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Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.9-11 OF 2014   

SALEM MUNICIPALITY Appellant(s)

       Versus

P.KUMAR  & ORS. Respondent(s)

WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos.12-14 OF 2014

O R D E R

The Salem Municipality and State of Tamil Nadu

and  others  are  in  appeals  aggrieved  by  the

judgment and decree passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Madras on 8.12.2010 thereby deciding

three Second Appeals by the common judgment and

order reversing the judgment and decree passed by

the  First  Appellate  Court  of  dismissal  of  the

suits and restoring that of the Trial Court.   

It  was  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  that

initially, the lease was granted in favour of S.

Vijayaranga  Mudaliar  on  19.11.1940  by  the

erstwhile Zamindar – Ms.Gnanambal.  It was from

the month of November 1940 to the month of June

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1941.   

Similar leases had been granted on 19.11.1942

in  1943  and  1946.  In  the  lease  deed  area  was

described as “Chinneri Tank Bund Side -Waste dry”

and “Chinneri Tank Bund Upper-dry”.

It is significant that each of lease had been

granted for eight months, each year continued from

November to June next year, to expire before the

commencement of rains in July as the land used to

be submerged as it was situated in Chinneri Bund

side.

It  was  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  that  his

predecessor in title, continued in possession of

the  land  when  the  Act  called  the  Tamil  Nadu

Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)

Act, 1948 (in short “the Act of 1948”) came into

force.  The  Act  was  published  on  19.4.1949.

Sections 1,2,4,5,7,8 58-A,62,67 68 came into force

on 19.4.1949, as provided under Section 1(4) of

the Act of 1948. The State Government enforced the

other  Sections  on  the  appointed  date  i.e.

19.12.1950.  Thereafter,  the  entire  Pallapatti

village vested in the State as notified under the

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Act of 1948.  Pursuant thereto, the possession of

the  entire  village  was  taken  over  by  the

Government, which included the disputed land also,

vide possession receipt dated 12.1.1951.

The original plaintiff –late P.C. Pachiappan

purchased 4.91 acres of land from S. Vijayaranga

Mudaliar.   The  suits  are  with  respect  to  said

land.

It transpires that late Vijayaranga Mudaliar

had applied for a grant of Ryotwari Patta under

section 11 of the Act of 1948.  The prayer was

rejected on the ground that land was not ryoti

land  and  it  was  recorded  as  community  land.

Thereafter, settlement in the area was undertaken

and  was  finally  notified  in  the  Gazette  dated

21.12.1963.  Thereafter,  P.C.  Pachiappan  applied

under section 11 of the Act of 1948 for grant of

Ryotwari  patta  of  the  newly  carved  out  Survey

No.163  corresponding  to  old  survey  No.  779.

Prayer for grant of Ryotwari patta of the disputed

land was rejected vide order 5.11.1968 passed in

DOS 739/68 (F-2) by Assistant Settlement Officers

KDIS No. 737/1968. As recorded in the survey land

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register, Exhibit B-2, prepared in the survey and

settlement in 1959, the total area of the land 163

= 779 was 24.62 acres, recorded as Achuvan Eri

(lake).  Hence, it could not have been allotted.

A second application for ryotwari patta moved

by Pachiappan was rejected as per government Order

dated 11.5.1971. Review application was filed by

Pachiappan. It was also rejected vide order dated

7.5.1973 on the ground that records of rights made

it  apparent  that  disputed  land  formed  part  of

‘Achuvaneri' which is IV class irrigation source

with wet ayacut registered under it and that it is

retained as the tank in the interest of ayacutdars

under it. It was also observed that the entire

area  comes  into  submergence  and  the  land  in

question forms part of the irrigation tank.   

Unfettered  by  the  previous  two  rejections,

Pachiappan again for the third time applied for

issuance of patta on 21.6.1982. That application

was ultimately rejected vide Ex. P-5 on 9.5.1984.  

On  23.2.1984,  by  virtue  of  the  Office

Memorandum 255, the Transport Department of the

State  Government  handed  over  Survey  No.163

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admeasuring 24.62 acres to Salem Municipality for

construction of a new bus stand.         

Pachiappan  had  filed  a  civil  suit  on

20.12.1984  registered  as  O.S.34  of  1985  in  the

Court  of  District  Munsiff  of  Salem  against  the

State  of  Tamil  Nadu  and  M/s.  Anna  Transport

Corporation for declaration of title and permanent

injunction in respect of 4.91 acres of the land,

out of survey No.163.    

Yet another civil suit came to be filed by the

same plaintiff as against Salem Municipality alone

for declaration and injunction on 22.12.1989.   

Thereafter, the fourth application was filed

for  obtaining  ryotwari  patta  by  Pachiappan  on

26.3.1992. He had filed yet another writ petition

No.3932/1992 for restraining the respondents from

disturbing  peaceful  possession  and  enjoyment  of

the property.  

In Writ Petition No.5642/1992 he prayed that

respondent  may  be  directed  to  consider  an

application for grant of ryotwari patta. However,

both  the  writ  petitions  were  dismissed  as

withdrawn.  Earlier writ petition filed in 1984

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was also dismissed with liberty to file a civil

suit.

Third  suit  O.S.No.342/1996  (348/95)

(renumbered as 2066/96) was filed as against Salem

Municipality, Anna Transport Corporation and State

of Tamil Nadu. He has prayed for the same relief

in the third civil suit.     

By  virtue  of  the  various  leases  granted  to

S.Vijayaranga  Mudaliar,  he  became  entitled  to

obtain ryotwari patta under Section 11 of the Act

of 1948. Plaintiff entered into an agreement to

purchase  the  suit  property  in  1951  which

culminated into a sale on 29.9.1952.  The suit

property never formed part of the communal land of

Achuvan Eri or its tank bund.  Further, the extent

of  the  Achuvan  Eri  as  per  the  records  is  only

15.00 acres.  The Plaintiff had remained in actual

possession and enjoyment of suit property.  In the

year 1982, Forest Department attempted to commit a

trespass  in  the  suit  property  and  put  up  a

nursery.  The plaintiff objected and obtained the

stay  orders  from  the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu

against trespass. The Forest Department withdrew

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and  was  restrained  from  further  work. The

plaintiff  also  filed  applications  for  grant  of

ryotwari patta in his favour and his predecessor

in interest since 1940 onwards had prescribed his

title by virtue of adverse possession also.  

Earlier suit No. OS.34/1985 was dismissed in

default, in the absence of both the parties. The

application No.I.A. 583/94 for its restoration was

pending. The cause of action arose in the year

1940, thereafter in 1952, when the sale deed was

executed  and  again  in  the  year  1984.   Besides

declaration and injunction, prayer was also made

for demarcation of the property in question.

After  the  restoration  of  the  suit  of  1985,

three suits were decided vide common judgment and

decree dated 27.4.2000 passed by the Trial Court,

Additional District Munsif of Salem. The suit was

decreed on 27.4.2000. The appeals were allowed by

the First Appellate Court i.e., First Additional

District  Court,  Salem  vide  judgment  and  decree

dated  30.1.2004.  Aggrieved  thereby,  three-second

appeals, which were preferred have been allowed by

the impugned judgment and decree thereby restoring

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that of the Trial Court.   

The  High  Court  has  given  the  finding  that

there  is  nothing  to  doubt  the  various  leases

granted to S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar.  Sale deed has

also been relied upon, the documents A-1 to A-4

have been relied upon by the High Court. The High

Court  has  drawn  adverse  inferences  against  the

appellants for not producing record pertaining to

the aforesaid documents A-1 to A-4. High Court has

disbelieved documents B-9 of taking possession on

12.1.1951.  Finding of possession has been arrived

at in favour of the plaintiff.  The High Court has

also doubted the action of Salem Municipality of

handing  over  only  19.64  acres  area  to  the

Transport Corporation for bus stand, whereas the

entire  land  24.62  acres  has  been  given  to  the

Salem Municipality by the Tamil Nadu Government.

High Court has further stated that there is no

estoppel created against the plaintiff by virtue

of the facts mentioned in lease deeds.   It has

also not been explained by the defendants that how

the area of 15 acres of water tank increased to 24

acres.  Consequently, the High Court has set aside

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the  judgment  and  decree  of  the  First  Appellate

Court and restored the judgment and decree passed

by the Trial Court.   

Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, Shri R.Venkataramani and

Shri Gurukrishna  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that

High  Court  has  failed  to  consider  the  various

provisions of the Act of 1908 as well as the Act

of 1948. No right could have been created in the

water tanks by virtue of the provisions contained

in  the  said  Acts.  They  have  relied  upon  the

definition of Ryot and Ryoti land in Section 3(15)

and 3 (16) of the Act of 1908.

The ryoti land as defined in section 3(16) of

the said Act specifically excludes beds and bunds

of tanks. It was also urged that High Court has

also failed to consider the impact of dismissal of

the proceedings for obtaining ‘Ryot Patta’ under

Section 11 of the Act, filed by the Predecessor in

interest  S.Vijayaranga  Mudaliar  and  by  the

original plaintiff.  The prayer of S. Vijayranga

Mudaliar  for  grant  of  ryotwari  patta  has  been

rejected vide order dated 20.7.1953.  Other four

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prayers made by Pachiappan also stood rejected in

the  years  1968,1971,  1984  and  1994.    In  the

absence  of  a  grant  of  ryotwari  patta  and  even

otherwise, the land remained vested in the State

Government.  The  finding  as  to  possession  of

plaintiff  recorded  by  the  High  Court  is  also

perverse and is contrary to the revenue entries,

the documents of settlement and other record of

rights w.e.f. 1948 till 1995. The revenue records

have been placed on record and in none of them,

there is an entry of possession of Pachiappan.  On

the strength of sale deed executed in 1952, the

name of Pachiappan had never been mutated. Since

Predecessor S. Vijayaranga Mudaliar had no title,

late Pachiappan could not have derived any right,

title  or  interest  from  him.   Having  failed  to

prove  the  title  of  S.  Vijayaranga  Mudaliar  and

also his own title, the plaintiff was not entitled

to obtain the decree in his favour.  Apart from

that, it was also urged that though such a suit

was barred under the provisions of 1948 Act. Even

if it is held to be maintainable for establishing

of  the  rights  of  Ryot,  plaintiff  has  miserably

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failed to prove right, title or interest so as to

seek declaration and injunction prayed for.  The

suits  were  rightly  dismissed  by  the  First

Appellate  court.   Learned  counsel  have  also

referred to the decision in  State of Tamil Nadu

Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (1985) 4 SCC 10.  Even

if  the  documents  A-1  to  A-4  are  taken  to  be

proved, plaintiff did not derive any sustenance

from them for proving of right, title or interest

over  the  land.   The  High  Court  has  proceeded

merely on the basis of adverse inference so as to

confer a title in favour of the plaintiff whereas

the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove his

own case. They have also relied on Section 14A of

the 1948 Act.   

Shri  Rajiv  Dutta  and  Shri  V.Giri,  learned

senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

plaintiff contended that once documents A-1 to A-4

are found to be proved, right, title and interest

stands  proved  not  only  of  the  predecessor-in-

interest  but  that  of  the  plaintiffs  also.

Finding of fact as to possession of plaintiff has

been  rightly  recorded  by  the  Trial  Court.  The

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decision  of  the  First  Appellate  Court  has  been

rightly  reversed  by  the  High  Court.  The

entitlement  to  obtain  ryotwari  patta  has  been

proved.  The claim for conferral of ryotwari patta

has not been properly adjudicated by the concerned

authorities.  Civil suits were maintainable and

have been rightly decreed.    

It was also contended on behalf of plaintiff

that difference in the area of the tank has not

been properly explained and the area in question

is not part of the tank, it was at the periphery

of the tank.  Thus, there was no bar under the Act

of 1908 to give the same on lease to S.Vijayaranga

Mudaliar  and,  as  right,  title  and  interest  for

obtaining of ryotwari patta had accrued to him, he

could  have  alienated  the  property  in  the  year

1952.   Finding  as  to  possession  is  also  the

question of fact and has been rightly arrived at

by the Trial Court which has rightly been restored

by the High Court. No case for interference is

made out.  For maintainability of the civil suit,

they have relied upon the decision in  Dokiseela

Ramulu  vs.  Sri  Sangameswara  Swamy  Varu  &  Ors.

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(2017) 2 SCC 69.  Lastly, they contended that the

adverse inference has rightly been drawn by the

High Court.     

First,  we  take  up  the  determination  of

question  as  to  the  nature  of  the  land  as  the

accrual of right, title and interest depends on

that under both the Acts of 1908 and 1948. It is

apparent from the lease deed placed on record by

the plaintiff (Exh. A-2) dated 15.11.1940 that the

land formed part of the Chinneri Tank Bund Side

-Waste dry Chinneri Tank Bed Upper-dry Chinneri

Tank  Bund  Side  -Waste  dry    Chinneri  Tank  Bed

Upper-dry and the lease was granted in Fasli 1350

corresponding to Gregorian calendar year of 1940

w.e.f. the month of November 1940 to June 1941.

Similar other leases collectively marked A-2 are

dated 19.11.1942, 1943 and 1946 w.e.f. the month

of November to June.  The leases were granted in

the exercise of the powers under Section 51 of the

Act of 1908.  It is apparent from the leases that

area in question is specifically depicted in the

aforesaid lease deeds to form part of the tank.   

Besides that, there are a plethora of revenue

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entries  placed  on  record  indicating  that  the

entire area 24.62 acres had been recorded as tank

continuously right from 1950 till 1995.

The lease had been granted for eight months in

the  year  1940.   The  grant  of  lease  for  the

aforesaid period excluding rainy season from July

to  October   and  evidence  indicates  that  land

formed  part  of  the  tank.   Thus,  we  have  no

hesitation  in  rejecting  the  submission  to  the

contrary  raised  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff-

respondent to the effect that land did not form

part of the tank.

Now,  we  come  to  the  question  whether  any

right can be acquired on such a land.  When we

consider the relevant provisions contained in the

Act of 1908 and definition as defined Ryot under

Section 3(15) and Ryoti Land under 3(16).  The

same is extracted hereunder:  

“Section  3  (15)  -  “Ryot”  means  a person who holds for the purpose of agriculture  ryoti  land  in  an  an estate on condition of paying to the landholder the rent which is legally due upon it.”

Explanation:

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A person who has occupied ryoti land for  a  continuous  period  of  twelve years shall be deemed to be a ryot for all the purposes of this Act.

Section 3 (16)- “Ryoti  land”  means cultivable  land  in  an  estate  other than  private  land  but  does  not include;

(a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply,  drainage,  surplus  or irrigation channels:

(b)  threshing  floor,  cattle-stands, village-sites  and  other  lands situated in any estate which are set apart  for  the  common  use  of  the villagers.

(c) lands granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rates or rent if granted before the passing this act or free of rent if granted after that date, so longs as the service tenure subsists.”

It is apparent from the definition of ‘ryot’

as defined under Section 3(15), means a person who

holds the land for the purpose of agriculture. It

is  necessary  for  such  a  ‘ryot’  to  hold  ‘ryoti

Land’ in an estate.  Ryoti land has been defined

in Section 3(16) as cultivable land in an estate

other than private land but does not include beds

and  bunds  of  tanks  and  of  supply,  drainage,

surplus or irrigation channels. Thus, as the area

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in question formed part of the tank was clearly

not  ryoti  land  as  per  the  said  definition  in

Section  3(16).   As  such,  the  predecessor  in

interest -  S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar or plaintiff

could not be said to be ‘ryot’ holding ‘ryoti’

land.

The provisions contained in the 1948 Act have

been enacted to bring about agrarian reforms and

to  abolish  the  intermediaries,  zamindars,  and

Jagirdars etc.  As a matter of fact, a lot of

agrarian reforms have taken place by the enactment

of Abolition Act, as mandated by Article 39 (b)

and (c) of the Constitution.  By virtue of the

provisions contained in Section 3 of the Act, on

issuance  of  notifications  with  effect  from  the

notified  date  certain  consequences  ensues

automatically. It is provided in Section 3(b) that

entire estate including with all communal lands;

porambokes,  other  then  ryoti  lands;  rivers  and

streams;  tanks  and  ooranies  (including  private

tanks  and  ooranies  and  irrigation  works]  etc.,

shall stand transferred to the Government and vest

in them, free of all encumbrances.   

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Section 3 is extracted hereunder: “Section  3:  With  effect  on  and

from  the  notified  date  and  save  as otherwise expressly provided in this Act:

(a) the  Tamil  Nadu  Estates  Land (Reduction  of  Rent)  Act,  1947 Tamil Nadu Act XXX of 1947 [in so far  as  it  relates  to]  matters other  than  the  reduction  rents and the collection of arrears of rent and the Tamil Nadu Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802 Tamil Nadu Regulation XXV of 1802, the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1908, and all other  enactments  applicable  to the  estate  as  such  shall  be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the estate]

(b) the  entire  estate  including  all communal lands; porambokes; other nonryoti  lands;  wastelands; pasture  lands;  Lanka  lands; forests;  mines  and  minerals; quarries;  rivers  and  streams; tanks  and  ooranies  (including private  tanks  and  ooranies  and irrigation  works]  fisheries  and ferries, shall stand transferred to  the  Government  and  vest  in them,  free  of  all  encumbrances and  the  Tamil  Nadu  Revenue Recovery  Act,  1864,  the  Tamil Nadu  Irrigation  Cess  Act,  1965, and  all  other  enactments applicable  to  ryotwari  areas shall apply to the estate;

(c) all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any  other  landholder,  shall  as against the Government cease and determine;

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(d) the  Government  may,  after removing any obstruction that may be  offered  forthwith  take possession of the estate, and all accounts,  registers,  pattas muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the estate which the Government may require for the administration thereof;

Provided  that  the  Government  shall not dispossess any person of any land in  the  estate  in  respect  of  which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta-

(i) if  such  person  is  a  ryot, pending  the  decision  of  the Settlement  Officer  as  to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;

(ii) if such person is a landholder pending  the  decision  of  the Settlement  Officer  and  the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to it,  as  to  whether  he  is actually  entitled  to  such patta;

(e) the  principal  or  any  other landholder and any other person, whose  rights  stand  transferred under  clause  (b)  or  cease  and determine under clause (c), shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognized or conferred on him by or under this Act]

(f) the  relationship  of  landholder and ryot, shall, as between them, be extinguished;

(g) any  rights  and  privileges  which may have accrued in the estate to any  person  before  the  notified date,  against  the  principal  or

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any  other  landholder  thereof, shall  cease  and  determine,  and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such landholder and  every  such  person  shall  be entitled only to such rights and privileges  as  are  recognized  or conferred on him by or under this Act.]”

It is also provided in Section 3(c) that all

rights and interests created in or over the estate

before the notified date by the principal or any

other  landholder,  shall  against  the  Government

cease and determine.

It is apparent that under Section 3 of the Act

of  1948  vesting  is  automatic  by  virtue  of  the

statutory provisions and government is empowered to

take  possession as  provided under  Section 3  (a)

only saving in the proviso to section 3(d) is that

in  case  any  person  is  prima  facie  entitled  to

ryotwari  patta  and  during  pendency  of  his

application,  for  the  settlement,  was  not  to  be

dispossessed.  In the case of the landholder, it is

provided that if the decision is pending before the

Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, the

State before taking possession has to prima facie

consider  whether  landholder  is  entitled  to  ryot

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patta.  Another consequence of vesting as clearly

provided in Section 3(f) of Act of 1948 is that the

relationship between the landholder and Ryot shall

stand extinguished.   

Section 3(g) of the Act of 1948 specifically

provides that right which may have accrued in the

estate to any person before the notified date shall

not be enforceable against the government and such

person shall be entitled only to such rights and

privileges as are recognised or conferred on him as

provided under the Act of 1948.   

Section 11 deals with rights of a ryot in an

estate to apply for a ryotwari patta in respect of

ryoti land which was properly included or ought to

have been properly included in his holding.   

Section 11 is extracted hereunder:

“Lands in which ryot in entitled to ryotwari patta: “11.  Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of ;

(a)   all  ryoti  lands  which, immediately before the notified date, were  properly  included  or  ought  to have  been  properly  included  in  his

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holding  and  which  are  not  either Lanka  lands  or  lands  in  respect  of which  a  landholder  or  some  other person  is  entitled  to  a  ryotwari patta  under  any  other  provision  of this act; and  

(b) all Lanka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified date, such  land  having  been  in  his occupation  or  in  that  of  his predecessors-in-title  continuously from the 1st day of July 1939.

Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by as landholder on or after the 1st day of July 1945 shall, except where the Government, after an examination of  all  the  circumstances  otherwise direct,  be  entitled  to  a  ryotwari patta in respect of such land.

Explanation:  No lessee of any Lanka land and no person to whom a right to collect the rent of any land has been leased  before  the  notified  date, including an ijaradar or a farmer of rent, shall be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land under this section.”

Section  12  deals  with  the  right  of  the

landholder in zamindari estate and Section 13

deals with the landholder of Inam estate with

which we are not concerned in the present case.

Plaintiff  has  claimed  the  right,  title  and

interest as ryot, not as landholder.

22

Section 14-A was inserted by amendment Act

49 of 1974. The provisions contained in Section

14-A is extracted hereunder;

“Ryotwari patta not to be granted in respect of private tank or oorani:

14-A.(1)  Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  this  Act,  no  ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of any private tank or oorani. (2)   Any  ryotwari  patta  granted  in respect of any private tank or oorani under this Act before the date of the publication of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition  and  Conversion  into Ryotwari) Amendment Act, 1974, in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, shall stand cancelled, and for purposes of compensation  under  this  Act  the private  tank  or  oorani  shall  be deemed to be land in respect of which neither the landholder nor any other person is entitled to ryotwari patta under this Act.”

Section  14-A(1)  makes  it  clear  that

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,

no ryotwari patta shall be granted in respect of

any private tank or ooranies. Even if any patta

has been granted the same shall stand cancelled

and the land of the private tank or oorani shall

be deemed to be land of neither the landholder

nor  any  other  person  is  entitled  to  ryotwari

patta under the Act.  

23

It is apparent from the conjoint reading of

the provisions contained in Sections 3(15) and 3

(16)  of  the  Act  of  1908  and  the  provisions

contained in Section 3, 11 and 14-A of the Act

of 1948 that the land of the tank is not ‘ryoti

land’ as such no rights of ‘ryot’ could accrue

in the person by holding the land on temporary

arrangement of lease granted for 8 months in a

year  when  water  was  not  there  in  the  tanks.

Such  bodies  are  protected  by  virtue  of  the

aforesaid provisions carved out under the Acts

of 1908 and 1948. The amendment made in 1974 in

Section 14-A makes it clear that even if any

ryot patta has been granted to any incumbent

even with respect to private tank or ooranies

that shall be inoperative and stand cancelled.   

In the instant case, it is apparent that

not only S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar the vendor of

plaintiff had applied for a grant of patta under

the provisions of Section 11 of the Act of 1948,

but the same very prayer had been unsuccessfully

made four times by the original plaintiff.  All

such prayers made in 1953, 1968, 1971, 1982 and

24

1994 had been rejected.  It is not in dispute

that ryotwari patta had not been granted.  In

the order passed rejecting review in 1973, there

is categorical finding that land is comprised in

the tank and area was liable for submergence and

formed part of the irrigation tank.  Once the

claim  of  the  original  plaintiff  had  been

rejected, it was incumbent upon him to file a

suit for establishing his rights, if any.  He

could not have waited till 1984, after initial

rejection of the prayer in 1953. Again, could

not have waited till December 1984 after the

rejection order was passed in 1968 and again on

11.5.1971  and  review  had  been  dismissed  on

7.5.1973.  In the absence of grant of ryotwari

patta and even otherwise in view of the fact

that  land  formed  part  of  tank  reserved  for

common use, no right accrued to the plaintiff to

claim ryotwari patta as his predecessor was not

‘ryot’  and  the  disputed  land  was  not  ‘ryoti

Land’.  Apart from that, vendor of the plaintiff

did not hold land for 12  continuous years, as

such no right, title or interest accrued to the

25

vendor of the plaintiff or to the plaintiff.

The Trial Court, as well as the High Court, have

committed  patent  illegality  in  ignoring  the

aforesaid  prohibition  contained  in  the

provisions of the Act of 1908 as well as of the

Act of 1948.

Coming to the question of possession, the

High Court has discarded B-9 proceedings taking

possession  on  12.1.1951.   Though,  there  was

absolutely  nothing  to  doubt  factum  of  taking

over the possession.  It is also apparent that

the land formed part of tank which used to go in

submergence during the rains from the month of

July to October, it was not capable of being

possessed continuously.  No patta was granted to

the vendor of the plaintiff for a complete year

at any point of time,  it was from November to

June.  The four lease deeds for the period of

four years are for 32 months i.e. 8 months each

year, have been placed on record of 1940, 1942,

1943 and 1946, no other lease has been produced

indicating that he was holding land for 12 years

or any lease of the land as on the date when the

26

Act of 1948 came into force or on the appointed

day. Even the vendor was not in possession of

the land as the entire estate of the village

stood  vested  in  the  state,  as  per  the

notification issued on 12.1.1951, possession had

been taken.  Thus, there was absolutely nothing

to  hold  that  possession  continued  with  the

vendor of the plaintiff.  After the purchase was

made by Pachiappan in 1952 there is not even

single revenue entry placed on record indicating

that he ever remained in possession at any point

of time or cultivated the land.  On the other

hand,  various  documents  to  the  contrary  have

been placed on record by the appellant.

Firstly,  there  are  copies  of  settlement

register indicating the land comprised in new

survey No. 163 corresponds to 779 old and same

is  recorded  as  Poramboke  (common  land)  for

common use.  Entire area 24.62 acre had been

recorded as Poramboke.  There is yet another

settlement  entry  of  1959  which  records  that

Survey No.163 had been carved out of 779 in an

area 24.62 acre and area has been recorded as

27

Achuveri i.e., lake and also Porampoke i.e., for

the common use.  The document records the fact

that  Pachiappan’s  application  for  grant  of

ryotwari patta has been rejected on 5.11.1968.

Survey Map of the village also records that the

old survey number 779 has vested in the State.

When we consider Exh B-13, Fasli 1379 = 1969

year (Gregorian) the land has been recorded as

Chinneri (small lake).  In the remarks column

possession of several persons is recorded as a

trespasser,  but  not  that  of  the  plaintiff  -

Pachiappan.   Similar  is  the  position  in  the

entry of various Fasli 1380 = 1970, 1381 = 1971,

1382 = 1972, 1383 = 1973, 1384 = 1974, 1386 =

1976, 1390 = 1980, 1391 = 1981 till 1405 = 1995.

The  entries  in  remarks  column  shows  neither

ownership nor tenancy as observed by this Court

in  Beohar Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. and

others,1970 RN 16 (Supreme Court).

Other documents are also placed on record

indicating  that  area  is  Chinneri  (lake)  of

common  use.   Thus,  there  was  absolutely  no

material or ground available to the High Court

28

to set aside the finding of possession recorded

by the First Appellate Court and for discarding

the B-9 of taking possession in 1951 as that was

supported by corresponding revenue entries and

statutory presumption of correctness is attached

to  such  entries  though  such  presumption  is

rebuttable.   However,  there  is  absolutely  no

evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff to

rebut the statutory presumption of correctness

of document of record of rights.  Thus, trial

court, as well as the High Court, has acted in a

perverse manner in discarding the overwhelming

evidence merely on the ground that document A-1

to A-4 stands proved.  The High Court could not

have inferred in favour of the plaintiff, as no

right  accrued  to  the  plaintiff  or  to  his

predecessor-in-interest  on  the  basis  of  the

aforesaid document A-1 to A-4.  The High Court

has unnecessarily drawn adverse inference just

in order to give a finding of the genuineness of

the  document  A-1  to  A-4.   We  take  these

documents as proved and proceed to deal with the

case on that basis.

29

When we consider the documents A1 to A-4,

taken as proved, not only they fail to advance

the cause espoused by the plaintiff but rather

negates it.  Ex.A-2 are the 4 pattas placed on

record by the plaintiff granted in favour of

S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar as predecessor interest

of 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1946.  The lease deed

itself records that land was comprised in the

tank and formed part of the tank. Thus, no right

or title or interest could have accrued to the

plaintiff over the said land.   

Apart from that, when we consider sale deed

A-1,  executed  by  S.Vijayaranga  Mudaliar  in

favour  of  original  plaintiff  Pachiappa,  the

recital in the sale deed is that though patta

was  granted  in  his  name  he  could  neither

cultivate nor able to look after the same, as

such,  he  has  decided  to  sell  the  land.   In

Exh.A-3 rent register of Fasli 1369 = 1959. It

only records the rent not the factum of lease or

possession  or  cultivation  by  S.Vijayaranga

Mudaliar. A-4 is document of the year 1949 that

records the name of S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar but

30

in  that,  no  cultivation  is  recorded  of

S.Vijayaranga Mudaliar. It records only how much

was the cess of land.   No case is made out in

favour of vendor of the plaintiff on the basis

of the entry of amount of land cess or land

revenue of the year 1949.  Merely recording the

cess  or  revenue  in  the  year  1949  or  even

assuming it was paid by the vendor in 1949, is

not going to confer title in favour of vendor,

particularly when the area was comprised in the

tank.  In case any lease had been granted for

the period of 1947 to 1949 ought to have been

placed on record but no such lease deeds except

for  four  years  have  been  placed  on  record.

Thus, the finding recorded by the High Court as

to possession is clearly perverse and contrary

to  the  revenue  records  and  the  Gazette

notification of vesting of land in State issued

in 1951.   

It is no doubt true that under Section 114

of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of

continuance of a state of affairs once shown to

have prevailed.  It is open to the court under

31

Section 114 to presume the continuity of any

fact  once  shown  to  have  prevailed.   Such

presumption of continuity can be drawn not only

forward  but  backward  also.  Court  can  presume

that such state of affairs might have existed in

past  also unless discontinuity is proved.  In

the  instant  case,  it  is  not  shown  by  any

affirmative evidence on record in the form of

revenue record that the plaintiff’s vendor was

in  possession  on  the  date  of  abolition  and

thereafter plaintiff remained in possession at

any point of time.  This Court has observed in

Sir Bhimeshwara Swami Varu Temple v. Pedapudi

Krishna Murthi and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 1299 that

by stray entry no such presumption arises.  On

the  other  hand,  the  successive  five  attempts

made by the plaintiff and his vendor failed to

obtain ryotwari patta as no right in such land

existed neither accrued.  The plaintiff due to

failure  to  obtain  ryotwari  patta  and  even

otherwise as land formed part of tank has failed

to prove entitlement to be treated as Ryot. No

right,  title  or  interest  has  accrued  to  the

32

plaintiff to obtain any ryotwari patta or for

obtaining decree in the suit.

It  was urged  before us  on behalf  of the

appellant that suit was barred by limitation by

virtue of provisions contained in Article 58 of

the Limitation Act 1963.  The suit was required

to be filed within three years.  We need not go

into the question.  We have found on merits that

absolutely no case is made out in favour of the

plaintiff.   Thus, he was not at all entitled

for any relief.

The  High  Court  has  considered  another

aspect of the difference in area, it has opined

that earlier it appeared that land was 15.00

acres only later on how the area was increased

to 24.62 acres has not been explained by the

defendants. The aforesaid reasoning recorded by

the  High  Court  is  totally  based  upon  the

ignorance of the material aspects and evidence,

as a matter of fact earlier dispute land was

comprised  in  survey  no.  779  and  which

corresponding to new s.no. 163 in 24.67 acres,

said area has been continuously recorded in the

33

revenue papers and register of settlement, right

from the beginning.  After 1948 till 1995, no

cogent document indicating the disparity in the

area  has  been  filed  by  the  plaintiff.   Even

assuming that the finding recorded by the High

Court is correct, it passes comprehension how

that helps the case of the plaintiff.  Plaintiff

has to succeed only on the strength of his case

and when temporary leases had been granted to

his vendor within the area of tank as mentioned

in the lease deeds which was reserved for the

common use, no right could have accrued.  The

High  Court  has  ignored  and  overlooked  this

material  aspect.   In  case,  the  area  has

increased from 15 acres to 24.62 acres and has

not been explained how the plaintiff can claim

any right in the land which formed part of water

body is not understandable as the case of the

plaintiff is not at all or buttressed by the

aforesaid  discrepancy  even  if  it  exists.

Moreover, the entire area of 24.63 acres has

been recorded as Chinneri (tank) and poramboke

i.e., for common use.

34

Now,  we  deal  with  last  ground  raised  by

learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the

plaintiff  based on  provisions  contained  in

section 64 of the Act of 1948. Section 64 deals

with the right of the owner, occupier not to be

affected  by  temporary

dispossession/discontinuance  of  possession.

Section 64 is extracted hereunder:

“Rights of owner or occupier not to be  effected  by  temporary discontinuance  of  possession  or occupation:

64.  Where a person-

(a) is entitled to the ownership of to  the  possession  or  occupation  of any  land  or  building  immediately before  the  notified  date,  but  has transferred  his  right  to  the possession  or  occupation  thereof  or has been temporarily dispossessed or deprived  or  his  right  to  the occupation thereof; and

(b) has not on that date lost his right  to  recover  the  possession  or occupation of such land or building;

He  shall,  for  the  purposes  of  this Act,  and  subject  to  the  provisions thereof be deemed to be the owner, or to be in possession or occupation, of such land or building;

Provided  that  any  lawful  transferee

35

of  the  right  to  the  title  to  such land of building shall be entitled to all  the  rights  this  Act  of  his transferor.

Section  64  pre-supposes  that  a  person  is

entitled to ownership or possession or occupancy

of  any  land  immediately  before  the  notified

date.  In  case  of  temporary  dispossession  or

deprivation of his right to occupation hereafter

and he has not lost the right to recover the

possession of such a land or building shall for

the purpose of the Act be deemed to be the owner

or to be in possession or occupation of such

land or building.

There cannot be any dispute with respect to

legal provisions in Section 64 of the Act of

1948.  It is settled proposition of law that in

case of wrongful dispossession or discontinuance

of possession of owner, possession of person who

has wrongfully taken it is deemed to be that of

the true owner, but in the instant case, the

provisions of Section 64 render no help to the

plaintiff  for  the  singular  reason  that  his

vendor is not proved to be the owner of the land

36

nor has proved his occupation on the date of

abolition or that it had been discontinued in

illegal  manner,  no  such  right  of  vendor  to

remain  in  possession  has  been  established.

Plaintiff’s  vendor  was  not  having  any  right,

title or interest after  the lapse of temporary

leases.  Consequently, he did not possess any

transferable  right  in  the  land.   Hence,

Pachiappan did not derive any right, title or

interest from his predecessor in the land as he

had  none.   Plaintiff  was  required  to  prove

derivative  title  in  which  he  has  miserably

failed.  It was mentioned in recital in the sale

deed  by  his  vendor  that  he  was  not  able  to

possess  land  nor  could  cultivate  it.

Apparently, the vendor of the plaintiff was not

in occupation of land.  Moreover, possession had

been taken in 1951 of entire estate by the State

Government  as  apparent  from  the  Gazette

notification,  the  land  of  the  entire  village

stood vested in the State.

The  State  Government  has  handed  over  the

land to Salem Municipality and a major part of

37

it  has  been  given  to  the  Anna  Transport

Corporation for the purpose of the bus stand.

The High Court has observed why entire land was

not  given  to  Transport  Corporation  by

Municipality and consequently inferred in favour

of the plaintiff, only part of the land has been

given could not have been made the basis by the

High Court to derive a conclusion in favour of

the plaintiff so as to buttress the title.  The

High Court has gravely erred in recording such

an inferential finding. There was no scope to

arrive at the same.  The approach employed by

the  High  Court  is  wholly  impermissible,

unsustainable, perverse and illegal.

Thus,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  setting

aside the judgment and decree passed by the High

Court and restoring that of the First Appellate

Court. All the three suits stand dismissed.  As

there was multiplication of various proceedings

and three suits were filed, we impose cost of

Rupees One Lakh upon the plaintiff/respondent to

be deposited with the Welfare Fund of Supreme

Court Advocate-on-Record Association within two

38

months and receipt be filed in the Registry.

The appeals are allowed.

           .........................J.          (ARUN MISHRA)

                  .........................J.

    (VINEET SARAN) NEW DELHI, 15th NOVEMBER, 2018