  

deceased Jyoti six months prior to the occurrence and  

the physical relationship developed by him with her.  

Accepting the said statement cannot be held to  

straightway implicate the accused into the crime and  

consequently it cannot be construed as a confessional  

statement in order to reject the same by applying Section  

25 of the evidence Act.  In this context the reliance  

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placed upon the decision of this Court reported in Bheru  

Singh S/o Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan –  

(1994) 2 SCC 467 is quite apposite.  In the said decision,  

this Court in paragraph 16 and 19 has held as under:-

“16. A confession or an admission is evidence  against the maker of it so long as its  admissibility is not excluded by some provision  of law. Provisions of Sections 24     to     30   of the  Evidence Act and of Section 164 of the Cr.P.C  deal with confessions. By virtue of the  provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a  confession made to a police officer under no  circumstance is admissible in evidence against  an accused. The section deals with confessions  made not only when the accused was free and  not in police custody but also with the one  made by such a person before any investigation  had begun. The expression "accused of any  offence" in Section 25 would cover the case of  an accused who has since been put on trial,  whether or not at the time when he made the  confessional statement, he was under arrest or  in custody as an accused in that case or not  inadmissibility of a confessional statement  made to a police officer under Section 25 of the  Evidence Act is based on the ground of public  policy. Section 25 of the Evidence Act not only  bars proof of admission of an offence by an  accused to a police officer or made by him while  in the custody of a police officer but also the  admission contained in the confessional  statement of all incriminating facts relating to  the commission of an offence. Section 26 of the  Evidence Act deals with partial ban to the  

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saved by the provisions of the Evidence Act.  However,     the     statement     that     the     sword     had    been     used     to     commit     the     murders     as     well     as     the    manner     of     committing     the     crime     is     clearly    inadmissible     in     evidence.   Thus, to the limited  extent as we have noticed above and save to the  extent only the other portion of the first  information report Ex. P-42 must be excluded  from evidence as the rest of the statement  amounts to confession of committing the crime  and is not admissible in evidence. (Emphasis  supplied)

31. Another submission made on behalf of the  

appellants was that there was inordinate delay in  

sending the express report as well as in altering the  

offence.  The crime was initially registered as one under  

Section 307, IPC and subsequently altered as one under  

Section 302, IPC.  It was pointed out that immediately  

after registration of the FIR based on the complaint of  

PW1 at 23.15 hours on 17.11.2004, the crime was  

registered under Section 307, etc., the same came to be  

altered only on 20.11.2004 even though the factum of the  

death of the deceased was intimated by PW-6 on  

19.11.2004 itself by 1 p.m.  It was further contended that  

the registration of the complaint after its alteration on  

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20.11.2004, the express report was forwarded to the  

Magistrate only on 25.11.2004 which was in derogation  

of the prescription contained in Section 157, Cr.P.C.  

Based on the above discrepancies, it was contended that  

the purported delay was only to antedate the FIR to suit  

the convenience of the prosecution. The submission is on  

the footing that the prosecution developed the case for  

implicating the accused while the accused were not really  

involved in the offence and, therefore, they took their own  

time to register the complaint.  In order to support the  

said stand, learned counsel also went on to rely upon the  

statement of PW-1 as compared to Soubir Singh (PW-5),  

that while PW-1 stated in his evidence that they reached  

back the police station at around 23.45 hours, PW-5 in  

whose presence the complaint was stated to have been  

registered mentioned the time as 23.15 hours.  We do not  

find any serious infirmity based on the said statement.  

When the preference of the complaint by PW-1 and its  

registration cannot be doubted in the absence of any flaw  

in its preference and registration, minor difference in the  

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timing mentioned by the witnesses cannot be taken so  

very seriously to hold that the very registration of the  

complaint was doubtful.  In fact PW-1 in his chief  

examination in another place has also referred to the  

registration of the FIR at 23.15 hours though the  

appellants counsel wanted to rely on the statement of the  

said witness to the effect that they all reached back the  

police station at around 23.45 hours.  Apparently, there  

appears to be some mistake in recording the timing as  

stated by PW-1.  Therefore, nothing turns much on the  

said submission of learned counsel for the appellants.  

As far as the contention that there was considerable  

delay in altering the offence from Section 307, IPC to  

Section 302, IPC was concerned the said submission was  

made by referring to the evidence of the Doctor (PW-6)  

who conducted the post-mortem that by 10.55 p.m. on  

17.11.2004 itself the death of the deceased was  

confirmed when the victim was admitted to the hospital  

which was also known to Constable Rambir Singh who  

accompanied the victim to the hospital.  It was also  

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pointed out that PW-6 sent the intimation about the  

death of the deceased to the police station at 23.10 hours  

while keeping the body in the mortuary. To the above  

submission, on behalf of the State, it was sought to be  

explained that even though the death intimation was  

dated 17.11.2004 itself, since the post-mortem was held  

only on 19.11.2004 and the post-mortem report was  

received on 20.11.2004 the offence came to be altered  

based on the post-mortem report on 20.11.2004.  

Though the said explanation cannot be said to be fully  

satisfactory, it will have to be stated that when there was  

no serious infirmity in the registration of the FIR based  

on the complaint on 17.11.2004 (i.e.) immediately after  

the occurrence and every follow-up action was being  

taken meticulously, we hold that such a minor  

discrepancy in the timing of alteration of the crime by  

itself  cannot be held to be so very serious to suspect the  

registration of the crime or go to the extent of holding  

that there was any deliberate attempt on the part of the  

prosecution to ante date the FIR for that purpose.  We  

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have already held that the accused miserably failed to  

substantiate the stand that he was not present at the  

spot of occurrence whereas he was really apprehended on  

the spot by the prosecution witnesses and was brought  

to the police station from whom other recoveries were  

made.  The submission by referring to certain  

insignificant facts relating to the delay in the alteration of  

crime cannot be held to be so very fatal to the case of the  

prosecution.   

32. It was also feebly contended on behalf of the  

appellants that the express report was not forwarded to  

the Magistrate as stipulated under Section 157, Cr.P.C.  

instantaneously.   According to learned counsel FIR  

which was initially registered on 17.11.2004 was given a  

number on 19.11.2004 as FIR No.116 of 2004 and it was  

altered on 20.11.2004 and was forwarded only on  

25.11.2004 to the Magistrate.  As far as the said  

contention is concerned, we only wish to refer to the  

reported decision of this Court in Pala Singh and  

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Another v. State of Punjab - AIR 1972 SC 2679  

wherein this Court has clearly held that where the FIR  

was actually recorded without delay and the investigation  

started on the basis of that FIR and there is no other  

infirmity brought to the notice of the Court then, however  

improper or objectionable the delay in receipt of the  

report by the Magistrate concerned, in the absence of any  

prejudice to the accused it cannot by itself justify the  

conclusion that the investigation was tainted and  

prosecution insupportable.  Applying the above ratio to  

the case on hand, while pointing out the delay in the  

forwarding of the FIR to the Magistrate, no prejudice was  

said to have been caused to the appellants by virtue of  

the said delay.  As far as the commencement of the  

investigation is concerned, our earlier detailed discussion  

discloses that there was no dearth in that aspect.  In  

such circumstances we do not find any infirmity in the  

case of prosecution on that score.  In fact the above  

decision was subsequently followed in Sarwan Singh &  

Others v. State of  Punjab (AIR 1976 SC 2304), Anil  

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Rai vs. State of Bihar (2001 Supp. 1 SCR 298) and  

Aqeel Ahmad vs.  State   of U.P. -  (2008) 17  SCR  

1330.

33. Another submission made on behalf of the  

appellant was that there were serious infirmities in  

preserving and testing of the sample of the foetus and the  

consequent DNA report implicating the accused Sandeep  

to the destruction of the foetus whose biological father  

was found to be the accused himself.  The infirmity  

pointed out was that the sample of the foetus of the child  

was taken as early as on 17.11.2004 while it was sent for  

forensic lab only on 25.01.2005 and that since there was  

a long gap in between, the prosecution ought to have  

disclosed as to how the samples were properly preserved  

in order to ensure proper test to be conducted for  

ascertaining the correctness of its outcome.  Though  

such submission was made with some emphasis, it was  

not pointed out as to what was the nature of procedure  

to be followed in regard to the preservation of the  

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samples taken apart from what was followed in taking  

the samples by the prosecution.  It is not in dispute that  

at the time of post-mortem, when the foetus was  

discovered, the same was preserved by taking two  

samples one in the Formalin solution and the other one  

by ice preservation.  It is borne out by record that there  

was an FSL report dated 5.1.2005 as per which the SSP  

of Muzaffarnagar was informed that the foetus which was  

preserved in Formalin solution was not accepted since  

laboratory had no standard protocol for extracting the  

amplifiable DNA of Formalin preserved tissues.

34. Therefore, in the evidence of PW-10 Junior  

Scientific Officer of Central Forensic Laboratory,  

Chandigarh, it was brought out that the blood samples of  

accused Sandeep and the foetus received by him on  

27.01.2005 and that necessary test was conducted based  

on which a report on 13B/1, 13A/2 and 13C/3 were  

forwarded which confirmed that the accused Sandeep  

was the biological father of the foetus.  He also confirmed  

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in the cross examination that the earlier sample of foetus  

preserved in Formalin solution received on 05.01.2005  

was returned back without opening the seal as the same  

was kept in Formalin solution and standard protocol  

analysis was not available in the laboratory.  He further  

confirmed that when the sample on second time was  

received along with the letter dated 25.1.2005, the same  

was preserved in ice separately which they were able to  

test in their laboratory for finding out the result.  It has  

also come in his evidence that the collection of samples,  

preservation of samples and transportation of samples if  

not carefully done, it may affect the result, but in the  

case on hand the result  reported by him was not based  

on wrong facts.  In the light of the said expert evidence of  

the Junior Scientific Officer it is too late in the day for the  

appellant-Sandeep to contend that improper preservation  

of the foetus would have resulted in a wrong report to the  

effect that the accused Sandeep was found to be the  

biological father of the foetus received from the deceased  

Jyoti.  As the said submission is not supported by any  

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relevant material on record and as the appellant was not  

able to substantiate the said argument with any other  

supporting material, we do not find any substance in the  

said submission.  The circumstance, namely, the report  

of the DNA in having concluded that accused Sandeep  

was the biological father of the recovered foetus of Jyoti  

was one other relevant circumstance to prove the guilt of  

the said accused.  

35. There were certain other submissions made on  

behalf of the appellants, namely, the seizure of materials  

from the car were highly doubtful etc. We do not find any  

serious lacunae pointed out in support of the said  

submissions.  As rightly submitted on behalf of the  

learned senior counsel for the State, the discrepancies  

were minor in character and we do not find any serious  

infirmity based on the said discrepancies argued on  

behalf of the accused/appellants.  In the light of the  

above conclusion, we find that the chain of  

circumstances alleged against the appellants was  

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conclusively proved without any missing link.  We,  

therefore, do not find any scope to interfere with the  

conviction arrived at against the appellants by the trial  

Court as confirmed by the Division Bench of the High  

Court.   

36. We, therefore, do not find any scope to interfere  

with the sentence of life and other sentences imposed  

against accused Shashi Bhushan under Section 302, IPC  

read with Section 34, IPC by the High Court and the  

other sentences under Section 316 read with Section 34  

IPC.   

37. When we come to the question of sentence of  

death as imposed by learned Sessions Judge, which was  

also confirmed by the Division Bench as against the  

accused Sandeep, the same will have to be examined in  

the light of the principles laid down in the various  

decisions of this Court right from Bachan Singh v.  

State of Punjab [1980 (2) SCC 684], Machhi Singh v.  

State of Punjab [AIR 1983  SC 957], Swamy  

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Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008 (13) SCC  

767], Santosh Kumar Satishbushan Bariyar v. State  

of Maharashtra [2009 (6) SCC 498], Mohd. Farooq  

Abdul Gafur v. State of Maharashtra [2010 (14) SCC  

641], Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of  

Maharashtra [2011(12) SCC 56], State of  

Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul [AIR 2011 SC  

2689].  The principle of ‘rarest of rare case’ enunciated in  

Bachan Singh(supra) has been restated and  

emphasized time and again in the above referred to  

decisions.  In order to appreciate the principle in a  

nutshell, what is stated in Haresh Mohandas Rajput  

(supra) can be usefully referred to which reads as  

under:-

“20. The rarest of rare case”  comes when a  convict would be a menace and threat to the  harmonious and peaceful coexistence of the society.  The crime may be heinous or brutal but may not be  in the category of “the rarest of the rare case”.  There must be no reason to believe that the accused  cannot be reformed or rehabilitated and that he is  likely to continue criminal acts of violence as would  constitute a continuing threat to the society.  The  accused may be a menace to the society and would  continue to be so, threatening its peaceful and  

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harmonious coexistence.  The manner in which the  crime is committed must be such that it may result  in intense and extreme indignation of the  community and shock the collective conscience of  the society.  Where an accused does not act on any  spur-of-the-moment provocation and indulges  himself in a deliberately planned crime and  meticulously executes it, the death sentence may be  the most appropriate punishment for such a ghastly  crime.  The death sentence may be warranted where  the victims are innocent children and helpless  women.  Thus, in case the crime is committed in a  most cruel and inhuman manner which is an  extremely brutal, grotesque diabolical, revolting and  dastardly manner, where his act affects the entire  moral fibre of the society e.g. crime committed for  power of political ambition or indulging in organized  criminal activities, death sentence should be  awarded.”

It is, therefore, well-settled that awarding of life  

sentence is the rule, death is an exception.  The  

application of the ‘rarest of rare case’  principle is  

dependant upon and differs from case to case.  

However, the principles laid down earlier and restated  

in the various decisions of this Court referred to above  

can be broadly stated that in a deliberately planned  

crime, executed meticulously in a diabolic manner,  

exhibiting inhuman conduct in a ghastly manner  

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touching the conscience of everyone and thereby disturb  

the moral fibre of the society would call for imposition of  

capital punishment in order to ensure that it acts as a  

deterrent. While we are convinced that the case of the  

prosecution based on the evidence displayed, confirmed  

the commission of offence by the appellants, without  

any iota of doubt, we are of the considered opinion, that  

still the case does not fall within the four corners of the  

principle of the ‘rarest of the rare case’.  However,  

considering the plight of the hapless young lady, who  

fell a victim to the avaricious conduct and lust of the  

appellant Sandeep, the manner in which the life of the  

deceased was snatched away by causing multiple  

injuries all over the body with all kinds of weapons, no  

leniency can be shown to the said appellant.  In the  

decision reported in Swamy Sharaddananda (supra)  

even while setting aside the sentence of death penalty  

and awarding the life imprisonment, it was explained  

that in order to serve ends of justice, the appellant  

therein should not be released from the prison till the  

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end of his life.  Likewise, in Ramraj v. State of  

Chhattisgarh [AIR 2010 SC 420] this Court, while  

setting aside the death sentence, directed that the  

appellant therein should serve a minimum period of 20  

years including the remissions and would not be  

released on completion of 14 years of imprisonment.

38. Taking note of the above decision and also taking  

into account the facts and circumstances of the case on  

hand, while holding that the imposition of death  

sentence to the accused Sandeep was not warranted  

and while awarding life imprisonment we hold that  

accused Sandeep must serve a minimum of 30 years in  

jail without remissions before consideration of his case  

for premature release.   

39. Criminal Appeal No.1651/2009 and the Criminal  

Reference No.19 of 2007 thus stand disposed of  

modifying the punishments imposed on accused  

Sandeep as one for life and he should undergo the said  

sentence of life for a fixed period of 30 years without  

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any remission to be allowed.  The Criminal Appeal  

Nos.1425-26/2011 of accused Shashi Bhushan stand  

dismissed.

….…………………………...J. [Dr. B.S. Chauhan]

  ………………………………J.                   [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim  

Kalifulla]

New Delhi; May 11, 2012

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